700 B.C., an important astronomical revolution was
effected. We have no historical record of the
revolution, but its results are apparent. The
Zodiac which had hitherto been divided into
eleven or twelve constellations of very unequal
extent, was now divided into twelve signs, all
exactly equal. The Bull, which had hitherto been
the first constellation, now became the second
sign, and the Ram, which had been the last
constellation, became the first sign. It is prob­
able that at the same time Capella was abandoned
as the index star, since it now gave an obviously
late beginning for the year; and there being no
suitable star to take its place, the method of using
an index star was superseded by the direct observa-
tion of the equinox.

It is easy to see how the original meaning of the
Triad passed out of recollection, whilst the symbol
itself was still retained. When Capella became
the index star, the Triad became divided, and the
crescent on its back being naturally assigned to
the first month, drew with it the allotment of that
month to Sin, the Moon-god, whose symbol the
crescent was. The twin stars, now symbol of the
second month, just as naturally involved the
allotment of that month to the Heavenly Twins—
the king and queen of heaven—Šamaš and Ištar—
the ruler of the day and the ruler of the night. At
a much later date, when the planets were recog­
nized, and Venus the morning star was identified
with Venus the evening star, it was natural to
assign this beautiful attendant on the sun to Ištar
as the consort of Šamaš. Consequently in the
later presentations of the Triad we find the twin
stars differentiated in form; one is a disc bearing a
four-rayed star with four streams of light, else­
where the symbol of Šamaš, the Sun-god; the other an
ordinary eight-rayed star. But on the earliest
example that we have of the Triad—the triumphal
stele of Naram-Sin, now in the Louvre—we find
both stars are of the latter type; both simple
eight-rayed stars; neither of them the solar disc.

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Recent Foreign Theology.

The New 'Herzog.'

Amongst the articles which give distinction to
vol. xix. of the Hauck-Herzog Realencyclopaedie
fiir protestantische Theologie und Kirche are
Kattenbusch on 'Symbolik,' Nestle on 'The Syrian
Church,' Strack on 'The Talmud,' Preuschen on
'Tatian,' and Bertheau on 'Tischendorf.' On these
various themes the scholars named respectively
furnish concise and comprehensive dissertations,
illuminating to read and valuable for purposes of
reference, though they cannot easily be summarized.

To the Leipzig Professor of Philosophy—not
of Theology,—Dr. Hauck has entrusted the im­
portant subject of

Theism.

Accordingly, the real theme of Professor Heinze's
article is the Philosophy of Theism, and his
method is that of historical exposition. He is
an authority on Kant, and discusses at considerable
length the question: 'Should Kant be described
as a Deist, or as a Theist?' The reply is that
if by Theism is meant not knowledge of God
gained as a critical philosopher, but faith in God,
then Kant was a Theist; for assuredly he believed
in a God possessed not only of such metaphysical
attributes as omnipresence and eternity, but also
of such moral attributes as righteousness and
goodness. Kant ascribes to God reason and
will, though he does not go so far as to maintain
the possibility of personal communion between
man and God. Therefore, if Theism is held to
include belief in the answering of prayer, Kant
was not a Theist.

An interesting account is given of the establish­
ment in 1837, for the advocacy of speculative
Theism, of the Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und
spekulatifs Theologie. Its first editor was
Immanuel Hermann Fichte, and amongst its
earliest contributors were the philosophers Fr.
Hoffmann and Weisse, also the theologians
Neander and Rothe. The name of the journal
was afterwards changed to that which it now
bears, namely, Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und
philosophische Kritik. Both under the editorship
of Fichte and of Ulrici a vigorous polemic was
waged against the pantheism of Hegel. As re­
gards Fichte himself, his Theism was ethical; in
the absolute personality of God he found the
solution of the riddles of the universe. The same
may be said of Trendelenburg, who teaches, in Aristotelian fashion, that purpose pervades and rules the world. This purpose is moral, and God is a moral Being with whom it is, therefore, possible for man to enter into a religious relationship.

Lotze's influence on contemporary and subsequent thought is fully recognized. But if Heinze rightly estimates the philosophy of some modern German writers, dependence upon Lotze has, in their case, resulted in a tendency towards Pantheism, from which his English disciples are free. His teaching that God is 'more than personal' is, indeed, capable of a one-sided development, resulting in a weakening or a dissolution of the true conception of personality; but English writers, who claim affinity to Lotze and gratefully confess their indebtedness to him, understand him to teach that God is 'at least personal,' and therefore free from the limitations which belong to human personalities.

In his closing remarks Heinze calls attention to the ambiguity which results from attaching different meanings to the word 'Theism.' The Theist, who has a genuine religious experience, believes in a personal God possessed of moral attributes. For religion, it is essential that God should be all-wise as well as all-knowing, all-loving as well as all-powerful. Science cannot, qua science, raise any objection to faith in such a divine personality; but by Science alone it is impossible to attain to this certitude of faith.

