THE ROOTS OF ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF SIN

has adduced some evidence which he thinks points to such an original.

The question of the original language of each of these works might, perhaps, with advantage, be reconsidered in connexion with the general question of the extent to which parallelism was adopted in Jewish writings not written in Hebrew. We have on the one hand the clear example of the use of parallelism in Wisdom, and on the other the exceedingly slight use of parallelism, for example, in the Sibylline oracles; and we may recall again in this connexion the avoidance of parallelism in mediaeval Hebrew poetry. These avoidances or absences of parallelism are certainly worthy of attention in view of the ease with which this feature of Hebrew poetry could have been reproduced in Greek works, and even combined, if necessary, with the use of Greek metres like the hexameters of the Sibylline oracles. Was it merely due to the fact that the one was writing in Hebrew and the other in Greek, that the author of the Apocalypse of Baruch in his loftier passages employs the form of ancient Hebrew poetry, whereas his contemporary, St. Paul, even in such a passage as 1 Corinthians xiii., avoids it? Or may we detect here the influences of different schools or literary traditions?

G. BUCHANAN GRAY.

THE ROOTS OF ST. PAUL'S DOCTRINE OF SIN.

There are some eight sources from which it must be held that St. Paul drew his teachings on the subject before us. First and second, there are two Jewish or Old Testament dogmas; Death is caused by sin—Crucifixion is a death which implies a peculiar curse. Third, fourth, fifth and sixth, we have to look to St. Paul's personal experiences—of helplessness in sin; of sudden miraculous conversion;
of a new life of moral victory through Christ; of conflict between flesh and spirit. Seventh and eighth, there are two moral postulates enunciated by Paul as a Christian: That Christ did not die gratuitously—that no flesh shall glory before God.

I.

We begin, then, with two dogmatic postulates which St. Paul learned while he was in the Jews’ religion and which he never questioned. And first of all, death was the wages of sin. Or again, Sin entered into the world and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all sinned—whatever perplexities of interpretation attach to the last words, there is no mistake about the main thesis.

This position manifestly reproduces Jewish theology. We cannot say that it reproduces the teaching of Gen. iii. When correctly interpreted, that chapter, as it is shaped in our Bibles, says nothing about the origin of death, unless indeed its closing portion confirms the old Hebrew belief that man is naturally mortal. The utmost possibility it contemplates as open to the first human pair in Eden is that they might have eaten magic fruit from the tree of life, and so have lived forever. If that was not to happen, being dust-born they were dust-doomed. Nor does the Fall story seek to explain the origin of sin. It deals with other problems, which pressed hard on primitive man, and have not ceased to torment his descendants. Why must men work so hard at tilling a thorny and niggardly soil? Why must women bear their little ones in such cruel labour? Why is the serpent so revolting in his grovelling gait, and again—for so the Hebrew naturalists evidently taught—in his habit of eating dust? The story answers these questions. It was not always so! There was a Saturnian age to begin with, when our first parents lived in a lovely and bountiful garden. But the cunning serpent beguiled Eve,
and she persuaded her husband; they ate magic fruit from
the tree of knowledge, the one thing withheld from them;
and so their miseries—nay alas! our miseries too—began.

True, the death penalty which had been threatened was
not immediately inflicted on them. The explanation is no
jejune modernism, such as Dr. Clemen offers in his study of
the Biblical Doctrine of Sin, about the workings of death
beginning at once. That far-fetched suggestion is out of
place. God, we are told, learned the facts in answer to a
few searching questions. The man and woman tried to
excuse themselves; and up to a certain point their excuses
are accepted. The serpent is guiltiest of all. Everything
that lives is to hate him, and he is to be visibly degraded.
The woman, his first victim, is next to him in guilt, and
receives appropriate punishment in the agonies of child­
birth. The man, less weak than she, has yet shown himself
fatally complaisant, so his pleasant work is to become hard
drudgery among weeds. The origin of sentient evil—not of
sin, but of pain, unnatural pain—is thus accounted for
to primitive minds. An act of sin explains it, with far­
reaching consequences for men, women and serpents; but
those who first spoke and first listened to the Fall story did
not dwell upon this primeval sin for its own sake. In­
trinsically, what was a sin? To the early Hebrew, possibly
not much more than it is to the self-complacent average
modern mind.

