

contemplative, was about to die. Knowing that Philip II. of Spain, when the candle was put into his hand at death, had exclaimed, 'Now for the

great secret,' Gregory said, as he himself held the death candle, 'No secret for me,' and smiled with joy as he went to his Lord.

The Person of our Lord.

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II.

WHILE Chalcedon branded as errors the two extreme positions of Nestorius and Eutyches, it left room for both the opposite paths of approach to this central mystery, which for generations had already divided the suffrages of Oriental Christendom—the paths, I mean, which had been chosen by the two rival schools of Antioch and Alexandria. And the striking fact must be noted that of these two, the one which met with least success at the time, and was for many a century left behind by the main stream of doctrinal history, is that in which the modern mind has been led to feel a keener interest and warmer sympathy than can now be evoked by its rival. To understand this is to read in large outline the subsequent movement of christological development.

What appeals most powerfully to a modern theologian in the Christology of the Antiochians, is, first, their preoccupation with the historical Life related in the Gospels, and, next, the emphasis they laid on its ethical features. The former stood connected with the sound and sober character of their exegesis. The latter was a result of their habit of approaching the doctrines of the faith from the anthropological rather than the theological side, and their insistence on the perfection of humanity as consisting in the moral coincidence of man's free choice with the will of God. In this way they came to the problem of Our Lord's Person from the side of His earthly humanity; preoccupied with the historical career of Jesus, desirous before all things to understand and do justice to His moral union with the Father. This ruling conception determined the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia, their representative divine who died only some quarter of a century before the Chalcedon Council. But the attempt to ethicise the incarnation had been at home in Syrian theology long before. Theodore was fol-

lowing on the lines of the earlier Theodore of Tarsus, and, in fact, there were some who traced the genealogy of those views back to Paul of Samosata.

The centre of this Mopsuestian Christology must be found just here: that the special presence of God in Man, being a personal presence, cannot be conceived as other than ethical. Not a presence of the Divine Essence, since that is everywhere; nor merely a dynamic presence, since His power is everywhere operative. But the specialty is, that with Man, who is a free moral Person, God who is likewise a free and moral Person, can be united in a way of ethical coincidence of will and disposition (*ἐν γνώμῃ*)—leading to the entire approval or goodwill of the Father resting on His earthly child (*ἐνδοκία*). So has God dwelt in a measure in all good men, especially in prophets; but so He dwelt without measure and with complete fulness in Jesus Christ His Son. Probably Theodore's best contribution to the subject lay in his insistence that the development of our Lord in knowledge and virtue could be no *θέατρον*, but a genuine human progress culminating in genuine human virtue; and that this human life and character, with its free self-determination and moral victories, was essential to His work of redemption. No doubt Theodore moved loyally within the accepted lines of orthodoxy. The doctrine of the two natures was far from denied. The Logos incarnate in Jesus was still the influence which from the first was supposed to keep the human life of Jesus in such unbroken accord with the Father. Still, in order to do this, the Divine in the God-Man did not infringe in the least upon the freedom of our Lord's ethical choice as a Man. All along He needed, as we do, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and His personal struggles with temptation were the road which conducted

Him, as they must conduct us, to perfection of character.

The wide acceptance which this type of Christology met with in Western Syria was probably due in part to the complete antithesis which it offered to the theory of Apollinaris, just condemned, but still dangerous and dreaded by the orthodox. Since the appearance of Dräseke's book, most of us have come to appreciate better the importance of that great divine. He was known to have written extensively in many departments, but hardly anything was supposed to have survived to justify the remarkable impression which he left on his contemporaries. Till recently the only reliable source from which students gathered his Christology were the fragments cited from his lost work on the incarnation by his antagonists, especially by Gregory of Nyssa. In his *Alte und Neue Quellen*, which appeared in 1879, Caspari gave strong reasons for rescuing as genuine works of Apollinaris at least two treatises which had been hitherto ascribed to others: one the Creed *ἡ κατὰ μέγρος πίστεως*, which used to be credited to Gregory the Wonderworker; and the other, a tract on the Incarnation, included among the writings of Athanasius, though by his Benedictine editors placed among the 'doubtful' class. This result of Caspari has been accepted by recent scholars like Loofs, and Krüger, and A. Dorner; and the two documents are printed in the third edition of Hahn's convenient *Bibliothek der Symbole*. Both of them, especially the last named, which is a confession of faith said to have been sent to the Emperor Jovian, become important authorities.

