When the History of the Higher Criticism comes to be written, it is to be hoped that a short chapter will be given to the Emil Reich episode. Even if there is not much instruction in it, and even if it is not very creditable to our common Christian intelligence, it still deserves a short chapter for the humour it contains.

Who is Emil Reich? Dr. Emil Reich is a traveller who has written some books and a great many magazine articles. One day he sent an article to the Contemporary Review about the Higher Criticism. He did not know anything about the Higher Criticism, but he did not know that he did not know. He knew, however, that a strong title is half the victory in a magazine article. He called his article 'The Bankruptcy of the Higher Criticism.' Next morning he awoke and found himself famous.

The article in the Contemporary Review appeared last February. Since then Dr. Reich has had no time to travel or to write travellers' tales. His whole time has been spent in writing upon the Higher Criticism and in reading what he has written. He has written lectures and read them. His success as a lecturer has been greater than his success as a traveller; and although he knows no more about the Higher Criticism than he did at first (for you cannot get up such a subject in six months, however diligently you read your own writings), Dr. Reich is now unable to fulfil half the engagements that are thrust upon him to lecture against the Higher Criticism.

Dr. Reich's success as a lecturer has been as phenomenal as his success as a writer of magazine articles. And it has been earned in the same way. His tale may be a tale of little meaning, but he knows that that matters not, provided the words are strong. He called his magazine article 'The Bankruptcy of the Higher Criticism.' He called the lecture which gave him such phenomenal fame 'The Higher Criticism the Greatest Crime of Modern Times.'

Dr. Reich has not been able to go everywhere preaching his gospel of strong language. But when an invitation came to him from the principal and professors who for the present occupy the Chairs of Theology in the New College, Edinburgh, he joyfully assented. He knew that these professors were not orthodox; they were nothing. He knew that he himself was anything but orthodox in their eyes. But he knew that they did not know how utterly unorthodox he was. It is true that Professor Driver has been pointing out how utterly unorthodox Dr. Reich is, but he knew that the professors who are at present in the New College do not read Dr. Driver. He went...
The Expository Times.

to Edinburgh and lectured in the New College on 'The Greatest Crime of Modern Times.'

Canon Driver does not think that the Higher Criticism should be called a crime. He does not think that the late Franz Delitzsch, the friend of Israel and of God, or the late Professor A. B. Davidson, who gave the New College that name by which it is known and loved all the world over, should be spoken of as criminals. But if the Higher Criticism is the greatest crime of modern times, it is not these men only that are our greatest criminals. Dr. Emil Reich is one of them.

For in the very first article which Dr. Reich sent to the Contemporary Review he spoke of a people now living in East Africa called the Masai, who possess legends which strikingly resemble the Creation and Deluge narratives of Genesis. They also possess a legend which resembles the narrative of Exodus 19. In that legend, to use Dr. Reich's own words, 'on a great mountain the thunder peals and the storm rages, as the voice of God proclaims his law from a cloud.' 'Nothing,' says Dr. Reich, 'could be more like Moses on Sinai.' Where did the Masai get these legends of theirs? 'Thousands of years before Christ,' says Dr. Reich (for we must quote his own words again) 'a stock of religious and other legends had grown up amongst the peoples of Arabia about the great riddles of the world. This, as they emigrated in all directions, they carried into their new countries; and thus the Babylonians, the Hebrews, and the Masai preserved, and still preserve, the legends about the Creation, the Deluge, the Decalogue, etc., in their aboriginal form.'

So the accounts of the Creation, the Deluge, the Decalogue, etc., in the Old Testament are legends. They are relics of a mythology which was in existence long before the Israelites went down into Egypt. If that is so, what are we to do with our present account of the Exodus? And where does Moses come into this story? As Dr. Driver puts it, temperately enough, in a letter to the Record, 'if the account of the Law-giving on Sinai embodies a piece of prehistoric Mythology, it is extremely difficult to understand how Moses could have written at any rate those parts of Exodus and Deuteronomy which relate or allude to it.'

