Its response, the truest, most stringent and smart,
Its pathos the purest, from out the wrung heart,
Whose faculties—flaccid it may be, if less
Sharply strung, sharply smitten—had failed to express
Just the one note the great final Harmony needs.
And what best proves there's life in a heart—that it
bleeds!
Grant a cause to remove, grant an end to attain,
Grant both to be just—and what mercy in pain?
Cease the sin with the sorrow! See morning begin!
Pain must burn itself out if not fuel'd by sin.—LYTTON.

If there had been any better thing, and more profitable

to man's salvation than suffering, surely Christ would have
showed it by word and example. For both the disciples
who followed Him and all who desire to follow Him He
plainly exhorted to bear their cross, and saith, 'If any man
will come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his
cross, and follow Me.'—A. KEMPIS.

Is He not perfect, this Man of Sorrows? Did He not
unite in Himself all good qualities which in others are only
found apart, and even then in an inferior degree? Do
we not find in Him, for example, more than the tenderness
of woman, combined with more than the strength of man?
Has not the story of His self-sacrificing love purified many
of the vilest hearts, and brought some of the most
abandoned of the devil's votaries to the feet of God? Did
not everything good in the world before Christ point to
something far better in Him? Does not everything that is
best in the world to-day owe its origin to Him? How much
of what is sweetest in art, how much of what is noblest in
life, would never have existed but for Christ? Must we
not thank Him for all that is most beautiful in our social
intercourse, in our friendships, in our homes? Can you not
trace His influence wherever there is progress in right and
freedom and toleration and joy? The thoughts of the
Nazarene lie at the basis of modern civilization, and are
inextricably bound up with the future progress of the world.
—A. W. MOMERIE.

There is no grief of man can hold so much
As this of Thine;
Our human sorrows cannot nearly touch
Thy pain divine.

They suffer most that most have power to love,
And Thine, we know.

Is measureless by aught in heaven above
Or earth below.

There is no bleeding like the spirit's pain,
The pierced soul;
There are no tear-drops like the drops that rain
From hearts not whole.

There is no broken heart like heart that breaks
For loved one's sin;
The fall of our ideal ever wakes
The death within.

And this was Thine, is Thine, O Father dear,
In triple power,
Thy boundless love with vision piercing-clear,
Beheld that hour.

Forbid that I should add to Thy dread cup
One drop of woe,
But grant me for myself to gather up
Its overflow.

Thy tears in dark Gethsemane o'erran
Their limits' brim,
Help me to lift those fallen drops for man,
And live for him.

—G. MATHESON.

Sermons for Reference.

Barrett (G. S.), Temptation of Christ, 1.
Brown (A.), God's Great Salvation, 61.
Bruce (A. B.), Epistle to the Hebrews, 88.
Hamilton (J.), Faith in God, 195.
Horne (W.), Religious Life and Thought, 49.
Kingsley (C.), National Sermons, 254.
Meyer (F. B.), Way into the Holiest, 41.
Momerie (A. W.), Origin of Evil, 12, 25, 37, 50.
Price (A. C.), Fifty Sermons, ii. 193.
Reichel (C. F.), Cathedral and University Sermons, 121.
Saphir (A.), Expository Lectures on Hebrews, i. 118.
Vaughan (C. J.), Lessons of the Cross and Passion, 62.
Westcott (B. F.), Christus Consummator, 17.

Ritschl in English.

BY PROFESSOR THE REV. JAMES DENNEY, D.D., GLASGOW.

DR. MACKINTOSH and his coadjutors, by their
translation of the third volume of Ritschl's Justi-
fication and Reconciliation, have earned the gratitude
of all theological students in this country. It is
nearly twenty-five years since the first volume
was rendered into English by Mr. Sutherland
Black. That was a premature venture, and
appealed to an interest which had yet to be
created; the present translation meets one of the
most urgent wants of the hour. Everyone has
been writing about Ritschl, and everyone has
been controverting his fellow; what the student
could do whose ignorance of German made it
impossible for him to refer to the text of Ritschl
himself, one can hardly imagine. But now the
great systematic work of Ritschl is open to all,
and the bewildered, if their interest survives, can
make up their minds for themselves.

The translation must have been a work of
incredible labour. Ritschl says somewhere that
he is the most difficult German writer since Kant.
Many of his readers will say, Why except Kant?
Both are difficult, no doubt; the difference is that
where Kant is intricate, Ritschl is opaque. There
may not be much to choose between a labyrinth
and a fog, but, on the whole, the possibility of
making progress seems greater in daylight. It
may be said at once that the translation is an
extraordinary success. It is the work of several
hands, but has undergone a careful revision by
the editor, and the English reader can use it
without misgiving. There are inequalities of
merit in it, from the point of view of skill in
translating; the eighth chapter, for instance, is
not as fine a translation as the sixth; but there
are none of those ruinous misapprehensions of
an author on critical points by which such work
is often made worse than useless. The style,
considering the difficulties to be overcome, is
singularly pure. It is only once in a long time we
come upon such an expression as 'the Bearer of
the Divine self-end,' which to the reader who does
not know German must be more or less puzzling.
Would it not have been defensible, at the risk of
dropping something, to say, 'the representative'
or 'the impersonation' of God's own end?