Apollinaris, it appears, had a clearer insight than his contemporaries into the difficulties of the christological problem. His fundamental difficulty was that the integrity of man's moral and spiritual nature requires his free choice of virtue, and free human choice, according to his psychology, implies a human personality. Hence, on the current theory of two complete natures, it seemed to him hopeless to maintain the oneness of Jesus' person. For on that theory what you get is two personal beings alongside of one another; God the one, the other a man. Push this dual personality to its consequences. Not only have you a double will, the one mutable, as the Arians allege, because human; and the other immutable because Divine, as Catholics teach; anticipating the Monothelite controversy of three centuries

later. But you have even a double sonship to God, anticipating, one sees, the Adoptionists of five centuries later. From such difficulties Apollinaris on his psychological assumptions could see no escape save by curtailing our Lord's human nature in the way which has ever since been associated with his name.

Of course, the whole Church promptly and energetically rejected a mutilation of Jesus' human nature, which left Him lacking in the very constituent of manhood which makes man to be man and capable of union with God at all: the very part of his nature in which man has sinned and needs to be redeemed. Yet the bold logic of Apollinaris at least rendered to faith this indirect service that he compelled divines to learn, if they could, to make hospitable room in their reading of the Wondrous Person for a moral and religious life which shall be lived throughout, not under unnatural or supernaturally guarded conditions, but under strictly human conditions of growth, trial, dependence, and freedom. It was a very long time indeed before the Church learned to do that. Indeed, it is only learning it now. And the fact that the Mopsuestian Christology had already attained to such a reading of the Saviour's life lends to it a curiously modern air. Only within a few recent generations has theology come back to approach the unsolved problem in the spirit and by the methods of the Antiochians. With us, as with them, the problem centres to-day in the consciousness of Jesus and in the progressive virtue of His spiritual life on earth.

In spite of this, I believe the Church was right in distrusting the tendencies of that Antioch school. By an instinct of her faith, or, if you will let me reverently say it, under promised guidance, the majority of Christians saw in its rival, the Athanasian-Cyrrillian Christology, elements of still more vital consequence. May I say a few words on both points?

It was right to distrust the Antioch school. For (1) when Theodore defined the relation of the Divine to the Human in Christ not only to be one of ethical coincidence, but to be that *alone*, not at all a relation of essence or union of natures, it clearly followed that the superiority of Jesus to His people was one of degree, not of kind; and that consequently what you reach by this road is no real incarnation of Deity, but only an indwelling of the Logos in the Man Jesus, analogous to

that indwelling of the Spirit which Christians all enjoy.

(2) More than that: such a Saviour could stand to us in no other relation of Saviourhood than that of Forerunner and Pattern. If the needs of fallen human nature demand more than that—if the soteriological faith of the Church and the Christian experience of salvation attest that we possess more than that in Christ—even a Redeemer from Sin and a Renewer of Life—then Antiochian Christology gives no inkling of how that more and greater blessing has been brought to us by the Incarnation.

(3) And lastly: the logical issue—probably some will say, the inevitable issue—of Mopsuestian Christology, as of similar systems in more modern times, is that Jesus was a Human Person: not 'Man' merely, but a Man possessing a personality not divine but human. To that issue Theodore himself did not bring matters. But Faustus Socinus, setting out from somewhat similar premises, did so. And the latest scholar who has thoroughly discussed the matter on modern Ritschlian lines makes this a cardinal point in his Christology (Schultz, *Lehre d. Gottheit Christi*).

In turning away from Antioch to pour the main stream of its christological effort into the Alexandrian channel, Eastern theology no doubt risked a great loss of elements that are now seen to be essential. But the question is whether it did not on the whole secure more than it lost. Losing for a time—a long time—the comprehension of its Human Brother and Example, what the Church secured was its Divine Deliverer, the Lord of Life.

In Cyril the Christology of Athanasius and the Cappadocians was crystallized into a more formal shape in the hands of a less attractive personality. A grave change for the worse had passed over Alexandrian religion since the disappearance of Athanasius and his great contemporaries. Inferior men held the stage, and an obscurantist fanaticism was in the ascendant. Illiterate and half savage monks from the Nitrian desert were trampling out learning and science in the land which Origen had adorned. In personal character Cyril himself stands much below the Nicæno-Constantinopolitan generation; yet theologically he was their heir, as one best recognizes from his *Dialogues*, issued before the outbreak of the Nestorian strife. Of Alexandrian Christology the inspiring force had been, and always was, soteriological; but it was

salvation as the Greek East understood it; and therein lay at once its weakness and its strength.

