Authors do owe something to publishers. They even owe something to their printers. Paper and printing may not make a book, but they may make a book better. *The Note-line in the Hebrew Scriptures, commonly called Pāṣēq or Pēṣēq,* is not attractive as the title of a book to the mere book-lover. Yet we can imagine the mere book-lover led to buy Dr. Kennedy’s book by the beauty of the paper and the printing.

The ‘Note-line in the Hebrew Scriptures,’—what is that? It is a thin perpendicular line usually found between two words. What is it for? That is the very question in dispute. Dr. James Kennedy of the New College, Edinburgh, says it is for the purpose of drawing attention to some peculiarity in the text. It is not a Massoretic sign. It was there long before the Massoretes. It was so old when the Massoretes did their work that they did not know the meaning of it. It is an old, old sign belonging to the consonantal text itself. It is the Hebrew way of writing *N.B.*

Dr. Kennedy has made this discovery. Other men have written about Pāṣēq or Pēṣēq. Within a quarter of a century it has been written upon by the great William Wickes of Oxford, by E. von Ortenberg, by Ed. König, by Felix Perles, and by F. Prätorius. But they have all left Dr. Kennedy to make his discovery. And why not? It is the patient investigator that makes almost all the discoveries that are made, and there never lived a more patient student of the Hebrew Bible than the Librarian of the New College.

Dr. Kennedy has made this discovery, and he has set it forth with skill. He has set it forth with so much skill that the book on such a technical subject is very pleasant reading. And it is not less profitable. For it renders much assistance to the interpretation of the Old Testament. And more than that, it comes with some assurance to us that the text of the Old Testament is not quite so chaotic as some recent critics have asserted. Long before the days of the Massoretes Hebrew scholars were so careful of the purity and integrity of the text that they inserted this sign whenever there was anything peculiar in the use of the name of God; they inserted it when one word ended and the next began with the same letter, that nobody might drop one letter and change the meaning; they even inserted it between two words or phrases which were identical, that everybody might understand they were repeated on purpose, and say, ‘Unclean, unclean!’ in Lev 13:46, or ‘Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us’ in Ps 115:1.

Among the temptations of this world there is one to which the Assyriologist is peculiarly ex-
posed, and the Assyriologist has not always been able to resist it. It is the temptation to use the imagination a little in order to identify Babylonian texts with biblical incidents. We need not blame the Assyriologist very much. Without its temptations life would be less interesting than it is. Without this special temptation the science of Assyriology would be less popular. All we need insist upon is that we be told when the imagination has been used, and the difference it has made. Sometimes the Assyriologist himself tells us this. Sometimes another Assyriologist comes and tells us, and that is more exciting.

Mr. R. Campbell Thompson, M.A., Assistant in the Department of Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities in the British Museum, has published the first volume of a translation of certain Babylonian texts. The texts themselves have been already issued by the Trustees of the Museum, under the title of _Cuneiform Texts from Babylonian Tablets_. Mr. Thompson's title is more specific. _The Devils and Evil Spirits of Babylonia_ is its shortest form (it is vol. xiv. in Luzac's 'Semitic Text and Translation' Series; 15s. net), but its fuller form is 'Babylonian and Assyrian Incantations against the Demons, Ghouls, Vampires, Hobgoblins, Ghosts, and kindred Evil Spirits which attack Mankind.' In this volume Mr. Thompson attacks Professor Sayce and Dr. Pinches for agreeing to say that they have found a Babylonian parallel to the Garden of Eden.

The passage is from one of the best known of Babylonian texts. Professor Sayce has translated it twice, Dr. Pinches once, and Mr. Thompson translates it now. The text is short, and it may be instructive to quote all three translations, choosing Professor Sayce's latest in the Gifford Lectures of 1902.

This is Professor Sayce's translation—

In Eridu a vine grew overshadowing; in a holy place was it brought forth; its root was of bright lapis, set in the world beneath.

