The issue, presumably, is one not so much for theoretic argument as for the most private and spiritual feeling. In any case, we may be sure men will decide it for themselves; and hearts overburdened with grief, as they follow the dead into the world of light with longing unspeakable, will not inquire closely, or too much care, what rules of prayer have been devised by men whose minds are cast in another mould. To the demand that they must set limits to intercession they will be apt to reply that they cannot break off the utterance of fond wishes at the grave. To them it seems merely natural that at will they should speak to the Father concerning those whom He has in His safe keeping.

Who shall forbid the heart’s desires to flow
Beyond the limit of the things we know?
   In heaven above
The incense that the golden censers bear
Is the sweet perfume from the saintly prayer
   Of trust and love.¹

H. R. MACKINTOSH.

RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

In its modern form the question of the relation of religion to philosophy was first raised by Kant and Schleiermacher—by the former from the side of philosophy, by the latter from the side of religion. Against the Rationalism of the 18th century, which had made religion dependent on metaphysic, Kant demonstrated the impossibility of any theoretical or speculative knowledge of the ultimate realities on which religion hangs. Detaching religion from metaphysic, he grounded it in man’s moral consciousness, in other words, in ethics. The ideas in which it moves are postulates of our moral consciousness, as certain to us as the fact of moral

¹ Poems, by Walter C. Smith, p. 175.
obligation; and we are religious when we fulfill the duties imposed upon us by our moral reason as at the same time divine commands.

Equally with Kant, Schleiermacher was concerned to loose religion from its dependence on philosophical speculation. But he took a further and much more dubious step when he sought to demonstrate its independence of morality as well. According to this epoch-making theologian, religion is an ultimate function of the human spirit, distinct alike from philosophical knowing and ethical doing, and in no way an appendix of one or the other. It is the feeling or sense of the Infinite in the finite, the Eternal in the temporal, the Whole in the part; the feeling that our time-life, with all that comes within its experience, is a manifestation and organ of the eternal Whole and absolutely dependent on it. That religion involves knowledge or doctrine Schleiermacher admitted; but such knowledge, he affirmed, relates only to the various ways in which the religious consciousness is determined, and is not derived from any source outside that consciousness. It may be remarked that in opposing the Rationalistic conception of the dependence of religion on speculation, both Kant and Schleiermacher equally opposed the traditional Church conception of its dependence on a body of supernaturally revealed truth.

There is probably no one to-day who would maintain the theories of either Kant or Schleiermacher in their entirety. None the less these theories mark a notable advance in the understanding of religion. Their demonstration that the religious impulse is radically distinct from the speculative, and that religion does not wait on speculation for its knowledge of ultimate truth—that, I believe, stands and will stand. And equally irrefragable is the Kantian position that religion, in its higher forms at least, is inseparably bound up with our moral consciousness.
Where both of these great thinkers fall short is in their analysis of religion, their conception of what religion essentially is. Neither the one nor the other had before him religion as it has been exhibited by the outstanding prophetic spirits of our race. Kant knew it only in a miserably truncated form, as an appendix of morality; and for Schleiermacher it was hardly more than an emotional apprehension and appreciation of the unity of the universe.

If we can claim for Albrecht Ritschl that he lifted the whole subject to a new level, his success is due far less to his philosophic penetration, for which he was not conspicuous, than to his deeper understanding of the impulses from which religion springs and the interests to which it ministers. It would not be easy to sum up Ritschl’s position in a few sentences, and the attempt is the less necessary that the discussion which follows is substantially on Ritschlian lines.

Before entering on a consideration of the relation of religion to philosophy it is necessary to determine what these two great magnitudes severally represent. From what root in human nature do they spring? What human need do they seek to satisfy? The definition of philosophy is perhaps the simpler task, and with it we shall begin.

We may count on fairly general agreement when we say that philosophy represents the attempt of the human mind to impose on the manifoldness of its experience the unity which it finds within itself. Proceeding on the assumption that things form a connected whole, it essays the task of exhibiting them in their organic relation to each other and building them into a system. The impulse from which it springs is thus purely intellectual in character. Like science it seeks to understand the universe; only, raising questions that lie beyond the domain of science, it seeks to understand it in its ultimate principles.

