spirit returns to God who gave it.' The Israelites ceased to be.

This did not enlarge the boundaries of the realm of Jehovah, but it extinguished the gods of the underworld. It extinguished also all approaches to ancestor-worship, and much of the degrading dread of demons. It was a step in advance. It prepared the way for the recognition of Jehovah as the only living and true God. Soon Jehovah will be the God of the living in the hereafter as well as here.

The Sadducees never took another step. They never came to believe in the life to come. They arrested revelation at this stage in its progress. They cut off a portion of the past and called it tradition, and were content with it. They counted Sheol a synonym for Abaddon or Destruction. They quoted the 88th Psalm, 'Shall Thy loving-kindness be declared in the grave, or thy faithful-

ness in Abaddon.' They said, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.'

This next great moment in the progress of Israel's belief in the Future came in with Amos. It came with a new revelation of Jehovah. According to Amos, Jehovah not only brought the children of Israel out of Egypt, He also brought the Philistines from Caphtor, and the Syrians from Kir. He is the God of the nations over all the earth. He is the Creator of heaven and earth. Sheol also comes under His authority. Now there is no passing beyond the skirts of His white raiment.

Whither shall I go from Thy Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend unto Heaven, Thou art there; If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, Thou art there.

This is the 139th Psalm. Prebendary Pooler holds that it is the high-water mark of the Psalter.

Can We still Defend a Vicariously Penal Element in the Atonement?

By the Rev. W. D. Maclaren, M.A.

In the discussion of this question we must assume the Being of God, man's present alienation from Him, and His constantly reconciling action on the souls of men. It will also be allowed that all professedly Christian teachers, whatever their view of Christ's person, regard His mission as specially concerned in bringing about this reconciliation. Behind these assumptions we cannot at present go. Our question further implies the existence and quondam popularity of an opinion that this reconciliation of man with God has taken place in virtue of a penalty incurred but not endured by the wrong-doer, endured but not incurred by Christ, in the name of those thus redeemed. With this theory there has always been presented a corre-

1 This paper was first prepared for the Manchester Ministers' Association a few years ago, and has since been discussed at a number of other ministerial gatherings in different parts of England.

responding conception of the whole Christian economy.

It is equally notorious that this opinion can to-day hardly get a hearing, and that it is chiefly defended, even by those in whose Christian experience it is most deeply intertwined, by arguments and formulæ of a traditional character, which seldom venture to deal with the ultimate realities of the question. The extreme individualism of the greater part of the nineteenth century was hostile to the admission of any vicarious element in the divine treatment of sinful men. A purely humanitarian view of Christ's person naturally associates itself with individualism as to the nature and effect of this mission. Not a few, however, who most strongly affirm the trinitarian view of Christ's person, and who admit therefore the entrance into the human race of an extraordinary type, deny that His mission, while
inclusive of much undeserved suffering, in any way effects a remission to the offenders of their penalty of suffering, save so far as His sympathy reclaims them and renders further penalty needless; but He endures nothing, it is said, which they escape, while they escape nothing which He endures. There are, on the other hand, those who confess the action of a representative principle in human affairs, and who allow a certain representative relation of Christ to the race, in virtue of which His perfect obedience procures a divine forbearance and even favour towards those whom He represents. Yet many even of such are found to deny any representative virtue to Christ the Penalty-bearer, and any consequent modification of the divine attitude towards sin. The vicarious element in His life and work, say such, is not to be regarded as penal; nor the penalties which He shared as vicarious.

Our question suggests the conclusion which we now desire to maintain, that, in spite of the consensus of opinion against us, the presence of an element at once penal and vicarious in the reconciliation effected by Christ can be made credible and attractive alike to those who emphasize the spontaneity and exuberance of the divine mercy, and to those who insist on the continued uniformity of the natural law in the spiritual sphere; that indeed it is an element which cannot be dispensed with by either. With a view to this conclusion, we shall consider: (1) The Nature and Design of Penalty; (2) Penalty and Reconciliation; (3) Reconciliation and Representation.