And this is Mr. Campbell Thompson's translation—

In Eridu groweth the dark _kiškanā_ That springeth forth in a place undefiled, Whereof the brilliance is shining lapis Which reacheth unto Ocean; From Ea its way in Eridu Is bountiful in luxuriance, Where earth is, there is its place, And the Couch of the Goddess Id its home. In an undefiled dwelling like a forest grove Its shade spreadeth abroad, and none may enter in. In its depths (are) Shamash and Tammuz. At the confluence of two streams The gods Ka-Hegal, Shi-dugal, (and) ... of Eridu (Have gathered) this _kiškanā_, [and over the man] Have performed the Incantation of the Deep, (And) at the head of the wanderer have set (it).

Those are the translations. It is open to anyone to draw conclusions. The conclusions which Dr. Pinches draws are these. Mr. Thompson divides them into _a_, _b_, _c_, and _d_ for effective answering. _a_ Eridu is the Babylonian Garden of Eden, in which there grew a glorious tree, apparently a vine, for the adjective 'dark' may reasonably be referred to its fruit. Strange must
have been its appearance, for it is described as resembling white lapis-lazuli, that is, the beautiful stone of that kind, mottled blue and white. (b) The god Aē and his 'path,' that is, the rivers, filled the place with fertility, and it was the abode of the river-god Nammu, whose streams, the Tigris and Euphrates, flowed on both sides. This strengthens the probability that Eridu was a garden. (c) The sun made the garden fruitful, and the 'peerless mother of Tammuz' added her fructifying showers. (d) To complete the parallel with the biblical Eden, Eridu was represented as a place to which access was forbidden, for 'no man entered its midst,' as in the case of the Garden of Eden after the Fall.

But before attacking these four conclusions Mr. Thompson discusses the meaning of kēškanū. Professor Sayce and Dr. Pinches believe that kēškanū is the Tree of Life that was in the midst of the Garden. Mr. Thompson does not believe a word of it. For in the text before us the kēškanū is not a vine nor any glorious tree. It is a medicinal herb of some sort. The man is sick; the incantation is to recover him; his recovery is to be wrought by the use of this kēškanū. What the kēškanū is Mr. Thompson is not himself very sure. It grows thickly like a grove near Eridu, in Southern Babylonia; its colours are white, and probably blue and brown. He has consulted Mr. H. H. W. Pearson of the Royal Gardens at Kew, and Mr. Pearson has informed him that it is probably an astragalus. The Astragalus gummi-fer yields tragacanth, which possesses emollient and demulcent properties, and was used by the Greek physicians as far back as the fourth and fifth centuries, to allay cough and hoarseness and promote expectoration.

Well then, (a) that Eridu was as the Garden of Eden there is 'absolutely no reason to believe.' There is no reference to a garden in the text, and the probability is that the kēškanū was some medicinal shrub which grew wild. (b) A river does not always involve a garden. Moreover, the rivers here have nothing to do with the River and its Four Heads of Genesis, but is purely symbolical. As for (c) the presence of Tammuz and the Sun-god, either we have here a relic of tree-worship, or else we have no more than the familiar fact, stated in theological language, that the shrub thrives best in sun and rain. The last point (d) is the most important. Dr. Pinches sees in the exclusion from the Babylonian garden a parallel to the exclusion of man from Eden after the Fall. The translation is, 'No man enters its midst'; and Mr. Thompson scarcely alters it, 'None may enter in.' Yet Mr. Thompson denies the parallel. For in the first place Eridu is a city, and it is absurd to say that no man enters into Eridu. The reference must be to the kēškanū. The kēškanū 'grows like a forest.' 'Either,' says Mr. Thompson, 'by reason of its thick growth or from its thorny character, or both, it is difficult to force a passage through, and no man can push his way into the depths of its thickets except with extreme trouble.'

