Dr. Percy Gardner is Fellow of Lincoln College and Professor of Classical Archaeology in the University of Oxford. The special department in which he is an authority is the religion of Greece. But he has studied the origins of Christianity. He has an acquaintance with theology, both historical and dogmatic, which would do credit to a professional theologian. He can write literary English. And he is a man of a most attractive spirit.

Professor Gardner has just published an address on Christian Faith. It is evidence of his interest in religion that he should have chosen Faith as the subject of his address when invited to speak to the Martineau Society in 1909. It is evidence of his interest in the Christian religion that he should have called his address 'The Essential Nature of Christian Faith.' And it is evidence, further, of his sense of having something to say about Christian Faith that he publishes that address in a volume which, from the title of the first address in it, he has called Modernity and the Churches (Williams & Norgate; 5s.).

He divides his address on Christian Faith into three 'heads,' as though he were a preacher of the last generation. But he is not a preacher. With all his interest in theology, he is careful to observe the distance that separates the man to whom theology is the business of life, from the man to whom it is a pastime. Nor is he of the last generation. In the first address here he speaks about those who are called 'modernists,' but there is not one of the modernists who is more modern than himself.

He divides his address into three 'heads' because he finds it convenient to speak of Faith, Religious Faith, and Christian Faith separately. And to make the comparison with the preacher complete he clears the way to his 'heads' by an introduction. Faith, he says in the introduction, is not merely an intellectual thing, such as the assent to a proposition or a creed. Nor is it merely an emotional thing, such as loyalty to a recognized spiritual authority, 'the view current in the Broad Church.' Thus he clears the way.

Then to the first head. But stay. Is the way quite clear? Are we sure that faith is not 'assent to a proposition or a creed'? Are we sure that it is not 'loyalty of heart to a recognized spiritual authority'? Perhaps the caution is enough. Let us pass on.

The first head is the nature of faith in general. And on faith in general Professor Gardner says excellent things. It is not of the will only, he says, because the will has to do with action. It is of the spirit. 'For faith, though it is always an active quality, does not always produce action.' Sometime
times it becomes enthusiasm, 'an enthusiasm of the spirit.' That is the first thing. The second thing is its relation to experience. It rises out of experience; it goes beyond experience; it is subject to the control of experience.

But these are abstract statements, and, as Professor Gardner says, it is not easy to convert abstract statements into the current coin of thought. So he gives examples. 'A child may know by experience that he can float in water, yet it requires a perceptible exercise of faith before he can throw himself into the water in the certain hope of rising to the top.' And he has a better example than that.

He has the example of trust. But is not trust faith? No, trust is not faith; it is the result of faith. Faith, says Professor Gardner, is in its essence 'a self-determination, a putting of the whole being into an attitude of trust.' Faith puts the whole being into the attitude, trust is the result of that self-determination. The determination may be sudden, and the result immediate; or it may be slow, and the trust long in coming. A man determines to trust another man. The determination may be based on slowly gathered experience of the man's character. Or it may be due to an emotional impulse, to a sudden desire to love him, a sudden discovery, perhaps, that he must return the trust which the other man already has in him. And the trust that is emotional is better than the trust that is intellectual. 'Trust which, if it arose entirely out of stress of will, would be hard and cold, is the easiest and simplest thing possible when aroused by love.'

All this, we say, is excellent, and excellently expressed. We need not linger over it. The second head is Religious Faith.

Now the difference between Faith and Religious Faith is this. Religious Faith 'goes further into the realm of good and evil.' It goes as far as God. It is true, Dr. Gardner does not use that word. He prefers to use the word Power. But as he uses Power with a capital, there seems to be little difference. Religious Faith then, in its essence, is the belief, a belief sustained by a continuous will to believe, that a beneficent and wise Power lies behind the visible world; that the working of the universe, if it could be understood, would be found to be essentially kind and good to man; that life is worth living; and that it is, in the long run, wise to do what it is our duty to do.

But is not that simply optimism? No, watch the phrase 'in the long run.' It seems parenthetical. It is essential. The mere optimist can say that on the whole Providence is good, and life is worth living. But suppose that a man lost his belief in Providence. Suppose that an experience came to him which seemed to say that Providence was either not good or not able to make His goodness appear. Then religious faith enables him to recover his belief. And if he dies before he recovers it, religious faith enables others to believe that he will recover it in a life to come.