This is not to be taken as meaning that the intellectual
interest is the only one to which philosophical constructions minister or by which their character is determined. As a matter of fact there has never been a system which has not to a greater or lesser extent been dominated by judgments of value—judgments, that is to day, regarding the worth or value which certain elements in experience possess for the human spirit. If Plato, for example, sets the Idea of the good at the apex of his system, it is not from any intellectual or logical demand, but because of the religious judgment that the good possesses a worth which entitles it to such a position. So far his system is determined by a religious motive and ministers to a religious interest. But while this must be affirmed, it still remains true that the characteristic task of philosophy is an intellectual one, to unify and organise. What is taken over from religion, like what is taken over from other departments of experience, is treated as an element that has to be built into a general scheme of things.

Turn we now to religion. There are those who find at the basis of religion precisely the same intellectual impulse that, as we have seen, gives rise to philosophy. Religion, according to this account, represents the search of the mind for an ultimate cause; or, again, as in the Hegelian and Neo-Hegelian philosophy, it is rooted in the impulse to discover a unity that shall comprehend and explain all distinctions, more especially the distinction of subject and object. The idea of an absolute Unity, Edward Caird asserts, is the ultimate and essential principle of our intelligence, and as such the ultimate principle of religion. Every rational being as such is a religious being. Wherein then do religion and philosophy differ, for that there is a difference is an undeniable historical fact? The difference is reduced to this, that while the first attains the goal by a kind of intuition, the second proceeds by the path of rational demonstration. Needless
to say it is the latter path that in the estimation of Idealistic thinkers is the more certain one, and the one to which all men will in time betake themselves. Religion is relegated to the position of a forecourt of philosophy.

To me it seems difficult to find in such an analysis a single grain of anything that can be called truth. If there is one thing that stands out in religion through all its stages it is its practical character. Religion, as it presents itself to us as an historical phenomenon, is rooted, not in the impulse to find a cause that shall explain the world, nor in the impulse to pass beyond all antitheses to the unity that embraces them, but in man's practical situation and in the practical needs of his life. It has what we may call its natural basis in our sense of dependence on a power above us, however we may name it, a power which besets us behind and before, breaks in upon our life at every point, often in staggering enough ways, and which we cannot escape. So to relate ourselves to this power as that it shall not be against us but with us, is one of the great practical needs that in all ages have impelled men to religion. But this, of course, does not carry us far. Only when we enter the domain of man's moral life do the profounder needs to which religion ministers disclose themselves. Kant was right in asserting that religion is bound up with our consciousness of moral obligation. Its deepest root is the impulse to establish at the heart of things, on the throne of being, those great moral sanctities that impose upon us a limitless obligation and bow us before them in profoundest reverence. The God whom religion seeks is not the One in the many, not the Absolute, but the Almighty Power whose loving kindness is in the heavens, whose faithfulness reacheth unto the skies, whose righteousness is like the mountains of God, whose judgments are a great deep. And that communion with God in which religion lives is communion with the Being
who stands behind these sanctities as their source and their guardian.

This then is our first result, that religion and philosophy spring from radically different impulses of our human nature and minister to different needs. The first, in its highest form, arises as an answer to the demand that the moral sanctities of our life be established as the ultimate and supreme reality; the second as an answer to the demand for a completely unified and organised experience.

We pass to another point. Whence does religion derive its knowledge of God? On what is our belief that God is such as our Christian faith represents Him to be ultimately founded? It is the great question of revelation, or, viewing the matter from the philosophic standpoint, the question of epistemology.

According to the traditional Church view, common alike to Catholics and Protestants, reason supplies us with certain elementary truths about God, and revelation supplements these with a number of supernaturally communicated and authenticated truths of a higher order. I shall not stay to criticise that view. Enough to say that it lies behind us. Our concern is with the claim often advanced on behalf of philosophy, that religion is in the last resort dependent for its knowledge of God on a philosophic construction. There is, it is often maintained, but one pathway to truth, the pathway of reason; and philosophy represents the attempt of the human mind to apply reason to the problems of existence in a systematic way.

