A new theological quarterly journal has appeared in America under the title of The Baptist Review and Expositor. It is edited by the Faculty of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary.

Right in the middle of the first number lies an article by the President of that Faculty, Dr. E. Y. Mullins. It discusses a matter of considerable urgency at the present moment. For since Professor William James of Harvard charmed us all by the dash and generosity of his Gifford lectures, the question has been waiting discussion, Who is it or what is it that starts in us that experience which is called Conversion? Professor James, we know, accepts Conversion as a fact, and seeks to set it on a scientific basis. Who or what is the author of it? What happens to us when we are converted, and who is it or what is it that causes that to happen?

Dr. Mullins recalls three books which handle the question. One is The Evidence of Christian Experience, by the late Professor Stearns of Bangor. Another is Christian Life and Theology, by Professor Foster of Michigan. The third is the Gifford lectures which have been mentioned—The Varieties of Religious Experience, by Professor James. These three books agree in recognizing the fact of Christian experience—that singular experience which is denoted by the convenient word Conversion. They differ in their estimate of the author of it.

Professor Stearns held that the author of Conversion (let the word have its full and proper meaning) is Christ. Professor Foster holds that it is the person's own choice of duty. Professor James holds that it is the soul's entrance upon communion with the Oversoul, that is to say, with the spiritual universe of which this world is a part, or, if you prefer the phrase, with the Higher Powers. Professor James is an agnostic; not a full-blooded boisterous agnostic like the late Professor Huxley or the late Sir Leslie Stephen, but what Dr. Mullins calls a 'semi-Christian agnostic'; and so it does not become him to define his 'Oversoul,' 'Spiritual universe,' or 'Higher Powers' more narrowly. He does not care to call it God, because he does not think it need be infinite. Nor does he like to call it god, because he is not sure that it must be plural. It does not greatly matter. This is enough for the present, that this communion with the Higher Powers is a wholly new and radical change in a man, well deserving of the name Conversion and all the meaning that can be contained in that name.

The three writers agree that Conversion is a change that is radical, far-reaching, and nearly always permanent. They also agree that in some
proper sense it is supernatural. Professor Stearns does so clearly when he calls its author Christ. So does Professor James when he refers its origin to the Oversoul, Spiritual Universe, or Higher Powers. And so also does Professor Foster, though he speaks of it as the ultimate choice of Duty. For he says distinctly that no man would ever choose Duty if he did not come in contact with a certain supernatural Person who urges its choice upon him. Indeed, he defines Duty as love to God as Father. And he says that no man would ever love God as Father if he did not see God in the face of Jesus Christ.

Very well. Professor Stearns, Professor Foster, and Professor James agree that Conversion is a fact, and that it is a supernatural fact. Who is the author of that fact? They differ there. Professor Stearns and Professor Foster agree that it cannot come to pass without Christ; Professor James believes that it can. Professor Foster differs from Professor Stearns in holding that Conversion is the acceptance of the law of Duty (which is the law of love to God) because it has been shown by Christ to be worth accepting; Professor Stearns believes that Conversion is the acceptance of Christ Himself.

How shall we decide between them? Dr. Mullins is convinced that there is only one way. It is the way recommended by Professor James—and sometimes followed by him. Observe the facts of Christian experience.

Now when the facts of Christian experience are observed, this is the result. Preaching with a certain element in it has always produced conversion. Preaching without that element has always failed. Is that element the insistence on Duty, even when Duty is defined as the Love of God? It is not. Is it the demand for communion with the Oversoul, the Spiritual Universe, the Higher Powers? It is not. In his recent history of early Christian Missions, Harnack says that in the early Church conversion was wrought by the preaching of the personal Christ. What Harnack says of the earliest conversions, Dr. Mullins says is true of every conversion that the world has ever seen.

Was Luther insane? The question forms the title of an article in the Dublin Review for the month of April in the year of our Lord 1904. The writer of the article is Miss J. M. Stone.

Miss Stone's article is a free review of a book by the Rev. Heinrich Denifle, O.P., which was published in Mainz last year under the title of Luther und Lutherthum in der ersten Entwicklung. Miss Stone has a high opinion of the Rev. Heinrich Denifle's work. It is 'an important work'; it is 'a valuable and competent work'; it is 'in many ways a luminous contribution to the modern school of Reformation criticism.' She thinks the time for such a book has come. 'Our better understanding of the Reformation period enables us to sift evidence more carefully, and thereby to arrive at more indulgent conclusions.' It is now possible, she believes, to make a more judicial revision of Luther's life and temperament than ever was made before.