We reach the third head. The third head is Christian Faith. And if the title is accurate, Christian Faith is the subject of the address. What, then, is Christian Faith?

Some of us in our simplicity would say that Christian Faith is faith in Christ. Professor Gardner does not say so. When he spoke of Religious Faith he did not call it faith in God. When he speaks of Christian Faith he does not call it faith in Christ. He calls it faith in the history contained in the Gospels, faith in the Christian spirit, and faith in the Church.

He calls it faith in the history which the Gospels contain. There may not be much history. Criticism may have carried most of it away. But 'it is of the very nature of vigorous faith that it can build securely on a very narrow platform of historic fact.' It may be necessary that we should
be able to believe in 'the life of the Founder as one really lived on earth,' and that His character and teaching are 'in essentials' to be ascertained. But that is enough.

He calls it faith in the Christian spirit. If we are to have Christian Faith, he says, we must not only believe in at least some of the things recorded in the Gospels, but we must also believe that 'after the death of the Founder a fresh spirit entered into the world, a fresh power urging to righteousness and the spiritual life.' Where did that spirit come from? Professor Gardner does not say. Did it come from Christ? He does not say, and he does not think it necessary to say. 'That there is some relation between the spirit of Christianity and the person of the Founder may be regarded as certain.' But what that relation was, and how the new spirit arose, does not matter. It arose; it is there; and we must believe in it.

But Christian Faith is also faith in the Church. Does Professor Gardner believe, then, that the Church is infallible? By no means. Christian Faith 'does not oblige us to believe in the infallibility of the Church, or to hold that the path taken by the Church is always the best path.' It is Christian faith if a man believes in Christ's 'general guidance' of the Church.

The Rev. Holden E. Sampson of Broad Town Vicarage, Swindon, has written a book on 'The Catholic Church, its Functions and Offices in the World, reviewed in the Light of the Ancient Mysteries and Modern Science.' He gives it the title of Progressive Redemption (Rebman; 12s. 6d. net). In a short preface he tells us how he came to write the book.

He found an irresistible force within him urging him to the severe task and labour of satisfying his own mental and spiritual demands for Truth. He calls his life a weary pilgrimage. He had to follow unknown paths. He met endless disillusionments and disappointments. He passed many years of a tempestuous lifetime, often dropping back into the currents of the world, and as often turning again to meet the opposing stream for another effort. His conduct, he thinks, might well have wearied and worn out the patience of his friends. The blind pursuit of an ever elusive light, which twinkled in the distance, but was apparently unreachable, was as much a mystery of destiny to himself as a perplexity to his neighbour. But a fate which he was powerless to control kept him doggedly on the path; till, finally, he reached the goal, and entered into the light. Then he wrote a book in two immense volumes, which he called Progressive Creation; and followed it up immediately with this book in one immense volume, which he calls Progressive Redemption.

It is a book about Mysteries and Initiation, into them, about Transmutation, Equilibration, and Purification of the Natures. And there never was a book that a sympathetic reviewer found more difficulty in describing. As a poem is either a poem and very much indeed, or not a poem and nothing, so Mr. Sampson's book is either a work of the spiritual imagination and of priceless worth, or it is, as the speech of Gratiano, 'an infinite deal of nothing.'

The idea of Redemption is familiar. But what is Progressive Redemption? We have entered but a few pages into the book when we come upon the definition of a Redeemed man—a Redeemed man according to the doctrine of progressive redemption. A Redeemed man, 'if he is qualified to enter the Kingdom of Heaven free of Purgatorial suffering,' must have three qualifications. First, he must be 'a normal microcosm.' And being a normal microcosm means being 'perfect in his Nature-conditions, none of his natures or parts sundered in the reincarnate life.' Next, he must have conformed faithfully to the principles of the Cross and the Serpents, embodying the Sacred Mysteries, and the Degrees of Initiation, as set forth in later
chapters of this book. He must, therefore, be finally, 'a man Pure and Uncorrupt, his Body transmuted, and in perfect coalescence with his Soul and Spirit,—or, in a state of equilibrium.'

We have quoted the definition word for word, including the italics and the capitals. Before we have had time to think out the meaning of it, we come upon the actual example of a Redeemed man. To our surprise it is the Penitent Thief.

