erects dangerous buildings, who sells dangerous commodities (e.g., alcohol), or who owns insanitary houses. The Eighth commandment is made to condemn the Unions which exact higher wages and then proceed to limit output. And so on. If there is nothing strikingly new in Dr. Charles’s comment, there is much that is worthy of careful attention.

On the critical side Dr. Charles ventures far. The Decalogue, as we have it in Exodus xx. 2–17, has a long and intricate history. At the top of its genealogical tree stands the Mosaic Decalogue, each commandment consisting of one short clause (c. 1320–1300 B.C.). This form received some small additions in the Fourth, Tenth, and perhaps Third commandment before it was incorporated in E (c. 800–750 B.C.). From E two separate forms were developed. The earlier, found in Deuteronomy, received a large addition in the Second commandment (i.e. Deut. v. 8–10), in the Fourth (i.e. Deut. v. 15), and in the Fifth. The later form, now found in Exodus, took over several of these “Deuteronomic” additions in (about) the fifth century B.C. Next a mixture of these two forms arose in Egypt, to which the Hebrew archetype used by LXX. c. 300 B.C. was due. From a further mixture of this archetype with the “Exodus” text arose the text of the Nash papyrus.

W. EMERY BARNES.

THE SECRET EXPERIENCES OF THE PROPHETS. 1

18. In what precedes we have looked at the inward experiences of the prophets as all on one level. To prevent our picture showing distorted features, let us look at their history.

1 By Professor Hermann Gunkel, being the second of three introductory essays in Prof. Hans Schmidt’s Die Grossen Propheten, Göttingen, 1923.
The oldest grade of prophecy was that which meets us in the story of Saul and Samuel. Groups of prophets were settled here and there throughout the country, practising ecstasy amongst themselves with all manner of exercises. Such prophets, objects of wonder to the people, but not always highly esteemed by them, are very similar to the ecstacies of other nations. That this ecstasy was taken over from the Canaanites, as has been suggested, is improbable, as the phenomena at all times manifested a distinctively Israelite spirit.

19. It was out of these circles, of course through a long development, that there came forth the best that is contained in the Old Testament. The greatest figures that ancient Israel ever produced were prophets. In many ways they resembled the nebiim of the old time, greatly as they differ from them in other respects. The similarity is in the form of the psychical processes. From the outside, the conditions seem the same, although their violence is diminished. The difference lies in the intellectual content. It is the highest thoughts that fill the ecstasy of the later prophets. And it is this supremely valuable content, though it took this form, that should warn the present day student not to estimate too lightly these strange phenomena. It was not ordinary men, but strong enthusiastic personalities who underwent these experiences. It was not an accident that it was just a man like Saul, of powerful passionate nature, that came "among the prophets": not an accident, that it was young men, with blood still warm, who were called to the prophetic office (Amos ii. 11; Jer. i. 6; Dan. i.). In particular, it was men of religion, in whom faith burned, not with a cheerful homely glow, but with mighty destroying flame—who experienced these conditions. In such men, these psychical processes may be the accompaniments of profound religious convictions, of great
strength and highest originality. And it was just in the hours when the New Thing burst upon these men, that they had these experiences. That is why the history of religion is full of such phenomena. The first disciples became certain that Jesus had risen, when they saw the Risen One in vision. It was by a vision that Saul was changed into Paul. The enthusiasm of the first Christian communities found expression in "speaking with tongues." Luther fought with the devil. Out of the ranks of the nebiim men came forth, in whom two things met—powerful religious excitation, which threw them into amaze, and noble religious thoughts which took entire possession of them. In the words of these men these two things were intimately combined—it was the thoughts that kindled the fire in their hearts.

20. We can still to some extent follow the stages of this evolution. The first onward step was when the nebiim were applied to for oracles and gave them. The earliest tradition knows nothing of this. The prophets whom Saul meets coming from the highplace are in ecstasy—nothing more is said. We must not ask what sort of oracles they uttered. Such ecstasy had originally no purpose beyond itself: it was in itself regarded as the work of Jahveh. But the oracle-giving, which was later attributed to them, added greatly to the importance and influence of the prophets among the people. They now became the counsellors of their nation in all their difficulties, great and small. In how many homes in Israel may the prophet have been the honoured family friend, helpful in word and deed (1 Kings xvii. 7; 2 Kings iv. 8). They were also skilled in healing disease, but they proudly disdained the round-about methods of heathen sorcerers (2 Kings v. 12). They cure by means of a bath (2 Kings v. 10) or a plaster (2 Kings xx. 7), or by the virtue of their body (1 Kings xvii.
26 THE SECRET EXPERIENCES OF THE PROPHETS