Where, as it seems to me, the Alexandrians were fundamentally right and strong was in their conviction that, if not sin, yet at least the effects of sin went deeper than to the action of the personal will, went down to the very nature of man; so that he can only be set right by an operation of Divine Power upon his nature. Humanity needs to be redeemed from the power of evil and uplifted into fellowship with the life of God. This required them to approach the Saviour's Person, not from beneath, from His historical life as a holy Man, but from above, from the standpoint of the Divine Being who interposes in the might of His love to deliver and regenerate by Himself descending into the bosom of humanity as a redemptive force; who must therefore both unite Himself with it and it with Himself. From the point of view of evangelical soteriology, it must be owned that this was both a deeper and a truer conception of the work of Christ than was reached by Antiochian theology. And it is easy to show that it called for a far closer union between the Saviour and the saved than the ethical *συναφεία* of Theodore—a union really of natures and not merely of personal concord. Surely this school of Greek theology was right in the stress it laid on the closest possible union of God with Man in order that the dynamic power of the Christ-life might operate upon the race whose new Head He is come to be. Cyril, at all events, went as far as he could, to the verge perhaps of monophysitism, in his effort to unite Godhead and Manhood, savingly, in the One Person of our Lord. By his phrase, 'one incarnate Nature,' he strove to convey, I think, that between the Humanity and the Deity after their union there is a mutual interpenetration, which, on the divine side, can be called an appropriation of our nature by the Logos, a making of it His own; and on the side of His Manhood, a coming into possession of the Divine Being, whose nature it has become. In words he denied that he confounded or mingled the natures: each remained what it was. Only he would not look at them in their distinctness, but in their mysteriously intimate and inseparable conjunction, believing that, for the purpose of our salvation, all that the manhood endured must really be the redeeming passion of the Son of God, and all that dwells in God of divine life and immortality must become the possession also of

Christ's manhood in order to become our possession in Him.

So far, then, I find the Cyrillian Christology inspired by what was best in the Greek view of salvation; for the heart of human deliverance, it seems to me, must lie, neither in the moral force of an ethical example (where, if anywhere, Antioch put it); nor (as the Latin Church came more and more to place it) in forensic or in ritual arrangements; but in a divine dynamic, introduced into human nature at its centre—by the vital union of God with us in Christ.

But the prevalent Greek conception of our Lord's work—both of His redeeming and of His renewing work—on humanity, had its well-known weak points; and these told no less on the form of its Christology.

Its weak point in respect of redemption was connected with the ransom to Satan theory. The bearing of that on Christology I take to be this. The earthly experiences to which, as our Redeemer, the Son of God submitted, had value, not ethically, as a life of free and loving obedience to the Father, or a vocation carried through to the sacrifice of life; but simply as a ransoming passion—so much suffering paid for a price to buy back forfeited lives of men. The same result followed, as we find in the later Middle Age, under the influence of Anselm's similar theory of atonement. In both cases the value of our Lord's Deity was supposed to lie just in the fact that the Passion was His passion and not a man's only; the Divine Person of the Sufferer raising His suffering to a quite incalculable worth. But the worth is not moral worth—it is the worth of the Divine Nature itself as such. One sees how that fell beneath the teaching of Theodore, by evacuating the career of Jesus of that sort of value which comes of free and victorious human virtue. All the same, it made it very necessary to bind the two natures as closely in one as possible; so that the costly sacrifice or ransom-price paid in human nature might win nothing less than an infinite worth. Deity could not suffer, to be sure; yet the suffering must be for all that a Divine passion, and the price of our redemption the blood of God.

Then, secondly, in respect of the other factor in Christ's work—the renewal or transformation by incarnate God of which fallen human nature stands in need, the same weakness appears: it was conceived not as spiritual regeneration, so much as

physical incorruption. It was thoroughly characteristic of Greek theology at its best period to see in physical death the leading consequence of sin; and therefore in our Lord's incarnation and resurrection, the overcoming of physical death for the whole race in principle, and the planting in the race of a divine force of life, from which, mainly through sacramental agency, immortality and incorruption are diffused to individual Christians. This view of redemption was first put forward with great clearness by Athanasius; but the same tendency, as is well known, was widespread among the Greek fathers, especially of the Alexandrian School—in the Cappadocians (especially Nyssa) and in Cyril. With the severe criticisms passed by recent Continental writers since Ritschl—by Harnack, Loofs, Schultz, and others—on this physical theory of Salvation, it is certainly impossible not to feel sympathy. It brought the physical, even the material, side of our deliverance much too prominently to the front. I am far from saying that there is no such side. Christ's union with us men will certainly bring incorruption one day to our mortal bodies, raising us even corporeally to the power of an endless life. But the prominence given to physical over moral and spiritual renewal wrought disastrously in many ways; and one of these was (as those writers insist) to trace the saving action of God less to the Divine Person who assumed humanity than to the Divine Nature itself.

