

period about 8000 years B.C., and he may have been on the earth much longer.

2. I know of no special work to recommend on Biblical Chronology. EDWARD L. CURTIS.

New Haven, Conn.

In vol. i. of the 2nd series of the *Expositor*, a theory that Abraham was not really commanded to sacrifice his son is based on the assertion that the noun translated 'burnt offering' in Gen. xxii. 2 does not necessarily mean more than 'offering.' Does the best Hebrew scholarship allow this interpretation? —H. W. H.

I should simply say that Hebrew scholarship, good, bad, and indifferent, maintains that *חֵבֶלֶת* means 'burnt offering,' viz. that which goes up in fire and fragrant smoke to God. But even though it did mean 'offering' merely, I do not see what difference that would make; for it certainly cannot mean anything but an offering to be sacrificed on the altar. So far from *חֵבֶלֶת* meaning less than burnt offering, it is often equivalent to *חֹלֶקֶת*, whole burnt offering, being rendered by the Septuagint 'holocaust.' J. A. PATERSON.

Edinburgh.

I have several times tried to use the Revised Version at family worship, for I am well aware that it gives a more accurate account of the original than does the Authorized, but I have always had to give it up. I do not think it is the unfamiliarity of its language only. It seems to me that it is

often (I refer to the New Testament only, however) so un-English. Take the translation of the tenses. You know how often a perfect has been changed into a past. In very many cases the change is a great gain. But there are not a few cases where it seems to be a mistaken adherence to a Greek idiom which is different from ours. I am anxious to go into the subject more carefully, and I shall be much obliged to you if you will mention any accessible and reliable literature.—W. M.

A few years ago Dr. R. F. Weymouth, author of the *Resultant Greek Testament*, and a capable scholar, contributed a series of articles on this subject to *The Theological Monthly*. These articles have lately been reprinted in a shilling pamphlet, and published by Mr. David Nutt. The title of the pamphlet is: *On the Rendering into English of the Greek Aorist and Perfect*.

But anyone who wishes to understand the subject in its whole bearings should read the chapter in Professor Burton's newly issued *Syntax of the Moods and Tenses in New Testament Greek* (T. & T. Clark, 6s. 6d.), an extremely able and interesting book. Nowhere else can the relation between the Greek and the English idiom be so clearly and speedily caught. On p. 24, Professor Burton gives the Greek and the English idiomatic usages of these tenses in parallel columns, and it is at once seen when the past should be used in English for the Greek aorist, and when it should not. Professor Burton has not the Revisers in mind as Dr. Weymouth has, but he silently answers them now and then. EDITOR.

The School of Ritschl.

BY PROFESSOR THE REV. JAMES ORR, D.D., EDINBURGH.

IN a paper in the September number of this Magazine last year an attempt was made to give some account and estimate of Ritschl himself and his theology. Whatever judgment we may form of the man and his system, the fact is undoubted, as there pointed out, that Ritschl's teaching has had a most powerful effect on multitudes of minds in Germany and other countries, and has given birth to what, by general consent, is recognised as the most influential theological movement of recent times. It touches all spheres and sides of theology, and

gives a character to the thinking of many who are not formally ranked as Ritschl's disciples. This of itself is evidence of the forcefulness of the original impulse, while it enables us to estimate better than we can do even from the study of Ritschl himself the innermost meaning and permanent worth of his system. For it is a truism to say that the real spirit of any movement, and the elements of permanent worth which belong to it—as well as the weaknesses and inconsistencies which inhere in it—only become fully manifest in its historical

development. In this sense, the study of the school of Ritschl is on a larger scale the study of Ritschl himself.