There is not too much imagination in Mr. Thompson. His conclusion is that none of all the characteristics of the Garden of Eden are found in the Babylonian account of Eridu. There is neither the planting of a garden by a god nor the four-headed river, neither the tree of the knowledge of good and evil nor the tree of life, neither the serpent nor the cherubim and the flaming sword.

Too much Bible-reading has driven some men and more women mad. And although that form of insanity is said to be decreasing, it is possible that our Assyriologists have all been suffering from it. It would have been better for Assyriology, and perhaps better for the Bible, if they had been less expert at finding parallels.

It is in any case highly significant that the author of the first History of the Old Testament to be written in English after the manner of modern scholarship almost ignores the Babylonian tablets. Dr. Henry Preserved Smith is this author.
His *Old Testament History* (T. & T. Clark; 12s.) is the latest issue of 'The International Theological Library.' No one will dare to assert that Dr. Smith does not know what the Assyriologists have been doing. No one will even dare to affirm that the critic in Dr. Smith has been unfair to the Assyriologist. His apparent neglect of the monuments is due to that wider sweep which the eye of the student of Old Testament origins is now compelled to take.

For however close and however convincing may be the parallels between the mythology of Babylon and the religion of Israel, it is no longer possible to separate them from the general field of Comparative Religion. When Dr. Smith seeks to interpret the serpent of the Garden of Eden, he does not look for him in Babylonian texts alone. He seeks him in the wider field of Semitic religion and mythology. And he finds him there, finds him in many guises, yet recognizable in them all. And now, what he has to do with the biblical serpent is to mark his peculiar characteristics.

It is not peculiar to the Bible that the serpent should be more than an animal. To primitive man all animals were something more than animals. They all had something demonic about them. The serpent of Genesis 'is so far simply a *jinnee*, a fairy if you will, possessed of more knowledge than the other animals.' He knows, what the rest of the animals do not know, that by the eating of the forbidden fruit man will be raised towards the life of the gods. But he is a meddler rather than a devil. He has not cunning enough to escape the curse that comes upon him for his meddlesomeness; far less is he the malicious demon of the New Testament or the arch fiend of the Paradise Lost. In all this he does not differ from the serpent of mythology. Where he does differ is in the fact that he also is in the hand of God, who maketh even the mischief of the serpent to praise Him.

We should be wrong if we said that the imprecatory Psalms were altogether after the mind of Christ. But we should not be right if we said that they were altogether after the mind of Satan. We should be wrong if we said that they were fit for daily use to-day. But we should not be right if we said that they never could have been fit for use.

For if there is a development of revelation in the Bible, there is also a development of the people who are to receive it. For the hardness of their heart Moses gave the Israelites such and such commandments. Moses is not condemned in that. Until their hearts were softer, better commandments were of no use to them. It becomes us therefore (without being condemned as harmonists at all costs) to consider the imprecatory Psalms in the light of their circumstances—in the light of the circumstances of the people who sang them and of the work these people had to do.

That is what Professor John D. Davis does in the *Bible Student* for October. He says that while the occasions for the use of the Impeccatory Psalms grow fewer, a mark of the progress of the doctrine of Christ, even yet circumstances may arise in which they would be the natural and even the appropriate utterance of the Christian spirit.

He quotes from *The Land of the Veda*, a book written by the Rev. William Butler, a Methodist missionary in India at the time of the Mutiny. 'I preached in Nynee Tal (north-east of Delhi in the hills) on Sabbath,' says Mr. Butler. 'Except my wife and another, every lady was in mourning. The enemies of our Lord and Saviour were raging and blaspheming below, thirsting for our blood. The denunciatory Psalms, which in a calm and quiet civilization seem sometimes to read harshly, were in our case so apposite and so consistent that we felt their adaptation and propriety against these enemies of God as though they had been actually composed for our special comfort. We read them with new light, and they drew out our confidence in God.'
He also recalls an incident in the war with gambling in New Jersey. 'The Christian public was thwarted in high places, and sin seemed triumphant. Then recourse was had to united prayer. Meetings were held on a Sabbath afternoon throughout the State for an expression of public opinion and an appeal to God. The late John T. Duffield of Princeton attended the meeting held at the capital of the State. He was asked to lead in prayer. He did so, rising and using the imprecatory petitions of the Psalms. The audience joined in the prayer. They instinctively felt that the imprecatory Psalm was in proper place. The spirit was that of righteous indignation. The desire was the overthrow of wickedness and the triumph of the right. The prayer was believed to be acceptable to the God of truth and righteousness.'