Still, there the story was, in the Hebrew Bible; and its
theological consequences could not possibly be limited to
those drawn from it at the first. We have evidence that,
before the days of St. Paul, Jewish theology had been
working at further problems arising out of the legend.
Not to speak of inferences carried backward from the
Talmud, writings earlier than the New Testament like
Sirach and the Book of Wisdom, and writings contemporary
with its later parts such as the Apocalypses of Ezra and Baruch, show this process at work. The tempter, the serpent, was now explained as diabolical. Adam’s sin, it was now taught, had somehow introduced death. There was in man’s heart—not in his flesh, as Paul writes—an evil Yetzer. The relation of this to Adam’s first act of guilt was left extremely vague, though there was at any rate room for a view which has been ascribed to the Talmud, that the human race started with an inclination towards evil, and that Adam’s rashness could do no more than increase the inclination, fearfully enough, in his posterity.

Even St. Paul writes not dissimilarly. Thus he leaves us in the dark as to how far his doctrine of Adam is a distinct or more ultimate root of his doctrine regarding sin. He concurs with Jewish theology in tracing death to sin (Rom. v., 1 Cor. xv.). He recognises that the story of Adam constitutes in some sense the supreme illustration of that fatal connexion. But he has another doctrine which we must glance at shortly—that of the sinful flesh. And the relation in Pauline theology between the flesh and Adam’s sinful act is a matter of uncertain and precarious inference—no more to be cleared up than the origin of the Yetzer in Jewish theology. The one clear ringing note that sounds out is this—Death came by sin.

II.

St. Paul’s second borrowed dogma asserts that death by crucifixion implies a specially awful curse. The doctrine rests, as we all know, upon scarcely more than a single verse in Deut. (xxi. 23), quoted once in Gal. (iii. 13) with a slight softening. St. Paul in his Christian period writes that one hanged on a tree is ipso facto accursed; he does not explicitly say, with the Old Testament passage, cursed by

1 St. Paul makes a severely dogmatic use of Deut. xxvii. 26 also.
God. This dogma makes even clearer to us than the last how the young Saul necessarily must regard the crucified Jesus—as a heinous impostor. A dead Messiah meant no Messiah at all, but a sinful man exposed and punished. A crucified Messiah—blasphemous paradox!—meant one upon whom God’s curse notoriously rested. To persecute the followers of such a one was plain duty for every loyal Hebrew.

III.

Without for the present following St. Paul’s thoughts along this line to their further phases, we have to speak of the third great root of his doctrine of sin, as revealed in the personal experiences of his unconverted days. Later Jewish theology, which we need not hesitate to carry back to the earliest Christian age, declared that man’s inborn taint of sin found appropriate remedy in the law. From his eighth day onwards the male Jew was pledged to his religion by the rite of circumcision; but for a time religion led him on a wide leash. The child was wisely enough regarded as not more than half responsible for his deeds. Then a happy day came about the age of twelve—they reach physical maturity in the East sooner than we of the West—when the child assumed the responsibilities of a man, took on himself the yoke of the law, fought with his sins, overcame them. When a child was growing up in a zealous Pharisee atmosphere, all this business of what we may call confirmation would be transacted in the most solemn earnest.

Paul gives us a record of his inner history in the seventh chapter of Romans. I see no reason why we should evaporate this narrative, with Dr. Denney, into a merely ideal human biography. It is personal and literal. As a child, Saul had been alive without the law. We who spend our days under less legal systems of religion can hardly (I fancy) imagine the complete relief from moral responsibility that
exists, so long as a child knows that the hour of accountability has not yet struck. His parents or his teachers may have to answer for him, but he personally has nothing to answer for in the meantime. In the case of Paul we must think of an innocent and noble nature, but one morally quite unripe. Even a child of exceptional gifts would be singularly at rest in the legal system. He knows there are grave ordeals in front of him; but he knows that, before facing these, he will have put on the whole armour of righteousness as supplied by the law. All must "come right."

So it may have proved for many, but so it did not prove for Saul of Tarsus. This exceptional young Pharisee gave himself enthusiastically to fuller study of the law and to careful personal obedience, but with grievous results. Innocence and happiness fled away. He struggled and struggled, only to fail. The law which was to be his saviour and champion proved his worst enemy. It showed him his sin; apart from it, he might never have known what sin was. That eager will of his could not meet the law's claims; that almost morbidly acute conscience of his discovered taint after taint within him. Outwardly all went well. There was no more punctilious Pharisee than he. Touching the righteousness that was in the law he was blameless. But, within the shell of this outward success and seemingly well-earned esteem, there was a miserable baffled man, who grasped every day anew at peace with God, and who had to confess to himself every night that he had once more failed.