When we speak of Ritschl as the founder of a school, we mean more than merely that he has exercised a freshening influence on the theology of his time, or even that he is a noteworthy theological thinker and writer. There have been many leaders of thought in theology—Rothe, for example—who yet have not been founders of schools. We use this title to describe one—Schleiermacher, for instance—whose thinking has something principal or germinal in it; who looks at theology from a distinctive and original standpoint; who determines its aims and methods along new lines; and the principle of whose teaching proves its fertility by the abundance and variety of its developments and applications in the different spheres of theology. Applying this test to Ritschl, we cannot deny him the right to be regarded as the creator of a school. Widely divergent in the details of their systems as many of his followers are,—strongly as some of them, while acknowledging their obligations to Ritschl, desire to assert their independence,¹—they are yet fitly grouped together as sharing in a common impulse, and united by certain fundamental resemblances alike to their master and to one another. Among these generic features which bind together the Ritschlian party are those with which the study of Ritschl has already made us familiar, viz. the strong contrast they all draw between religious and theoretic knowledge; the desire to free theology from all association with, and dependence on, metaphysics; the insisting on the positive revelation in Christ as the one source of true religious knowledge; the central position they all assign to the doctrine of the kingdom of God, and their making of this conception determinative of every other notion in theology—*e.g.* of that of God, of sin, of the Person of Christ, of redemption; the rigorous exclusion from theology of everything which lies outside the earthly manifestation of Christ (*e.g.* pre-existence, eschatology); and finally, the distrust of, and antagonism to, everything of the nature of mysticism in religion. Partial exceptions must be made in the case of individuals.

A greater difficulty arises when we attempt to describe the circumference of this school. Certain important names are generally recognised as repre-

senting it in theology, as Herrmann of Marburg, Kaftan of Berlin, and (under Ritschlian protest) Bender of Bonn; beyond these we have a class of able writers, more or less representative of the ideas and tendencies of the school in different departments, as Harnack in Church History, Wendt in New Testament Theology, Schulz in Old Testament Theology and Christology; finally, we have a wider circle of talented and enthusiastic disciples who have done good work in the magazines of the school,² and in separate publications—men like Bornemann, Reischle, Gottschick (editor of *Zeitschrift*), Schrempf (deposed on the *Apostolicum* question), with many others. Reischle, *e.g.*, takes up the mediating rôle—writing on such subjects as, 'Can we know the deep things of God?' 'A Word on the Controversy on Mysticism in Theology,' and in an able article in the *Studien und Kritiken* (1891), energetically combating Kaftan's empirical theory of cognition. Bornemann, again, in his *Unterricht*, has attempted a sketch of the theology of the school in systematic form; he also writes the pamphlet *Bitter Truths*, in reply to Egidy's *Earnest Thoughts* (*Ernstes Gedanken*), etc. His *Unterricht* is a curious example of the upside-down kind of treatment to which the working out of Ritschlianism leads in theology, beginning as it does, after some introductory matter, with the kingdom of God in its perfection in glory; then treating of the world in its opposition to this kingdom; then of the kingdom in its present form; then of the Person and work of Christ; then of the knowledge of God; finally, of the Church, and Christian life and duties.

It is of more interest to us to observe how, within this general framework of the Ritschlian party, there has developed itself the most marked individuality in the different members of the school, often leading to entire divergence of view on the most essential points. This may be pointed to as evidence of the healthful vitality of the movement, but it has its side of weakness also, and leaves the impression of a lack of unity and coherence in the Ritschlian theology, arising, it may plausibly be held, from its subjectivism, or weak hold on objective truth, and from the absence of a controlling standard of belief. It would, indeed, be possible, though not perhaps profitable, by playing off the various writers of the school against

¹ Kaftan, *e.g.* in his *Das Wesen*, etc. Preface.

