Notes of Recent Exposition.

The Supremacy of St. Peter is a toothless tyrant. We laugh when the Keys are shaken in our face. But the true interpretation of Scripture has always an interest for us, and we are concerned to know if our Lord really gave St. Peter this supremacy. So the subject ever comes up again, and will keep coming up till we bow to science, and a scientific study settles it.

Within the last few weeks it has come up from several quarters, and some things worth noticing have been said about it. Principal Drummond in his Hibbert Lectures touches the subject. It is in his first lecture. He is considering what is the essential character of Christianity, and what is meant by the Christian Church. And he says, 'It is certainly remarkable that in three of the Gospels the word “Church” does not occur, and in the remaining one it is used only on two occasions.' One of these occasions is the passage in question: ‘Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My church’ (Matt. xvi. 18). And inasmuch as that passage is omitted in the parallel accounts of the same incident, Principal Drummond thinks it is exposed to the suspicion of a later date; ‘for we can hardly suppose that two of the Evangelists would deliberately omit a saying which constituted the very basis of ecclesiastical authority.’

But Dr. Alfred Resch is bolder than Principal Drummond. In the Critical Review for the current quarter, Professor Marshall has a most interesting article on Resch’s new volume. One item in it was mentioned last month, and the promise made that another might be mentioned now. This is the other. For Dr. Resch quotes several passages that are found in all our great manuscripts and all our critical editions, but which he considers to be nevertheless ‘lacking in originality and the insertion of a later redactor,’ and this is the first passage of that kind which Professor Marshall refers to.

Principal Drummond thinks that the words, ‘Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build My church,’ are exposed to the suspicion of a late date, because they are found in St. Matthew alone. Dr. Resch believes that they were not at first found even in St. Matthew. He would not reject the whole verse, certainly, but he would cast out the words round which all the controversy has gathered; the words, ‘Thou art Peter,’ and ‘this.’ He would therefore read simply, ‘I say unto thee, that on the rock I will build My church.’

Dr. Resch gives two reasons for his bold suggestion. The one is that St. Paul cannot have known of the prerogative assigned to St. Peter, or he would never have spoken of him as ‘seeming to be a pillar,’ or ‘withstood him to the face.’ And the other, that in the entire literature of the second century, the verse, as we have it,
is not once quoted, its oldest witnesses being Tertullian and Origen.

Thus Principal Drummond and Dr. Resch agree in rejecting the disputed passage as a late addition to the sayings of our Lord. But Dr. Drummond is well aware how reluctantly in this country we recognise the right to cut the Gordion Knot of a theological difficulty in that way. So he quotes the opinion of Professor Bruce, in a footnote, that the saying is far too remarkable to have proceeded from anyone but Jesus. This is the opinion also of Dr. Denney, who next may be summoned in. He sees no difficulty in treating the words as genuine. ‘The occasion suggested the idea quite distinctly, and, as Beyschlag has acutely remarked, the magnificent ideal with which the Church is here spoken of, the poetic figures, the high attributes and functions assigned to the representative of her faith, authenticate the Word as genuinely Christ’s’ (Studies in Theology—Hodder).

Dr. Resch casts out the words by a process of historical criticism. By a process of literary criticism Dr. Denney keeps them in. ‘Who but Christ was capable of saying, Thou art Peter, and upon this rock will I build My church, and the gates of hell shall not prevail against it? Who but Christ was capable of saying, I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven? That is obviously, almost palpably, Christ’s anticipation, Christ’s ideal of the Church; it is the grand style of the Master; no ordinary man who saw the form in which the Church actually became historical could have spoken of it in this lofty strain.’

Now it will be observed that all these writers, though they differ on other points, agree in this, that they make St. Peter the rock on which the Church is supposed to be built. Dr. Denney, it is true, describes ‘the paltry papal interpretation, in which the whole soul and originality of the words are lost,’ as ‘beneath contempt.’ Still it is only when we come to the last writer who need be mentioned now, the late Dean of Dromore, that we find it earnestly contested if that is the proper reference of the words as they stand.

Dr. Campbell’s volume of Studies in Biblical and Ecclesiastical Subjects (Elliot Stock) was mentioned last month. The third paper in it is entitled ‘The Rock,’ and its argument may be given in a few sentences. ‘Peter’ does not mean a rock. It means a stone, the detached portion of a rock, movable, unsteady, most unsuitable for a foundation. To say nothing of the Greek scholar, no mere English reader should ever have made this mistake, for we are expressly instructed by St. John (i. 43) that this name given by our Lord to St. Peter meant a stone. The passage is, ‘Thou shalt be called Cephas, which is by interpretation a stone, Cephas being the Aramaic form of Peter.’