21; 2 Kings iv. 34), but they always use prayer. Even leprosy comes and goes at their word (2 Kings v.). We must take it that the cures were due to the absolute confidence reposed in these men. Even the state consulted them (1 Kings xxii. 6). This type of activity was bound to become a trade, and thus it seemed natural that those consulting them should bring a small offering (1 Kings xiv. 3). The king’s prophets ate at the king’s table (1 Kings xviii. 19). This trade was not always highly esteemed (1 Sam. x. 12), for of many of them Micah’s words would be true (iii. 5), “When they get somewhat to eat, they cry Peace; if nothing is put into their mouths, they declare war.” There were many prophets of this kind in Israel. Visions were no rarity (Hosea xii. 11). One king assembled four hundred prophets and consulted them before undertaking a campaign. But we also read how such a crowd of nebiim could be abashed by the strong personality of one man (1 Kings xxii. 10). Most of these prophets were of no importance in history. Their oracles are forgotten and would concern us little even if we knew them. This type lasted down to the latest time in Israel’s history and only died out when it had fallen into contempt. Zechariah xiii. 2 mentions it for the last time and with contumely as the outflow of an “unclean spirit.”

21. But out of the ranks of such “prophets” there arose men of a nobler stamp, men of a loftier flight of thought and greater breadth of view. These great ones speak of the fates of peoples and kings, victories and defeats, the deliverance of a besieged capital, the downfall of a dynasty—the greatest things in the Israel of their time. And they dealt with them of their own accord. The ordinary sons of the prophets waited till they were consulted: these men came forward without such waiting. Hence their stoutheartedness; conscious of being God’s servants
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they withstood kings to their face (1 Kings xviii. 17; xxi. 19; 1 Sam. xv. 14). Naturally they came forward specially when the matter was one of which they disapproved (1 Kings xvii.; xx. 35). Then appeared the man of God unbidden and unwelcome and uttered the mind of God. Or when some great event is imminent, when Jahveh has resolved upon a new thing, the prophet’s more delicate sense perceives what is about to happen. No great thing ever happened in Israel without the presence of a prophet to announce it (Amos iii. 7). A prophet like this, especially when he prophesies evil, need not look for reward. Persecution and insult are bound to be the lot of these men who speak their mind as no one ever spoke before (Jer. xxii. 19). Some indeed stand by the king, the most faithful pillars of the kingdom (Elisha 2 Kings v.; Jonah under Jeroboam II. 2 Kings xiv. 35). One true prophet is worth a whole army (2 Kings xiii. 14). But these great men are still among “the prophets.” The prophets of a lower type may form a following, obedient to their commands—a kind of league constituting a great danger to the safety of the state. From amongst them came the worst revolution that ever devastated Israel (2 Kings ix. 1). But even in the great men themselves the wild element is plainly perceptible, although its violence is somewhat less. In accordance with this we must take it that their speech was more rational than the “crying” of the prophets of the oldest time.

22. This stage of prophecy exhibits two different types—prophets of weal and prophets of woe—two types which can be traced through almost the entire after-history. The less important are the prophets of weal. With them, religion and patriotism are closely entwined: they work in the cause of Jahveh and of Israel together. Higher than these are the prophets of woe. They are more than patriots; they can be the enemies of the kings (1 Kings
xxi. 20), nay, they can be the enemies of their nation. It was they who instigated the great revolutions—Ahijah against the House of David, Elijah against the dynasty of Omri. Zeal for Jahveh absorbed them entirely. They were also zealous for the severe customs of patriarchal Israel as against the new luxurious manners, and for ancient justice as against the injustice of their own time. Samuel opposes Saul’s attempt to set aside the ban of Jahveh (1 Sam. xv.) and Nathan vetoes David’s desire to build a house for the ark (2 Sam. vii.). Ahijah protests against Solomon’s excessive oppression of the people: Elijah and Elisha head the opposition to Omri’s building of a temple for Tyrian Baal—an unbroken chain of zealots for Jahveh from the earliest to the latest. And these men could even see in the great misfortunes of the state Jahveh’s judgments upon sin (1 Kings xix. 15; 2 Kings viii. 7), for to them Jahveh was more than a national God, and He would bring His people to destruction unless they obeyed Him.

