however (for it was the literal soul of the life of the Redeemer, John xv. 10), is the peculiar token of fellowship with the Redeemer. That love to God (what is meant here is not God's love to men) is described in such a case as a perfect love (love that has been perfected), involves no difficulty, for the simple reason that the proposition is purely hypothetical. We must, of course, also take the "keeping" in all its stringency. John knows right well that the case supposed here never becomes full reality. "Hereby," i.e. from the actual realization of love to God. "That we are in Him" is equivalent to "that we have known Him" (ver. 3); for a real knowledge of Christ brings directly with it fellowship with Him, and is not even possible without it. Real love to God is the token of real fellowship with the Saviour, because love to God was and is the essential content of the Saviour's whole being and existence. He who loves God is hereby one with the Saviour, whose whole being is a loving of the Father (John xiv. 21, 23, 24, xv. 10, viii. 29). This being in Christ is not, as many expositors think, mere moral oneness with Him, for such a oneness does not even exist; it is at the same time essentially a real unity of the one spirit with the other. Wherever there is an actually sanctified ethical being, there there is of necessity a real fellowship with God.

"J."

BY PROFESSOR SIR G. G. STOKES, BART., M.P., PRESIDENT OF THE ROYAL SOCIETY.

II.

And now let us just consider one or two other assertions with respect to soul and spirit which we shall find in the Bible. We have the expression "living soul," but I do not recollect that we ever have the expression "living spirit." Spirit in relation to life is called, not "living," but "quickening,"—that is, not living, but "liveloging." I will refer to one somewhat remarkable passage in the eighth chapter of St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans, where it is said, "If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin, but the Spirit is"—is what? What is the opposite of "dead"? Surely "living" or "alive." But the word is not "the spirit is alive," but "the spirit is life because of righteousness." It was an energy underlying, as it were, the manifestations of even life itself. Again, when that in man which is not put an end to by death is spoken of, it is not, I think, called "soul," but "spirit." Stephen said, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit;" and in the Epistle to the Hebrews we have the expression, "Ye are come unto the spirits of just men made perfect," or rather perhaps "of just men finished,"—who had completed their course. It appears then that there are certain indications in Scripture of a sort of energy, if I may so speak, an energy which is individualized; and the processes of life, thinking included, as a result of the interaction between this fundamental individualized energy and the organism. It is free also from the difficulties attending what I called the psychic theory, because if thinking is a process of life, and life depends upon the interaction of this individualized energy,—to use a term to express a perhaps somewhat vague idea and an organism,—then we can understand that thinking, in order to be continued in its normal healthy action, requires the interaction of these two things. Now the supposition that our individual being depends upon something lying even deeper down than thought itself enables us to understand—I was wrong, perhaps, in saying to understand, but at any rate to conceive—how it might be that our individual selves might go on in another stage of existence, notwithstanding that our present bodies were utterly destroyed and went to corruption. We frequently hear of the immortality of the soul as if it were—which I do not think it is—a part of the Christian faith. You must not, when I say this, you must not confound two totally different things—the immortality of the soul and a future life. That there is to be a future life is beyond all question the doctrine of Scripture, but the supposition that the soul is innately immortal is merely a philosophical hypothesis to account, so to speak, for a future life; and that hypothesis may be an incorrect hypothesis, and I am disposed to think that it is incorrect to a very considerable extent. In Scripture the doctrine of a resurrection is most clearly laid down, and it is most clearly
laid down that in the resurrection state the man does not consist of pure soul or pure spirit, but that there is a body of some kind which belongs to him, belongs to that being which has its self-consciousness as our present bodies belong to us here.