Dr. Reich is not concerned about Moses. He does not care whether he was called 'Moses or Sesom or Uriah or Smith.' The name is accidental, he says. Nor does this Higher Critic, who has been lecturing with such acceptance in the New College, care to commit himself to the existence of Abraham. 'There is no safe psychological inference,' he says, 'from the work which Abraham did to his personal existence,' though 'he may very well have existed.' Dr. Reich is not concerned about the personality either of Abraham or of Moses. He is content if he gets a 'psychological role' and a 'safe psychological inference.' Professor James Orr (who is in no danger of being called a criminal by Dr. Reich) has a few sentences on the subject in the United Free Church Magazine for September. He asks the question: 'Do critics like Dr. Driver or Dr. G. A. Smith go further than, or nearly so far as, this?'

We would not dream of calling Dr. Emil Reich a criminal. We are sorry to have to call him a Higher Critic. For he evidently does not like it. He complains (in the Record of September 1) that Dr. Driver calls him a Higher Critic, and most of all that he does it 'vaguely.' And he says, 'It is this abominable, unscientific, and absurd vagueness that renders the method of Higher Criticism so worthless.' Certainly, if Dr. Reich must be 'called a Higher Critic it is better to call him so quite plainly. For he tells us that he is going to write a book about the Higher Criticism, and in that book he is going to prove that the Higher Criticism 'is identical with the methods of the inquisitorial procedure rife especially in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.' Now 'the essence of that method of treating criminals,' says Dr. Reich, 'was insinuation—insinuation of the most unscrupulous,
of the grossest, and at the same time of the subtlest kind.’ It is better to tell Dr. Reich quite plainly that he is a Higher Critic himself, and an advanced one, and that he cannot escape the application of his own strong language.

'I am of opinion that we both need, and shall in course of time possess, two Old Testaments—the one handed down to us by the scholars of the Synagogue, and most important from a strictly Church point of view; the other underlying this, and slowly being brought to light by a succession of workers, primarily to the benefit of history, but also, in the second degree, of religion.'

So writes Professor Cheyne, reviewing President Harper's *Amos and Hosea* in the *Hibbert Journal* for July. It is a remarkable review. Everything that Professor Cheyne writes is of interest, because everything that he writes is so closely identified with himself. But the special interest of this review lies in the fact that from beginning to end of it Professor Cheyne writes as if already he had two Old Testaments in his hand. President Harper, like the rest of us, has only one. He has written his Commentary on *Amos and Hosea*, working upon the Hebrew Old Testament as we have it. And Dr. Cheyne, courteously recognizing that, reviews the book first of all from the standpoint of the author. But when he has done that, he takes up his own Old Testament, that Old Testament which as yet no one possesses but himself, and reviews the book anew.

Is it possible, then, that there can be two Old Testaments? No, it is not possible. It is only a temporary expedient. Dr. Cheyne does not believe in the Old Testament which has been 'handed down to us by the scholars of the Synagogue,' the Old Testament which is in all our hands. But he believes that at present we have two different interests to serve, the interest of the Church and the interest of truth. And he sees no way of preserving the peace of the Church and at the same time serving the interests of truth, except by having two Old Testaments.

Does Professor Cheyne give us any idea of the difference between his two Old Testaments? In the end of his article he says, 'it only remains to justify myself, as a reviewer, against a possible charge of captiousness by mentioning a very few of the new and approximately true things which Dr. Harper, if he had had greater courage, might have found out.' Whereupon he quotes from his own Old Testament three passages in Amos. Let us quote the passages, setting down the Revised Version beside them:

**Revised Version.**

iii. 12.—As the shepherd rescueth out of the mouth of the lion two legs, or a piece of an ear; so shall the children of Israel be rescued that sit in Samaria in the corner of a couch, and on the silken cushions of a bed.

vi. 1—7.—Woe to them that are at ease in Zion, and to them that are secure in the mountain of Samaria, the notable men of the chief of the nations, to whom the house of Israel come! Pass ye unto Calneh, and see; and from thence go ye to Hamath the great: then go down to Gath of the Philistines: be they better than these kingdoms? or is their border greater than your border? Ye that put far away the evil day, and cause the seat of violence to come near; that lie upon beds of ivory, and stretch themselves upon their couches, and eat the lambs out of the flock, and the calves out of the midst of the stall; that sing idle songs to the sound of the viol; that devise for themselves instruments of music, like David; that drink wine in bowls, and anoint themselves with the chief ointments; but they are not grieved for the affliction of Joseph.