23. Then came the last great turning in the history of prophecy in the eighth century, when the dread Assyrian danger was coming ever nearer. When the hearts of all the world were quaking before the coming destruction, the universal feeling found vent in the first of the literary prophets. In a day of prosperity and peace in Israel they announced in piercing tones their dread message of destruction for Israel, and they stated the reasons why their people, and just their people, must perish. Their ideals were lofty, and by these ideals they judged their people and recognised that they had come short. Therefore away with them from the earth. With indignation they thundered against Israel’s sin. They spoke but little of repentance, because for that it was too late. They fulminated not only against the sins of the kings and the nobles: they felt themselves set against their own nation. What their con-
temporaries held to be the highest, they treated with scorn. Passionately they besought Jahveh, who glorified Himself in judgment upon sinners and who yet had no desire that any should perish, and would yet bring the Good to victory. The passion and strength of these men still awes and uplifts us who have come after them. Only rarely did they touch the notes of tenderness, although, of course, these are not wholly absent. It was they who welded together, as with bands of iron, religion and morality. Above all it is to them that we owe monotheism: to the feet of the God of their nation they brought all peoples and powers of the world and all the gods. From the eighth century onwards these prophetic voices never ceased: they accompanied the history of Israel and Judah and outlasted both.

24. When we compare the mighty figures of these prophets with the nebiim of early times, we are first struck by the great difference between them. Amos felt this difference strongly (Amos vii. 14). But this should not lead us to overlook the ecstatic element that was present in the later prophets also. Amos used the word hithnahbe' of himself (vii. 15). There was no other he could use, and his successors used it too.

25. The really prophetic element present in these great men has already been referred to. We may here gather together the main features of it. The fundamental conviction common to them all is, that their thoughts are from God Himself. The prophet did not find them. “They were found” (Jer. xv. 16). He who speaks his own thoughts is a “lying prophet” (Jer. xxiii. 16). Left to themselves, they might perhaps have thought the contrary. Jeremiah agreed at heart with the patriotic desires which the prophet of weal announced as divine certainties, even although he considered their realisation impossible (Jer. xxviii. 6). Nor is it the prophet’s personal resolve that causes him to speak
as he does. It was against his will that Jeremiah became a prophet (i. 6). Necessity was laid upon him: woe to him if he refused (1 Cor. ix. 16; Amos iii. 8). Even if he desired to desist, he found it impossible (Jer. xx. 9).

But when we ask the prophet, when and how Jahveh's word came to him, he tells us of certain hours when the Spirit fell upon him and he heard and saw secret things. Experiences such as these have their effects on body and soul, described by Jeremiah iv. 19, 21. Nor was it abstract thoughts, but concrete revelations, that came at such times. The prophet received superhuman knowledge of the future. If we are to understand aright a prophet, even of the highest type, we must always first ask, what event of the immediate future did he come forth to predict? They believed they were able to predict not only the fate of the people and the kings of their time, but also the varied fortunes of individuals (Amos vii. 17; Jer. xx. 3; xxviii. 15; xxix. 21; xxxii.; xlv. 3, etc.). And their contemporaries cherished the same belief and asked their counsel (Jer. xxi. 2; xxxvii. 3; xxxviii. 14; xlii. 1).

26. But in spite of the prominence which they themselves give to this side of their activity, we feel that their highest virtue does not lie in prediction. Were that all, the value of their words for us to-day, who have but little interest in by far the majority of their predictions, would be very small. Even their strange experiences, their phantastic visions and their strange symbols are but externals. There is more in them than that. They proclaimed to their day the thoughts of God. They even gave Jahveh's reasons; they know why their words are true. Jeremiah was able even to announce the law of God’s government of the world (chap. xviii.). The new element in these men was that in their work prophecy assumed a spiritual and moral content.
27. It is in this change of content that we find the reason why the vehement element in the outward form of their experiences subsides (although it never quite disappears), and is replaced by inward experiences which we can understand. They felt themselves dominated by emotions which they could not shake off, and sustained by an extraordinary confidence in the truth of their convictions. So confident are they, that they can bid defiance to kings and people. They care not for persecution, prison or death (Jer. xv. 16). It is clear that in their hearts they are on God's side, and approve of the message God sends them (Micah iii. 8). Such a man has not merely a few isolated moments in which God speaks to him; his whole life is filled with revelations. It is not only one commission that he has from God: he is in God's service all through his life. At the outset of such a life-work he had, as a rule, to have experienced a vision—what we term his "call," when his electrically charged soul found relief in a first great discharge. Later in life the forms in which revelations reached him were less arresting, and he nourished his soul all his life on that first great hour. When he grew uncertain whether he were really God's instrument, he called back to mind that decisive hour.