i. The Nature and Design of Penalty.—Penalty is conceived as the evils, whether moral or physical, attaching to evil-doing. When we consider these as consequences following from the nature of the act, as, for example, the acquisition of evil habit or the misery to one's neighbour, we imply, in regarding them as penalty, a belief in the universal and particular Divine Government. We cannot proceed without inquiring what is the object of such penalty. It has often been pointed out that the immediate object cannot be to reform offenders, nor to deter from further offence; inasmuch as neither reformation nor deterrence will ensue, unless the penalty be both just and be felt to be just. Is retribution, then, the proper end of penalty? What constitutes the essential justice of mere retribution? And why should retribution be an end in itself? If neither reform nor deterrence be thus the primary design in the divine sequence of penalty, what satisfaction can the Creator or any of His moral creatures find in penal suffering? We are driven to affirm positively that penalty in its ultimate significance is the operation of the divine mind, expressing itself in its abhorrence of evil. Now, there is no alternative between absolute Materialism and a thoroughgoing Theism. By such Theism we mean the conception of the material world and its working, as not merely the creation of a Supreme Mind, but also as, in every one of its properties and laws, an expression and revelation of the moral and spiritual thought of Him who is the Holy One. This follows from the revelation being made to a human creature who, besides being intelligent, is also moral and spiritual. On this view then penalty means that the evil act or conduct is as loathsome to God as its consequences are to the evil-doer. It is obvious that such consequences may help both to deter and to reform, supposing, that is, that the evil-doer or others can be made to understand them when threatened, or survive them when endured; of which anon. Such a view of the nature and design of penalty prepares us to perceive the true relation between—

ii. Penalty and Reconciliation.—Until the offender and the offended concur in their judgment of the offence, they can have no real harmony the one with the other. If this be true as between mere fallible mortals, how much more important that sinful men should concur with God in His view of their sin! But how concur except this view be revealed? And how can it be revealed without divine self-expression? and, again, how expressed without penalty? If there be a remission of the penalty, there remains no divine dictum upon sin, no oracle of revelation to the sinner concerning the nature of his fault. The sinner has no occasion for repentance for a fault of which he knows nothing. And even were he penitent, there could be found no adequate expression of his penitence; for penitence ever carries unreserved consent to the infliction of appropriate penalty. Yet without such consent he cannot be assured of reconciliation, based on that concurrence in the divine view of his sin. The desire itself for reconciliation, whether it be God's or the sinner's, covers a yearning for the divine mind to express itself in penalty sufficient to declare the nature of
the offence. Thus alone can both parties be satisfied.

But what is this penalty? Towards sin can God stand in any but one attitude—that of inexorable intolerance? Sin or evil however is only a relation. There is no such thing as sin apart from the sinner. The common saying that 'God hates sin, but loves the sinner' is really a most misleading expression of a half truth, tending to destroy men's sense of the reality of their sinful state. Hence we must confess that the really intolerable object is the sinner himself, the more he has been and still is loved the more intolerable. The wages therefore of sin is death. The sinner through his sinfulness is unfit to live, and God, in His well-fitted government, withdraws from him without cruelty or harshness, or want of love, the life of which he is unworthy. Rather the sinner, in withdrawing himself from God, has withdrawn himself from the conditions of permanent life. Nothing short of this can adequately express the divine mind and the mind of all righteous beings upon moral evil. Herein lies the real absurdity of the once popular view of penalty as endless suffering, not in its supposed cruelty, but in its utter inadequacy and insufficiency. It is irrational. According to it, the punishment of the reprobate was the divine folly, the one unfinished work of the Lord who, according to prophet and apostle, finishes His work of judgment and cuts it short in righteousness. Suffering has indeed its place in the economy of the reprobate, as the threat or instalment of the ensuing destruction. As such, it might well be a merciful warning, but it cannot be, either to God or the sinner, an equivalent symbol of the awfulness of his sin.

Yet observe the pass to which we are now brought. The sinner is indeed deterred from his offence, but it is by his abolition. He is made fully aware of his wrong-doing, but cannot reform; for the knowledge dissolves him. It is indeed retributive, but the wages are fatal. It is thoroughly constitutional, inwoven with the fabric of nature, and analogous to the fate befalling all the lower creatures whose nature cannot attain to fitness for permanent life. In it is nothing arbitrary; rather is it but an instance of the divine laws of life expressed in the working of the whole universe; but it is relentless. Reconciliation then is impossible without the declaration given by the infliction of penalty, for the sinner in that case would not know what he has done. Reconciliation is equally impossible when the only declaratory penalty is inflicted, for he no longer lives to be reconciled.