It is not in any carping spirit, but with the fullest
recognition that the translators have achieved
their task with a success which entitles them to
the warmest gratitude and admiration, that I
venture to note one or two slips such as no
vigilance can guard against in a work of nearly
700 pages. On p. 139, line 5 from foot, 'the
whole of the religious community' does not
convey the meaning to an English reader; it
should be 'the religious community as a whole'
(das Ganze der religiösen Gemeinde). Similarly
on p. 227, line 12 from top, 'in His thinking of
Himself' is not the same as 'in dem Denken
seiner selbst.' In English, to think of never
means anything but to think about, which is not
the thing intended either by Aristotle or Ritschl.
On p. 255, line 7 from foot, 'primitive' justice is
a printer's blunder for 'punitive' justice (Straf-
gerechtigkeit). On p. 279, line 8, 'spirit' should
be Person. On p. 289 there is a rather misleading
inaccuracy. At line 4, Predigtamt is twice ren-
dered 'preaching'; and 'preaching' is repre-
sented as a 'legal institution of the Church,
incogrounds with the spiritual and inward union
of the believers with Christ, expressed in the
notion of His kingdom.' But it is not 'preach-
ing' of which this is true, nor does Ritschl mean
it so. Preaching as the testimony of the believing
community to Christ is a function of its faith and
life, and not a legal institution; it is the attach-
ment of it to an 'amt'—'the office of preaching,'
as it is properly rendered farther down on the
same page—which is open to Ritschl's criticism.

On p. 304, line 3, Rom. viii. 24 should be Rom.
vii. 28 (this false reference is in the original).

On p. 415, line 10, I should question whether an
English reader would take out 'the subject-
matter' of Christ's life the same meaning which
belongs to der Stoff. Would not the contents,
or simply 'the material,' have given a less am-
biguous suggestion of a difficult word? On
p. 419, line 18, the reference given as (vol. ii.
p. 15), as if it referred to the second volume of
Ritschl's work, should be (Lib. ii. c. xv.); the
reference is to Calvin's Institutes, and as I shall
show farther on is one that ought to be verified
by the student of Ritschl. On p. 425 the date
1650 should be 1560. On p. 462 there is a
Hebrew word misprinted in Ritschl, and the
misprint is continued in the translation. On
p. 491, line 11, the words 'came to be regarded as
possessing equal worth in God's sight' are by no
means equal to 'in gleicher Bedeutung auch Gott
untergeschoben.' Perhaps they say all Ritschl
had a right to say, but his own expression is
psychologically much more interesting. On p.
517, line 20, there is a rendering which perplexes
me. It runs thus: 'James, therefore, is not quite
right when he says that the man who fulfils the
law is blessed in his deed. But what he does
express quite precisely is the truth that blessed-
ness accompanies a good deed which springs from
the supreme motive, and not from a calculation of
the result.' Ritschl has no doubt shown himself
capable in other connexions of inserting a 'not'
into what was once an affirmative proposition;
but I find no trace of such a various reading in
this passage. In both the 1st and the 3rd edd.,
what he says is, 'James, therefore, is quite
right when he says, etc. (Deshalb hat Jacobus
The Expository Times. 137

ganz Recht mit dem Satze)'; and in the following sentence he adds, 'But in doing so he at the same time gives quite precise expression to the truth,' etc. And this, surely, is what the connexion requires. On p. 569 there is a misapprehension in the sentence beginning at line 13 from the bottom. 'His making men good by the counter-working of His obedience against the entire sin of mankind' misses the point of 'dass Christus . . . durch die Gegenleistung seines Gehorsams gegen die Gesammtsinde der Menschen diese gutgemacht hat.' It is not men who are made good, it is the sin of the world which is made good, that is, compensated for: the diese refers to the Gesammtsinde, not to Menschen; and gut-machen is not bonum facere, but to satisfacere. I do not think that in the important parts of the book (and I have read most of it with the original at hand) there are any other slips of consequence.

Reading Ritschl is like learning to see in the dark. It is provoking, because you strike against things where you did not expect them; you fancy you see things looming through the haze, but they recede as you approach; and you want to find things, but cannot lay hands on them. But it is full of psychological interest, for Ritschl was a strong personality, and there is a refreshing sense of the natural man in all his criticisms; it is full of historical interest, for he was genuinely learned in his science; and as his wide influence proves, it is full of religious interest as well. For only a real religious interest can form anything resembling a theological school. Readers will often differ from one another about Ritschl's meaning, will sometimes be disposed to give him the benefit of the doubt, and sometimes to insist on his taking the responsibility of his logic; but no one can become familiar with his attitude to the Christian revelation—and it is this rather than his particular ideas which is of importance—without acknowledging toward him a great and lasting obligation.

