THE EXPOSITORY TIMES.

Notes of Recent Exposition.

The saddest book of all that have recently come to us, came the month before last from Cambridge. A sadder book comes this month from Oxford. We were told by Mr. McTaggart that St. Paul had missed the meaning of the gospel, and that we all had missed it with him. St. Paul had thought that not many wise men after the flesh were called. Mr. McTaggart told us that none but wise men could be called. Looking round upon those who seemed to have entered the kingdom, St. Paul had asked, ‘Where is the wise? where is the scribe? where is the disputer of this world?’ Mr. McTaggart assured us that it is only the wise, only the scribe, only the disputer of this world, that can ever enter the kingdom. For there is no faith, he said, without dogma, and there is no dogma without metaphysics, and except we repent and become metaphysicians we shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.

Is it not sad? Not for Mr. McTaggart, the metaphysician; but for us. And Mr. McTaggart has grace enough to be sorry for us, as we should expect him to have, being a metaphysician. He has grace to be sorry, and he has also encouragement. He bids us become metaphysicians. Is it hard to become a metaphysician? Mr. McTaggart knows it is hard. But again he comforts us, and says that the good things of this life are all hard to obtain.

Vol. XVII.—No. 9.—June 1906.

We read Mr. McTaggart’s book and are sad. How few of us can ever hope to enter the kingdom through metaphysics. But if we are chastised with whips in Mr. McTaggart’s book, in the book which has come this month from Oxford we are chastised with scorpions. If, according to Cambridge, only the few who are metaphysicians can be saved, according to Oxford the kingdom of heaven has been opened to only one believer.

The title of the book is The Religion of all Good Men (Constable; 5s. net). Its author is Mr. H. W. Garrod, Fellow and Tutor of Merton College.

How attractive the title is! The religion of all good men—we hope it will prove to be our religion. Like Abou ben Adhem, we desire to be written down among the number of all good men. It is a most hopeful title. But what do we find in the book? We find that the religion of all good men is simply and solely the religion of Mr. H. W. Garrod.

It is the religion of Mr. H. W. Garrod. Of that there is no doubt. With a modesty that is most becoming, Mr. Garrod assures us that what he has to say he can say ‘with some confidence,’ and again, ‘with still greater confidence,’ and once again, ‘I speak that which I know’; and all within one paragraph in the preface. So the religion of
which Mr. Garrod is going to speak is his own religion. Of that there is no doubt.

And it is the religion of no one else. For the religion of all good men is an ethical religion. And a large part of ethics is courage. And Mr. Garrod is the only man who has had the courage to write this book. Mr. Garrod is modestly aware that no one else has had the courage to write it. He looked around him before he began, and he saw no man. He shrank from writing it himself. Not because he had not courage. But because he was modestly aware that he could not write it perfectly. Yet the thing had to be said by somebody, and 'it is better that I should say it imperfectly than that nobody should say it at all.' And so, since the religion of all good men is an ethical religion, and courage is a large part of ethics, the religion of all good men is just the religion of the one good man who has had the courage to write this book.

But there is another argument to show that the kingdom of heaven is open to only one believer. No other believer is likely to desire to enter into it. For Mr. Garrod's kingdom of heaven is simply the end of the world; and, to mention only one peculiarity of it, our Lord is not its Messiah, He is only one of the Messiah's forerunners.

Mr. Garrod's book, we have said, is called The Religion of all Good Men. Now, we must add that it is a volume of essays, and that that is really the title of only one of the essays it contains. The title of the first essay is 'Christ the Forerunner.' In that essay Mr. Garrod shows that in the religion of all good men Jesus of Nazareth was a disciple of John the Baptist, that He was the chief continuator of the work of John the Baptist, without whom He would have been nothing, and that neither John the Baptist nor He was the Messiah, but that they were both equally His forerunners.

Who was the Messiah, then? Mr. Garrod does not tell us. He does not tell us, not because he does not know, for there is nothing that Mr. Garrod does not know if you press him wisely, but because it is no part of the religion of all good men. He tells us, however, that Jesus calls him 'the Son of Man.'