28. Thus we meet in the history of prophecy a steady transition from prophet to preacher and religious thinker. While, therefore, we must by no means overlook the strange element in Old Testament prophecy, we must be equally careful neither to exaggerate it nor unduly to admire it. Excessive admiration of it is forbidden by the knowledge that similar phenomena are found all over the world, even in religions of a low type, and by recognition of the fact that phenomena like clairvoyance and soothsaying have no necessary connexion at all with a higher conception of religion. Besides, many of the prophetic experiences have
a suspicious resemblance to mental ailments. A crude supernatural view of the phenomena finds even stronger contradiction in the fact that the prophets were not rarely in opposition to each other, and that their different personalities are still visible in their different methods and styles. They did sometimes in a marvellous manner foretell the future, but more often they were mistaken. The crude supernaturalistic view, in its desire to honour God, runs the risk of overlooking what God was really doing—making spiritually-minded men. To us the valuable element in prophecy is not the wonderful form of it, but its content; and God's revelation comes to us in those great, deep-hearted, spiritual men and in the eternal thoughts they gave to the world.

Hermann Gunkel.

**THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY AND THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF SIN.**

We read and hear much of the New Psychology to-day. It meets us in books learned and popular, newspapers and even in a certain type of novel. It can be recognised by its unfamiliar vocabulary, the use of words like "complex" and "libido," and frequent excursions into Greek mythology. It is distinguished from the older psychology also by its interest in instinct, emotion, and behaviour, the unconscious mind and pathological states, and its lack of interest in cognition. Mr. Tansley, in his book *The New Psychology and its Relation to Life*, has given us the main outlines of the new theories, combining in one composite photograph the ideas of so different men as Freud and McDougall. Our account will be based mainly on this book.

The fundamental basis of mental life is the instincts
that man has in common with animals. McDougall defines instincts as "certain innate specific tendencies of the mind that are common to all members of any one species," 1 or, again, as "psycho-physical dispositions the activity of which involves an impulse to be interested in and attend to objects, situations, etc., of a more or less specific kind and to act with regard to them in a more or less specific way." 2 Such are, e.g., the instincts of combat, curiosity, food-seeking, sex, etc. These are all purposive though not necessarily purposeful. Each has its own feeling-tone or emotion, e.g., fear accompanies flight. Each, also, has a quantity of psychic force or driving power attached to it. But not all our psychic force or "libido" is rigidly attached to the instincts. Not only does it vary with different individuals, but also there is some loosely attached, and some free and unattached. These energy-charged instincts account for all our action. "The ends of human activity may probably all be traced to extensions, combinations, modifications, or perversions of the primitive instincts." "All actions and the conations leading to them are motivated by, and gain their energy from, instinctive sources." 3 But in man at any rate the instincts are almost never met with in a pure state, unmodified by intelligence. They also tend to coagulate into groups. This process of coagulation is described by Shand, and McDougall following him, as the formation of sentiments. Certain instincts and emotions become grouped round an object, e.g., one's country, producing in this case the sentiment of patriotism. Here a difficulty appears. Tansley nowhere mentions sentiments, but much of what he says of complexes applies to them. So we may say that a sentiment and a complex are roughly the same. "In the broad sense ... the term

1 McDougall, Social Psych., p. 22.
2 McDougall, Outline of Psych., p. 110.
3 Tansley, pp. 32, 170.
[complex] becomes almost identical with the sentiment." 4 But Tansley 5 says, "A complex is a system of associated mental elements, the stimulation of any one of which tends to call the rest into consciousness through the medium of their common affect." The effect, not the object, is here the common element.

Now it continually happens that the demands of different instincts and complexes conflict with one another, and "mental conflict is the struggle between two complexes whose conations would lead to incompatible actions." 6 But "it is impossible to overemphasise the overmastering desire of the human mind for unification." 7 The thwarting of an instinct is painful in itself, but the conflict between two instincts or complexes is acutely disturbing to the whole mind. All the libido is used up in this struggle, and the whole activity of the mind is impoverished and held up till the conflict is resolved. This can be done in several ways.