The three great chapters in this book are the fourth, on the doctrine of God; the sixth, on the Person and Life-work of Christ; and the eighth, on the necessity of basing the forgiveness of sins on the work and passion of Christ.

It is in the first of these that the application is made of Ritschl's peculiar theory of Knowledge, the precise import of which has given rise to so much discussion. As everyone knows, Ritschl, like Schleiermacher, summarily banishes from Dogmatic the traditional arguments for the being of God. It would be impossible here to criticize his criticism of them, but it is permissible to say that the effect left on many minds by repeated and as far as possible unprejudiced study of this part of his work is, that Ritschl denies that any positive relation whatever can be established between the human intelligence as it has been evoked and formed by the Christian revelation, and the same human intelligence apart from that aid. Of course, I know there are students of Ritschl who would say that such an impression is unjust, and I am far from denying that they could adduce passages to support their opinion. The theologian, too, it may be argued, who makes a point of establishing a positive connexion between the moral development of man independent of the gospel, and the coming of the Redeemer,—who insists that justitia civilis is not merely the achievement of liberty in the realm of sin, but an essential preparation for the kingdom of God—who makes the State, in a word, the indispensable basis of the Kingdom,—need not, one might think, have shrunk from an analogous procedure on the intellectual side. But with Ritschl in our hands, we are tempted to feel that it is hopeless to look for agreement. It has often been pointed out, but it comes back inevitably to one in this connexion, that Ritschl's own mind never was and never became clear on the questions here involved. Could anything be more significant, more ominous, than the insertion of the famous 'not' in the third edition, where there was no 'not' in the first? The acceptance of the idea of God is at first 'no practical faith, but an act of theoretic knowledge'; at last it is, 'as Kant remarks, practical faith, and not an act of theoretic knowledge.' Without the expense of altering a word in his premises, without abating in the slightest the characteristic arrogance of his logic, Ritschl simply reverses his conclusion. This is not obscurity, it is incoherence, and on this point it haunts us throughout the work. Thus on p. 616 of the translation, he assumes that it must be possible 'to harmonize the scientific study of nature and the Christian view of the world in the same mind'—as if he had forgotten to carry forward the 'not' to this point. In these circumstances it seems wiser not to be too careful about what he actually thought, but to ask rather what the true logic of his premises leads to. If he himself
wavered and was undecided as to the inferences to be drawn from the distinction between theoretical knowledge and that knowledge which can only be expressed in a *Werthurtheil*, and as to the possibility or impossibility of making a scientific connexion between them, surely students of his work may be excused if they misrepresent him to each other.

The great Christian interest of Ritschl is represented by the chapter on the Person and Life-work of Christ. It deals with the manner in which the Godhead of Christ is to be conceived, and with the interpretation of His work as that in which His Godhead is revealed. As for the first part, one is tempted to say (as so often in theology) that Ritschl is right in all he asserts, and wrong in all he denies. The explanations of Christ's Godhead which are given in the creeds and confessions to which Ritschl is so intertemperately superior, are, in truth, not so much inconsistent with his doctrine as ulterior to it. They are the answer to questions which he refuses to ask, and forbids others to ask. But the mind will ask its own questions nevertheless. It has done so from the beginning, and answered them as it could. Ritschl defines Christ's Godhead solely by relation to God, and not an irresponsible adventure; it was the work Christ did was. The new name was unknown perhaps, but hardly the thing. What they signify is that the work Christ did was not an irresponsible adventure; it was the work the Father gave Him to do; the discharge of it had moral value, demanding as it was a great act of obedience, which at every step had moral value, demanding as it did conscientiousness, dutifulness, fidelity, love to God and men. This is not 'Amt,' with its alien associations; but it is very like the idea of an ethical vocation, which Ritschl says was unknown to the old theologians. The new name was unknown perhaps, but hardly the thing.