**DR. CHEYNE.**

iii. 12.—... as the shepherd rescues Out of the lion’s mouth two legs, So shall the bené Israel be rescued Who dwell in Shimron.

vi. 1—7.—Woe to the careless in Šiyyôn, To the confident on the mount of Shimron, Who have conquered Ashtar of the Gileadites, And swallowed up for themselves Beth-ışmael, Who have gone to war with Jerahmeel of Aráb, And rule over Šephath of Aramashaḵ, Who vaunt themselves because of Beth-jerahmeel, Who have subdued to themselves all Assur. Therefore at this time shall they go into exile, From Assur of the Gileadites shall they be expelled.
We have heard much of the doctrine of Original Sin. Why have we never heard of a doctrine of Original Virtue? Is it because our doctrine of Original Sin makes a doctrine of Original Virtue impossible? Benjamin Jowett says that our doctrine of Original Sin comes from St. Paul. Two passages in St. Paul, he says, are all that we have to show for it. And the less its foundation, he says, the more sweeping its application. But the Jews do not follow St. Paul. If our doctrine of Original Sin, being a doctrine of universal application, leaves no room for a doctrine of Original Virtue, with the Jewish doctrine of Original Sin it is not so. In the Jewish Literary Annual for 1905 there is a paper on 'The Doctrine of Original Virtue.'

The writer of the paper is the Rev. S. Levy, M.A. Mr. Levy is a member of the Council of the Union of Jewish Literary Societies, of which Mr. Albert M. Hyamson is the hon. secretary; and this particular paper was read before one of the societies which belong to that Union, on the second of February 1905. There are many societies in the Union, and many papers are read in the course of the year before each society. Out of the whole number five papers have been chosen for publication in the 'Annual.' Mr. Levy's paper is one of the five.

Mr. Levy does not claim to have discovered the doctrine of Original Virtue, he only claims to have discovered its title. There is an ancient Hebrew phrase (חן אבות) which has usually been translated 'the merit of ancestors.' McCaul devotes a short chapter to it in The Old Paths, and Weber describes it more fully in his Jüdische Theologie. The late Professor Lazarus, in his Ethics of Judaism, says that 'the merit of ancestors' is a Jewish notion to which there is no analogy in the thought of any other nation, and that it has never been properly described yet. 'It is worthy of a monograph,' he says, 'dealing with it philologically, and at the same time presenting its ethical aspects.' Mr. Levy took the hint and wrote the monograph.

Mr. Levy soon perceived that 'the merit of ancestors' is a most unhappy rendering. Literally the words mean 'the virtue of the fathers,' and the literal translation is better. But who are the fathers? Mr. Levy took some time to make sure that they are not the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The word includes the patriarchs, he perceived, but it is not limited to them. It means the ancestors of the Jewish race generally. Whereupon Mr. Levy made his great discovery. We have our doctrine of Original Sin, he said; what is this 'virtue of the fathers' but just a Doctrine of Original Virtue?

Where do the Jews find their doctrine of Original Sin? They find it in Exodus 205. 'Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me.' Where does Mr. Levy find his doctrine of Original Virtue? He finds it in the very next verse: 'Showing mercy unto thousands, of them that love me and keep my commandments.' When he did make the discovery he was amazed that it had never been made before. The one verse was taken as the basis of the doctrine of Original Sin: how is it that no one ever thought of making the other the basis of a doctrine of Original Virtue?

Some of Mr. Levy's fellow-Israelites must answer his question. No Christian could have found a doctrine of Original Virtue in Exodus 205. For no Christian finds a doctrine of Original Sin in Exodus 205. 'Visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children’—that is not what the Christian theologian means by Original Sin. And even if he found room for a doctrine of Original Virtue beyond the sweep of his doctrine of Original Sin, he never could find it in such words as, ‘showing mercy unto thousands, of them that love me and keep my commandments.’

There are two ways of looking at sin. Either it is a matter of imputation or else it is a matter of actual transgression. The doctrine of Original Sin is a doctrine of imputation. It does not wait for actual transgression. But Mr. Levy’s doctrine of Original Sin is neither transgression nor imputation. It has nothing to do with sin. Science would call it heredity, for science looks at the facts of life from the human side and gives them a name accordingly. Theology, looking at the same facts on their divine side, might speak of it as a doctrine of retribution. But it has nothing to do with sin.