Now the Penitent Thief of Progressive Redemption is not the Penitent Thief of popular exposition. The mind of the reader, says Mr. Sampson, 'needs to be disabused of the current notions regarding the character of this person, with which common tradition has misrepresented him. He must have been far from the gallows-bird and dangerous criminal that the Christian preacher generally represents him to have been.'

Mr. Sampson does not deny that he was officially a malefactor, that is to say, that he had committed a capital offence against the Roman Empire. Very likely he was one of the Jewish Zealots, men fired with enthusiasm for their national faith and traditions, and fiercely resenting the pusillanimous and cringing subjection of the Jewish Hierarchy to the lordship of the Romans. The Roman tribunal, steadfastly set upon crushing every symptom of insurrectionary activity, made short work of suspected persons captured by the Roman soldiery and brought before them. They might be guilty, or they might not. The evidence was not carefully sifted, and the cross was close at hand.

But the Penitent Thief was not only a probable Zealot, he was probably a disciple of our Lord. Mr. Sampson's words are: 'There is little doubt that this "malefactor" was one of the secret followers of Christ, an Initiate of the Mysteries.' Christ Himself was 'a Master of the Essene Order of the Cross and Serpent.' From the language used by the thief on the cross, and from the reply of Jesus, Mr. Sampson comes to the conclusion that the malefactor was a secret member of the same Order of the Cross and Serpent. 'Remember me,' he said, 'when thou comest into thy kingdom,' and Jesus replied, 'To-day shalt thou be with me in Paradise.' Both sentences, says Mr. Sampson, betray an intimate acquaintance with the sacred formulas of the Mysteries. 'Thy kingdom' and 'with me in Paradise' were talismanic formulas technically appertaining to the secret doctrine of the Mysteries. They were Signs of a Sacramental nature which linked the Master and the Disciple in the bond of secret communion. The thief on the cross is no example of a sudden 'death-bed' repentance and the conversion from a wicked life and nature; it is the case of a 'faithful Brother and Initiate receiving from the lips of the dying Master that assurance which, in the hour of his darkness, he so greatly needed, that his Eternal Destiny was sure, that death to him was the immediate passage to Eternal Life, that his course was finished, his race run, his crown won.'

In a recent number of the Harvard Theological Review (which has not fallen away from the very high ideal set in the early issues) there is an article on the Religious Philosophy of Rudolph Eucken. We shall soon be unable to name a theological review or magazine that does not contain an article on Eucken. This article is notable because the author is in entire sympathy with Eucken's philosophy. It is also enticing because it is wholly occupied with the essential things in that philosophy. The author is Professor Howard N. Brown of Boston.

To enter into the article at once, Professor Brown finds the value of Eucken's philosophy to consist in this. Eucken maintains a balance between the three supreme realities with which religion has to deal—God, nature, and the human soul. He finds that wherever in all its history religion has failed to maintain itself: or to produce:
good fruit, the failure has been due to the neglect of one of these three realities. Either God has not been given His due place, as in Buddhism; or man has been belittled, as in Monasticism; or nature has been denied, as in Christian Science.

In Buddhism God was neglected. For in its origin Buddhism was practically an atheistic faith. Its founder taught men to expect no help whatever from God, but to rely solely on the power for self-denial residing in their own will. Human nature, it is true, revenged itself upon this Eastern prince, and made Gautama himself its deity. But it remains until now a religion without a real doctrine of God; and in consequence it has never built up, in the minds of those over whom it has held sway, any robust spiritual life.

Monasticism belittled man. And not only Monasticism. ‘For man as man,’ says Professor Brown, ‘most Christians have manifested, and do still manifest, the utmost contempt.’

And here already almost every reader of Eucken will be arrested—every theological and almost every philosophical reader. For the philosopher, if he is a ‘naturalist,’ denies that man is more than the evanescent shadow of the real outward world. If he is an ‘intellectualist’ he holds that the outward world and all that man hopes from it is a delusion, being nothing more than a reflexion of his own inner world of thought. And whatever he is, he rejects the doctrine of human personality as that fact of ‘cosmic significance,’ which Eucken (in the words of his American interpreter) claims for it. While the theologian, unless he belongs to the newest and least theological school, will be greatly astonished at this attempt to give man a place of importance in the sight of God against whom he has so grievously sinned and come short.