Why was it that St. Paul never had any doubt of the gospel? Men doubt it to-day after all it has done; in his day it had scarcely done anything. Mr. Johnston Ross says it was because he had seen Jesus Christ the Lord.

Mr. G. A. Johnston Ross of Cambridge has been preaching on 'The Spiritual Vision.' His sermon is reported in the *Methodist Times* for 1st October. His text is, 'Have I not seen Jesus Christ the Lord?' (1 Co 9:1). He says that this was not only St. Paul's claim to be an apostle. It was also his reason for never doubting the gospel.

He had seen Jesus Christ the Lord. These are St. Paul's own words. That is his own way of putting the fact on which he staked everything. He had seen Jesus Christ the Lord. Seen him, he meant, with the bodily eye. You may say he was mistaken, but you cannot say he was in doubt. He never did doubt all through his life that he had seen Jesus Christ the Lord with the bodily eye. And yet it was not because he had seen Him with the bodily eye that he believed the gospel and risked everything. It was because the bodily eye had conveyed an impression down into the soul. It was because, at the time he had seen Jesus Christ the Lord, it had pleased God to reveal His Son in him.

That is not an inference from the apostle's words. The apostle himself says so. He says so even in the words he uses here. For it should not be passed over that there is 'seeing' and 'seeing' in the New Testament. Says our Lord, 'A little while and ye shall not see me, and again a little while, and ye shall see me.' Mr. Johnston Ross has noticed that we put the emphasis when we read on the *not* and on the *shall*. We ought to put it on the verb. A little while, says the Master, and ye shall see me no longer, as you and all the world see me now (θεωρεῖν), and again a little while and ye shall see me as the world never can see me (ὁράω), with the eye that carries me down into the soul. 'Am I not an apostle too?' demands St. Paul; 'have not I too seen (ὁράω) Jesus Christ the Lord?'

We stake the permanence of the gospel upon the empty sepulchre and the resurrection of Christ from the dead. St. Paul did not do that. The resurrection of Christ from the dead is an historical fact. But just because it is an historical fact we should not, indeed we cannot, plant our foot upon it, and say 'I know.' St. Paul had seen the risen Christ. That carried the resurrection from the dead with it. Without the resurrection from the dead there was no Christ to see. But it was more than the resurrection from the dead. It was the risen Christ in moral majesty, judging the moral life of a man and claiming lordship over his moral nature. 'I have seen,' he says, 'I have seen Jesus as Lord.'

It is there, says Mr. Johnston Ross, that the experience of St. Paul and our experience meet. He had a physical vision, or thought he had. We do not meet him there. But he made no account of the physical vision. What he did make account of was the fact that the physical vision had opened
the gates of his moral life and given Christ entrance. And when the bolts of the door of our soul are withdrawn, let it be by sudden shock as Paul’s, or gentle pressure of the truth as Lydia’s, and when Christ enters as both the ideal and the realization of moral goodness, we too can say, ‘I have seen Christ Jesus the Lord.’ If that is the mark of an apostle, we too can claim to be apostles. We do not doubt that it is the mark of acceptance in the Beloved, and we can say, without hesitation, ‘I know Him whom I have believed, and am persuaded.’