² Chiefly the *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche* and *Die christliche Welt*.

each other, to make out a far stronger case for the disintegration of Ritschlianism, than they are able to establish, in their favourite line of criticism, for the disintegration of catholic dogma. Only to indicate what I mean—we have Herrmann definitely separating himself from Ritschl in his theory of knowledge; we have Kaftan decisively repudiating Herrmann, and declaring that with his Kantianism he is back again on the old ground which makes a philosophical view regulative for the treatment of theology;¹ we have Reischle as vigorously demolishing Kaftan's empiricism, and regarding it as the surrender of the possibility of theology;² we have Bender thrown over by all parties, while Herrmann retaliates on his own critic by describing Bender as only a 'secularised Kaftan';³ we have another writer in a recent number of the *Zeitschrift* of the school (Troeltsch) describing Kaftan's apologetic as sceptical in its standpoint, and only avoiding the consequences by falling back on revelation in Christ without either making good the exclusively supernatural character of this religion as against the claims to revelation of other religions, or showing what supernatural in this connexion means.⁴ Finally, Ziegler of Strassburg, an independent critic, with much more justice, sees in Bender's theory of religion simply the 'unveiled Feuerbachism of the Ritschlian theology.'⁵

Approaching the study of this school more seriously, I shall endeavour to bring out as concisely as I can the distinctive positions of some of its leading representatives on the main topics under discussion in their circles. This method of comparison will enable us to see at once the measure of their agreement, and the amount of their divergence, both from each other, and from their common master Ritschl.

We begin naturally with that on which all the members of the school lay great stress—the *theory of knowledge*. The common points here are the assertion of what Kaftan calls the primacy of the practical over the theoretic reason; the denial of the power of the theoretic reason to attain to any knowledge of God, or of supersensible reality; and the consequent drawing of a strong distinction between religious and theoretic knowledge. But within these limits, as already indicated, the widest

differences prevail. Herrmann is out and out a Kantian in his view of the Practical Reason, and of an *à priori* moral law, though, in divergence from Kant, and really in inner contradiction with him, he places at the centre of all 'the feeling of self' (*Selbstgefühl*), to the satisfaction of which both religion and morality are related as means. Kaftan, on the other hand, is as decidedly an empiricist as Herrmann is an idealist—stands on the basis of Locke or Hume, and rejects all *à priori* norms, whether on the theoretic or the practical side. Bender's position I shall refer to later. Yet Kaftan is distinguished from the other members of his school by the earnestness of his attempts to find a means of adjustment between faith and theoretic knowledge which may avoid the appearance of collision between them, and save his faith-theology from the reproach of subjectivism. This is the weakest point in the theology of Ritschl, that by resolving religious knowledge wholly into 'value-judgments,' and making a complete divorce between religious and theoretic knowledge, he seems to throw doubt on the objective truth of the former. Both in his *Wesen* and his *Wahrheit*, Kaftan deals with this difficulty, and makes liberal concessions in the way of conciliation. He goes so far as to grant the theoretic character of the propositions of faith. 'The fact itself,' he says, 'of the theoretic character of the propositions of faith lies clear before our eyes.'⁶ He argues strongly that there is only *one* truth, and that all truth is from God; concedes that faith-propositions have their theoretic side, and that 'in the treatment of the truth of the Christian religion, it is the theoretic side of these which comes into consideration'; explains that 'truth' in this connexion means simply what it does in other cases, not subjective truth, but 'objective'—'the agreement of the proposition with the real state of the case,' which is unaffected by our thoughts and judgments upon it, etc.⁷ In a more recent article in the *Zeitschrift*, he even proposes to abandon the expression 'judgments of value' altogether, as liable to misapprehension. 'I have,' he says, 'in this attempt to describe the knowledge of faith according to its kind and manner of origin, avoided the expression "Werthurtheil," though I have earlier so characterised the propositions of faith. They are theoretic judgments, which are grounded upon a judgment of

¹ *Das Wesen*, p. 13.

² *Stud. und Krit.* 1891.

³ *Theol. Lit. Zeit.* No. 4, 1886.

⁴ *Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche*, 1893, p. 509.

⁵ Quoted by Pfeleiderer, *Die Ritschlsche Theol.* p. 123.

⁶ *Das Wesen*, p. 109 (1st ed.).