The Rev. Heinrich Denifle has made this judicial revision. He has arrived at these more indulgent conclusions. It is true that he comes to the conclusion that Luther was addicted to habitual drunkenness. It is true that in his judicial revision of Luther's life he decides that 'his intercourse with the band of runaway nuns, one of whom he afterwards married, was distinctly immoral.' Still, the Rev. Heinrich Denifle is a great historian, and he has come at the right time.

Well, was Luther insane? It is difficult at first to say. It is evident to Miss Stone that he was a great liar, and that he was not ashamed of it. 'What would it matter, asked Luther, if one were to tell a good round lie for the sake of a higher motive and in order to further the interests of
the Christian Church?' But that is not conclusive evidence of insanity. It only raises the question whether his imagination was possibly diseased from the beginning—a problem, says Miss Stone, 'which seems to us to merit and demand the consideration of the modern historian.'

It is evident, again, that Luther's moral life was very bad. Miss Stone does not believe that he was a habitual drunkard. She does not even believe that his intercourse with the band of runaway nuns was distinctly immoral. But she agrees with the Rev. Heinrich Denifle that 'the very kernel of Luther's theology is his own guilty and miserable moral condition'; and she reproves 'Harnack and all other Protestants' for not seeing that. But even a guilty and miserable moral condition does not prove a man insane. It only makes the problem of diseased imagination more acute and pressing.

Now there are some signs that are very suspicious. 'While no epithets were too grossly offensive for his enemies, he never lost his temper with his friends.' That is one sign. Here is another. 'As the father of a family his urbanity inclined to the maudlin.' Again, his spirits were sometimes 'extravagantly high, and he knew how to introduce a jovial tone among his guests at table.'

He had visions too, and Father Grisar, another indulgent historian, of whom Miss Stone has a higher opinion than even of the Rev. Heinrich Denifle, 'Father Grisar arrives warily at the conclusion that the most suspicious of Luther's visions are those which were supposed to have a consoling, edifying, and encouraging character.' So Miss Stone returns to her question, 'Are such things, taken together, compatible with sanity?' And, almost as if she were an ad hoc Scotchman, she answers by another question, 'May not the true inwardness of the case lie in the term mental aberration?'

We have not hitherto found much edification in the titles of the Psalms. We have not even found much instruction. For the most part we know not what they mean. There they are, but the key to their meaning was lost long ago. 'The LXX,' says Delitzsch, 'found them already in existence, and did not understand them; they cannot be explained even with the aid of the Books of Chronicles, in which much is said about music; the key to their comprehension must have been lost very early.'

But now Mr. Frowde has published a volume, The Titles of the Psalms, their Nature and Meaning explained by James William Thirtle (6s: net). Mr. Thirtle claims that the long lost key has been found.

It seems to be a genuine discovery. And, like all great discoveries, it is extremely simple. Mr. Thirtle has discovered that the musical titles have been placed at the beginning of certain psalms, whereas they belong to the end of the previous psalm.

It was the study, not of any of the psalms in the Psalter, but of the Psalm of Habakkuk, that led Mr. Thirtle to his discovery. The Psalm of Habakkuk opens with the words: 'A Prayer of Habakkuk the Prophet upon Shigionoth.' It ends with the words 'To the Chief Singer on my stringed Instruments.' The psalm stands by itself. There could be no confusion with other psalms. Therefore the ending comes at the end. It is not attached to the beginning of another psalm.

Mr. Thirtle went back to the Book of Psalms. He saw at once that the musical titles which are found at the beginning of certain psalms did not suit the character of those psalms. They suited the character of the psalm preceding. His discovery was made. The psalms had once followed one another without a break. When they were detached, the musical endings had been carelessly carried away at the beginning of the psalm that came next.
Take the case of Psalms 55 and 56. At the top of Psalm 56 we read (in the R.V.) : ‘For the Chief Musician; set to Jonath elem rehokim. A Psalm of David: Michtam: when the Philistines took him in Gath.’ The words, ‘Jonath elem rehokim’ are translated in the margin, ‘The silent dove of them that are afar off,’ or ‘The dove of the distant terebinths.’ But there is no reference to a dove in this psalm. It is in Psalm 55 that we read, ‘Oh that I had wings like a dove! Then would I fly away, and be at rest.’ Mr. Thirtle shows that the literary information about Psalm 56—that it is a psalm of David, that it is in character that special kind of song called Michtam, and that it refers to his experience in Gath—belongs properly to the psalm it is prefixed to. But the musical information, that it has been handed over to the care of the Chief Musician in the temple, and that it goes among the musicians by the title of its most distinctive verse—the Dove of the Distant Terebinths—that belongs to Psalm 55.