(1) Possibly the commonest, and certainly the most objectionable and even dangerous, is to let one complex have its way, and to repress the other. "The mechanism of repression involves the cutting off of the obnoxious complex from the rest of the mind, so that it no longer has normal access to consciousness and the conflict is automatically brought to an end. The process of repression is itself in most cases unconscious—the mental elements of the complex are simply forgotten—but the forgetting may sometimes follow a deliberate effort to banish the complex from the mind. The repressed complex is not destroyed, as is clearly shown by its subsequent vitality. It is not allowed to manifest itself directly in consciousness but finds its expression in indirect, symbolic, and often curiously

4 Rivers, Instinct and the Unconscious, p. 87.  
5 P. 49, op. cit.  
6 Tansley, p. 101.  
7 Ibid., p. 135.
distorted forms." Repressed complexes lead to various forms of mania and dementia, nightmares, obsessions, and even, as in many cases of war-neurosis, to apparent paralysis; and in extreme cases to disassociation or dual personality. They also drain away great quantities of the libido; so it may be seen that this is a most ineffective way of settling mental conflict.

(2) The complexes may also be segregated on the conscious level. The two complexes are simply held violently apart and not allowed to appear in consciousness together. The stock instance of this is the merchant who has one code of morality for his home and Church, and another for his business. This does not breed the same crop of mental evils as the method of repression, but it does prevent the proper growth of the personality; and besides, it is only possible with certain individuals, though no doubt commoner than some psychologists seem ready to admit. It is certainly morally fatal.

(3) A rather obscure solution is proposed. This is to allow the complexes to fight a pitched battle till one is broken or a truce is patched up. The conception of the personality that this involves we shall consider later. But it is allowed that this is a most painful process, and possible only to exceptionally strong-willed persons.

(4) Yet another solution of conflict, this time of the greatest importance, is thus described by Freud, though in relation to the particular instinct or major complex which completely monopolises his vision. "One amongst these processes . . . has reached a particular significance in the development of culture. It consists in the abandonment on the part of the sexual impulse of an aim previously found either in the gratification of a component impulse or in the gratification incidental to reproduction and the

adoption of a new aim—which new aim, though genetically related to the first, can no longer be regarded as sexual but must be called social in character. We call this process \textit{sublimation}, by which we subscribe to the general standard which estimates social aims above sexual (ultimately selfish) aims.” That is, the instinct is gratified by the substitution of another and higher and social outlet for the libido than the natural one. Thus the sublimation of the sexual complex produces art; the sublimation of the ego-complex or self-regarding sentiment leads to science.

(5) Another modus vivendi between complexes, in some ways akin to (2) above, the segregation method, is rationalisation. So long as the conflict does not imply physical incompatibility, we may rationalise one or both complexes by finding reasons for acting along the lines proposed which appear perfectly good reasons, and reasons of which we have no cause to be ashamed, but which are not the real reasons of our action. The process is the same as that of finding excuses, but it takes place not in consciousness but in the unconscious. These “defence reactions” “are often ‘the homage which vice pays to virtue,’ that is to say, they are a concession to morality”; but “it is quite a mistake to suppose that they represent ‘conscious hypocrisy.’” \textsuperscript{10} This method is psychologically quite healthy, but it is obviously a very dangerous one for morality.

(6) Conflict is also responsible for the phenomenon known as projection. “Repressed complexes which we refuse to recognise tend to attach themselves to persons and objects of the outside world. Thus we condemn in others what we refuse to admit in ourselves.” \textsuperscript{11} This is the very opposite of those of whom we read in Hudibras, who

\begin{quote}
“Compound for sins they are inclined to
   By damning those they have no mind to.”
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{10} Tansley, p. 104. \textsuperscript{11} J. A. Hadfield, \textit{Psych. and Morals}, p. 34.
We compound for sins we are inclined to by damning them in others. "Preachers are always preaching against the sins to which they are unconsciously most prone." This process can go further, and we can even objectify our complexes—give them a fictitious reality. God, on this theory, is an objectification of the ethical or ideal self; the devil a projection of the anti-moral complexes. So the mind resolves its conflict by removing one combatant and refusing to acknowledge it as its own possession.

(7) The last method of dealing with conflict is not dealt with in many psychological textbooks. "Freedom," not only from conflict but from the tyranny of repressed complexes, "can be brought about . . . by the presentation of an "inspiring" ideal able to produce such a revolution of soul that not only the sentiments, but those emotions that we attached to morbid things are aroused to attach themselves to the new ideal. This is what normally takes place in religious conversion." The centre of the new sentiment must itself have the power of moving the mind and causing this frequently violent break-up of old complexes and readjustment of the instincts and emotions.

