

*FURTHER STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE OF ST.
JAMES, CHIEFLY SUGGESTED BY DR. HORT'S
POSTHUMOUS EDITION.*

I. 19, ἵστε ἀδελφοί μου. Hort's note on this is, "St. James has the form οἶδατε in indicative (iv. 4) οὐκ οἶδατε ὅτι ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου κ.τ.λ., and probably used this shorter and sharper form to mark the imperative. The N.T. writers commonly use οἶδατε, but ἵστε occurs in two other places, Ephesians v. 3-5, Hebrews xii.14-17, both of which gain by being taken imperatively." In the former Dr. Armitage Robinson follows the A.V. and R.V. "Let fornication be not even named among you. . . . For *this ye know* of a surety that no fornicator . . . hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ." I cannot help thinking that, if the Ephesians were capable of appreciating the rule laid down, "Let it not be even named among you," they could hardly need to be taught that a fornicator hath no inheritance in Christ's kingdom. This latter truth they know already: it is the foundation upon which St. Paul builds his special precept in ver. 3. That precept requires the imperative, while the indicative alone is suited to the principle on which the precept rests. In the second passage the R.V. has, "Follow after sanctification, lest there be any fornicator or unclean person, as Esau, who for one mess of meat sold his birthright. *For ye know* that, even when he desired to inherit the blessing, he was rejected." Here the imperative would be just as unsuitable as in the former case. Jews did not need to be taught the story of Esau, but simply to be reminded of what they already knew. Similarly in St. James I understand ἵστε as indicative, "All this ye know: act upon your knowledge." Since it is through the word we are begotten from above, let us receive it with

meekness. H. argues that as the form *οἶδατε* is used for the indicative in ver. 4, the form *ἴστε* could not have been used in the same sense by the same writer ; but we find the two forms *ἔστω* and *ἦτω* both used by St. James as imperatives of *εἰμῆ* (i. 19, v. 12), and *ὀράτε*, which is always imperative in the other books of the N.T., is found only in the indicative in St. James. The imperative form *ἴστε* seems never to be found in biblical Greek, its place being usually taken by *γινώτε*. On the other hand, *ἴστε* is indicative in 3 Macc. iii. 14 (Ptolemy's letter).

II. 1, *μὴ ἐν προσωποληψίαις ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν τῆς δόξης*. I am glad to find that H. follows Bengel in taking *τῆς δόξης* in apposition with *τοῦ Κυρίου*. I think, however, that he is mistaken in regarding *μὴ ἔχετε* as interrogative, and in his explanation of *τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου*. The former he translates "Can you really think in your acts of partiality that you are holding the faith? I prefer to render it, "Do not have your faith in personal respects," i.e. "Do not you who call yourselves believers in Christ disgrace your faith by exhibitions of partiality." H. thinks "this gives rather a tame sense, and gives no exact sense to the phrase *ἐν πρ. ἔχετε*." On the other hand, my objection to Hort's rendering is that it is simpler to take *ἔχετε* as an imperative, especially as it begins a new section of the Epistle, and it is the manner of the writer to introduce each new topic with a clear heading, usually in the form of a precept,¹ and then to enforce it in a variety of ways. It certainly cannot be said that, taken interrogatively, the sentence gives an unmistakable meaning. On first reading, it suggests that those addressed are not guilty of respect of persons. And the following *γὰρ*, which, if we take *ἔχετε* as imperative, gives a warning against respect of persons, as involving worldly-mindedness and unrighteous judg-

¹ See my *Introduction*, pp. cxxx., cclviii.

ments, is hard to explain, if we take ἔχετε as a question, "Can it be that you are guilty of partiality?"

Hort's note on the following words τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου is "The two most obvious senses of the genitive here are the subjective, the faith which our Lord Himself had, and the objective, the faith in Him. . . . The latter is not supported by any clear parallels and gives a not relevant turn to the sentence." "Even Mark xi. 22 is not so much 'have faith *in God*' as 'have faith *from God*.'" I cannot myself feel this, and I think besides that the following passages favour the objective force of the genitive, Acts iii. 16 τῇ πίστει τοῦ ὀνόματος αὐτοῦ τοῦτον ἐστερέωσεν τὸ ὄνομα αὐτοῦ, Rom. iii. 22 δικαιοσύνη Θεοῦ διὰ πίστεως Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, Apoc. ii. 13 οὐκ ἠρνήσω τὴν πίστιν μου. It seems to me that this view is confirmed by the frequent use of the prepositions εἰς, ἐν, ἐπί, in place of the genitive, and by the array of texts which speak of faith as belonging to man, such as "Great is thy faith," "Thy faith hath made thee whole," "O ye of little faith," "All things are possible to him that believeth," "If ye have faith as a grain of mustard seed."