Jesus sometimes spoke of a 'coming.' When we speak of it now, we call it a 'second coming.' For we think that He who came once in the flesh will come again in glory. But, says Mr. Garrod, Jesus never spoke of a second coming. And He never dreamt of coming again Himself. When He spoke of a 'coming,' He spoke of another who was yet to come. He spoke of the coming of one whom He designates 'the Son of Man.'

It has sometimes been supposed by some of us that Jesus applies the title Son of Man to Himself. Mr. Garrod is 'fully convinced' that He never does so. What fully convinces him? Three simple things. First of all, the title Son of Man was always applied in Jesus' day to the Messiah, and Jesus was far too modest to call Himself the Messiah. Next to that, Jesus never speaks of the presence of the Son of Man, but of His coming. If He had applied the title to Himself, He would have said, not 'Ye shall see the Son of Man coming,' but 'Lo, the Son of Man stands in your midst.'

The third thing that fully convinces Mr. Garrod that Jesus never applies the title Son of Man to Himself is that, when He is represented in the Gospels as doing so, He at the same time prophesies His own death, and the manner of it. Now that is a thing which no man can do, and therefore Jesus could not do it. For, says Mr. Garrod, parenthetically, 'I approach the Gospels, be it understood, from a frankly naturalistic standpoint.' Therefore Jesus could not have spoken the words which such passages attribute to Him.

And with that we may part from Mr. McTaggart and Mr. H. W. Garrod.
Messrs. Hodder & Stoughton are the publishers in this country of a volume of Systematic Theology, which has been written by Professor Olin Alfred Curtis, of the Drew Theological Seminary in America. The title of the volume is The Christian Faith, Personally Given in a System of Doctrine (1os. 6d. net). These words ‘personally given’ prepare us for the frequent introduction of the pronoun of the first person, perhaps also for the absence of the technical language of theology. And all this is acceptable to-day. No American book of recent years has done better in this country than Professor W. N. Clarke's Outline of Christian Theology. Professor Curtis reminds us of Professor Clarke. He is not quite so fresh—perhaps because Professor Clarke was before him. He is not quite so able. And then, whenever their ways diverge, Professor Clarke takes his own flowery byway, Professor Curtis keeps to the beaten road of the doctrine of the Church.

All modern Systematic Theology is exegetical. Professor Curtis is rarely anything else. The title of his twenty-second chapter is, ‘Our Lord’s Strange Hesitation in approaching Death.’ It is surely a curious title for a volume of Systematic Theology; and the chapter is as strange. It is simply an exposition of the Prayer in the Garden. It is simply another attempt to explain what the ‘cup’ was which, ‘with strong crying and tears,’ our Lord prayed might pass from Him.

What was that cup? First of all Professor Curtis mentions some ‘inadequate explanations.’ He mentions some explanations which he calls ‘purely humanitarian and rationalistic.’ Thiess held that Jesus was suddenly ‘attacked by some malady.’ Heumann thought that, ‘in addition to His inward sorrow, Jesus had contracted a cold in the clayey ground traversed by the Kidron.’ Strauss believed that ‘Jesus on that evening in the garden experienced a violent access of fear.’ Renan—but Professor Curtis refuses to translate Renan’s ‘sentimental indecency.’ Then Professor Curtis recalls an explanation which is neither humanitarian nor rationalistic. It is the explanation suggested by Principal Fairbairn.

Principal Fairbairn’s explanation is found in his Philosophy of the Christian Religion. Gethsemane, he says, offered a new problem to Jesus. What was it? It was this, that the death which He had come to die was to be the very occasion for the increase of sin. He had come to die that He might take away sin, but His death was to be the occasion for sin becoming more exceeding sinful than it ever had been before. He had come to die for the men who were putting Him to death, for Pilate and Caiaphas and Judas; but His very death was to be made the occasion whereby they would put far from them the redemption which He had come to accomplish. ‘Father,’ He cried, ‘if it be possible, let this cup pass from me.’