⁷ *Die Wahrheit*, pp. 1-7.

worth, which therefore cannot be appropriated without entering into this judgment of worth which lies at their foundation.¹ But this only raises the new question—What is meant by a ‘theoretic judgment’ which rests exclusively on a judgment of worth?

The truth is, that while Kaftan, in the above expressions, seems to be vindicating an objective character for his propositions of faith, he never really gets—and from his empirical basis cannot get—beyond subjective postulates and representations. What is more to our purpose at the present stage—these views with which he sets out, of the unity of truth, of the theoretic and objective character of our faith-knowledge, are completely left behind in the subsequent discussions. There we have the old dualism brought back in the most pronounced form. In the analysis of knowledge in the *Wahrheit*, e.g., we have a distinction drawn between Opinion, Faith, and Knowledge. ‘An opinion,’ we are told, ‘can be true, and religious faith is always regarded as true, by him who adheres to it. But neither in the one case nor in the other do we speak of such a thing as knowledge. . . . Faith lies in quite a different sphere from both knowledge and opinion. . . . In contradistinction to faith and opinion, knowledge signifies that we are convinced of the state of things in a manner which admits of no doubt.’² The drift of this, confirmed by the context, is, that knowledge is excluded from faith; and since theology consists only of faith-propositions, it cannot give knowledge. The amazing thing is that, after all, it is held by Kaftan to be the direct function of faith to give us knowledge—nay, the highest knowledge—on the supreme questions of existence; and it is claimed that it is the *sole* source of knowledge on these questions. ‘Christian faith,’ we are told, ‘asserts that it is the true knowledge of the First Cause and of the final purpose of all things. . . . it offers just what philosophy has sought as the highest knowledge, or as the solution of the enigma of the world. . . . The task is no other than that of proving that the knowledge supplied by Christianity as to the First Cause and final purpose of all things is true.’³ I think that anyone who goes carefully through Kaftan’s books will be compelled to come to the conclusion that underneath an appearance

of great clearness and precision of style, there exists about as confusing and incoherent a system of positive thought as could well be presented. He will be struck also by the fact that in neither of his works—while speaking constantly of faith—does Kaftan ever give a proper definition of faith, and such descriptions as he does give have generally reference to it as a mode of apprehension.

Connected with this theory of knowledge in the school of Ritschl, considerable importance attaches to the *theory of religion* of the members of the school. In one negative respect the Ritschlians all agree, viz. in denying to the soul any essential or immediate conscious relation to God. The first thing is not the consciousness of dependence on God, or of relation to Him, but some impulse or want of the individual life—in Ritschl and Herrmann, the feeling of personality, and the desire for freedom from the limitations of nature, and for dominion over the world; in Kaftan, the wish for life, or blessedness. God is then postulated as the means by which this end is to be brought about. Here again Kaftan severs himself from the others, and formulates a theory in keeping with his empirical basis. Briefly stated, it is this. Man finds in himself a desire for happiness, which with Kaftan is a synonym for ‘life.’ But experience shows that this longing for blessedness is not satisfied by anything in this world. The good which satisfies it must therefore be a supramundane, and furthermore an infinite, good. In this infinity of ‘the claim upon life,’ inseparable from our nature, and which the world is not able to satisfy, lies, according to Kaftan, the root-motive of religion. ‘Generally, the claim on life,’ he says, ‘lies at the foundation of religion. That this claim is not satisfied in the world, and further through the world, is the common motive of all religions.’⁴ It would be a pertinent criticism on this theory to ask, But whence this claim on life? Why this striving after an infinite and supramundane good? What view of man’s nature is implied in the possibility of such strivings? And how far does the mere existence of such a wish or claim guarantee the existence of an object or good fitted to satisfy the claim? These are questions which Kaftan does not answer, but which a true theory of religion should answer. But we may see next how Kaftan connects this theory of religion with Christianity, and with the proof of its truth. It has been observed by

¹ *Zeit. für T. u. K.* 1891, p. 501.