What the nature of this body may be we do not know, but we are pretty distinctly informed that it will be something very different from that of our present bodies, very different in its properties and functions, and yet not less our own than our present bodies are. St. Paul, answering the objection, “Some men will say, How are the dead raised? and with what body do they come?” says, “Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not quickened except it die, for what thou sowest thou sowest not the body that shall be, but bare grain of wheat or it may chance of some other grain.” He represents, in a sort of general metaphorical way, the relation of the future body to the present body as that of a plant of wheat to the naked seed from which it sprung when it was cast into the earth. Of course you are not to press the mere illustration too hard, you are not to suppose that the actual process of transition is the same in the two cases; only the one is taken as an illustration of the other; and he speaks of these two bodies as, the one our “vile body,” or the body of our humiliation, the other, or the redeemed, as the body of His glory, Christ’s glory. As I say, we do not know what the nature of that body may be, but you see in this transition there is a great deal—everything, in fact—that goes beyond what we should have found out for ourselves, but there is nothing running counter to what we do perceive by such means of investigation as are open to us. For there are many things that indicate that our personal identity does not depend upon the identity of the materials of which the body consists.

I go, suppose, to a dentist, and have a tooth pulled out. When it is pulled out it is no more to me than a bit of bone which is casually picked up. Or a man may be so unfortunate as to have a leg or an arm amputated, and when it is gone it is no more to him than a piece of meat on a butcher’s stall. And even taking our bodies in their normal state, there is a continual flux, a continual nutrition as the result of digestion and the assimilation of the food which we eat, and a continual wearing away of the original tissues. And, if I recollect aright, I have seen it stated that it is believed by physiologists that the whole of man’s body is pretty well changed in seven years. That, I suppose, hardly applies to the bones, but to the softer parts; and I should suppose certainly to that very soft, pulpy structure, the brain, which appears to be so intimately connected with the process of thought. Yet for all this change of ponderable matter, there is no breach in the continuity of our personal being. Well, then, there is no reason, therefore, to say that there can be no continuity in our personal being unless there is continuity in the material of which our bodies consist. Nay, we have no reason to suppose that that is at all necessary for personal identity.

Hence, then, the body may go to corruption, and may be reduced to ashes, and the small ashes may be dissolved by suitable chemical means and thrown into a river. What is that to us? Nothing at all. It does not depend upon that; nor are we obliged to make that extravagant—perhaps I am wrong in using that word, considering what great men have entertained it—that incredible supposition that in the resurrection of the body the various material particles which form the body which was laid in the grave have got to be collected from all sorts of places and brought together. We should be very wrong indeed to encumber the Christian faith with the necessity of believing any such thing as that.

I said that beyond all question the Scripture points to a resurrection state. Perhaps the question may arise, “What is man’s condition between death and the resurrection?” Well, the indication of Scripture with respect to that is exceedingly meagre, if there is even any at all; and I believe that, when you look into the question, there is even less information given us than might appear at first sight. As I said, “if thought as we know it depends upon an interaction between that energy, as I called it, which constitutes our personal selves and the organism with which that is associated, when that energy is deprived of the organism, our first supposition, at any rate, I think, would be that for the time thought would be in abeyance, as it is in a faint. Now, I think there is no occasion whatever, with regard to the Christian faith, to decide one way or other with respect to that question. As I said, the doctrine of a resurrection state is as clearly laid down as is possible to conceive, but for anything intermediate we are left very much in the dark. I know several persons who believe in the Christian faith, and who lean to the idea that the intermediate state is one of unconsciousness, passed, as it were, in a moment, involving, as to the perception of each person, a virtual annihilation of the intervening time, be it long or be it short. I told you I knew from my own experience how very curiously time appears to be annihilated so long as one is in a faint. I do not say that it is true or that it is false, but I think it may be left a perfectly open question. I confess my own leanings are rather in the direction of supposing it is so. To my mind, if it be so, some very solemn thoughts are opened to us, for we are brought face to face with this supposition, that when we breathe our last we shall, as far as own perceptions depend, be brought immediately face to face with our final account, to
receive our final destiny. However, as I say, I do not want to dogmatize one way or the other respecting that question; but I do think it is desirable to bear in mind, that whether we make one supposition or the other is no part of the essential doctrine of Christian faith.