Now the puzzle of Psalm 88 is resolved. We read: ‘A Song, a Psalm of the sons of Korah; for the Chief Musician; set to Mahalath Leannoth. Maschil of Heman the Ezrahite.’ How can one and the same psalm be a Song of the sons of Korah and Maschil of Heman the Ezrahite? Delitzsch tries to discover ‘which notice is the more trustworthy.’ Transfer the words, ‘A Song, a Psalm of the sons of Korah,’ to the previous psalm. That psalm is already so described in its heading. At the end of it the description is repeated. There is no contradiction. Mr. Thirtle claims that now each psalm has its own title, and the character of the psalm agrees with it.

There has been a good deal of superficial writing about the Abbé Loisy since his dramatic condemnation by the Vatican, and some of it has been frothy as well as superficial. In a sermon preached at St. Mary's, Oxford, and reported in the Guardian of 9th March, the Rev. W. R. Inge, Fellow of Hertford College, gets at the heart of the matter. It is not a dispute between a French ecclesiastic and his superiors. It is an incident in a movement of the most vital consequence for the Christian faith.

In the history of the conflict between Science and Religion there has not been written a more curious chapter than the condemnation of the Abbé Loisy. For whatever heresy Father Loisy has been supposed to be guilty of, his only real heresy is attachment to the Catholic Church. He is impressed with the progress of science. He is sensitive to the conflict between science and the faith. The whole desire of his heart is to put the faith of the Church on a footing of independence, so that henceforth no conflict between Science and the Faith can ever arise.

The pressure of the conflict between science and religion is felt by Abbé Loisy in the criticism of the Gospels. There the miracles, and especially the miracle of the Virgin-birth, must be dealt with. Modern science rejects the miracles of the Gospels; it refuses to believe in ‘an isolated case of parthenogenesis.’ What is the Church to do? Abbé Loisy, in his French atmosphere, sees no hope for the Church in the conflict with Science. Is there no way of escape from the conflict, from all such conflicts forever? He finds a way in the separation of the faith of the Church from the person of Jesus of Nazareth.

He does not deny the existence of Jesus of Nazareth. He would say that the existence of Jesus of Nazareth was essential to the faith of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church developed out of Jesus of Nazareth. But in its development it has long since left the Jesus of the Gospels behind. Like St. Paul it has said, ‘Though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we him no more.’ Why then should the Church care whether, the miracles are accepted or rejected? Why should it seek to identify its faith with the contents of the Gospels? The religion of Jesus has developed into the religion of
the Church. 'The Church,' he says, 'in order to be identical with the religion of Jesus, need no more reproduce the exact forms of the Galilæan gospel than a man of fifty need resemble a newly born child. When we want to assure ourselves of the identity of an individual we do not try to squeeze him into his cradle.'

What is the objection to this? Mr. Inge finds several objections. His first objection is that for some of its so-called 'developments' the Church was indebted to the pressure of popular demand, not to the voice of the Spirit. 'A more spiritual presentation of truth,' he says quietly, 'might have won a more durable if less rapid success.' His next objection is that the Roman Church is not all the Church of Christ. If the Roman branch developed in one way, and other branches in other ways, with which did the true development go? 'If the development of Roman dogma and culture was inevitable, so was the reaction—the Reformation—which it provoked.' His last and chief objection is that the continued existence of a Church is no proof of true development. Its present 'faith' may be due to a series of adaptations which were forced upon it in its struggle to exist. True development must be shown to be in moral and spiritual descent from the life and teaching of its Founder. 'External continuity,' says Mr. Inge, 'is not disputed, and proves nothing.'

There is a defence of Abbé Loisy in English by the Rev. T. A. Lacey, which Lord Halifax has commended in an introductory letter. The wonder is, not that he is defended, but that, by ecclesiastical authority, he has ever been condemned. Perhaps ecclesiastical authority does not admit the conflict, or does not feel it so keenly as the Abbé Loisy does. If it did, where could a better argument for the Church be found? 'How could it be placed on a more unassailable foundation? Father Loisy thinks that Jesus was a person of 'limited intelligence,' who went about telling men to prepare for a Messianic apocalypse, which he wrongly believed to be near at hand.' 'But, consider,' says Lord Halifax, 'how carefully he has distinguished between matter of faith and matter of science. He has impugned no doctrine of the Church; he professes unhesitating assent to all defined truth.'