The part of the new psychology that has aroused most popular interest is the cure of neuroses by analysis. The repressed complex has first to be discovered, either by hypnotic methods, by free association, or by interpretation of dreams. This is a difficult business, as the patient is exceedingly liable to receive the complexes by suggestion from the analyst, and then project them back into the past. But when the complex is brought up, it has to be got rid of in some other way, and the most common way is sublimation, i.e., directing it into useful social channels.

The bearing of these theories on the Christian idea of

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11 Hadfield, p. 35.
12 Hadfield, p. 82.
sin we may discuss under three headings—the nature of sin, the origin of sin, and the remedy for sin.

We have already noted the tendency of the individual to achieve unification and avoid conflict. This points to a distinct type of ethical theory. “The Ideal . . . is the idea or object which leads to the complete realisation of the whole individual. . . . Psychologically the right ideal is one that can bring harmony to the soul and . . . secure self-realisation or happiness.” 14 This conception of goodness as being, formally considered, a harmonious system of all the impulses of the individual, and, in a wider sphere, the harmony of all the impulses of all individuals, is Plato’s view, and it is in entire agreement with the Christian teaching about love, which is the emotional counterpart of such a harmony. Sin, on this theory, is any wilful opposition to this harmony. So far as this goes, we are in entire agreement with the theory. But there are other questions involved, for the New Psychology launches out into metaphysics and makes quite unwarranted deductions. We offer the following criticisms.

1. The question of moral obligation is not explained. We are told “it has long been our contention that dread of society [soziale Angst] is the essence of what is called conscience,” 15 and Tansley 16 derives it from the herd instinct—which, by the way, is not an instinct but a sentiment. Apart from the fact that this reduces morality to benevolence, which alone is an idea long abandoned by most moralists, we believe that moral obligation cannot be found within human nature. “It takes two,” said Martineau, “to establish an obligation. . . . It is impossible to be at once the upper and the nether millstone.” We believe that a personal God must be postulated to account

14 Hadfield, pp. 76, 85.
15 Freud, Group Ps. and Analysis of the Ego, p. 10.
16 P. 198.
for moral obligation or this unifying tendency. But most of these psychologists believe that God is only a projection; not that He comes to be known by projection, which is of course partly true, but that He is created by projection, a quite illegitimate inference. Even those who admit that sin is against God then destroy the reality of sin by making God a fiction.

2. The whole discussion moves on a metaphysical plane that ought to have perished with Kant’s answer to Hume. There is no real personality involved, but all the time we have nothing but the old “bundle of ideas” over again, under the more dignified name of complexes. The unity of the ego, in spite of references to ego-complexes, is denied, at least implicitly. The whole personality is analysed into component parts. But morality is personal, in the fullest sense, and so, as we said, implies a personal God. Here again psychology is set up as metaphysics.

3. For the most part, this psychology is determinist. Jung is a notable exception, for he held to vitalism for a time. Now with determinism you can have morality and moral imperfection, but sin is questionable, and guilt impossible. Freud tells us that “the sense of guilt . . . can be understood as an expression of tension between the ego and the ego-ideal.” Surely Dr. Adams Brown is nearer the truth when he says, “Guilt is the personal blameworthiness which results from wilful disobedience.” In fact, we cannot really deal with the question apart from Christian experience. Guilt is essentially the consciousness of having sinned, and sin means sin against God. This a deterministic and naturalistic psychology can never account for.

It will be seen by the above criticisms that the New

17 Group Ps. and Analysis of Ego, p. 106.
18 Christian Theology in Outline, p. 284.
Psychology does not radically conflict with Christianity, except where it exceeds its limits or goes on assumptions otherwise untenable. But we believe that whether it is or is not justified by later thought, it is capable of re-statement and alteration in such a way as to leave nothing incompatible with Christianity, always provided that it is remembered that it is a science, and not a philosophy.