The question of Subscription is always with us. There are times, however, when it presses more heavily upon us, and such a time is this. One of those ‘accidents’ that are, we believe, in the hand of God, drew men’s attention to the difficulty of belief in the Virgin-birth of our Lord. Men found that they were not at liberty to believe or disbelieve it as they would: It is in the Creed. They had subscribed to it. The question of subscription, the whole question of the obligation of the Creeds, became suddenly urgent.

It was almost inevitable, therefore, that when a new Review appeared there should appear in it an article on ‘The Obligation of the Creeds.’ The new Review is called the Independent Review (Fisher Unwin; 2s. 6d. net). Its attitude is as its name. And that attitude is to be observed in Religion as in Politics. So Dr. Sanday was chosen to write the article on ‘The Obligation of the Creeds.’ He represents the scholarship of our day in its most advanced and its most convincing form. And he is independent.

No one will read the first number of the Independent Review from cover to cover. ‘Protection and the Steel Trade’ does not appeal to the same mind as ‘The Obligation of the Creeds.’ But every article will be read by somebody. For it is to be the first demand upon the writers in the Independent that they be ‘readable’ every one. It is on that account also that Dr. Sanday was chosen for the article on ‘The Obligation of the Creeds.’ He cannot write an article that has no interest. He cannot write a sentence to which there is no response. If the readers of ‘Protection and the Steel Trade’ should happen unthinkingly to dip into ‘The Obligation of the Creeds,’ they would find that the most learned theologian is still a man.

Dr. Sanday says that there are three different attitudes towards the Creeds. One man is content with them. He does not seek to go behind them. They are his standard of theological truth. Another separates himself from the Creeds. He uses them to assist him in the formation of his beliefs, and he recognizes the force of that corporate consent that is in them. He has no desire to see them abolished. But he stands outside of them. His beliefs are his own. It has cost him something to win them. He does not find that they coincide in every respect with the Creeds, and he does not strive to make them coincide. A third feels the Creeds a burden. His beliefs are independent, he feels that they are perhaps antagonistic here and there. The Creeds are purely external, and yet they claim an authority over him. He is ‘somewhat impatient of them as representing the element of restriction and constraint.’

The first type is represented by the late Canon Moberly, the third by Dr. Hastings Rashdall. Where is the representative of the type that comes between? Dr. Sanday does not name him.

The late Canon Moberly is the representative of the first type of mind. But Canon Moberly did not shut his eyes and swallow the Creed. Dr. Sanday holds him to have been the greatest English theologian since Butler, the most original theological thinker of our time. It was not the Creeds that Canon Moberly was concerned with. It was the mind of the Church as embodied in the Creeds. He had an intense belief in the corporate character of the Church. That was for
him 'a truth primary and essential, a necessary result of the nature of man and of God.' If, then, the Creed comes to him, not as a statement of doctrine, but as the statement of the doctrine of the Church, Dr. Moberly will shut his eyes and swallow it. His originality of mind will exercise itself subsequently in discovering and declaring what the Creed means, what is the mind of the Church that it embodies. Here are Canon Moberly's own words, most appositely quoted by Dr. Sanday from his paper on Doctrinal Standards: 'You will observe that, while there is this strong a priori presumption in favour of creeds in the abstract as creeds, the authority of any particular creed will vary just in proportion as it can be said with more or less approximation to truth, to be the very form with which the heart of the faith of the Church in all ages and places has been identified, and in which the devotional aspiration and worship of the whole historical Church has expressed itself with most undeviating conviction and joy.'

Professor Sanday does not criticise, and we shall not attempt to criticise, this attitude to the Creeds. Its questionableness is obvious. For what is the Church? It is not the Eastern nor the Western Church, nor is it an imaginative combination of these Churches. To Canon Moberly its only possible unity is a unity of Creed. But that is first to define the Church by means of the Creed, and then to accept the Creed on the authority of the Church. We pass to the second type.