Professor Curtis is unwilling to criticize Principal Fairbairn's explanation. It is so large and sincere, he says. But he offers two objections. He says it confuses sin with crime. The death of Christ was a crime. Now, crime is caused by sin, not sin by crime. The crime of the death of Christ did not increase the sin of Judas or Caiaphas or Pilate; it only brought it out. Their sin was there already. The dreadful thing about the crucifixion was not the crucifixion itself, but that Judas and Caiaphas and Pilate were the men they were. And Jesus knew that already. He knew what kind of men they were. He pitied the people, saying, ‘Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do’: but He branded the leaders with fiery invective.

The second objection is that Principal Fairbairn’s explanation is redemptionally superficial. These are Professor Curtis’ words, and the italics are his also. He is at his best as he goes on to vindicate them. The explanation, he says, ‘lies, like a sentimentality, on the surface of the awful deeps of redemption. That the Eternal Son of God could come into this world at infinite cost in self-sacrifice because of sin—' whole ages upon ages of
bottomless sin”—and then, at the crucial point of his atonement for that sin, could have his redemptional consciousness exclusively occupied with one phase, one local item of the huge chaos of wrong, is to me entirely inconceivable. Principal Fairbairn is too profound a Christian thinker to be long satisfied with his own explanation.'

What, then, is the cup? Dr. Curtis dismisses it in eleven lines. It is the projected shadow of the dereliction. Jesus already knows that His God will forsake Him; has forsaken Him perhaps already. The cry, ‘O my Father, if it be possible,’ and the cry, ‘My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me,’ are not two prayers, but one. Professor Curtis is sure of this. He says he is sure of it because he feels sure of it. Before he begins to try to understand the words of the agony, he feels sure that the cup is the hiding of the Father’s face. And then, when he looks at the prayer in the garden and the cry upon the cross, he sees that they have ‘the same intense spiritual accent, and the same indefinable suggestion of the depth of redemption.’

Does our Lord ever use the argumentum ad hominem? Does He ever address His argument not to the matter, but to the man? Does He ever point out to His opponents the consequences of their own beliefs, without saying whether the beliefs themselves are true or not?

There is nothing which the believer in Christ is more reluctant to admit. Take our Lord’s argument to the Pharisees about the Son of David (Mt 22:41-46). According to St. Matthew’s account, Jesus asked the Pharisees a question, saying, What think ye of the Christ? Whose son is He? They answered, The son of David. How then, He asked, does David in the Spirit call him Lord, saying, The Lord said unto my Lord? If David calls him Lord, how is he his son?

The reference is to the 110th Psalm. Does Christ give it as His belief that that Psalm was written by David? Or is He arguing with the Pharisees on their own ground? Is He simply asking them to draw the inevitable conclusion from their own premises? In the latter case He expresses no opinion as to the authorship of the Psalm.

But the ordinary believer rejects such an explanation. He rejects it usually with scorn, and sometimes with something like loathing. The argumentum ad hominem seems to him to be unworthy of Christ.

But what follows? It follows in the case before us that our Lord pronounces an opinion upon a matter of mere scholarship. Now, there is no matter of the kind upon which the scholarship of to-day is more unanimously on the other side. If the work on the Old Testament of the last half-century is worth anything at all, it is certain that the 110th Psalm was not written by David.

What is the modern scholar who is also a believer in Christ to do? What is Dr. Gore, for example, to do? What can he do but say that Christ did not know better, and then run for refuge into theories about His Kenosis? But there is nothing that we know less about than what Christ knew and did not know. And there is no topic upon which there has been more useless writing of late (and some of it is worse than useless) than the subject of Christ’s ignorance.

Take another example. According to St. Matthew again, some one came to Jesus one day and said, ‘Good Master (or simply ‘Master’), what good thing shall I do that I may have eternal life?’ Jesus replied, ‘Why callest thou me good,’ or, ‘Why askest thou me concerning that which is good?’ ‘There is none good but one, that is, God,’—or simply, according to the Revised Version, ‘One there is who is good.’

The exact form of the words is not vital. Did Jesus use the argumentum ad hominem here? Did
He tells the man to think what he was saying? And, reminding him that God alone is good, did He bid him either withdraw his word or else apply it to Jesus with all its meaning? That is the *argumentum ad hominem*. It simply asks a man to go on to his own conclusions. It says nothing here of what Jesus thought of Himself. It does not make Him assert His sinlessness, and it does not make Him deny it.