Two lengthy articles are devoted to Theology. Professor Deutsch of Berlin writes on 'Mystical Theology,' and Professor Caspari of Erlangen on 'Practical Theology.' The former begins by insisting on the exclusion from the connotation of the term Mysticism of much that is popularly so described. Feelings aroused in us by the contemplation of the sea or a forest, when those feelings cannot be logically explained, are often described as mystical. But to this poetic mysticism the name does not properly belong. The experience of the true mystic does not begin until the soul 'seeks union with the Highest,' however the Highest may be conceived. The Mystic may be a Theist who regards the universe as 'the creation of the almighty will of God,' or he may be a Buddhist whose conception of the world involves the denial of the reality of sense-phenomena.

The essence of Christian mysticism is found in the complete surrender of the individual will to 'the will of God'; but quietistic teaching notwithstanding, this surrender may be complete, although consciousness of the motions of our own will is not wholly lost. Dr. Deutsch does not agree with those who say that it is incorrect to speak of mysticism at all in the early stages of Christianity. Divine revelation could not possibly 'leave untouched the mystical yearnings of mankind... Not only in John, but also in Paul, there are plentiful traces of mysticism.' Therefore, as mysticism is 'an essential element of the new religion' in the earliest Christian writings, its influence in the early Church could not be called in question, even though we did not possess, as we do, proof of the fact 'in the letters of Ignatius of Antioch, in the Shepherd of Hermas, and elsewhere.'

The result of the contact of Christianity with non-Christian philosophies was the intrusion of non-Christian elements into Christian mysticism. Briefly, but luminously, Dr. Deutsch comments on its historical development both in the East and in the West. He also discusses the relation of mysticism to scholasticism, and clearly shows how the Reformation resulted in the differentiation of three different types of mysticism in the Roman Catholic, the Lutheran and the Reformed Churches respectively. 'In the Reformed Church the soil was much less favourable to the growth of mysticism than in the Lutheran Church.' Zwingli had little interest in the experiences of the mystic, and Calvin was even more unsympathetic. Familiar ground is traversed as the teaching of the chief Roman Catholic mystics is sketched in outline, and as the revival of mysticism under Pietistic influences and its decay during the latter half of the eighteenth century are described.

Coming to the nineteenth century, Dr. Deutsch calls attention to religious and philosophical tendencies of thought which were well adapted to 'impart a new impulse to mysticism.' In Romanticism there is a strong' mystical element, whilst Schleiermacher's Reden über die Religion may be described as 'containing more mysticism than religion.' Account is taken of the new interest manifested in the history of mysticism, one result of which was to restore the name of 'mystic' to its rightful place of honour.

But investigation into the history and theory of
mysticism may coincide and consist with neglect of the practice of mysticism. ‘We find in the nineteenth century few genuine mystics, that is, few who are distinguished for living the life of mysticism.’ Inquiring into the causes of this, Dr. Deutsch lays stress on ‘the unrest of the times which was so detrimental to the formation of the meditative habit of mind and to the practice of communion with God. He closes with an expression of the hope that a time is coming in which mysticism will once more come to its own, though it may reappear in new forms.

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Wendt’s Christian Doctrine.

Professors Wendt writes with so much clearness and good feeling, as well as erudition, that his works are never likely to want a public. He does not indeed appear to be one of the dii maiores of theology, and I should not myself class him with such men as Kähler, Herrmann, or Häring. But of his great competence there can be no question; and if he does not always convince us that he is right, or even that he has rightly apprehended the deeper issues of a subject, at least he does place before us all the materials of an independent judgment. His latest work is on his usual high level. Its flowing style, its live interest in modern themes, and the fine impartiality of its exegesis and history are certain to make it a favourite. Wendt has the gift of exposition in a measure few possess. His common sense never fails; though at times we become conscious, in reading him, of the limitations of that estimable faculty.

The arrangement of topics does not diverge greatly from tradition. It is noticeable, however, that the doctrine of Christ’s redeeming work is taken before that of His person, as in not a few recent systems; also that eschatology forms the last section of the doctrine of our Divine Sonship (the Christian life). The unusual amount of space given to the latter topic—some 200 pages—is surprising, until we discover that Wendt holds the view strongly that Dogmatic and Christian Ethics should be treated as a single whole. ‘I trust,’ he says (p. 19), ‘that the following exposition of a unified system of Christian truth will furnish a more detailed proof of the real necessity of this method. I hope to show that dogmatic conceptions of God’s eternal being, as of His revelation in time, can only be grasped a right if His will and working is at every point given a teleological relation to the producing of that filial religion which it is the ethical lifework of the Christian to develop.’ Wendt is not, of course, the first to take this road. By 1830 Schleiermacher had proclaimed the separation of Dogmatic and Ethics to be needless; and both C. I. Nitzsch and Bornemann have exemplified in well-known books the organic unity of the two. At the same time, the mode in which Wendt carries out his programme of unification is not convincing. Little or no injury is done to the Dogmatic element in the partnership, but Ethics has to be content with rather scant measure, and might reasonably claim that it preferred the freedom of the old duality to the questionable honours of absorption. A purely ethical chapter occurs now and then, certainly, but it is difficult to perceive that the consolidation has exerted any real influence on, say, Wendt’s exposition of Christology, or even of the mediating functions of the Church. An ideal this amalgamation may no doubt remain; but to realize it in a form which shall be vital and pervasive, not mechanical, has the appearance of a task almost beyond the reach of minds like ours, for which so many ethical facts and institutions are simply data of experience, neither lucid corollaries from first principles of thought, nor deducible in a necessary way from truth revealed in Christ.