'Unhesitating assent,' exclaims Mr. Inge, 'to the full divinity of this person of limited intelligence, this victim of Jewish patriotic dreams! Unhesitating assent to the miraculous Birth, Resurrection, and Ascension of this Being, as defined by the Church!' Scientific criticism takes the miracles away; let them go, says the Abbé Loisy. The Church receives them all; take them back again, he adds. Criticism takes them away by the use of the understanding; the Church restores them by the exercise of faith.

This is the heart of the matter. This is where Abbé Loisy has significance for us all. In the interests of science he denies us the exercise of our intellect. In the interests of the Church he destroys the foundation of our faith. Because Science and the Church are at war, Christ is sawn asunder. 'There is a sharp distinction,' he says, 'between Jesus of Nazareth and the Lord Christ.' And his Anglican advocate, though not so pointedly, says, 'the Christ of our altars is surely the historic Christ, not a thin figure drawn from inadequate materials in the Synoptics.'

Mr. Inge perceives the drift of this apology. The historic Christ, who is so much better than the thin figure drawn from the Synoptics, is the Church. It is the Gnostic Aëon Ecclesia invested with divine attributes. It is here, and not in the Gospels that we are invited to study the character and life of our Redeemer. St. Paul, who is often invoked by the Loisy school of apologists, made it his hope and aim that the Church might grow up into Him in all things, which is the Head, even Christ. We are now told that we must be content to grow up out of Him. We are forbidden to look back for Christ. We are equally forbidden to look up for
Him. We are told to find Him in the Church—and there rises before our imagination a figure splendid but terrible, with the light of contemplation and the fire of devoted enthusiasm in her eye, but splashed with innocent blood, like the rider of the Apocalypse, even to the horse-bridle, the cruel oppressor of liberty, the bigoted enemy of truth.

Mr. Tennant's Theory of the Origin of Sin.

By the Rev. W. Mackintosh Mackay, B.D., Aberdeen.

The promise Mr. Tennant made two years ago, in his fresh and interesting lectures on the 'Origin and Propagation of Sin,' he has just fulfilled in the larger work on the Fall-story in pre-Christian or rather pre-Augustinian thought; and the result is that we now have his theory in a complete form. In the earlier and perhaps more interesting work, Mr. Tennant was content to deal with the doctrine of Original Sin in the light of philosophy and modern science—specially the latter. He threw out the idea, however, that the doctrine, as we have it to-day, was not the outcome of a true exegesis of Scripture, but was due to speculation, working indeed on the lines of Scripture, but chiefly moulded by the current science and philosophy of the times. This statement he has now tried to prove by an examination of the Fall-story, not only as it appears in the Bible, but also in all extra-canonical Jewish and early Christian literature. To say that this is done with scholarship, lucidity, and above all with fairness to the facts before him, is only to say what all previous readers of Mr. Tennant's work would expect. The book covers pretty much the same ground as Dr. Clemen's Christian Doctrine of Sin, but the standpoint is quite independent, and in its examination of Jewish extra-canonical writers is much fuller. On the latter subject it is, we think, a real contribution to theological science.

Nevertheless, in one point it is distinctly inferior to the German work. It lacks the severely impartial attitude of that writer. Mr. Tennant writes with a distinct bias in his mind against the whole conception of 'a Fall;' and this polemic, though it does not interfere with his candour in giving us the facts, does very materially interfere with the scientific impartiality of the conclusions he draws from these facts.

Thus in his opening chapter on the meaning of the Fall-story, Mr. Tennant accepts what one can only call the extravagant and very slenderly supported view of Wellhausen, that the story in Gn 3 is a mere culture-myth; that there is no moral content whatever in the eating of the forbidden fruit; that the Tree of the Knowledge of Good and Evil is symbolic of the advance of science, and that the reason of God's anger at Adam and Eve for eating of it was not because of their disobedience, but from a jealous fear that Adam would now become the 'lord of nature and able to use its forces for his own purposes.' As Clemen well remarks, had this been the idea in the author's mind, he would not have made the woman lead the way. It is contrary to the whole Oriental conception of woman that she should lead the van in the progress of knowledge. But, indeed, the whole trend of the narrative is opposed to such a view. That ethical considerations are paramount with the sacred writer is evident from the story of the crime of Cain, which immediately follows; while the origin of science forms a special section still farther on. The only reasonable ground for the interpretation of Wellhausen is the curious anthropomorphism at the close of the chapter (Gn 3:22): 'Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil: and now, lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever; therefore the Lord God sent him forth,' etc.; but this verse is now almost universally regarded as forming no part of the original narrative, which knows nothing about any pos-

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