Who is the representative of the second type of mind in its attitude to the Creeds? Dr. Sanday does not say. It is not the ordinary unquestioning Churchman. It is one who is unable to take anything altogether upon trust. He may, he does, arrive at last at a result 'very similar to that which has just been described.' But he does not regard the Church as infallible. He does not take the Creeds on authority. He weighs them; he weighs every clause in them. He is reluctant to think that the universal belief of so many centuries has been wrong. But is it universal? Is it not rather more or less consent? He is a scholar. He seeks to discover the exact amount of consent that each of the Creeds and each clause of the Creeds represents. 'He will compare the Nicene Creed in its original form, and in its later form or forms. He will put aside the Filioque to be considered by itself. He will compare both forms of the Nicene Creed with other Creeds current in the East. He will take to pieces as it were, the traditional form of what we are accustomed to call the Apostles' Creed. He will distinguish between the oldest form of the Creed and its gradual accretions. He will consider what elements in both the Creeds have been constant and what variable. He will even go back behind the Creeds, and take into account those floating "preachings" (κηρύγματα), as Harnack calls them, brief summaries of belief current especially in the second century, disjecta membra of Creeds not as yet exactly made, but in the making. All these multitudinous items our scholar will try, as best he can, to put into their place, in order that the argument from consent may take concrete shape, with due discrimination of its various shades and degrees.'

Who is this scholar? Who is the representative of this attitude to the Creeds, 'with due discrimination of its various shades and degrees'? Take these two sentences more: 'For such a one the Creeds will be a great deal more than a string of dry propositions and skeletons of belief unclothed with flesh and blood. They will be what, I think, Tertullian called his creed, con- tesseratio, "the password of brotherhood," the password by which a Christian is known to his fellows, the countersign that he gives when he is challenged.' We pass to the third type.

The representative of the third type is Dr. Rashdall. The expression of Dr. Rashdall's mind on the subject is to be found in the International Journal of Ethics for 1897, in an article on 'The
Ethics of Religious Conformity.' The third type
does not much consider the place of the Creeds
in the history or devotion of the Church; it does
not consider their value as the countersign of
Christian brotherhood; it concentrates attention
upon them as 'the test required by law of English
Churchmanship.'

Dr. Sanday takes Dr. Rashdall as the represen­tative of this type. He associates with him for a moment Canon Hensley Henson. And he
is glad that he has two such representatives to
produce. They are both so outspoken. They
do not believe in the Creeds, and they say so.
They have subscribed to them in a non-natural
sense, and they say that they have. They do
not take the words of the Creeds (that is to say,
certain words round which modern objections
gather), in the sense in which these words are
ordinarily understood, and they say that they do
not.

Dr. Sanday likes this candour. What he thinks
of their way with the Creeds he will say in a
moment. At present he says that he likes the
candid confessions that they make of their way
with them. His only fault with them is that they
are too candid, especially Dr. Rashdall. Dr.
Rashdall repeatedly applies the words 'untruth'
and 'disbelief' to his own conduct and his own
attitude toward the Creeds. Now this is all very
well as candour; but what if it contains a subtle
suggestion that the opponent in argument is
equally unbelieving and untrue but less candid?
What, too, if it not only makes sport for the
Philistines, but misses the exact shade of a
rather delicate truth? 'It is all very well,' says
Dr. Sanday, 'to call a spade a spade, but it would
disturb the look of the page—and perhaps some­
thing more than the look of the page—to insist on
spelling the word, every time it occurs, in capital
letters.'

Dr. Rashdall's argument—to put it much more
bluntly because more briefly than Dr. Sanday puts
it—is that every man should interpret the Creeds,
or any article in them that offends him, in his own
way. Let him also say so. The world may be
shocked, but it is better that the world should be
shocked in that manner than that the Church
should lose the use of the very men who are able
to free her from the shackles of Creed subscrip­tion.
Dr. Sanday answers that in all this he hears Dr.
Rashdall the liberal theologian. He wonders what
Dr. Rashdall the moral philosopher will say. 'I
should like to be instructed by the two Rashdalls,
the Churchman and the philosopher, when they
have come to terms between themselves.'