But what follows if it is not an *argumentum ad hominem*? We turn to the very last book of importance which has been published on the life of Jesus. Says Professor G. B. Foster, of Chicago, in his *Finality of the Christian Religion* (p. 446):

‘Jesus did not transcend the limits of the purely human. He did not put himself alongside the Almighty God. If he bound his disciples to himself, it was but to lead them beyond himself to the living God. He would not himself be the goal, but only the way to the heavenly Father.’

What proof has Dr. Foster of that? Negative proof is of no value. What positive proof has he? He has this single passage, and his own interpretation of it. ‘Instead of identifying himself with God,’ he says, ‘Jesus sharply separated himself from God, saying that no one was good save God alone.’ And if our Lord is not using the *argumentum ad hominem* here, Professor Foster is right. No other interpretation of the passage is possible.

There are many other examples. The subject is brought before us in a book on *Jesus and the Prophets*, which has just been published by Messrs. Putnam (6s. net). The book is written by Dr. Charles S. Macfarland, a graduate of Yale, and it is introduced to us by Professor Sanders, Dean of the Divinity School of that University. It is a book of good scholarship, and it has promise of better work to come.

Dr. Macfarland has no doubt that Jesus uses the *argumentum ad hominem*. He refers to one of the passages which we have already touched, and he gives other instances. The most striking instance that he gives is the reference in St. John’s Gospel (10:46) to the fact that in the Old Testament Israel’s judges are described as ‘gods.’

Jesus had spoken of God as His Father, and the Jews accused Him of blasphemy. ‘Thou being a man,’ they said, ‘makest thyself God.’ Jesus answered, ‘Is it not written in your law, I said, Ye are gods? If he called them gods, unto whom the word of God came (and the Scripture cannot be broken), say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?’

The reference is to the 82nd Psalm. There the judges of Israel, even the unrighteous judges, are called gods. They are called gods because the Word of God has come to them and they have become partakers of it, and have thereby been raised to a position in which they are the representatives of God upon the earth. How the Jews understood the Word as they read it in the Psalms, we cannot tell. We cannot tell how they made it square with their keen and aggressive monotheism.

But what did Christ Himself do with it? Did He distinctly declare that the unrighteous judges in Israel were gods? Did He deny that there is one only living and true God, in order that He Himself might be accepted as a Son of God? Did He assert that He claimed no more for Himself than He granted to other men? If not, He used the *argumentum ad hominem*.

In the passage just referred to there is one thing more. Let us look at it before we leave the subject altogether. It is the meaning of the clause which has been thrown into brackets in the Revised Version—‘and the scripture cannot be broken.’

But before looking at the brackets let us look at the word ‘scripture.’ It is written, you observe, with a small ‘s.’ These small letters and capitals in our versions of the Bible are worth watching. The
word 'scripture' is written here with a small 's' both in the Authorized Version and in the Revised. But in the original 1611 edition of the Authorized Version it had a capital. And it ought to have a capital still. For by 'Scripture' the Authorized Version means 'the Bible,' the whole Word of God as it is contained in the Old and New Testaments.

The Revisers, on the other hand, rightly spell 'scripture' with a little 's.' For by 'scripture' (with a little 's') they mean only some particular passage of Scripture. Since the Authorized Version was made, the use of the original word for 'scripture' has been studied. And it has been found that St. John at least, when he uses it in the singular, means not the whole Bible, but only the immediate passage in question.

Now let us look at the brackets. There are no brackets in the Authorized Version. Why have the Revisers used them? Because they understand that the clause, 'and the scripture cannot be broken,' is an independent statement. Tindale, who made the translation which all the rest have followed, used brackets. But they were dropped in the Geneva Version, in the Rhemish Roman Catholic, and in the Authorized, although there is no doubt that in all these versions the clause was taken to be an independent statement.

But is it an independent statement? It is not. That is just as sure as grammar and the context can make it. It is a conditional statement. The 'if' of the previous clause is understood before it. The grammar (one's feeling for grammar) requires it; and the argumentum ad hominem demands it. For if our Lord does not commit Himself to the propriety of applying the title 'gods' to unrighteous judges, neither does He commit Himself to the integrity of Scripture (whether you spell it with a little 's' or a big). Let us read the sentence this way—'If he called them gods unto whom the word of God came, and if the scripture cannot be broken, say ye of him, whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world, Thou blasphemest; because I said, I am the Son of God?'