This is very like the picture furnished to us in many an Augustinian or evangelical autobiography of later ages; yet there are differences. Later orthodoxy teaches that man is wholly bad until the grace of God masters him. Not till he is radically upon God's side does struggle begin. Previously there had been a sort of peace—in willing obedience to evil. Bunyan tells us in the *Holy War* how Mansoul
tore down the image of Shaddai and erected in its place the image of Diabolus. Nor is this extravagance peculiarly Puritan; it could be followed far back, I believe, among the church fathers. Calvinism only carries it to a logical issue in declaring mankind "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." Briefly, unconverted men are devils.

The teaching of St. Paul was not this. Drawing from the experiences of a bitter past, he did not find that such was the true description of the trouble. He had never been willingly carried along upon the current of evil. There were two inclinations in his make up; but the flesh had the mastery, and the spirit was impotent. St. Paul is as dogmatic as any Calvinist in asserting the impossibility of doing right, while unregenerate; but not of wishing to do right. He affirms, with deep pathos, the existence of a longing hopeless wish. It is hardly strange that dogmatic interpreters refused to find unregenerate man in Romans vii., or even that critical theology sometimes tries to revive the mistaken interpretation of that chapter as recording a Christian’s conflicts. But there can be no real doubt that Paul is portraying his past self. This root of his doctrine about sin is not a borrowed dogma, but a grievous fact in his personal history. And yet St. Paul interprets the fact in almost dogmatic fashion as the inevitable lot of man. He did not conceive himself as exceptional, but as a purely typical human being. At the most, he might be more conscious than some others were of the state of the case. But inward division and helplessness were the lot of all sinners.

What shall we say to these things? Calvinistic orthodoxy never tires of telling us that, in everything gloomy which St. Paul says about the natural man, he is right, and that only our own shallowness or hardness of heart keeps us from full sympathy with him. This will not quite do.
There are manifold ways of approaching God's Kingdom. Struggle and failure are not the only possible initiation of the religious life. No religion which contains in its canon such a document as Psalm cxix. can afford to impose the Pauline experience, to say nothing of the Calvinistic, as de fide for every disciple. "I will never forget thy precepts, for with them thou hast quickened me"—this is the very experience St. Paul sets aside as unthinkable; "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." No forensic skill can harmonise the wording of these two scriptures. We must maintain the spirit of both, but hardly the letter of either.

Yet we must grant that the experience of St. Paul is profoundly significant. If any one cares to say that it is essentially of deeper quality than the chastened piety of the Psalmist within his narrow round, I do not know that we can refuse it that tribute. Happy they who, discovering the Slough of Despond, press on through it and emerge on solid ground upon the side towards the Celestial City! But not unhappy they who, serving the same Lord and seeking the same home, find their days "Bound each to each by natural piety."

IV.

The fourth root of St. Paul's doctrine of sin is his sudden conversion on the Damascus road by the vision and voice of the glorified Jesus. We may take different views of the event. We may say, like Professor Feine, that the miracle is a scientific certainty, necessary to account for the known facts of Paul's experience. Or, if we like, we may take the high-flying anti-miraculous line, and declare that the vision was a psychological illusion, though one that happened to teach wholesome truths. Or, once again, we may prefer to
hold that the vision was a true revelation from heaven to earth, without committing ourselves to any theory of its mechanism. In any case, we have to recognise that Paul raised no nice questions. To him it was frankly and plainly a miracle. In a violent and unnatural if most gracious way, he was born into the Christian faith and added to the list of men who had seen the Lord after the Resurrection. The fact as a fact was among the bases of his experience and the sacred springs of his Christian beliefs. Jesus was alive, was in heaven, was ruling God's world. He was not an impostor or a blasphemer. Jesus was Lord. He was Messiah in an even more eminent sense than if He had occupied the throne of David at Jerusalem.

Yet this immense upheaval in belief—this transvaluation of almost all his values—did not lead to St. Paul's abandoning his Jewish dogmas about sin and death. Death, even Christ's death, was still the wages of sin; only, it was the wages of our sin, not of His. Death on the cross was still the bearing of a Divinely imposed curse; only, it was the curse due to Jewish disobedience through long ages towards a Divinely imposed law. The Jewish dogmas and the personal experience combined, strangely, interestingly, to create Paul's Christian doctrines.