Thus Dr. Sanday's arguments are with Canon
Moberly, not with Dr. Rashdall. Where is Dr.
Sanday himself? Dr. Sanday is after all and
almost altogether on Dr. Rashdall's side. For he
appreciates, as Canon Moberly was unable to
appreciate, the rights of the individual Church­
man's intellect. He appreciates, as Canon
Moberly was unable to appreciate, the progress
of human thought. 'The thought of the twentieth
century'—his words are very strong—'cannot be
identical with the thought of the second or fourth.'
He therefore sees and frankly acknowledges that
'some mitigation to the strictness of subscription,
even to the Creeds, is not only desirable but
inevitable.'

How is mitigation to come? One way, he says,
is by having regard to the scriptural meaning of
the words of the Creed, or of some particular clause in
the Creed, and by accepting the words in that
sense, not in the sense in which the framers of
the Creed understood them. He considers it
quite legitimate for a man who knows all that
the clause, 'He descended into hell,' or the clause,
'I believe in the resurrection of the body,'
properly means, to accept these clauses in that
proper meaning.

This principle, he believes, would cover all the
difficulties that are felt as to what is called the
Athanasian Creed. And he gives his own
experience: 'Many years ago, when I first began clerical life, I joined in a memorial asking for relief from the use of this Creed; but now I value it greatly. The principal reason for this change of front has been a more thorough study of the patristic writings concerned with the prolonged and searching controversy of which this Creed is at once the climax and, in the Western Church, the close.'

No doubt there are 'damnatory clauses' in the Athanasian Creed. And Dr. Sanday knows that the modern mind shrinks from what seems to be sweeping condemnation of its fellow-men. He does not doubt that this shrinking is just. But wrongness of belief is not to be dismissed as an unimportant thing. In proportion to the blessedness of right belief must be the loss of wrong belief. And for the rest it is well to let the modern mind emphasize the positive, and skip somewhat lightly over the negative side of these disturbing clauses.

But there is another principle whereby the rigour of subscription may be mitigated. The Creeds belong to the Church, not to the individual. Properly they are the expression of the faith of the corporate body. Their use is in public worship. And when the individual joins in reciting them he does so, not as an individual but as a member of the corporate body. It is true that in the Nicene Creed the Western Church has taught us to say, 'I believe.' But this is a Western modification. In the Eastern Creeds generally, and even in the Nicene Creed in its older Latin translations, the form is 'we believe.'

The question then is this. How much does the 'we' of the Creeds demand of the individual? How much does it demand of a scholar who knows their history and the process of their formation? Dr. Sanday answers by an example.

His example is the clause in the Creed that affirms the Virgin-birth. Now Dr. Sanday will not admit that the evidence for the Virgin-birth is really 'slight.' It is small enough in amount. But objective truth of fact is not always in proportion to the amount or even the conclusiveness of evidence. In this case the loss of a particular branch of literature might account for the paucity of the evidence. A chance discovery might at any moment make it more. Moreover, you cannot isolate the Virgin-birth and deal with it out of all relation to the doctrine of the Incarnation and its own historical place in the Christian religion. Yet Dr. Sanday deliberately says: 'I do not think that we can prevent, or that it would be right to attempt to prevent, a competent scholar from forming his own estimate of the evidence (in the narrower sense) for the Virgin-birth.' And when Canon Hensley Henson complaints that the Bishops of Norwich and of Bristol demand from candidates for ordination express and separate subscription to this article of the Creed, he does not approve. 'We do not want,' he says, 'to induce our young men to commit themselves to more than their knowledge or clearness of head would perhaps justify them in committing themselves to. The total effect is the important thing. Let it suffice that by subscribing to the Creed as a whole, the man declares himself heart and soul a Christian.'