² *Die Wahrheit*, Eng. trans. ii. p. 14.

³ *Ibid.* i. pp. 4, 5.

⁴ *Das Wesen*, p. 67.

Köstlin that Ritschl himself never attempted any definite answer to the question of apologetics—How do we know that in Christianity we have the truth? Ritschl certainly hints at the matter when he says in his large work, 'Its representation in theology will, therefore, come to a conclusion in the proof that the Christian ideal of life, and no other, altogether satisfies the claims of the human spirit to a knowledge of things.'¹ It is along this line—the agreement of Christianity with our postulates of what is necessary to the realisation of the idea of the supreme good—that Kaftan seeks the proof of the truth of Christianity. First, he sketches the idea of the supreme good, as that is deducible from the claim on life, and the facts of experience and history. History shows that the supreme good must be a moral one; experience also demonstrates that it must be a supramundane one. Its true, rational, universally valid idea, in short, is that of just such a kingdom of God as we have made known to us in Christianity. This kingdom is therefore a postulate of reason—*if* the supreme good is to be realised. It is a further postulate of reason that it must be made known to us in history by divine revelation. The Christian revelation, as an historical fact, is then compared with this pre-constructed idea, and these assumed postulates, and is found of course to agree with them. In this agreement lies the proof of its truth. Only when we speak of Christianity in this connexion, we have to remember that it is just so much of Christianity as it suits the requirements of Kaftan's theory to admit. It seems to follow that, rightly understood, what is called faith in Christianity is much more faith in Kaftan's peculiar hypothesis about religion. Christianity, that is, does not come to us with any self-certifying power. First, we have to reach this idea of the supreme good, and of the kingdom of God as corresponding with it, by what Kaftan himself calls the speculative method. Then we prove Christianity to be true by its agreement with this idea. I fear if the demonstration is made to hinge on the success of this attempt, it will be a long time before the claims of Christianity meet with general recognition. Here we observe a distinct superiority in the method of Herrmann over that of Kaftan. Herrmann, too, has his theory of religion, and his manner of applying it to the judgment of Christianity is not essentially different from Kaftan's. But after his first work, Herrmann

leaves his theory of religion very much behind him, and goes out on a totally different line of proof. The great—almost the sole—idea in his later writings is the irresistible impression (*Eindruck*) which Christ makes on the soul historically confronted with Him, compelling the acknowledgment that God is with Him, and is gracious. This is a true thought, and Herrmann has done service in ringing the changes on it as incessantly as he has done. After all, however, it leaves us very much in the vague as to the nature of this 'Power over all things' which Christ is alleged to reveal. Herrmann thinks that by this method he has shaken himself clear of all dependence on philosophical assumptions, but he only accomplishes this by reducing the impression we receive from Christ to something so indefinite and formless that no proper theology can be deduced from it.

From these fundamental positions, it will be possible to sketch rapidly the attitude taken up by the followers of Ritschl to some of the special doctrines in theology. The controlling conception with the whole school is, as already stated, the idea of the kingdom of God. But then this idea, as we have had occasion to see, is itself not very definitely conceived. With Ritschl himself it is exclusively—with Herrmann predominately—a kingdom in this world; with Kaftan and other prominent Ritschlians, including Weiss (Ritschl's own son-in-law), it is wholly an eschatological conception. With Kaftan the kingdom of righteousness on earth is but a moral preparation for the true kingdom of God, which, in accordance with his fundamental positions, he defines as super-terrestrial and future. A semi-mystical element, therefore, enters into Kaftan's conception of Christianity which is foreign to most writers of the school. The centre of gravity in the Christian system is not with him, as with Herrmann, the historical Christ, but, on the contrary, the glorified Christ, and the life of the Christian is a life hid with Christ in God. Herrmann's attitude is the very opposite of this. The only 'Verkehr,' or communion, of the Christian with God he will recognise is that mediated by the historical life of Jesus; everything that savours of mystical converse or communion of God with the soul, through a direct and present communication of Himself by His Spirit, he energetically repudiates. By this idea of the kingdom of God, then, variously as it may be conceived by the different writers,