Into what a chaos has the doctrine of Scripture fallen among Protestants. When the Reformation took place, the Reformers rejected some of the books received by the Church of Rome, but they taught the inspiration of the books which they retained. They rejected certain books and parts of books, believing that the Spirit which was in them gave them liberty and understanding so to do. But they believed that the same Spirit which was in them was in every part of the true Word of God, and the presence of the Spirit is inspiration.

It is unfair, or rather it is ignorance, to say that the Reformers substituted an infallible Bible for an infallible Pope. The Pope was not then infallible. Nor was the Reformers' Bible infallible, in the modern use of that word, since questions had scarcely arisen yet as to its statements of fact, modern science being not yet out of its cradle. For the authority of the Pope, if you like, they substituted the authority of the Bible. But it was a different kind of authority. It was an authority which came to them in the reading of the Bible. It came to them just as the Word of God came to the original writers of it, not of man, neither by man, but by the Spirit of God moving in them while they read, and giving to the written Word its authority.

This is an intelligible doctrine of Scripture. It is intelligible, and it is workable. Why has it fallen into chaos? Simply because men have not applied it. When science grew to manhood and challenged some of the statements of fact, Protestants fell into a panic, not about the Spirit of God speaking to them in Scripture and making it authoritative, but about the written letter of Scripture itself. The Spirit giveth life, but Scripture was no longer looked upon as having life in it. It was as dead to the modern Protestant as it was to the ancient Jew, who thought he did God honour when he
counted the number of letters in a book and told Him which letter stood exactly in the middle of it.

But the Roman Catholic doctrine of Scripture seems to-day to be in no better case. We do not rejoice in that. Our business is simply to take account of it.

In the first number of the Irish Theological Quarterly, scholarly and candid, there is an article on 'The Church and the Biblical Question.' We all know that the Catholic Church has been much exercised of late about this question. The editors of the new quarterly recognize it as their very first duty, just as if they were Protestants, to declare their attitude to Holy Scripture. They do it, no doubt, in a somewhat different manner. They state their attitude, not directly to Scripture, but to the Church's doctrine of Scripture. In the end, however, it seems practically to come to the same thing.

The writer of the article is the Rev. Joseph MacRory, D.D., one of the professors in St. Patrick's College, Maynooth, the college from which this welcome addition to the literature of theology proceeds. But Professor MacRory does not speak for himself, he speaks for the whole Faculty. He speaks for the Irish Theological Quarterly. Whether his article has been read by his colleagues we cannot tell. But it is certain that it is not only bold and clear and capable, but also representative.

The doctrine of Scripture of the Divinity Faculty of Maynooth is the doctrine of the Catholic Church. Of course it is. But what is the doctrine of the Catholic Church? It cannot be expressed in a single sentence, yet it will not take many sentences to express it. Three councils have to be referred to — the Councils of Florence, Trent, and the Vatican. The Council of Florence declared 'that one and the same God is author of both the Old and New Testaments; that is, of the Law and the Prophets and the Gospel, since the holy men of both Testaments spoke under the inspiration of the same Holy Spirit.' The Council of Trent defined: 'If any one will not receive as sacred and canonical the entire books with all their parts, as they have been accustomed to be read in the Catholic Church, and are contained in the Old Latin Vulgate ... let him be anathema.' This, of course, was directed against the Reformers. Finally, the Council of the Vatican announced: 'If any one will not receive as sacred and canonical the entire books of Scripture with all their parts, as the holy Synod of Trent enumerated them, or will deny that they are divinely inspired, let him be anathema.' The point of the last anathema lies in the words which we have thrown into italics. There were some, it was said, who accepted the books as the Synod of Trent demanded, but denied their inspiration.