That is to say, it has nothing to do with sin in the children. If the doctrine of Original Sin signified that because Adam stretched forth his hand to take of the forbidden fruit, all mankind have felt an inclination to stretch forth their hands likewise, as a drunkard’s child is supposed to be liable to take to drinking, then these words; ‘visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children’ would belong to it. But the doctrine of Original Sin has nothing to do with hereditary tendency. The doctrine of Original Sin is that all mankind ‘sinned in Adam and fell with Adam in his first transgression.’ Nor have the words anything to do with actual sin. They have to do of course with the actual sin of the parents, but that is past and gone. They have nothing to do with the actual sin of the children. They do not belong to any doctrine of sin, whether actual or original.

So Mr. Levy’s doctrine of Original Sin is not our doctrine. Nor is his doctrine of Original Virtue ours. Looked at from the human side, Mr. Levy’s doctrine of Original Virtue is simply a doctrine of heredity. It is a way of expressing what we mean when we speak of the virtues of the fathers being inherited by their children. From the divine side it is different, and not so estimable. As sometimes we give charity to a man, says Mr. Levy, not because he deserves it, but because the play of his features reminds us of one near and dear to us, so, because the father has been righteous in His sight, God will sometimes have mercy upon the son. That is the doctrine of Original Virtue. Mr. Levy admits that it is weakness upon our part to act so, but it is an amiable weakness. He does not see why we should deny the same amiable weakness to God. It is clear that Mr. Levy does not know the God who gave His only-begotten Son.

‘Take heed that ye do not your righteousness before men, to be seen of them: else ye have no reward with your Father which is in heaven’ (Mt 6:1). The Authorized translators have ‘alms’ for ‘righteousness.’ They followed an inferior text (δακτυλίστην for δικαιοθήνην). Hatch held that, though their text was wrong, their meaning was right. And Simcox, reviewing in the Expositor Hatch’s Studies in Biblical Greek at the time of their publication, admitted that Hatch had proved that these two Greek words were often interchanged in the Septuagint. But he would not allow even then that ‘righteousness’ in this passage certainly means ‘almsgiving.’ ‘It is at least a possible reading of the passage,’ he said, ‘that we first are warned against making display of “righteousness,” good works in general, and that afterwards the principle is applied in detail to the special good works of almsgiving, fasting, and prayer.’

Simcox’s possibility is now a certainty. With the exception of Carr, in the ‘Cambridge Bible for Colleges,’ no expositor takes ‘righteousness’ to mean ‘almsgiving’ here. Our Lord is first warning against making display of good works in general, and in the verses that follow, He applies the principle to the special good works of almsgiving, prayer, and fasting.
All through the Sermon, but deliberately and unmistakably from the time that He said, ‘Think not that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets,’ Jesus has been speaking of righteousness. He is speaking of righteousness still. Hitherto He has spoken of the extent of the righteousness which He expects of His followers; now He speaks of its motive.

He has said, ‘Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven.’ The Scribes and Pharisees were righteous exceedingly. Who would dream of being able to exceed their righteousness? You must exceed it, He said. You must exceed it, else you remain outside. And He gave examples. The Scribes and Pharisees said, ‘Love your friends, and hate your enemies.’ ‘But I say unto you, Love your enemies.’ Was it hard on the Scribes and Pharisees? Did it seem to shut them out of the Kingdom? It seemed (and it seems still) to be harder on the disciples. How could they hope to reach a righteousness that would give them entrance?

But He passes on. He has spoken of the extent of the righteousness required; He passes on to speak now of its motive. And again He uses contrast: ‘Take heed that ye do not your alms before men, to be seen of them—as the hypocrites do.’ What was the motive of the hypocrites? To be seen of men. What is to be His followers’ motive? To be seen of their Father which is in heaven? How could they hope to reach a righteousness that would give them entrance?

We understand how offensive was the hypocrites’ motive—we all understand that now. We understand it so clearly that we enjoy the humour of the situation. For it does look as if there were humour in it. ‘They sound a trumpet before them.’ ‘Oyez! oyez! we are going to give; come and see us drop our penny into this beggar’s lap.’ Yes, we enjoy the humour of it.—‘Take heed,’ He says. We are taken aback. He does not mean, surely He does not mean, that we sound a trumpet before us? ‘Take heed,’ He says.