These words therefore, in Dr. Campbell’s judgment, were not the expression of a signal and solitary grandeur conferred on St. Peter. They were the very opposite. ‘By the marked contrast which our Lord draws between the stone and the rock, He seems to me to indicate this as His design,’ that just as St. Paul received a thorn in the flesh to buffet him lest he should be exalted overmuch through the abundance of his revelations, so there was the danger that St. Peter would be uplifted by his magnificent and unexpected revelation, and to humble him the Lord reminded him that he was but an unsteady stone, while the Church must be built upon the Rock.

And the Rock was none other than Himself. It was Himself as the Christ the Son of God, the Living One. For Dr. Campbell believes that the stress of the statement lies in its last word in the Greek—living. As the Father hath life in Himself, even so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself. For what end? That He might give eternal life to as many as Thou hast given
Him. And thus the Church is built—the living stones upon the Living Stone—into a spiritual house.

The chapter of most immediate usefulness in the Dean of Lichfield's recently published volume on the History of Marriage (Longmans) is that which he calls 'A Critical Examination of a Much-vexed Clause.' It is Lev. xviii. 18: 'And thou shalt not take a woman to her sister, to be a rival to her, to uncover her nakedness, beside the other in her lifetime.' Its present importance springs from the circumstance that it is the only passage in the Bible that seems directly to handle the question of marriage with a deceased wife's sister. And the reason of its great vexation is that it is hard to tell whether it allows such marriage or condemns it.

Jewish commentators, from the beginning even until now, have with one voice declared that this verse permits marriage with a deceased wife's sister. Christian expositors with almost equal unanimity have decided that it condemns such marriage. And Dean Luckock, much to his own sorrow, thinks the Jews have the best of the interpretation. An able reviewer in the Guardian suggests that Dr. Luckock has missed some of the Christian evidence. In particular, it is pointed out that he has not considered the opinion of Dr. Kalisch, 'a high authority on such a matter,' that the verse in question has no right to its place in the Law of Moses, the whole scope and aim of which it manifestly contradicts; that it is a late interpolation in short, Moses having written no more than the words, 'You are forbidden to take to wife two sisters.'

Now it may be true that the Dean of Lichfield has overlooked some of the evidence, even on both sides, and they who know its accumulation will scarcely blame him. But it does not seem likely that he has overlooked Kalisch. For he acknowledges that his interpretation of this verse contradicts the general aim of the chapter in which it is found. He also quotes, as Kalisch does, the plain Mohammedan precept on the subject, 'Thou shalt not take to wife two sisters,' and admits the relevancy of it, for Mohammed confessedly based his marriage laws on Moses. But to know Kalisch's suggestion is one thing, to accept it is another. For Dr. Luckock, like the rest of us, takes to the suggestion of interpolation only when he cannot help it.

He takes the passage as it stands. He accepts the Jewish interpretation that it permits marriage with a deceased wife's sister. He admits that it thus gainsays the whole tone of the legislation around it. And he comes to the conclusion that it is another of those things which Moses allowed for the hardness of the people's hearts, but it was not so at the beginning, and it must not be so now.

A great congress of philologists was held in Philadelphia recently, and Professor Batten gives an account of the proceedings in The Biblical World for February. Seven great societies assembled. All were philologists, but each was interested in a different philological field, and the experiment was watched with some anxiety. Nevertheless, all went well. Even the joint-meetings were successful. The Aryan listened complacently to the Hebrew grammarian, and the enthusiast in dialects became interested in the advocate of spelling reform.

From Professor Batten's report it would seem that to some of us the separate meetings of the Exegetical Society would have been of most interest. For there Professor Barton, for example, discussed the meaning of that phrase in the song of Deborah (Judg. v. 14) which our Authorized Version gives as 'the pen of the writer.' It is a hotly contested translation, one of the sweetest bones of contention between the Higher Critic and the Archæologist. For the Higher Critic cannot allow that there were pens at so early a date as this, or scribes who could make use of them. And so you find in, say, that excellent little Primer
of Judges which Dr. Black edited for the Cambridge Press, that 'all modern interpreters agree in rendering the phrase, "the marshal's staff." The word denoting a writer or scribe (šopher) also denotes a kind of military officer, as in 2 Kings xxv. 19; Jer. lii. 25, where we read of "the principal scribe of the host," or rather of "the scribe, the captain of the host," who mustered the people. And so, even the Revised Version has changed the familiar rendering into "the marshal's staff."