¹ *Recht. und Ver.* iii. p. 25 (3rd ed.).

every other doctrine of the Christian system is to be measured. The central point here again is the Christology. That all the members of this school reject the orthodox Christology—regard it, with Herrmann, Kaftan, Harnack, as a result of the fusion of Christian ideas with Greek, and particularly with Alexandrian metaphysics—is well known. But it is not so clear what they propose to put in its stead. It is easy to say—let us content ourselves with the certainty that in some way, borne in upon us as an irresistible conviction, God was in Christ—that we can therefore with justice attach to Him the predicate of Godhead,—but the mind cannot permanently maintain itself in this vague, unquestioning condition. How should it, indeed, be possible for a speculative faculty such as both Herrmann and Kaftan assume, which goes on building up theories of the world, postulating God to reconcile moral antinomies, and defining the nature of the true good;—how should it be possible for such a faculty not to ask itself the question, What is the postulate needful to explain this extraordinary phenomenon which we have in Christ? Why must the thinking mind postulate God for the explanation of the world, and be debarred from postulating something transcendental in explanation of the Person of Christ? Now the interesting fact is that the moment the Ritschlians do take up this task of trying to explain Christ to their own minds, they are driven back on transcendental explanations. There is a striking passage in the *first* edition of Herrmann's *Verkehr* in which he says that if the Christian will follow out the question of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, 'the Christological decisions of the ancient Church still always mark out the limits within which such attempts must move.'¹ He expresses himself in a yet stronger way on the necessity of recognising a super-earthly basis for the Godhead of Christ in his recent pamphlet on the *Apostolicum* controversy. Kaftan utters himself hardly less distinctly. This movement, as I have observed elsewhere, can scarcely fail to go further, and work itself into clearer relations with existing Christian dogma.

To discuss the views of the Ritschlian writers on the doctrines of sin, of reconciliation, of the future life, would carry me beyond the limits of the present paper. It is perhaps the less necessary to go into this region, that the disciples add little

that is distinctive to the general features of the Ritschlian theology. Not one of these writers holds an atonement in the objective sense; but Christ's work is conceived of as giving us the assurance of God's forgiving grace. Without entering further into this subject, I shall conclude with a very few words on the views of perhaps the least known of all these theologians—Bender of Bonn. Bender is the *enfant terrible* of the Ritschlian party, but with all their repudiation of him, I cannot but think that he expresses the real tendency and essence of the theology better than many of its more reputable representatives. He at least starts from orthodox Ritschlian ground in affirming that religion is simply a means through which man seeks freedom from the limitations and hindrances of his existence, and the furtherance of his lower and higher life-aims. But Bender makes no disguise of what this means for him. 'Not the question as to God,' he tells us boldly, 'but the question as to man, is the central question of religion. The idea of God is in the first instance only the imaginary line (*Hilfslinie*) which man draws in order to make his existence in the world comprehensible. The elevation of the mind to the Godhead in worship is only a means of help, by which man, in the battle of his existence, seeks to appropriate super-terrestrial powers to himself, in order to maintain in their integrity his selfish or disinterested, his material or ideal, interests, especially when his own powers are exhausted.'² Man, therefore, is the centre, not God. 'Every religious view of the world,' he says, 'is anthropocentric.'³ Ritschl had declared that what we affirm of God in our Christian view of the world is a product of our phantasy (*unserer Einbildungskraft*). Bender takes this view of the matter quite in earnest. 'The idea of God,' he says, 'is a thought-image of our phantasy more than of our understanding.'⁴ He tells us how it originates. It frames itself 'out of the need of so thinking of the world-development that the specifically human ideal of a perfectly blessed life is attainable in spite of apparent contradictions.'⁵ The religious cultus is explained as a further means to the self-maintenance of man and his interests in the world. The idea of revelation obtains in all religions, and we get a psychological explanation of it, not unlike Pfeleiderer's. The outcome

¹ P. 46; cf. his *Die Religion*, etc. pp. 438-9.