Of the origin of sin the New Psychology offers no explanation. The most it can do is to give a new description of the fact. It lends itself, however, to an interpretation along the evolutionary view, and it is perhaps not unfair to deal with that as being probably the explanation that would be given, if one were offered. This theory is that sin is the assertion of our instincts, coming in conflict with a higher law. We have already seen that moral imperfection is regarded as a lack of harmony among our instincts, or at least among our volitions. It has been urged against this that man has many impulses to sin that are not relics of his brute inheritance, are not over-indulgence of primitive instincts. While this may well be true, it is hardly possible to prove it. Every action is traced by the New Psychology to some development of some instinct, however far-fetched the derivation may be; and if an action cannot be accounted for conveniently by the given instincts, a new instinct is invented or postulated to account for it. So to refute this line of argument would lead us into a detailed discussion of all the known books on the subject and a detailed examination of what the instincts are, and what are their developments. But fortunately there is a simpler attack. We know that on the whole the instincts in animals do function fairly efficiently. They are coordinated and controlled in some way that provides very effectively for the well-being of the individual and of the species. Self-abuse is extremely rare, though not quite
unknown. But in man the instincts are not so controlled, for an instinctive life for man is not only morally but biologically harmful. We are therefore forced to conclude that in man there is a radical derangement of the instinctive life. Man is given reason to control these instincts, and the former control is removed; and the consequence is, though not total depravity, very great imperfection. While we must admit that mental characteristics are not inherited, and much of the nature of a man's character depends on his earliest environment, it remains true nevertheless that all men are born with a greater or less derangement of the balance of their instincts. This is what we would put forward as the truth of original sin.

This fact is overlooked or denied by Dr. Tennant, to whom the instincts are merely the material for sin, so that he makes sin coextensive with guilt; so that "'original sin' must mean merely the solicitations of the lower nature, conceived of proleptically as sin because they constitute its potentiality." This conception of sin confines it to particular sins, and ignores the fact of the sinful nature of man; and further, it is too individualistic. Is it not much truer to say that "the sense of sin is consciousness of moral incompatibility with God"? Too little emphasis seems to be laid on "want of conformity to the law of God," and too much on "transgression" of it. Further, it is a fair criticism of Tennant to say that he occupies himself too exclusively with the moral side of sin, and too little with the religious aspect, though his avowed purpose is directly contrary to this.

We see then that the New Psychology tells us little of the origin of sin, unless that its springs of it are to be

21 With Bicknell, p. 32.
found within man himself. It does give us certain light on temptation, though not always definite enough for practical guidance. Repressed complexes we would rather consider under the subject of moral disease, for they are something different from the derangement of instincts which we have spoken of, and only come into existence when better and more effective methods of dealing with conflict have failed. We have now to consider the remedies for sin offered by the New Psychology.

It is obvious that there is nothing said on the forgiveness of sins. If "forgiveness is a matter of personal relationship, to forgive any one is to restore him to his place in our confidence." There can be no forgiveness of a man by the projection of his ethical self. We may pretty safely say that the whole conception of the cure of sin is therefore forward-looking; there need be no regret for the past. There is truth in this, but it is not the whole truth. It is true that Coué more or less repeats the teaching of St. Paul, who says, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." And his teaching is in a sense a development of James's ideo-motor theory of action, and that "to think is the only moral act." But how far short does this come of the Christian idea of forgiveness! It is not even the whole truth about sanctification, let alone justification. The sense of guilt will, on the psychologist's own finding, become a repressed complex and breed all manner of ills. But "if we truly regret the past, we have strong motives for doing better hereafter... Why cut the pair of scissors into halves under the pretence that it will do better work?"

First get rid of the sense of guilt, and then apply Couéism. Or, to put it another way, before new sentiments can be formed, the old ones have to be broken up. The power to do this depends largely on the inherent value and power of the centre of the new sentiment. On the value and effectiveness of the centre of the religious sentiment psychology has nothing to say. “The problem of sin is concerned with the general direction of the tendencies of life. Psychology does not deal with this issue.”

But even granting that psychology can give us some light on the nature of the process of forming sentiments, it describes the cure of sin from the purely human point of view. For religion this must always be inadequate. The Holy Spirit is a living force to Christian experience, not merely an inspiring idea.

Something must be said here of moral disease. There is a tendency among certain people to treat all sin as disease, to be cured by psychotherapy. The people of Erewhon sent for the “straightener” when they had committed a crime, though they compensated for this eccentricity by imprisoning the sick and diseased. But there is such a thing as moral disease—e.g., kleptomania, dipsomania. Hadfield would distinguish complexes from sentiments by saying that the former are unacceptable to the self, and there is a tendency to limit the word to repressed complexes (e.g., Rivers). It is these involuntarily repressed complexes that give rise to moral disease. “Sin is due to wrong sentiments, moral disease is due to morbid complexes giving rise to uncontrollable impulses.” This reads rather like Tennant’s view of sin, as being entirely volitional, but it does not really conflict with our view of original sin. What we have to remember about the morally diseased