Objection may be brought against the statement just given of each of these two Pauline affirmations. First: How could Paul teach that Christ died vicariously for us, if we still die? The answer is surely plain. To St. Paul, the death of a Christian is a painful anomaly. There was need of a special revelation from heaven to enable him to assure the Thessalonians that the pious dead have lost nothing. The typical Christian experience is to survive and be caught up into the clouds to meet Christ. Paul confidently anticipates that experience for himself when he writes 1 Thessalonians, and even when he returns to the theme in 1
Corinthians. Only in 2 Corinthians does he contemplate and accept the probable prospect of dying; only in Philippians does he speak of his longing to join Christ even by death, and of death itself as gain. Characteristically, then, according to St. Paul, the Christian is one for whom—in the words of a late epistle—Christ has abolished death.

Objection may also be taken to the view that St. Paul regarded the curse which Jesus bore as resting upon Jews rather than upon all mankind. Was not Paul the great apostle of Gentiles?—He was indeed; yet he was Jewish by birth and by many of his deepest sentiments. In Romans ii. the highest compliment he can pay to a good man is to call him a true Jew. In Romans xi. he startles us by his reassertion of the essential and abiding superiority of Jewish Christians over their Gentile fellow-believers. What wonder if his theology of the plan of salvation is largely concerned with Israel’s prerogatives and with God’s method of honouring the law of Israel before superseding it to make room for the eternal covenant of grace? Even the Epistle to the Hebrews regards the atonement of Christ as offered “for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant.” We read in Genesis i. with a kind of pathetic wonder how God made the great luminaries sun and moon; then—in a parenthesis—“he made the stars also”? Why may not the New Testament speak similarly? The work of Christ is essentially achieved on behalf of Israel; but—“He saves the Gentiles also”!

V.

The fifth root of St. Paul’s doctrine of sin was his experience of victory as a Christian man. What he had vainly sought by arduous effort from his youth onwards came to him now as the gift of the new life. It became easy to do right. The spell was taken off him. Sin had
no more dominion under grace. What the law could not do, God had done through Christ; and henceforth the law's requirement was fulfilled. There was a gulf between the new and the old. In Paul's own life there lay the deep cleft of conversion. In the history of the universe there stood Christ's cross. Henceforth the very creation round about him was new, and all was divine.

This also, like the last-mentioned source of his teachings, is not merely laid alongside St. Paul's Jewish dogmas, but enters into fruitful union with these. Once more we moderns might desire to cross-question, to sift, to pick and choose. We cannot be refused the right to make the attempt. It is a fair question, whether the jurisprudence of the Apostle and his ethical experiences really cohere as homogeneous and verify each other. But Paul knew no distinctions and felt no hesitations. His creed was to him a single tremendous divine revelation, and the jurisprudence of Christ's death played no small part in the peace and joy of St. Paul's new life. In its own place, each element is vital. Certainly, without the new and happier experience, St. Paul's creed would never have come into existence. His victory is so immense, and he describes it in terms so glowing, that he has been supposed to teach the absolute sinlessness of every Christian. That is perverse and absurd, yet it is the exaggeration of a truth. For once again St. Paul does not think of himself as exceptional, but as typical. His helplessness under law, in the flesh, was no idiosyncrasy but broadly human; and so is his Christian victory. Here too, then, there is perhaps a tinge of dogma, even while St. Paul is closest in touch with experience. Yet surely there is something also of dogma, and of a dogma far from being superior to the apostle's, when sundry moderns would write off all St. Paul's insight into the Christian life as a thing without any message for us.
Corinthians. Only in 2 Corinthians does he contemplate and accept the probable prospect of dying; only in Philippians does he speak of his longing to join Christ even by death, and of death itself as gain. Characteristically, then, according to St. Paul, the Christian is one for whom—in the words of a late epistle—Christ has abolished death.