² *Das Wesen der Religion*, p. 22.

³ P. 85.

⁴ P. 105.

⁵ P. 89.

is that in religion we move in a perfectly ideal world. Yet—and this is the remarkable thing—Bender holds also that we do not move in a world of mere ideals. He thinks the fact that we discern a moral progress in the world, and that in the religious development we find a gradual moving upwards to the perfected religious and moral ideal in Christ, with His doctrine of the kingdom of God, of forgiveness of sins, and of a providential government of the world, leaves often the hypothesis—for it really comes to no more than this—that there truly is a Power ruling us and the whole world, with whom we dare find the guarantees of the realisation of our life-ideals, and who can accordingly be the object of our faith and worship.¹ Christianity, at the same time, is accepted by Bender only in a very expurgated form. Here Ritschlianism and Rationalism perfectly shake hands. The supernatural in every form is denied.

¹ *Das Wesen der Religion*, p. 241, etc.

The incarnation, the miracles, the very sinlessness of Christ are set aside. Yet, just as in Pfeleiderer, a fine symbolism is found in all the Christian doctrines, and these are to be retained in the cultus, if not in the judgment of reason. If, e.g., 'the Church honours Christ as the overcomer of sin and evil, while it also in His individual life dramatically represents in the resurrection and ascension the process of the glorification and deification of human life, there is nothing,' he says, 'to be objected to this, if only two things are remembered'²—then follows the explication. The Ritschlian critics are right when they say that the first and second parts of Bender's system do not hold together, and that what we really have is only a subjective idealism. What they do not show so clearly is, how, starting from nearly identical premisses, they can logically avoid similar conclusions.

² P. 295.

At the Literary Table.

THE BOOKS OF THE MONTH.

(The Prices of the Books mentioned below will generally be found in the Advertisement pages.)

I.

ON THE BOOK OF JONAH: A MONOGRAPH. BY JOHN KENNEDY, M.A., D.D. (*Alexander & Shephard*. Crown 8vo, pp. xii, 113.) Dr. Kennedy, who has already made some weighty contributions to the science of Apologetic, adds this as his latest and perhaps his last. But is he entitled to include a defence of the historicity of the Book of Jonah in the science of Apologetic? 'Apologetics,' says Professor Bruce, 'is Christianity defensively stated.' How does it touch Christianity to know whether Jonah is fact or fable? Dr. Kennedy's answer is that Christianity does not begin with the first chapter of St. Matthew; and that, even if it did, the references to the Book of Jonah in St. Matthew are such as to demand either its historicity, or else a new attitude towards the Lord Jesus Christ. So Dr. Kennedy defends the Book of Jonah. And it may be said at once that he has given us the best popular account of that side of the question we are likely now to receive.

JOSEPH SIDNEY HILL. BY ROSE E. FAULKNER. (*Allenson*. Crown 8vo, pp. 223.) Another missionary biography, and a good one. Not in the very front rank, not a Livingstone nor a Moffat, nor even a Paton, but in the second row one of the best and pleasantest,—for Bishop Hill was a man as well as a missionary. 'His most marked characteristic,' says Bishop Stuart, 'was an incorrigible unselfishness': and it evidently followed him everywhere. Even the letters are full of it, and many of them are very happy reading. It was a sad and sudden ending, but not to him and not to Mrs. Hill,—to them neither sudden nor sad.

ANCIENT ROME AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD. BY ROBERT BURN, M.A. (*Bell*. Fcap. 8vo, pp. xiii, 292.) This is the most popularly written of all Mr. Burn's books about Rome. It is not a whit less accurate than the more technical books, it is not a whit less sumptu-