Now if by reason we are to understand the sum of our cognitive faculties, the claim that it is the one organ of truth can scarcely be contested except by one who occupies the ground of the older and discredited supernaturalism. But can we speak of reason as a uniform process? Has the human mind only one way of reaching truth? Or if more
than one, must all be regarded as variants of a single type?

To Kant we owe the earliest attempt to distinguish between
the cognitive process represented in science and philosophy
and that represented in religion. The former process he de-
scribes as that of the theoretical, and the latter as that of the
practical reason; and he lays it down that the theoretical
reason has as its proper domain the world of phenomena,
the domain of ultimate or noumenal reality lying outside its
competence. All our religious ideas are postulates of the
practical reason, that is to say, they are implied in our con-
sciousness of moral obligation, and are valid only for those
who acknowledge such obligation to be impregnably real.
We cannot linger to point out the strength and the weak-
ness of this epistemology. The further development of the
distinction established proceeded along other than Kantian
lines. In the hands of Herbart, De Wette, Lotze, Ritschl,
Kaftan and others it became a distinction between theoreti-
cal judgments on the one side and judgments of value on
the other.

What, according to this account of our cognitive pro-
cesses, is a theoretical judgment? It is one that has as the
ground of its validity the compulsion of perception and logical
thought. Every scientific and every strictly philosophical
judgment is theoretical in character. Starting from per-
ceived particulars, the scientist and, in a larger way, the
philosopher, proceed to the general conception that reduces
these particulars to unity and order; and they reach their
goal when the whole world of known fact is causally or logi-
cally connected in a single organic system. The proof that
their construction corresponds with reality lies simply in
this, its ability to exhibit the facts in their interrelation and
unity. It follows that the certainty with which such a con-
struction is held is a purely logical certainty.

If such be the character of theoretical judgments and
theoretical constructions, what are judgments of value? We may define them as judgments that have as the ground of their validity, not the compulsion of perception or of logical thought, but the fact that the object about which the judgment is made possesses for us as beings endowed with feeling, desire, volition, a certain value or worth. When I say travel is pleasant I pronounce a judgment of value, or when I say the Venus of Milo is sublime, or again when I say thought is a noble activity. Such judgments have no meaning except for a being who is the subject of feeling and desire and who pursues ends. They are rooted in the practical side of man's nature, and their validity depends on the inner satisfaction which their respective objects afford.

In the examples given the value predicated is, in the first case, a natural value, in the second an aesthetic, and in the third an intellectual. While these values are not without significance for religion, they are comparatively unimportant as compared with a fourth class, namely moral values. Every moral judgment is a judgment of value. To pronounce an act or a disposition or an end good or bad is to relate it to the feeling, willing self as possessing for it a worth or an unworth. One can say that the main concern of religion is with moral worths: "Seek ye first the Kingdom of God and His righteousness." As we have already seen, religion's deepest impulse is to find life's great sanctities or worths at the glowing centre of things.

But what assurance have we that they occupy that central position and constitute reality's ultimate meaning? How can we bridge the gulf between value for the human race and value for the universe? Must we wait till the philosopher with his speculative system provides us with a logical demonstration? History, were there nothing else, repudiates with sufficient emphasis that fantastic view. Where religion developed in its purest form and to its loftiest
height, in the prophetic movement, namely, that culminated in Jesus, philosophy was conspicuous by its absence. And religion on the whole owes little enough to philosophy’s speculative ministrations.

The truth is that religious faith has a certainty of its own, radically different in kind from logical certainty and able to stand alone. As we have shown, it moves in the region of worths, more particularly of moral worths. And in establishing its worths on the throne of the universe, it proceeds on this assumption that the highest in rank must be the ultimate in being. Bound up with all our worth-affirmations we find this ontological affirmation, made instinctively and almost unconsciously. And the assurance with which we make it is measured by our feeling for the significance and glory of the particular worths as elements in our human life.