Where there is no death, there is no divine self-expression upon sin; where there is no divine self-expression upon sin, there is no revelation to the sinner of the nature of his sin; where there is no revelation to the sinner, there is no means of repentance; where there is no repentance, there is no reconciliation; therefore, where there is no death, there is no reconciliation.

This relentlessness of the constitution of the universe in its moral aspects is forecast by what we know—and at no time so convincingly as at the present—of the uniformity of what we call Physical Law. And if we are to shut out miracle from the physical world, then we must equally shut out mercy from the moral. No miracle spells no mercy. 'For by the law,' the revelation of God in the constitution of Nature, is still 'the knowledge of sin.'

iii. Reconciliation and Representation.—Is reconciliation, then, for ever hopeless? By no means. There is mercy in the moral, as there is significant miracle in the physical world. Neither contradicts but each complements that uniform sequence which we call Law. There is life for the unfit on conditions which fit him to go on living, though of himself he no longer has a virtue which fits him to live. The principle which makes this recreation of life possible is one already inwoven with the constitution of moral beings as thoroughly as is the sequence of sin and death. It is the great representative principle. Like we this principle or not, we are compelled to act on it every day, and cannot refuse it a place in, or even suppose it to be absent from, that Divine action which the human only reflects. Through it, in the physical world, the life of a healthy body overcomes disease in the injured member. Through it, intelligent and moral beings, while retaining full individuality, can act the one for the other, in virtue of a deep unifying principle of fellowship, and in a sphere measured by the varying extent of that fellowship. Thus parent acts for child, husband for wife, partner for partner, councillor for citizen, ambassador for State.

The great embodiment of the representative principle is the Lord Jesus Christ. He is the representative of man, because also the repre-
sentative of God and of the universe. Unique, even at the lower estimate, He is the perfect flower of humanity, its own absolutely worthy personage, who realizes its ideal. In this way at least He stands for man, as the true Servant of Jehovah, the true Son who trusts the Heavenly Father. Why not also the true Sufferer for man, not only sharing the ordinary incidental woe of mankind, but suffering the consequence of sin as none but the Holy One could suffer, enduring to the uttermost the infliction of death, that inevitable result of sin? On the higher estimate of Christ, He was within creation from the first, and finally assumed true human nature for this very purpose of representation, so ‘partaking of flesh and blood,’ not so much to bring a message and to give an example, but that by this death (ἐν διὰ τοῦ θανέτου) He might deliver the death-doomed tremblers. In this unique instance, in the vicarious life and death of the Son of man, the representative principle by which men act for and in one another finds its consummation.

We say ‘for’ and ‘in,’ words which express the involuntary and the voluntary sides of the representative scheme. These are the two pivots upon which New Testament theology turns. For representative action in human affairs, though largely efficacious without the consent of the represented, is fully valid only with their personal choice. There are, accordingly, two identifications of humanity with the Son of man. By the one of these the race involuntarily shares here and now in the life won by His death; by the other the individual believer voluntarily receives this life for ever: this reception is implicit in the act of faith, even the least intelligent, which touches but the hem of His garment; and explicit in the conscious concurrence of the exercised soul with its death-doom, and in its baptism into the death of Christ.

Shall not we venture a step farther and affirm in Christ a yet more thorough embodiment of the representative principle? Who can this be, whose endurance of death for all moral beings shall allow the culprits to escape, and by that escape not to think less of their God, or their sin, but to understand and consent to their merited doom? Who is it whose death shall imbue the sinner with the sinless One’s horror of sin? Who can so understand sin as to express in death the Divine horror of it? Who but the everlasting Logos, the self-expression of God Himself to Himself, the brightness of His Glory, the image of His Invisibility, who, upholding all things by the word of His power, makes the purification of sins and reigns as the Reconciler of creature and Creator? It is Christ the Representative.