Objection may also be taken to the view that St. Paul regarded the curse which Jesus bore as resting upon Jews rather than upon all mankind. Was not Paul the great apostle of Gentiles?—He was indeed; yet he was Jewish by birth and by many of his deepest sentiments. In Romans ii. the highest compliment he can pay to a good man is to call him a true Jew. In Romans xi. he startles us by his reassertion of the essential and abiding superiority of Jewish Christians over their Gentile fellow-believers. What wonder if his theology of the plan of salvation is largely concerned with Israel’s prerogatives and with God’s method of honouring the law of Israel before superseding it to make room for the eternal covenant of grace? Even the Epistle to the Hebrews regards the atonement of Christ as offered “for the redemption of the transgressions that were under the first covenant.” We read in Genesis i. with a kind of pathetic wonder how God made the great luminaries sun and moon; then—in a parenthesis—“he made the stars also”; Why may not the New Testament speak similarly? The work of Christ is essentially achieved on behalf of Israel; but—“He saves the Gentiles also”!

V.

The fifth root of St. Paul’s doctrine of sin was his experience of victory as a Christian man. What he had vainly sought by arduous effort from his youth onwards came to him now as the gift of the new life. It became easy to do right. The spell was taken off him. Sin had
no more dominion under grace. What the law could not do, God had done through Christ; and henceforth the law’s requirement was fulfilled. There was a gulf between the new and the old. In Paul’s own life there lay the deep cleft of conversion. In the history of the universe there stood Christ’s cross. Henceforth the very creation round about him was new, and all was divine.

This also, like the last-mentioned source of his teachings, is not merely laid alongside St. Paul’s Jewish dogmas, but enters into fruitful union with these. Once more we moderns might desire to cross-question, to sift, to pick and choose. We cannot be refused the right to make the attempt. It is a fair question, whether the jurisprudence of the Apostle and his ethical experiences really cohere as homogeneous and verify each other. But Paul knew no distinctions and felt no hesitations. His creed was to him a single tremendous divine revelation, and the jurisprudence of Christ’s death played no small part in the peace and joy of St. Paul’s new life. In its own place, each element is vital. Certainly, without the new and happier experience, St. Paul’s creed would never have come into existence. His victory is so immense, and he describes it in terms so glowing, that he has been supposed to teach the absolute sinlessness of every Christian. That is perverse and absurd, yet it is the exaggeration of a truth. For once again St. Paul does not think of himself as exceptional, but as typical. His helplessness under law, in the flesh, was no idiosyncrasy but broadly human; and so is his Christian victory. Here too, then, there is perhaps a tinge of dogma, even while St. Paul is closest in touch with experience. Yet surely there is something also of dogma, and of a dogma far from being superior to the apostle’s, when sundry moderns would write off all St. Paul’s insight into the Christian life as a thing without any message for us.
Either way, St. Paul’s experience of victory is the fifth root of his doctrine about sin.

VI.

Sixthly: What is the origin of St. Paul’s doctrine of the flesh? Is the doctrine, as has been hinted, to be explained out of personal experiences, with help from the Old Testament or from Jewish theology? Or does it go back to Greek and Hellenistic thought?

We grant that St. Paul uses a multitude of terms from Greek philosophy, especially from Stoicism—reason, conscience, things which are seemly or proper, and so forth. But it does not follow that in making Christianity speak Greek he was Hellenising its essence. Every apologist has to translate religion into a dialect which is intelligible to his hearers; the task is difficult and delicate, but unavoidable. And it is possible to achieve success. While the terms employed are new, the thought may be essentially unchanged. The Greek dogma, which St. Paul is supposed to have borrowed, tells us that matter is evil and the body the prison of the spirit. Does Paul say that? It finds the appropriate remedy for sin in asceticism. Does Paul teach that? When death comes, sin is abolished. Does Paul say anything like that? In words he may; he that hath died hath been justified from sin; but the underlying thought is quite different. Moreover, “flesh” in this wide sense is a Hebrew and not a Greek term. It is surely a paradox to say such a word is the vehicle and proof of a specially Hellenic and non-Biblical stream of influence in St. Paul’s thinking.

But, if flesh is not equivalent to matter, what does it mean? Does it, as some would contend, mean sexuality and sensuality? If so, a great deal of popular Catholic theology goes back to St. Paul. Various pieces of evidence are
marshalled in support of such an interpretation. In Paul's lists of works of the flesh, sexual sins come first. The commandment which in Romans vii. is declared to have broken Paul's heart because he could never fully obey it—the command Thou shalt not covet—may also be rendered Thou shalt not lust. The body is the enemy which, according to a striking passage in I Corinthians, Paul buffets and brings into subjection; this certainly might suggest to us the most unruly of all bodily appetites. But there is evidence on the other side. Surely there is no temptation which so little needs a special commandment to prove its dangerousness as a sensual thought. "I had not known sin except the law had said Thou shalt not covet." Would any decently pure-minded lad sum up his history in such terms if he were thinking of sensual cravings? When sex begins to assert itself, with its train of unwelcome promptings by day and disorderly images by night, it is more likely to result in morbid horror of self than in a state of mind "which had not known sin except for the law." It was in some different region, we may feel confident, that St. Paul's temptations lay.