But a persistent champion for the oldest rendering is found in Professor Sayce. He spends three pages of his latest work, The Higher Criticism and the Monuments, in defending it. Criticism, he says, has contradicted its own primary rule of interpreting the words of the text in accordance with their natural and ordinary signification, and has endeavoured to transform the 'pen of the writer' into a 'marshal's baton.' But neither philology nor archaeology will permit the change. 'The word šopher, or scribe, defines the word shebhet, or rod, with which it is conjoined. What is meant by the rod of the scribe is made clear by the Assyrian monuments. It was the stylus of wood or metal, with the help of which the clay tablet was engraved or the papyrus inscribed with characters.'

What Professor Barton had to say on the subject we are not told. We are only told that he agreed with Professor Sayce, and held that the common translation, 'the pen of the scribe,' was the correct one.

Another paper, perhaps the most thorough and exhaustive of any of the papers read before the Exegetical Society, was that of Professor Schmidt of Colgate University on Maran-atha (1 Cor. xvi. 22). But we have not even a hint of his conclusions. We are more favoured with Professor Thayer, the well-known New Testament lexicographer. He is the president of the Society whose sittings we are discussing, and of which the full title is: 'The Society of Biblical Literature and Exegesis.' At the second separate session, then, of this Society, Professor Thayer 'gave an elaborate and learned note' on the expression, 'Thou sayest,' of our Lord in answer to His judges, and argued that it did not mean an emphatic 'I am,' as is so frequently and so confidently asserted, but simply the admission of a fact which has been stated by another.

Finally, it may be noticed that Professor Morris Jastrow, jun., of the University of Pennsylvania, read a paper in which he argued that many of the Hebrew proper names ending in Jah and Jahu are not compounds with the divine name, but that the Jah is simply an ending. Abijah, for example, could not be 'the father of Jah,' or 'Jah is my father,' since no Semite would put a child in that relation to the Deity.

'If I am not mistaken,' said Professor Sanday at the late Church Congress, 'Mr. Illingworth's Lectures will be found to mark the beginning of a new phase in the religious thought of our time,—a phase in which philosophy will once more take its proper place in supplying a broad foundation for other branches of theological study, and at the same time quickening them with new life.' A book about which Dr. Sanday can say that, is surely worthy of attention. Has Mr. Illingworth's Bampton Lectures received their due measure of attention yet?

No doubt the subject is at present but moderately attractive to us. We are all so busy with social Constitutions, as Carlyle would say, and with trying to get them to march. We have no time for philosophy. Besides, we are still a little suspicious of it. Has it not failed us already times without number, and even turned its back upon us? And especially have we not a lingering recollection that the thing is unlawful, being actually condemned in Scripture? What does Mr. Illingworth call his book? Personality, Human and Divine! The subject is not attractive, nor the title.
Yet Dr. Sanday has not misjudged. To the student of the Bible and to the preacher of the gospel this book has present practical worth. Perhaps beyond all the books that had the year 1894 stamped upon them.

*Personality, Human and Divine.* For the real question to-day between believer and unbeliever is, as Professor Iverach has cleverly put it: Is God knowable? Not God as a 'Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness.' Interesting as a literary phrase, that is utterly useless as a shelter from the storm. It is a personal God we need, a God with whom we can enter into personal communication. And so this is the thing which above all else we must be assured of, that the personal God we do have is not a mere projection of our own selves, a mere creation of our own desires.

The Agnostic says He is. He repeats the ancient utterance of Xenophanes that 'the lions, if they could have pictured a god, would have pictured him in fashion as a lion; the horses like a horse; the oxen like an ox;' and triumphantly concludes that man, with no more justification, inevitably considers Him a magnified man. And the plausibility, and therefore the malignity of the fallacy, says Mr. Illingworth, consists in the fact that it is half a truth. We do think of God as a magnified Man; we cannot think of Him otherwise; nay, it is as a magnified Man He makes Himself known to us. The fallacy is half a truth.

And, therefore, in order that we may know God, we must first know man. To know God as a Person, we must know man as a person. And Mr. Illingworth gives his first lecture to an account of the slow process by which man, thinking about himself, came at last to see that there are three constituent elements in his personality. These three constituent elements, once seen, are clear enough. But they are made surer to us by the searching analysis of the second lecture. They are these: (1) self-consciousness; (2) the power of self-determination; and (3) desires which irresistibly impel us into communion with other persons.

In other words: Reason, Will, Love.