It must not be overlooked that this principle, from the nature of the case, allows among men of acting by proxy to a much greater degree than of suffering by proxy. This is partly from the comparative rarity of the willingness to suffer for others, and partly from the impossibility in most cases of serving the purposes of the suffering, even where it can be undertaken by another. But the principle of representation remains the same in its essence and justification, whatever the extent of its range. Let it here be noted, however, that suffering merely on account of another is not representative or ‘vicarious’ in any strict sense of the term; it may be quite involuntary on the part of the sufferer, and in no way relieve the person whose action has brought it on. It is quite misleading to speak of such suffering as vicarious. What such suffering does show, however, is the principle of community of life and interest from which the representative principle arises—the principle, that is, by which the many act in the one, and the one for the many. Thus in theology, by means of the representative principle, we see the mercy of God finding its supreme expression in giving life to a race which has forfeited life; while His intolerance of sin finds equivalent expression in the personally undeserved death of the representative of that race. ‘Herein is love, not that we loved us and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins.’ In Christ, God Himself endures His own penalty due to man. In Christ, the believer endorses the penalty He has personally escaped, God reveals to the sinner the nature of his sin; the sinner accepts the revelation; and they twain come to be of one mind in their judgment upon sin. They are ipso facto reconciled.

This doctrine of Representation shows the pitiful poverty of most of the figures employed to illustrate for acceptance, or to caricature for derision, the old evangelical belief on this topic. How, for example, can the ‘whipping boy,’ unrelated either to the royal culprit or to his disregarded tutor, set forth the Redeemer of the evangelical doctrine, the very efficacy of whose suffering depends upon his absolute identification with both parties? Even really valid illustrations of ordinary representative
action must fail to set forth that which is unique, not because it contradicts the norm, but because it includes all instances, and completely realizes the representative idea.

Here it will be of course objected that as Christ and men alike die (i.e. that their bodies die), His death cannot have been a penal substitution for theirs. If they themselves survive a bodily death, what should lead us to affirm that Christ underwent what they escape, or that they escape what He underwent? Whether bodily death be part of sin's penalty, or simply incident to the physical creation, what is there to differentiate the disembodiment of Christ from the disembodiment of another man? This objection, however, is virtually calling in question the previous proposition as to the really fatal character of sin. If disembodiment be not death, nor even a premonition or instalment of death, and if to the spirit no death be possible, then, of course, neither Christ nor other men ever really die. But if, on the contrary, sin is really followed by death, and if bodily death be but the external expression of the ultimate dissolution of the spirit, the whole process seeming to be incident to man's place in the physical creation, yet really being due to his failure to observe the conditions of life; then the bodily death of the Redeemer is likewise only the outward expression of an absolute tasting of death for every man, in a complete, though temporary, withdrawal of life from His very spirit, in order that they who keep His sayings might never taste of death. In this way did He indeed pour out His life unto death, when He made it an offering for sin, and made intercession for the transgressors. It is in this sense throughout that I have spoken of Death as applied to the personality of both sinner and Redeemer. It is, therefore, implied in this amended version, or, as I should prefer to style it, the completed development of the old theory of vicarious penalty, that the resurrection of Christ was essentially and primarily the revivification of His justified spirit, which had undergone death in representation of our sinful race; the resurrection of His body then becomes the fit and proper expression in the physical order, of that Immortality which He had acquired for Himself and for all who should adhere to Him, and who, in that death of His, consent to be justified. In other words, He was delivered because we had offended, and was raised because we had thus been justified. Even a purely humanitarian view of Christ's person would admit of this representative death and resurrection from death 'by the glory of the Father,' while believers in His Divinity attribute that resurrection to His own divine virtue, even that eternal spirit, by which He once offered up Himself to God, that spirit of holiness which thereby marked Him off to be the Son of God with power. Thus of Himself He laid down His life, and thus of Himself He took it again. It is in this way that the Christian really escapes altogether that absolute forfeiture of life which is the natural issue of sin, and which was really endured by Christ alone. Thus clearly can we perceive, thus only can we defend, the essentially vicarious penal character of the Atonement.

Conclusion.—But why seek to defend this doctrine of vicarious penalty?

1. Because, if there be any force in the considerations above adduced, no other representation of penalty so fully exhibits the divine horror of sin and the necessity of righteousness as the supreme condition of life. No presentation of the uniformity and universality of moral law is so complete as that which extends its penal sanction to the sinless representative of a sinful race. Not till this fundamental relation of God to the world is vividly apprehended can men be got to care very much for the offers of Divine Love. Unmenaced by any real doom they naturally disregard what appear to be the unreal pleadings of divine compassion. In the interests of fundamental morality we must defend the vicariously penal element in the Atonement.