Again, he tells us in I Corinthians vii. that he was a man singularly free from the trouble arising out of sensual suggestions. Had he been so troubled, he must have applied to himself the remedy he offers to others—that of marriage; but there was no need. Of course he is writing here of his Christian period. Still, the gift of which he speaks is quite a distinct one from the great gift of spiritual life. And, I say again, he describes himself—in defiance of the prejudices of generations of celibate exegetes, who would have it forsooth that his stake in the flesh was a sensual temptation—he describes himself as exceptionally immune from such promptings. And once more; the processes of sex, far from being radically evil to St. Paul, are in a way
sacred things. This very animal body, with its maleness and its femaleness, has been bought with a price; its members are members of Christ; it is the temple of the Holy Ghost; with it—with the body—we are to glorify God.

I would suggest that the primary motive for St. Paul's identification of the flesh with sinfulness is his appeal to the Spirit as the source of ethical power. We are to conceive that, under Christianity, St. Paul became a new creature in many distinct ways. His old hard legal piety as a Pharisee passed away, and he plunged neck-deep into the stream of early Christian enthusiasm. There had probably been no visions in the early life of Saul; once they had begun, they never ceased. He now spoke with tongues more abundantly than all others. The "newness of the spirit" superseded for him the "oldness of the letter." Concurrently, as we know, his ethical life was revolutionised. In lieu of helplessness, he found infinite power at his disposal; and with the insight of genius he recognised there also "one and the selfsame Spirit." This doctrine of spirit versus letter being formulated, the other contrast of spirit and flesh moved forward voluntarily—so to speak—from the pages of the Old Testament, and fixed what name should be given to the power of sin within man. Sensual sins were obviously to be included among works of the flesh; they were even to be placed at the head of such lists; but they had no claim to exclude others. Nor can they cover the whole ground when we are formulating Paul's doctrine of sin.

On this interpretation, one must confess, the term "flesh" gives us but little light regarding the thoughts of St. Paul. Can it possibly be argued that there is much to be learned from it? When anger and pride are referred to the flesh, what meaning remains to the much emphasised statement that Paul holds the flesh to be the seat of sin?

Perhaps something further should be added as to possible
developments in St. Paul’s later teaching. We might connect these with his having had to look death in the face, and to accept the unwelcome prospect of ultimately dying. Both 2 Corinthians ii. and Romans vi. speak with a new emphasis of the mortal body or of mortal flesh; while in Romans viii. we have the still more unambiguous statement, that the body—the Christian man’s body—is doomed to death because of sin. Over against the still uncancelled principle, that the characteristic effect of Christ’s work is to abolish death, we seem to meet with a new position, perhaps not unconnected with personal experiences, that the characteristic destiny of the sinful human body is to die. We might further illustrate this change in outlook by the series of St. Paul’s statements regarding baptism. In Galatians we find mysticism, but of a comparatively undeveloped type; baptism is a putting on of Christ. In Romans, baptism has become baptism into Christ’s death. And in Colossians baptism is viewed as a disembodiment—a getting rid of the body of flesh. Still further, the new position may be thought to have modified Paul’s doctrine of Christ’s own body. He now seems clearly to teach that Christ must necessarily have died not simply as man’s representative (or again, as the bearer of Israel’s curse) but as having come into perilous contact with non-ethical human conditions by assuming the exact likeness of a body of sinful flesh.

It is even conceivable that St. Paul might never have become a Christian, if he had always lived in the grip of this train of thought. But it was not so with him. During a considerable period, the sinlessness of Jesus and His substitutionary sufferings filled the whole field of the Apostle’s vision. Afterwards it became possible for him, with unshaken Christian faith, to embark upon a new working-out of the ethical process of redemption—Romans vi.–viii., to which nothing corresponds in the scheme of Galatians—
with a darker view of the "flesh" and of the "body." But, if this was a later development, it certainly was not brought in from Greek thought. Rather, so far as we can trace definite antecedents, St. Paul's doctrine of the flesh is due (apart from the language of the Old Testament or the Jewish doctrine of the Yetzer) to personal experiences of the stubbornness of sin and the inevitability of death.