\[24\] Grensted, Ch. Quarterly Review, Jan., 1923, p. 300.
\[25\] P. 24.
\[26\] Ibid., p. 48.
man is that he cannot be rid of the impulse to sin. No efforts of his own can rid him of the temptation; though he may be able to control the actions to which his disease drives him. At any rate, he is subjected to temptation that no man should or need have to endure. It has been suggested that "'repressed complexes' hold much the same place in the thought of to-day that was given to evil spirits by the early Christians." If that is so, Christianity has a remedy to offer, now as then. But even so, it cannot but welcome the aid of psychology in identifying and in curing such cases. The cure psychology offers is to revive the complex into consciousness, and then dispose of the conflict which caused its repression by sublimation, if, as it does with most fear-complexes and war-neuroses, the conflict does not simply disappear.

We may conclude by summing up the criticisms we have to make on the New Psychology, and the points of value we find in it. Like all other forms of psychology in the past, and probably all that ever will be, this one has continually sinned by exceeding its bounds and giving judgments on ultimate problems of philosophy and theology. Whether psychology is to remain a part of philosophy, or to pass over to science, it cannot be too often repeated that, like science, it has never the last word on these questions. We make no claim to be able to judge it as a psychology, the more so that all its supporters, except the extreme right wing, such as McDougall and Shand, never deign to put forward the slightest proof of their assumptions. Some of the phenomena that Freud explains, e.g., slips of the tongue, are, even to the amateur, capable of much simpler and more natural explanation. But we must leave it to others to criticise the movement as a psychology. Yet we do claim the right to criticise the metaphysical assump-

tions made. The general assumption of determinism; the purely empirical view of the ego; the conception of God as a projection; these are ideas we must reject. Other shortcomings, such as the omission of the ideas of value and forgiveness, are only shortcomings if we take the psychology at its own valuation, for they do not properly find a place in psychology.

On the other hand, there is very much in the new theories that we must welcome, if they turn out to be in the main true. If it is the case that "in cases of defence reaction the mind may be unconscious of the real motive of the action defended,"28 i.e., in rationalisation of instinctive impulses, we must be grateful for a means of discovering what the real motives are. We can then deal with our real enemies, not the women and children whom they put forward as a screen in the battle. This was possible to some by intuition, but these people were exceptional. The emphasis on early environment and education is also valuable, for the mischief worked by complexes repressed in infancy seems to be incalculable. The idea of sentiments is not of so great practical value, but it reinforces Christian teaching and experience. There are, Grensted says,29 three main cores for sentiments, the self, other people, and God, and to have the third right means automatic adjustment of the other two. The distinction between sin and moral disease should be of the very greatest moral, social and religious value.

Yet when all has been said, personality still has its mysterious core that denies investigation; evil is not explained; and sin remains sin. Sin as opposition to God's will, and carrying with it the inevitable estrangement from Him, will always be a mystery to those who know in their own

28 Tansley, p. 104.
29 Church Quarterly Review, Jan., 1923, p. 296.
experience what it is. And the remedy for sin will never be found in psychology alone. Christ will always remain the Way, the Truth and the Life.

G. J. R. Macaulay.

GEORGE FOX AND THE SCRIPTURES.

(In references J means the Cambridge (1911) edition of Fox's Journal.)

With much truth "the apostate" Francis Bugg says in his Address to Parliament, "Your Honours will find it as difficult a thing to gain the true meaning of the Quakers touching the Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures . . . as the Emperor Constantius found it in the examination of Arius the Heretick to get his true meaning touching the Faith of one Substance." 1 The obscurity of Fox's view is manifest when we try to frame a statement in which place may be found for all that he says, and for what seems logically to follow therefrom. In this, however, Fox is by no means alone. Whose expressed views on Scripture are quite free of difficulty? Any statement that is not vague enough to be ambiguous is likely to be unsatisfying. There is in practice for everybody a Scripture within the Scripture; and a perfectly satisfactory view as to how this regulative element is to be determined is still to seek. The general bearing of many views is plain and acceptable; but press them into details or to their logical conclusions, and seemingly unanswerable questions immediately emerge. Most men, too, especially in the sphere of religion and politics, are apt to demand in the views of their opponents a degree of explicitness and consistency which it would puzzle them to exhibit in their own. It would have saved a great deal of bitter controversy and prevented much

1 A Modest Defence of 'Quakerism Exposed' (1700), Pref.