Eucken will meet the theologian and satisfy him. From the philosopher, however, he will demand that personality be restored to man, so that every man may be able to think of himself as a real entity, and not in any sense a succession of states of consciousness. Meantime observe that this is the first fine feature which Professor Brown recognizes in Eucken’s philosophy. It restores to their proper place in religion the three essential facts of God, man, and nature.

The second feature to which Professor Brown draws attention is the relation in which Eucken conceives that these three stand to one another. This is the relation. God is to man friendly, and only friendly, while nature is largely antagonistic.

That God is only friendly, Professor Brown accepts ‘as a matter of course.’ And we may let it pass. That nature is largely antagonistic he takes some trouble to prove. But as the proof proceeds it is impossible to avoid the suspicion that the antagonism of nature is emphasized because it is an essential part of the philosophical system. For it is the antagonism of nature that makes God necessary to man. Religion has always been concerned, mainly, with the means for procuring spiritual help amid the trials and hardships that men must bear. If there are no such trials and hardships, if the seeming opposition of nature to man’s desires is merely a disguised friendliness, then this quest for divine help is practically useless. So says Professor Eucken in the language of Professor Brown. And it has an uneasy appearance of reasoning in a circle. But so far it does not seriously matter. There is tribulation enough in life to make us all desire a way out; there are few indeed who do not hear with relief the Divine offer, ‘Come unto me all ye that are heavy laden.’

But as we proceed there emerges a more serious difficulty. ‘Are God and nature then at strife?’ asks the poet. And the philosopher replies with a most emphatic ‘Yes.’ Whatever man tries to do, says Eucken, nature tries to prevent his doing; whatever he does she sets herself to undo. ‘It is much to be doubted whether nature ever really
"adopts" any work of human hands. Wherever man has toiled to make visible his thought in wood or stone, nature following after him has done her best to obliterate his monuments. It takes her a long time to effect this in some instances, but she never surrenders the task.

But again, it does not seem to matter. In a little we shall hear Professor Brown admitting that nature is not actively antagonistic, that 'for the most part' she is simply indifferent. And all it seems to come to at last is the declaration that, whatever we may say about the flesh and the devil, there is an enemy whom we have to overcome called the world. And to that we all agree.

The third feature of Eucken's philosophy is its insistence on the New Birth. There is the 'mere man,' or 'the petty human,' the man of flesh and sense, man 'born of a woman' in the phrase of the Bible; and there is the 'new man,' the 'spiritual man,' the man who has been born again. For Eucken is most emphatic that in spiritual life we have to do, not with a mere addition to a life already existent, but with an essentially new life.

Professor Brown does not claim for Eucken that he has discovered and can tell us precisely where the spiritual man comes from. The wind still bloweth where it listeth. But he does claim that Eucken has introduced him to 'high circles of academic thought.' In other words, he has got the fact of the New Birth accepted by philosophy. And the distinction between the old man and the new is the very distinction with which we have been elsewhere made familiar. The old man thinks chiefly of his own things; the new man chiefly of the things of others.

The Authorities for the Institution of the Eucharist.


PART I.

The following paper was planned, and in great part written, early in A.D. 1901. Publication was delayed, because I had found myself driven to take Lk 22:15-16 in a sense diametrically opposite to the accepted view; and I shrank from once again challenging the general opinion. It seemed better, therefore, to wait and see if the interpretation which I put on those verses would stand the test of time. Now, since Professor Burkitt, Mr. Brooke, and Mr. Box have all independently declared themselves against the generally accepted view, I am able to follow with more confidence in their wake, even though I may perhaps proceed to draw inferences which none of them would accept or approve.

The article was originally intended as one of a series of comments on 1 Corinthians; but it took a wider scope. The series was published in the Expositor, 1900 and 1901, and came to an abrupt conclusion: in the Expositor, December 1901, p. 401, the writer mentions the reason: 'The succeeding paper of the series, written eight months ago, he desires to think over for another year before printing.' The single year has grown to nine; but the views expressed have not changed, though the paper is enlarged.

Having thus followed the rule of Horace, and reconsidered until the nine years have fully elapsed, I venture to print the speculative explanation of one of the most serious and enigmatic difficulties in the New Testament, the divergence between John and the Synoptists with regard to the day when the Last Supper took place. In the paper that follows the facts are arranged in a certain succession, corresponding generally to the order of historical development, which is not that of simple time;