The highest in rank must be the ultimate in being—why, you will ask, this necessity? The answer is that it is a moral necessity and morally conditioned. A universe in which it did not hold would not be logically absurd, but it would be morally intolerable. As Socrates long ago declared, if the gods do not prefer the just man to the unjust it were better to die than to live.

It goes without saying that the worths about which faith makes its affirmations are no products of human phantasy, but are historically given. We meet them as facts in the world in which we move, as indubitable parts of reality. A moral order in human life is a fact, and a moral end cherished in the breast of earth’s noblest sons and inspiring their highest efforts. Justice and mercy are facts. The purity, the love and the sacrifice of Jesus are facts. Such facts we gather up under the term Revelation. They form the material with which faith deals, the objective reality by which faith is evoked. Faith affirms their absolute worth and their
ontological significance. On the ground of their worth it establishes them on the world's throne.

This we take to be a correct analysis of the cognitive process as it proceeds in the minds of religious people, whether they be great prophets or humble believers. It may serve to confirm our analysis, if we show how it accounts for certain characters that have always been recognised as attaching to religious or faith knowledge.

Among the outstanding features of religious apprehension is the fact that it is morally conditioned. "The secret of the Lord is with them that fear Him." If religious apprehension was a function of the logical reason, if man was religious simply in virtue of his rationality, such a fact would be utterly unintelligible. It is no longer unintelligible but entirely luminous when we understand that our religious faith depends upon what approves itself to us as the highest meaning of our human life, depends upon the values we rank as the highest. Only he who feels the Kingdom of God with its righteousness and its love to be august and supreme will have the impulse to find in them the ultimate meaning of existence.

Again, the value-judgment theory explains what we may call the immediacy of our religious judgments. These judgments are not the result of a careful weighing of evidence and balancing of probabilities. God's existence is not for religion a hypothesis to be tested in the approved scientific fashion. We are borne forward to the great affirmation by the inner rush and tide of our feelings. How this should be becomes clear if our affirmation sums up our attitude toward the sanctities of our human life.

Finally we can say that the value-judgment theory explains the peculiar character that belongs to faith certainty as distinguished from logical certainty. Not seldom the two have been identified, or distinguished only by the
fact that in the former case our affirmations are based on evidence that falls short of being demonstrative. It was this conception of faith that was in Huxley's mind when he condemned faith as immoral, on the ground that it signifies a readiness to assent to a proposition on insufficient evidence. The truth is that with the weighing of evidence faith has little or nothing to do. Faith-certainty is not a logical but a moral certainty, representing the inner momentum of the soul's affirmation of the good and the true. Frequently our religious affirmations are flung in the very face of what seem the hard facts of existence. "Though the fig tree shall not blossom, neither shall fruit be on the vines; the labour of the olive shall fail and the fields shall yield no meat; yet will I rejoice in the Lord, I will joy in the God of my salvation" (Hab. iii. 17). But though our faith-affirmations are not logically demonstrated propositions, it does not follow that we hold them with a less degree of assurance than we hold the latter. It is precisely into such affirmations that we throw the whole force and passion of our being. What is true is that always there attaches to them the character of a venture. We cannot prove the eternal and cosmic significance of life's supreme values, but we stake our life upon the fact, face life and face death on the strength of it.

We may take it then that the knowledge of God on which religion hangs comes to us through another channel than that of the theoretical reason, and that consequently religion is not at all dependent on the constructions of any philosophy. There are, however, two other suppositions as to the bearing of philosophy on religion that remain to be considered.