The last great dogmatic chapter in Ritschl, on the necessity of connecting forgiveness with the work and passion of Christ, is the most involved and inapprehensible of any in the book. One misses here most of all a clear relation to the New Testament. A simple reader thinks he knows why the forgiveness of sins is necessarily connected with Christ's death. It is because Christ's death is a death for sin. The New Testament expresses this in a variety of ways. It says simply Christ died for sins. It says He suffered for sins once for all, the righteous for the unrighteous. It says He bore our sins in His own body to the tree. It says He put away sin by the sacrifice of Himself. It says He loosed us from our sins by His blood. In every way it solicits, prompts, and helps us to Godhead, as revealed in these functions, is not communicated to us. But this is not the case. In the 1559 edition, Calvin emphasizes the communication of everyone of Christ's offices to the Church. Thus of the prophet office he says that Christ 'non sibi modo uctionem accepisse ut funkeretur docendi partibus; sed toti suo corpori, ut in continua evangelii praedaione virtus spiritus respondet.' So of the kingly: 'talis est regnandi ratio ut communicet nobis quidquid acceptit a patre.' And finally of the priestly: 'Jam sacerdotis personam sustinet Christus, non modo ut aeterna reconciliationis lege paterni nobis faventem ac propitium reddat, sed etiam ut nos asciscat in societatem tanti honoris.' I am disposed to think, too, that in Reformation theology the word *munus* or *officium* answered much more closely to what Ritschl calls 'moral vocation' than to the German word 'amt.' A great deal of the meaning of words depends on association, and one can understand that in a bureaucratic State, and in a bureaucratic State Church, *Amt* should come to have associations which one could hardly connect with Christ. But *munus* and *officium* had not these associations. What they signify is that the work Christ did was not an irresponsible adventure; it was the work the Father gave Him to do; the discharge of it was a great act of obedience, which at every step had moral value, demanding as it did conscientiousness, dutifulness, fidelity, love to God and men. This is not 'Amt,' with its alien associations; but it is very like the idea of an ethical vocation, which Ritschl says was unknown to the old theologians. The new name was unknown perhaps, but hardly the thing.
define Christ’s death in relation to sin. But we look in vain for anything of this in the chapter in question, and he would be a bold man who ventured to maintain that the chapter provides an equivalent or a substitute. The New Testament language may be mysterious, but even those who are conscious of the mystery are conscious also that the New Testament writers are on the spot; they are at the very place at which God must meet sinful men; they are handling the one question which is vital to conscience; and whoever catches a glimpse of their meaning has a sudden inspiration to evangelize. Was anyone ever moved to evangelize by this prolix, obscure, and evasive discussion of the one theological problem on which the light of the New Testament should have been focussed?

The supreme merit of Ritschl’s work is that it never loses sight of the fact that the centre of gravity in the New Testament is the idea of reconciliation, and that it never ceases to bring theological propositions to the test of Christian experience. The latter of these characteristics has been pretty well assimilated by all modern theologians; with regard to the former, many have it still to learn. Nothing could be less like the New Testament than the quasi-philosophical theory of the Incarnation on which Christianity is built in books like Lux Mundi. Against such conceptions of the Christian religion, with all their pretensions to philosophical breadth and moral comprehensiveness, the insight and tenacity of Ritschl’s Justification and Reconciliation are a necessary and an irrefragable protest.

Contributions and Comments.

A Correction.

The writer of the article in the November number of The Expository Times headed ‘Some Internal Evidence for the Use of the Logia,’ etc., wishes to rectify errata in some words of the last sentence but one on p. 72, col. 2. That sentence ought of course to have stood, and was intended to stand, thus: ‘The words and phrases which are characteristic of Mt and of Lk as individual writers are used with considerably more frequency in the latter class of passages than in the former.’

Psalm Problems.

I.

In a review of Wellhausen’s text of the Psalms (in Haupt’s S.B.O.T.) which I wrote for the Theol. Literaturzeitung (1896, No. 22), I briefly contended for, or in some cases simply suggested, views regarding certain difficult passages which may have surprised scholars under whose notice they came. I desire now to repeat and to justify these views in detail, as well as to add some notes on other passages.

Verse 7.—Here the problem is to find a sensible equivalent for the two words יִשָּׁלֶּךָ; for to strike out both (Duhm) is merely to cut the knot, and if the first word is removed as a gloss (Cheyne), the result is two unequal lines. The words מַכְּלָל, ‘tin’ (Peiser) for the first, andכְּלָל, ‘gold’ (Dyserinck) for the second, satisfy so well all just demands that they are not to be given up again on account of trivial objections. Whether to read מַכְּלָל orכְּלָל orכְּלָל is merely a question of idiom, but, at all events, Is 1:25 gives us an undeniable right to coupleכְּלָל andכְּלָל, although they there fall into two parallel members. For יִשָּׁלֶּךָ we should not write יִשָּׁלֶּךָ, which would necessitate alsoכְּלָל, but simplyכְּלָל, as is done by Cheyne. The bare assertion that Jahweh’s word is silver and gold is better than the comparison. We read then: ‘Silver purified from tin [or purified silver, without tin], gold refined seven times.’ It will be long before a better restoration of the text is found.

Verses 8, 9.—Without any necessity, exception has been taken time after time to the words יִשָּׁלֶּךָ, and the most impossible proposals have been made to change them or to alter the punctua-