VII.

We now come to moral postulates laid down by St. Paul as a Christian man. The first of these, our seventh root of doctrine, is found in Galatians ii. 21. Christ did not die gratuitously. Any Christian (it is implied) may appeal in argument with his fellow-Christians to this certainty, that Christ's death was needful and not superfluous. According to 1 Corinthians xv., such teaching was part of the pre-Pauline theology of the early Church. "I delivered unto you that which also I received"—the words plainly refer to a human channel of tradition, i.e., to the Church of Jerusalem—"that Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." This, then, was general early Christian belief. Is it not also fact, and plain to Christian eyes? A foundation has been laid already, once for all, by the hand of God; even Jesus Christ. No doubt the fact comes to us associated with a certain amount of intellectual interpretation; but that is true of most facts. Paul assumes too that every Christian will grant the principles of interpretation made use of. He assumes that God means us, in some measure, to understand the death of Christ. The crucifixion is for him not simply one more moral mystery in this world of heart-breaking tragedies. There is light in the darkness when we recognise that Christ died for our sins.

I venture to think that the Apostle's plummet reaches deeper soundings here than elsewhere, and that it would be
well to dissociate the catholic Christian faith, that Christ died for sin, from the doubtful Jewish dogma that all death is due to sin. In the first, not the second, is an ultimate rallying-point for faith. Between the Christian mind and the modern levity which trifles with sin, there stands—the cross. It could be no minor evil from which mankind were redeemed at so heavy a cost, "with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ."

VIII.

The other moral postulate, the eighth root of St. Paul's doctrine, is found in the statement that no man dare glory before God (1 Cor. i 29). Traditionally, Augustinianism has blackened the character of man to the uttermost in order to establish his helplessness and so to magnify the grace of God. But, if we keep St. Paul's grand postulates in mind, our doctrine of grace will stand secure without support from exaggerated and impossible doctrines regarding human sinfulness. These may well cause us difficulty; but every Christian ought to accept the postulate of a God high and lifted up in the glory of his Divine purity.

IX.

If it were possible to add yet one more to the long list of influences that co-operated to shape St. Paul's doctrine regarding sin, one might wish to explain in a word that the assertion found at Romans ii. 14—Gentiles, without the law, do by nature the things of the law—belongs to a different order of thought from the eight foundation-stones or fountain springs which we have passed under review. This one is ethical; these others were theological or religious. It might prove impossible to harmonise Paul with himself. Will number nine ever perfectly accord with the eight previous sources of doctrine? If it is true that "they that are in the flesh cannot please God," how can it also be true that
"Gentiles," even if fitfully, "do by nature the things of the law"? Theologians who discover an antinomy in the doctrine of sin may claim that St. Paul gives them materials for their conclusion. Perhaps that is true. On the other hand, it is plain that St. Paul coins no such epigrammatic formula. And yet it is much that he should recognise, if hardly oftener than in a single passage, genuine moral processes in the life of unregenerate men.¹ This passage, much more probably that any passage regarding the flesh, may be of Greek provenance. It has a very Stoical ring.

One might suggest in closing that St. Paul's Jewish dogmas are the least authoritative part of his teaching; that his personal experiences, while profoundly significant for every Christian, are yet touched with idiosyncrasy, precarious in intellectual statement, and not wholly free from paradox; and that it is his Christian postulates alone which are absolutely central for those who share with him the evangelical faith. ROBERT MACKINTOSH.

THE FELLOWSHIP (Kouvovia) OF ACTS II. 42 AND COGNATE WORDS.

One of the practices or notes of life mentioned in Acts ii. 42, as those in which the early disciples of Christ "continued steadfastly" was ἡ κοινωνία, rendered 'fellowship' both in the Authorised and Revised Versions. Both these versions are, however, mistaken in connecting τῇ κοινωνίᾳ with τῶν ἀποστόλων ("in the apostles' teaching and fellowship"); still more mistaken is the rendering of the Vulgate, communicatione fractionis panis, only made possible by the unauthorised insertion of καὶ before τῇ κλάσει τοῦ ἄρτου, and even then an incorrect translation. Rightly interpreted

¹ I set aside the perversely ingenious view that the good Gentiles spoken of in Romans ii. are the Gentile Christians.