But I cannot see that the same criticism applies to what the Church essentially intends by her doctrine of the two natures in Christ. It does apply, perhaps, when the term 'Nature' is used of the Godhead of our Lord in just the same way as when we speak of the nature of Man. But that, I have already said, is a more or less inaccurate application of the word. What do we really mean when we say our Lord possessed the divine nature in the person of the Son? or that He brought with Him into union with Humanity His Divinity as well? Ought we to mean anything else than this, that He retained after incarnation the fulness of spiritual power and activity which essentially belongs to the Eternal as absolute Spirit? The word 'nature,' when applied to a spiritual person, can only denote either (*a*) (psychologically) that sum of active powers, of knowledge, of volition, of love, by which the personal life manifests itself; or (*b*) (metaphysically) that unknown essence, or *δυσία*, which

we are compelled to postulate as underlying such personal action. The latter being unknown, and a postulate only of thought, we may leave out of account. And then the Divine Nature of our Lord will signify only 'God and all that God is,' Divine Personality in possession of its fulness of attributes and powers. And so it comes to this, that when we ascribe what we call 'divine nature' to our Lord, we affirm that the Eternal Son after His incarnation retains His divine power to renew and quicken and glorify the human nature which He has assumed. Thenceforward all the resources of Deity are at the service of our race, working from within our race itself for saving ends; for purposes, that is, not of redemption only, but of vivification as well, and purification, and glorification.

Thus I think I can read into the 'Two Natures Dogma' of Chalcedon a sound sense, although I have criticised its terms: a sense not liable to the recent charge of suggesting crass and materialistic associations. But I am bound to admit that it did not conduct the ancient Church to any satisfactory unity in the Incarnate Life. To unify the life experiences of Jesus Christ, while retaining this duality of Godhead and Manhood, has always been the problem, attempted as often as theology has been actively occupied with the doctrine of the

Person, yet never successfully. The attempt of Cyril and his school, operating with the category of 'Nature,' to combine Godhead with Manhood in such a way that every action or passion of our one Lord Christ shall be theanthropic—not some of them merely human and others merely divine, but all of them both at once, was an attempt which led to no result in the end. For his party rushed it into a monophysite exaggeration which the Catholic Church quite properly condemned. A fresh effort followed to secure at least unity of action on the part of both natures—one will, one energy. It closed after a miserable strife in the victory of the Dyothelites, which left dualism more in the ascendant than before. When night fell on Oriental Christendom, the Roman West settled down contentedly into that acceptance of such dualism of which I have already spoken: Christ's Deity loosely attached to His human nature, yet overbearing it, and reducing to little better than a phantasm the moral victories and pathetic conflicts of His earthly career.

Once more, in the sixteenth century, the effort after unity, long suspended, was resumed by Luther; and since it again miscarried, we have witnessed a complete and startling rebound of christological thinking along totally fresh lines, with results not yet worked out.

The Great Text Commentary.

THE GREAT TEXTS OF JEREMIAH.

JEREMIAH XVII. 5-8.

'Thus saith the Lord: Cursed is the man that trusteth in man, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord. For he shall be like the heath in the desert, and shall not see when good cometh; but shall inhabit the parched places in the wilderness, a salt land and not inhabited. Blessed is the man that trusteth in the Lord, and whose hope the Lord is. For he shall be as a tree planted by the waters, and that spreadeth out his roots by the river, and shall not fear when heat cometh, but his leaf shall be green; and shall not be careful in the year of drought, neither shall cease from yielding fruit.'—R. V.

EXPOSITION.

Thus saith the Lord: Cursed is the man that trusteth in man . . . and whose heart departeth from the Lord.—In the higher gnomic or proverbial style. God

and man, flesh and spirit, are natural antitheses (comp. Is 31³, Ps 56⁴). The prayer of the believer is, 'Be thou (O Jehovah) their arm every morning;' not Egypt, not Assyria, not any 'arm of flesh.'—CHEYNE.

For he shall be like the heath in the desert.—The word rendered heath is, literally, *bare* or *naked*, and as such is translated by 'destitute' in Ps 102¹⁷. That meaning has accordingly been given to it here by some recent commentators. No picture of desolation could be more complete than that of a man utterly destitute, yet inhabiting the 'parched places of the wilderness.' All the older versions, however, including the Targum, and some of the best modern (*e.g.* Ewald), take the word as describing the 'heath' or other like shrubs standing alone in a barren land, a like word with the same meaning is found in chap. 48⁶, and stands in Arabic for the 'juniper.' Both views are tenable, but the latter, as being a bolder similitude, and balancing the comparison to a 'tree planted by the waters' in v. 8, is more after the manner of a poet-prophet. There is some-