Unlike the majority of recent dogmaticians, Wendt has omitted from his prolegomena, or ‘doctrine of principles,’ the discussion of religion in general which has been common form for the last sixty years. He has left it out, however, not because he thinks little of the science of religion, but because he thinks so much, and therefore has decided that he cannot spare room to deal with its results as they deserve. In place of a full treatment he offers later a few pages on the principles that ought to guide the Christian mind in the evaluation of non-Christian faiths, and at the close a valuable and judicious section on the essence of Christianity, its truth, and its religious and ethical worth. His plea that Dogmatic has no room for a complete treatment is entirely sound. The finer must be drawn somewhere. The writer on Christian doctrine would never get to his proper subject if he...
had first to examine every religion which might conceivably be put in competition with the gospel. Furthermore, philosophical or scientific disciplines exist for the very purpose of taking the wider inquiry out of his hands; and to these his proper relation is not that of a rival, but of a trustworthy expositor of the one religion which he holds to be perfect and absolute.

Nothing in Wendt's theology is more individual than his use of the teaching of Jesus as the norm of genuine Christianity. 'We must regard the ascertained ideas and purposes of Jesus,' he says with emphasis, 'as the touchstone by which to test the thoughts and doctrines of all who claim to be His followers.' It turns out later that we are not to interpret this too narrowly. The meaning is not that we must be able to quote a saying of Jesus in order to legitimize this or that belief. There is revelation also in His work and personality, and it is possible, if not certain, that the apostles can help us to seize and appreciate it. These two sides of Jesus' revealing function—His work and person on the one hand, and the gospel He preached on the other—are strictly correlative. Revelation is facts plus intuitions as to the meaning of the facts. And the novelty of Jesus' gospel consists in His total religious view of God and the world, not in particular new ideas. But the distinction between the revelation He taught and the revelation He was is purely ideal and reflective; in point of historic fact they are inseparably one.

One cannot but feel that this proposal to make the ipsissima verba of our Lord a test of what is authentic in the Christian religion, however valuable from some points of view, offends against the fundamental principle that He is not so much a believer as the object of belief, and has been regarded in this light from the first. We are not called in the gospel to have faith like Christ, but to have faith in Him. Moreover, if there is revelation in His person no less than in His words, have we any right to say that His person may not contain truth beyond and in addition to what His words teach? What are the Epistles of the New Testament but a classic instance to the contrary? How much the world has learnt of Jesus from the impression left by Him on the apostolic mind, of which there yet was no precise anticipation in the Synoptic Gospels!

It is unnecessary that details of such a book as Wendt's should be recounted. On themes like man and sin and (in part) the last things, he writes in a way that is always sensible and well-informed. Dr. Wendt is no Calvinist, but he has an excellent paragraph on the Pauline doctrine of election, which he might with great advantage have followed up with the suggestion that the true Christian doctrine of election is an experimental and therefore an exclusively positive one. He does his best to accept the position that Christianity was meant to be a miraculous religion. 'The Christian,' he holds, 'cannot surrender belief in the possibility that, even in individual cases, God can make events to happen in the natural world, other than the regular course of His operation in nature might lead us to expect.' Perhaps his chapter on the sacraments is the least successful in the book; and when he states roundly that a demand for moral cleansing, not the promise of grace, is primary in the religious significance of baptism, he definitely parts company with the teaching of the Reformation. But while his attitude to the ecclesiastical Christology is one, plainly, of resolute criticism, he is sincerely anxious to develop something as nearly akin to it as he can. This we gather from the following sentences which may conclude this notice: 'Thus it follows that our Christology permits us to accept, with the fullest conviction, these ideas of Nicea itself ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς and ἄμοιος. In the opinion of Athanasius, as we have seen, these ideas held good, not of the historical Jesus Christ as a whole, but of that in the historic God-man which was higher and heavenly, viz. the Logos. In so far as we also distinguish in the historical Jesus Christ between His creaturely and His supramundane being, we too must say of this supramundane element in Him—the Holy Spirit—that at bottom it was not of the world, but was something truly divine, ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας τοῦ πατρὸς. And this element, pertaining as it does to the very being of God, is also, in conception, eternal. That is the truth wrapped up in the doctrine of Christ's pre-existence, and from Paul's day till now it has made that doctrine credible to all who see in Jesus Christ the revelation of true Divine life' (pp. 378–379).

Edinburgh.

H. R. Mackintosh.