Is that all? Well, Dr. MacRory does mention another source of authority for a devout Catholic. It is the authority technically known as the Church's Ordinaria et Universale Magisterium. That is to say, the common and universal teaching of the Church, as represented by the Fathers and Theologians and by the belief of the faithful. Does this Magisterium, then, add anything to a Catholic's obligations? Yes. Dr. MacRory feels bound to say that it does. It adds the inerrancy of Scripture.

This is surely a mighty addition. But let us see how we stand now. The Roman Catholic must believe that all the books in his Bible (including the Apocrypha) have God for their author equally and throughout. He must also believe that they contain no error.

Now Catholics have no difficulty with the first demand. That God is their author means, no doubt, that the books are inspired. But what inspiration means they are left to themselves to discover. But with the second demand it is different. For Dr. MacRory and the professors
of Theology in Maynooth are quite convinced that
the Bible does contain errors.

What are they to do? What they do, and what
they advise every other Catholic to do, is made
perfectly clear by Dr. MacRory in this clear and
candid article. They are to say that, properly
speaking, the Bible itself does not contain errors,
but that there have been errors in their inter­
pretation of it. Does our Lord seem to say that
the Pentateuch was written by Moses? We have
misunderstood our Lord. He does not say so.
He simply speaks in accordance with the received
notions of His time.

But let us quote a complete paragraph. ‘The
Bible is inspired throughout, and it teaches no
error. Does it follow from this that everything in
the Bible is in conformity with facts, as they were
or are? Is everything true in the same way? Is
it equally true that God created all things, and
that He did so in six days? That He punished
sin in a terrible manner in the days of Noah, and
that He punished it by a deluge that was universal?
That He answered the prayer of Joshua, and that
He did so by causing the sun to stand? When
we ask ourselves questions like these, we begin to
realize that if the teaching of Scripture is always
true, it is sometimes difficult to know what that
teaching is; in other words, that the sense of
Scripture is not always what seems to lie on the
surface, and that we ought to be cautious lest we
hastily attribute to God statements which neither
He nor the sacred writer ever intended to be taken
as literal truth.’

How far does this carry? Apparently it carries
a good long way. Dr. MacRory names the leading
scholars on the Biblical Commission appointed by
the late Pope. They are not to be supposed to
be the wildest of the critics of the Bible. Yet Dr.
MacRory is quite certain that at least two of them,
Lagrange and von Hummelauer, find legends or
folk-tales in the earlier books of the Old Testament.

---

Our Sixth Visit to Mount Sinai.

BY MRS. AGNES SMITH LEWIS, PHIL.DOC., I.L.D., D.D., CAMBRIDGE.

There are now two ways of reaching the monastery
of St. Catherine, which stands some 5000 feet
above the sea-level in a narrow valley called Wady-
ed-Deyr, beneath the shadow of a steep shoulder of
Jebel Mousa, the traditional Mount of the Law.
The first way is what the monks call δία ζηράς; that
is to say, you cross from Suez to the Asian shore
in a dhow, escorted by a shoal of big fishes, which
may be either dolphins or sharks, and reach the
little oasis called ‘Uyun Mousa, the ‘Wells of
Moses,’ after a two hours’ ride. The gardens of
palm trees there belong to Mr. Athanasius, a store-
keeper of Suez, who is also agent for the convent;
and who can accommodate a passing traveller for
one night, but does not undertake to supply him
with food. There you bid civilization farewell, and
start on an eight days’ camel ride to the convent,
through scenery which becomes ever grander and
more interesting as you pass from the sandy plain
to the region of limestone, then to that of sandstone,
and finally to the valleys hemmed in by the great
granite mountains of Serbal and Sinai.

This path has the advantage of almost coinciding
with that traversed by the Israelites after their
exodus from Egypt; it is therefore the one which
has been frequently described by travellers; but
those who follow it will probably have hardships to
contend with. The first two days, from the oasis
of ‘Uyun Mousa to that of Wady Ghurundel, the
supposed site of Elim, take you over a flat sandy
plain, and amongst dreary sandhills where no
water whatever can be procured, so that your
Bedawin escort are most unwilling to encamp more
than one night on it, generally on a strip of little
green plants which stretches across the plain from
the mouth of Wady Sudr, the scene of the late
Professor Palmer’s capture. To ride twenty-five
miles on each of these two days, as you must do,