Now, I have endeavoured to bring some thoughts before you, which to my own mind rather clear away some difficulties from the supposition of a future state. But, of course, that does not give evidence or the other is no part of the essential evidence of it. No. What is the evidence? Well, the great evidence which we as Christians accept is, that there is One who has passed already before us from the one state of being into the other.

And now I will read you again an extract, part of which I have read you already, from a work of Dr. Westcott's, but I will begin a little earlier. He says: "Gradually we have been led to dissociate faith in the resurrection of the body from the actual Resurrection of Christ, which is the earnest of it"—and then what I read to you before: "Not unfrequently we substitute for the fulness of the Christian creed the purely philosophic conception of the immortality of the soul, which destroys, as we shall see hereafter, the idea of the continuance of our distinct personal existence." Well, then, I look upon it that to us the great evidence of this future state is, in the first instance, the actual exhibition of it in the Resurrection of Christ, and then in the promises that there will be to us a resurrection also at the proper time. And now, as to the Resurrection of Christ, what is the evidence of that? If it is true, it is an historical event, and certainly as an historical event it is supported by an enormous amount of most weighty evidence. Yet I think that the historical evidence, strong as it is, is not to be taken alone; we must take the whole body of Christian doctrine as a whole. Consider how one part dovetails into another; consider how the body of Christian doctrine meets with the requirements of our nature, and then consider how that hangs on to the historical evidence of the Resurrection of Jesus Christ.

I will not occupy your time longer—I am afraid I have occupied it too long already—for, after all, these are dark subjects, and I could not, as I said at the beginning, profess to give you an answer to the question which I propounded to you, but could only lay before you some thoughts which had proved helpful to myself, and may possibly prove helpful to some of you.

**Church and State:**

*A Historical Handbook.*


How Church and State have been related and have reacted on one another, is one of the great subjects of History. Commonly it is regarded in too partial and provincial a manner. Even historical students often fail to present to themselves any clear conception of the incessant play of forces in this line, which has given so special a character to the movement of the western world for many ages.

Mr. Innes's work is short, but it is quite remarkably interesting and attractive as mere reading. What is still better is, that without parade of learning, and while he avoids abstract discussion, the whole treatment is thorough and is illumiiated by clear thinking. It need hardly be said that the book is far above the level of mere partizanship. This is no controversial pamphlet, concealing a pleading under the pretence of history. At the same time, it suggests many a practical inference to the attentive reader. It would not be an intelligent History, a work of insight, if it did not.

We cordially recommend the work to those especially who wish to take a connected view of this great subject, and to possess a key to more extended reading. After an Introduction, the first chapter deals with the Primitive Church in its relations with the State. The twelfth and last treats of Europe from 1815 to 1870. All that lies between is dealt with in intervening chapters. We have experienced especial pleasure in reading the chapters on the Reformation settlements, and the development which these have received under more recent influences.

**The Two Kinds of Truth:**

*A Test of All Theories.*

*By T. E. S. T.* Fisher Unwin. 1890. 7s. 6d.