2. Because, if there be any force in the considerations above adduced, no other representation of redemption so fully exhibits the exuberance of the Divine Love. So far from the doctrine implying a heathenish conception of the divine unreadiness to forgive, it sets forth the divine passion for pardon as so intense that it will endure rather than inflict the penalty due to the offender; and this, according to the Christian conception of the Redeemer, in the most acute form of loss, the death of an only-begotten. Here, as no otherwise, 'God commended His own love towards us.' Only so is the awfulness of the Divine Love set forth, and only in its awfulness does it constrain full reverence and obeisance in the human heart. In the interests of the fulness, freeness, and greatness of the Divine Love we must defend the vicariously penal element in the Atonement.
3. Because no other presentation of the Atonement so fully sets forth the purpose and wisdom of God. The superficial philosophy which represents God as needing no penal expiation, as it admits no obstacle to be overcome, so it reveals no wisdom in overcoming it, and in taking no fatal view of sin attains to no exalted view of the Divine purpose of making sin for ever after impossible by the penal expiation of the Cross, when once the story of mankind’s doom and redemption has been completed. Still less can it explain the proved power of this doctrine of expiation over the hearts of men the most virtuous and the most degraded. In the interests of a solid theology and a satisfactory philosophy we are bound to defend the doctrine of a vicariously penal expiation in the Atonement.

4. Since the effect of any religious teaching on the mind and heart of man depends on the view of the Divine character exhibited, if there be truth in what has just been stated, it follows that no other view of the Atonement ultimately gives so convincing an impression of the reality of the gospel nor so moving a sense of the heinousness of sin, the certainty of pardon, the beauty of holiness, as the central conception of expiatory atonement of the Cross. The defective gospel of the Christmas Cradle has too long proved its impotency when deprived of the celestial explanation—‘a Saviour which is Messiah the Lord.’ As in Palestine then, so here and now, all the teachings, the warnings, the example, the manifest self-sacrifice, the works of power, the unwearied beneficence, result without the Cross in transitory crowds of those who go back and walk no more with Him, or the closer adhesion of a few who in extremity all forsake Him and flee. But let the Cradle be explained by the Cross, and all is changed. Horror at sin, repentance on account of it, desire for amendment, acceptance of the offered reconcilation, ever increasing estimate of the depths of love involved in procuring it, awe in view of the divine wisdom, and confidence in the immutability of the divine purpose for the believing individual and for the race, are generated in the souls of men and produce an enthusiasm which shall know no rest till ‘the kingdoms of this world are the kingdoms of our God and His Christ.’ In the interests of the best apologetic, the best evangelism and the most ardent zeal, we must retain, defend, and exult in the doctrine of penal expiation by the Cross.

And as here, so hereafter the multitude gathered in from every kindred nation and tongue attribute the eternal whiteness of their robes to the blood of the Lamb, and acknowledge when the glory of God is filling their souls with its illumination that the light of their city is the Lamb. Their song is ‘the song of Moses and the Lamb,’ for the note of doom is sounded from the Cross as well as the note of the gospel; and the right to inflict that doom at last on the incorrigible is felt to belong alone to Him who has Himself endured it, for they cry, ‘Worthy art Thou to open the book, for Thou was slain, and hast redeemed us by Thy Blood.’ Nor are they singular in this acknowledgment, for ‘every creature which is in heaven and in the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, honour, glory and power be unto Him that sitteth upon the Throne, and unto the Lamb for ever and ever.’ At the centre of creation is the Cross, and in the centre of the Cross is the doctrine of vicariously penal atonement as the supreme revelation of the heart of God.

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By Professor W. M. Ramsay, LL.D., D.C.L., Litt.D.

From the Fifth to the Tenth Hour.

In St. Paul the Traveller, p. 271, it is maintained that when the apostle lectured daily in the school of Tyrannus from the fifth to the tenth hour, he had the use of the lecture-room of Tyrannus, after the usual work which went on there was at an end for the day. The ordinary working day, beginning very early in the morning, ended at the fifth hour, one hour before mid-day. In Hastings’ Dictionary of the Bible, art. ‘Tyrannus,’ this opinion is supported by a careful examination of the different readings and of other ways of interpreting the passage; and the conclusion is reached that (as