II. 5, ὁ Θεὸς ἐξελέξατο τοὺς πτωχοὺς τῆ κόσμῳ πλουσίους ἐν πίστει. Hort's note is, "The meaning is not 'abounding in faith,' which would weaken the force of πλουσίους in this connexion, but 'rich in virtue of faith.'" The nearest approach to this phrase in the N.T. occurs in Ephesians ii. 4 ὁ Θεὸς πλούσιος ὢν ἐν ἐλέει διὰ τὴν πολλὴν ἀγάπην αὐτοῦ . . . καὶ ὄντας ἡμᾶς νεκροὺς τοῖς παραπτώμασιν συνεζωοποίησεν τῷ Χριστῷ, to which no reference is made by H. It is evident that "rich or abounding in mercy" is the true sense here, just as in 1 Timothy vi. 17, 18 the true sense is "Charge the rich not to put their trust in uncertain riches, but in God, who has enabled us to be rich (abounding) in good works." It is the dative of the sphere, not of the

cause. Compare *Hermas*, *Sim.* ii. 4 ὁ πένης πλούσιος ἐν τῇ ἐντεύξει, καὶ δύναμιν μεγάλην ἔχει ἢ ἔντευξις αὐτοῦ παρὰ τῷ Θεῷ.

II. 6, ἔλκουσιν ὑμᾶς εἰς κριτήρια. Hort's note is "the word κριτήρια may mean 'suits,' but better, as sometimes, 'courts of justice,' though we should have expected ἐπί rather than εἰς." For examples of κριτήρια in this sense compare Plato, *Legg.* vi. 767 B δίο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια (the one for private, the other for public actions), where Stallbaum quotes Polyb. ix. 33 κοινὸν ἐκ πάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθίσας κριτήριον. For εἰς see Plato, *Phaedo* 273 B εἰς δικαστήριον ἄγεσθαι, *Gorg.* 521 C, etc.

II. 8 εἰ μέντοι νόμον τελέετε βασιλικὸν . . . καλῶς ποιεῖτε. H. allows that μέντοι generally keeps its ordinary meaning "however" in the N.T., but thinks that, here and in Jude 8, it may mean "indeed." The words of St. Jude are ὁμοίως μέντοι καὶ οὗτοι σάρκα μαινοῦσιν, where οὗτοι refers to the heretics who follow the example of the men of Sodom and the fallen angels, *though* they know full well how these were punished. "However" seems to give the required sense both here and in St. James, where the context is "You ill-treat the poor whom God has chosen to be inheritors of his kingdom, and you pay court to the rich who oppress you and drag you before the tribunals." This respect for the rich may, *however*, proceed from a good motive. If you are filled with the spirit of love, ready to forgive injuries, and win your persecutors over to a better mind, it is well; but if you act thus from no better motive than respect of persons, it is sin. H. criticises this explanation in the following terms: "An intelligible adversativeness is obtained by supposing St. James to be replying to an imagined plea of the Jewish Christians that they were showing their love to their neighbours by their civility to the man with gold rings. It is hardly credible, however, that

so absurd a plea, of which there is not the least hint in the text, should be contemplated by St. James." At any rate forgiveness of injuries was not only contemplated, but commanded, by our Lord in the Sermon on the Mount (Matt. v. 44), and such a conflict of laws might well raise doubts in the minds of Jewish converts, which St. James may have felt it incumbent upon him to clear up.

II. 18, ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις κἀγὼ ἔργα ἔχω· δείξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων, κἀγὼ σοι δείξω ἐκ τῶν ἔργων μου τὴν πίστιν. Hort may well call this an extremely difficult verse. The preceding verses had shown that the same principle held good in a profession of faith as in a profession of philanthropy: without corresponding actions, a mere profession is worthless. Even supposing there could be real faith apart from its works, how is it to prove its reality if it is not attended by works? Whereas one who has good works thereby shows that he has faith also. Again, what is it you believe? and what is the effect of that belief? You believe that there is one God. The devils believe the same, and the effect of their belief is simply to produce terror. On the other hand (here I understand James himself to intervene), take the case of Abraham as a type of the faith which justifies. You will always find it co-operating with his works.