This is an unusual book. The writer tells us that he is an old life member of the British Association, and we can readily infer that he is a man of ample leisure and extensive reading, a philosopher in the sense of a lover, if not also a discernor of truth and wisdom. The volume, consisting of nearly 400 pages, which is handsomely prepared in respect of type and binding, is so varied in matter and style that the author had probably some difficulty in discovering a name and title which would give a suitable designation of its purport and contents. It is, he says, a Test with special application to the theories of creation, instinct, and immortality; and the arguments are drawn with equal impartiality.
from philosophy and science, history and poetry. The main purpose seems to be to establish and exhibit two kinds of truth, which he distinguishes as natural and universal; the former pertaining to the sphere of nature, including instinct, the latter to the sphere of mind. In some respects, the book reminds us of that far more successful literary production, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*. In both, the interest is in the chapters rather than in the work as a whole, in detached essays rather than in the general argument or main idea. But the main arguments or ideas are strangely different. The one seeks to establish the unity, the other the duality of truth; the one to carry law and principle from the natural up through the spiritual world, the other to separate the two spheres by impassable barriers, and to enhance spiritual, by a depreciation of natural, law. In the thoughts of our present author, the main subject is Evolution. This fact or tendency he does not deny, though he rejects Darwinism, and reiterates his opinion that retrogression has been more frequent than progress, and that the higher ages are behind. But his point is that Evolution is a natural, not a universal, truth. The distinction of natural and universal truth, which he deems of "altogether fundamental import," is pretty much the familiar distinction expressed by the terms *a posteriori* and *a priori*. The former includes the natural sciences, the latter geometry and mind. The truths of the one kind may be called arbitrary and empirical, of the other necessary; the former are local or temporary, the latter universal and eternal. Here several questions force themselves on the reader. Are there indeed two kinds, and not, rather, two spheres, of truth? What is involved in the word "kind"? And if there is such duality in philosophic thought is it to be carried into the region of the right and the good? Again, in exalting the higher kind, our author speaks of the infallibility of mind. The mind of every man (he conceives) is able to see clearly the truths that are universal. But where are the traces of such discernment? In what record of the harmonies of psychologists may we find the fruits of this unerring vision? Still more decidedly, however, will the scientist question the writer's conceptions of natural truth. Especially his arbitrary use of the word arbitrary. Natural laws, he says, being arbitrary, are liable to change, and even have exceptions, though rarely. This astounding fact he seeks to prove by an example; and we fear that this example, where the Demiurges has been caught napping or varying, has had too much to do with the philosophy of the two kinds of truth. It is the case of water which, as is well-known, contracts under cold until the temperature of 4° C. is reached, and then begins to expand, with the interesting effect that ice forms on the surface, and fishes live. Now, this change of process is regarded by our author as a change or variation in a law. In other words, the fact that there is a maximum of density somewhere between the boiling and the freezing points is considered to be a breach of order in Nature. This opinion we take to be the result of a confusion of the exact with the vague use of the word law. The expansive power of heat is, of course, conditioned by the nature of the physical bodies, and the peculiarity in the density of water is doubtless due, not to the laws of heat, but to the constitution of the liquid. It is a fact to be explained as the resultant of forces, not as a failure of law or a freak of nature. The question, however, which is raised in this treatise is one that requires preliminary definitions. We assume that there are kinds of truths, historical and geographical, mathematical and moral, but we must clearly understand what is involved in the word kind before admitting such a distinction in what is an attribute of Deity.

The object of the author is to show that this distinction affords a test of the value of all theories. The novelty which he claims for his book is in the importance he attaches to this point. By the application of the test, that is to say by the relegation of scientific discoveries to a lower and less certain level than the truths of mind, he at once removes religion from the assaults of scientific sceptics, or at least leaves it open to attack only on the side of a *a priori* argument. And in this conclusion there is substantial truth. It is no necessary deduction from the results of experimental science to say that there are spheres to which its methods do not apply, nor is it a denial of evolution to hold that development is altogether different from creation, and that questions of the origin of life or of mind are entirely beyond the province where natural selection reigns. In some respects, then, this work is fitted to be of real service. Its tone is altogether admirable. In its criticisms no uncharity is ever manifested. The writer has devoted considerable attention to the early records of different nations. It is true that his theories affect his judgment. His notions of Old Testament criticism, for example, are not derived from those who know; but in these respects he disregards the knowledge of to-day. Still the materials are collected from a large number of first-rate authorities. Not one of the thirty-seven chapters is uninteresting, and the reader who is wearied with paleography or metaphysics can relieve his mind by re-studying choice extracts from the poets of all periods of our literature.

Robert Scott.