Granting, it may be said, that the analysis given of the process of faith knowing is a correct one, may it not be possible to go behind these worth-judgments with their attached ontological assumption, and show them and everything else
Attempts at such a speculative construction are, as a matter of fact, in the field. Idealism essays the task of explaining subject and object, God and the world, morality and religion—everything in short in heaven above and on the earth beneath—from the principle of self-consciousness and its given contents. To subject this system to detailed examination would take us beyond our limits. Suffice it to say that it involves the retranslation of every magnitude of our experience into a form in which their distinctive features are no longer discoverable. Objects are stripped of their objectivity, and the subject is turned into a mere unifying principle. The causal relation disappears from nature, its place being taken by a logical relation. History becomes an illusion, for the universe is eternally complete. The moral impulse and the moral end are interpreted in terms of logic. Logic becomes the mainspring of the very Deity and we get a God whose only accomplishment is to turn dialectical somersaults. The prophecy of Edward Caird that such a philosophy will in time supersede faith—which he regards as only a kind of blind logic—as the ground of our religious convictions, seems to me to be of all prophecies the most preposterous.

But the claim for philosophy, that it can provide a bulwark for religion, may be put in a more moderate way and without any monistic presupposition. Our religious convictions form but one branch of the tree of knowledge, and no one will deny that all truth is interrelated. The task of building all our knowledge, from whatever source derived, into a single system, of exhibiting the universe in all its aspects and workings as an organic whole, is a legitimate one, and one that the human mind will probably never cease attempting. May not philosophy perform a real service for religion by showing that the truths on which religion hangs
are not inconsistent with the truths say of science, that in
the unity of the whole every aspect of existence has its place
and right?

To such a view much must be conceded. Unquestionably
religious faith is often menaced or even undermined by con­
ceptions of the world which either resolve its ideas into
illusions or allow them nothing more than a subjective
validity. For many, doubtless, it is enough to fall back on
faith’s native certainty. But not for all. Assailants must
be met on their own ground, and bad metaphysic refuted by
better. Not a few have owed their deliverance from the
nightmare of materialism to the demonstration that the
material world of our experience is relative to a knowing
mind. And perhaps faith would gain in security were we
in possession of a philosophy which allowed their full value
to the great Christian worths and articulated them in a
universal scheme.

Does such a philosophy lie within the compass of our
human powers? As we have already pointed out, almost
every philosophy has incorporated in its structure elements
derived from religion. But of no existing system can it be
said that faith and reason alike find themselves at home in it.
Of a Christian philosophy we have hardly more than frag­
ments. And despite the Hegelian confidence in the unlimited
resources of reason, one may be permitted to doubt whether
the structure of the universe will ever be made as clear to
the human mind as the mechanism of our grandfather’s
clock.

And there is another point in this connexion that must
not be overlooked. In striving after unity and system,
philosophy almost inevitably does violence to the facts,
cutting and clipping them that they may fit into their
appointed place. Nowhere is this more evident than in the
doctrine of God. The philosopher may be concerned to
conserve the moral being of God, but he is also concerned to exhibit God as the ultimate unity in which subject and object, mind and matter, find their ground and explanation. How extremely difficult it is to satisfy one interest without sacrificing the other history sufficiently shows. Of no Absolute ever constructed can we say that it is adequate to the needs of religion. Between the world of Idealistic Philosophy, with its eternal dialectic of ideas, and the mechanical world of Naturalism there is from the religious standpoint little to choose. The one is almost as bleak and inhospitable a place for the human soul as the other. With this peril to religion in view, one can understand how Ritschl should have demanded the complete extrusion of metaphysics from theology and limited theology to the task of systematising the simple affirmations of faith. Beyond question it is by these simple affirmations that religion lives; and so far as one can forecast the future, one may hazard the assertion, that to the end of the chapter the Christian man will walk by faith and not by sight.

W. Morgan.

NOTES ON THE FOURTH GOSPEL.

X. EVENTS IN GALILEE.

(1) It is probable that a transposition has taken place in the Gospel; and that chapter vi. should precede chapter v. for the following reasons:—The fifty-fourth verse of chapter iv. suggests that Jesus had left Judæa to exercise His ministry for a time at least in Galilee; but the first verse of chapter v., without giving an adequate reason, takes Him away again to Judæa. In iv. 46 He is in Cana in Galilee, and is appealed to by a nobleman from Capernaum. In vi. 1 He is represented as going over the sea of Galilee; a more appropriate description if He was already on the