These three constituent elements of personality seem clear enough. But it may be well to say that in gathering them together (which he does in his first lecture) and in analysing them (which he does in his second) Mr. Illingworth makes some very useful contributions to old, and we had almost thought worn-out themes. On the freedom of the will, for example. For the second constituent of personality is the power of self-determination, which simply means that man has freedom to will and to do of his own good pleasure. But 'the freedom of the will,' says Mr. Illingworth, 'does not mean the ability to act without a motive, as some of its opponents still stupidly seem to suppose. But it does mean the ability to create or co-operate in creating our own motives, or to choose our motive, or to transform a weaker motive into a stronger by adding weights to the scale of our own accord, and thus to determine our conduct by our reason. For instance, I am hungry, and that is simply an animal appetite; but I am immediately aware of an ability to choose between gratifying my hunger with an unwholesome food because it is pleasant, or with an unpleasant food because it is wholesome, or abstaining from its gratification altogether for self-discipline or because the food before me is not my own. That is to say, I can present to my mind, on the occasion of appetite, pleasure, utility, goodness, as objects to be attained, and I can choose between them. Nor is it to the point to say that I am determined by my character, for my character is only the momentum which I have gained by a number of past acts of choice, that is by my own past use of my freedom; and even so I am conscious that at the moment I can counteract my character, though morally certain that I have no intention so to do.'

That is what we mean by free-will. And it is a fact of my own consciousness, corroborated by the like experience of all other men. When Bain
compares it to a belief in witches, as being a fact of consciousness as long as it is believed, his misapprehension of the point is almost ludicrous, says Mr. Illingworth. For the sense of freedom is an immediate part of my consciousness. I cannot be conscious without it. I cannot tear it out. Moreover, upon this sense of freedom all law and morality depend. And, last of all, and most impressively, 'the sense of freedom has maintained itself, from the dawn of history, against a spirit far more powerful than any which philosophy can raise—the spirit of remorse. What would not humanity, age after age, have given to be free from remorse? Yet remorse still stares us in the face, overshadowing our hearts with sadness, and driving its countless victims into madness, suicide, despair, and awful forebodings of the after-world. Men would have exorcised it, if they could. But they cannot. And remorse is only a darker name for man’s conviction of his own free-will.'

Dante’s use of the Divine Name in the ‘Divina Commedia.’

BY ELEANOR F. JOURDAIN.

In the Divina Commedia we find that the conclusions of the philosophy of Dante’s day and the doctrines of the Christian Church are placed side by side and considered to be simultaneously tenable; for Dante admits no antagonism between reason and faith. In accordance with this view his conception of God unites what the Church teaches us as to the mystery of the Holy Trinity, with what Pagan thought has gained by speculation into the Infinite. Learning from Aristotle, Dante distinguishes between the relative and absolute sides of Perfect Virtue, and thus he thinks of God, considered absolutely, as Perfect Holiness: considered relatively to man, as Perfect Justice. But he teaches, too, that we can only conceive of this Perfect, or Divine Justice, as manifested in Power, Wisdom, and Love, the attributes which are traditionally connected with the three Persons of the Holy Trinity. This belief of Dante’s has a direct bearing upon the leading idea of the Divina Commedia.

It is comparatively seldom, and only, I believe, in the Paradiso, that God is referred to in the absolute sense, as, e.g., ‘the first and Unspeakable Holiness.’ For the most part the allusions to the Deity are from the point of view of his relation to man: Divine Justice governs the three kingdoms, Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise. But each kingdom

1 Par. x. (The English equivalents for the Italian passages referred to in this paper are taken for the most part from Butler’s Divina Commedia).

is represented as being under the special influence and control of one person of the Holy Trinity. The spirits in Hell see God revealed to them as Power, in Purgatory chiefly as Wisdom, in Paradise as Love. There are, however, many indications in the poem that, though the vision of the spirits in Hell is strictly limited, in Purgatory and Paradise it gradually widens, and towards the end of Dante’s journey the whole relation of God to man is more clearly revealed.

The evidence for these points lies principally in the use of the Name of God by the actors in the poem; though whether every detail of their practice is the result of deliberate intention on Dante’s part, or only of a poetical instinct of consistency, it is hard to decide.

I.

In Hell the spirits of sinners are, presumably, forbidden to mention God by name. Vanni Fucci, the only spirit who utters the word, uses it in blasphemous defiance of God’s power. As a rule the Deity is referred to in periphrasis, not only by the shades themselves, but even by Dante and Virgil in their presence. Thus Francesca and Paolo are implored by Dante to come and speak to him ‘if Another deny it not’; Odysseus describes the whirlwind which seized and sank his ship, ‘as it pleased Another.’ And Virgil, in the presence of the defiant demons who bar the

2 Inf. xxv. 3 Ibid. v. 4 Ibid. xxvi.