No, no. We understand how offensive the hypocrites’ motive is. We see the humour of the situation. Why, the Lord Himself is not pure-minded enough for us. Does He not speak of our Father seeing us? But we do our righteousness so stealthily that even He cannot see us. Does He not hint at a reward for doing good? But we can do it without thought of reward. Does He not speak of obtaining a reward of our Father which is in heaven? But now we know that virtue is its own reward. We are one step beyond the Master Himself to-day.

Virtue is its own reward. How strange it is that our Lord did not see that. He hints at a reward. He says plainly enough that if we do good with the right motive we shall receive a reward of our Father which is in heaven. He does not say that virtue is its own reward.

No, He does not say that. He could not say anything so foolish. What do men mean when they say that virtue is its own reward? They simply mean that when they do good they have a good conscience. They do not mean that they have no reward. They mean that they have the reward of their own approbation.

Where is it that men go astray when they cry out against the rewards of righteousness, and say that virtue is its own reward? They go astray at the word Father. They make a mistake when they think that our Lord bade His followers do good for a reward. They make a mistake also when they think He ought to have told them simply to do good. They go astray at the word Father. For Christ bade His followers do good as children do it.

Why do children do good? To be seen of men? Possibly; and they have their reward. To enjoy the luxury of it? Less probably; but again
they have their reward. But why do children do good? Because their father bids them do it.

And just here lies all the secret that there is in this much discussed Sermon on the Mount. How hard, men say, it is; who among us can live up to it? The difficulty with it is not that it is so hard, but that it is so easy. The child does what the father bids him, does it simply, does it easily. But he must be a child first. Hard? The Sermon on the Mount is either easy or else it is altogether impossible.

The Person of our Lord.

BY PRINCIPAL THE REV. J. OSWALD DYKES, D.D., WESTMINSTER COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.

I.

The Definition of the Fourth General Council has proved to be the high-water mark of confessional Christology, though not quite the latest of conciliar utterances on the subject. Not, however, because it solved the problem, for that it did not attempt; it did not even state the difficulty which faith offers to the intellect, and its careful phrasing rather concealed than harmonized the divergent tendencies which in the middle of the fifth century distracted the Church. On the contrary, it has owed its long prominence to the fact that it tried to formulate only the core of truth which is the minimum that faith feels it necessary to say on the mystery of the Incarnate Person. It would be a mistake to ask of any creed what it cannot give—an explanation either of the Person or of the Work of our Saviour. For its function is a different one. Dogmatic theology, indeed, working on the facts, and calling in such aid as it may find in other fields of science or of philosophy, may essay to penetrate a little way into a phenomenon so unprecedented as the Life of Jesus; and so long as this is done in the reverent and cautious temper which befits a sacred mystery, it seems to me to be within its rights. But the definitions of ancient creeds were meant to serve a purpose, humbler, and yet more necessary. They were an attempt to stake off the limits of that area which the Church had come to claim as reserved for faith and sacred to it; marking it off by certain assured points which she believed to be guaranteed at once by the witness of Holy Scripture and by her own consciousness of salvation in Christ.

Ever since the time of Irenæus, leading representatives of Christian thought had been contributing materials towards the ascertainment of what is vital to the Christian Faith in its central Object; and throughout the protracted controversies of the dogma-building period, what had continually turned the scale between rival opinions and determined the final judgment of the Church, was more than anything else the soteriological interests involved. The service which at Chalcedon the Latin West rendered to Christendom through Leo's valuable though prolix Letter to Flavian, was one of the same kind. No better service could at that conjuncture have been rendered to theology than just to recall both sets of disputants to those central conditions of the Christological problem which must always be prescribed to theological inquiry by the religious faith of Christian men in their Redeemer.

The Chalcedonian definitions are in part positive, in part negative. The positive are limited to two points. First, the true Deity and the complete Humanity of our Lord are affirmed. So much of net result had accrued on the one hand from the long fight with Arianism, on the other from the yet longer resistance to a docetic Christology, culminating in its most seductive shape of Apollinarism. 'The Catholic Church,' in Leo's words, 'lives by this faith, and by this faith makes progress that in Christ Jesus neither is the Humanity to be believed without true Divinity, nor the Divinity without true Humanity.' And this result, at least, of the first five centuries of discussion, is accepted by the latest Ritschlian writer on the 'Gottheit Christi,' Hermann Schultz of Göttingen—however far in many ways he and the school to which he belongs may deviate from the traditional dogma. The second positive affirmation of Chalcedon stands equally firm—the