I have said nothing as to the phrase ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, which is commonly used to introduce an interruption by an objector, as in 1 Corinthians xv. 35 ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, πῶς ἐγείρονται οἱ νεκροί; in my note I have endeavoured to show that the same phrase might be used to introduce an interruption by a supporter, such as "Nay! a man shall say (may go so far as to say)." I have, however, not yet succeeded in finding an exact parallel for such a use of the phrase. H., who understands the words ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις to be spoken by an objector to St. James' doctrine of works,

gives the following paraphrase, "Thou, James, hast thou faith, that thing which thou slightest in me? I for my part, as well as thou, have works; I do not allow that I have no works, I have works of the law in addition to my faith: can you conversely say that you have faith in addition to your works?" St. James then "begins his reply with the words *δείξόν μοι*, attacking the notion that faith and works are two separate things." My objection to this way of taking the passage is that the Greek is too much cut up into snippets (*Σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις; καὶ γὼ ἔργα ἔχω. δείξόν μοι τὴν πίστιν σου χωρὶς τῶν ἔργων κ.τ.λ.*), that it is very harsh to take *σὺ πίστιν ἔχεις* as a question, and that too much is understood in the English. The first two clauses, as read by H., make two distinct and opposed sentences. As I read them they make only one sentence, preparing the way for the imperative which follows. I do not think that *καὶ γὼ* can mean more than "and I." To express "I for my part" we should require *ἐγὼ δὲ* in answer to *σὺ μέν*. I understand *δείξον* to be spoken by the *τις* of ver. 18, whereas H. thinks that James here breaks in.

III. 3 *ὄλον τὸ σῶμα αὐτῶν μετάγομεν*. "*μετάγω*, as commonly used, means 'to transfer.' Apparently here simply in the sense of leading (?) not from one place to another, but from one direction to another, though it is not satisfactory to have no clear authority for it." H. Compare Luc., *Dial. Deor.* xx. 8 *οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως ἂν τις ἀπὸ τῆς ἐτέρας θεᾶς ἐπὶ τὴν ἐτέραν μεταγάγοι τὴν ὄψιν*, Stob. *Floril.* p. 280 (ascribed to Aristippus) *κρατεῖ ἡδονῆς οὐκ ὁ ἀπεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ χρώμενος μὲν, μὴ προεκφερόμενος δέ, ὥσπερ καὶ νεῶς καὶ ἵππου οὐχ ὁ μὴ χρώμενος, ἀλλ' ὁ μετάγων ὅποι βούλεται*.

Uses of αἰτεῖν and αἰτεῖσθαι.

IV. 2, 3. *οὐκ ἔχετε διὰ τὸ μὴ αἰτεῖσθαι ὑμᾶς: αἰτεῖτε καὶ οὐ λαμβάνετε διότι κακῶς αἰτεῖσθε, ἵνα ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ὑμῶν δαπανήσητε*. "It is remarkable that the middle is used

here and in the next line, but the active between (them). *αἰτέω* is properly to ask a person; what is asked for being often added in a second accusative: it is, as it were, 'to petition.' *αἰτοῦμαι* is properly to ask for a thing; the person asked is sometimes also inserted, but rarely." H.

It is to be noted (1) that in this passage the verb, in both voices, is used absolutely, so as to preclude the application of the test, that the meaning is determined by the nature of the following object; (2) that the rule is contradicted by the statement, which follows shortly afterwards, that the accusative of the thing, not of the person, is to be supplied after the middle, as well as after the active, as shown in the translation "Ye have not (what things ye desire) because ye ask not (for them): ye ask (for them) amiss that ye may spend them, etc."; (3) that (according to H.) it is impossible to explain the contradiction between *μὴ αἰτέισθαι* and *αἰτεῖτε* in vers. 2 and 3, by difference of active and middle. "St. James could never mean to say that they did *αἰτεῖν*, though they did not *αἰτέισθαι*": and yet we are told just before that the words have different meanings, that *αἰτέω* means properly to ask a person, and *αἰτέισθαι* properly to ask for a thing.

It seems to me that the distinction here laid down is not in accordance either with the usage of the N.T., as shown in Luke i. 63 *αἰτήσας πινακίδιον*, Acts iii. 2 *αἰτεῖν ἐλεημοσύνην*, xvi. 29 *αἰτήσας φῶτα*, or of profane Greek: *μισθόν, λόγον, χάριν* follow *αἰτεῖν* in Plato. It is contrary to the teaching of the Greek grammarians quoted in Stephanus and in Sturz, *Lex. Xen. s.v.* where Favorinus is cited for the dictum *αἰτοῦμαι τὸ μετὰ παρακλήσεως αἰτῶ καὶ ἰκετεύω*, as well as the scholiast on Aristoph., *Plutus* l. 156 (*αἰτοῦσιν οὐκ ἀργύριον οἱ χρηστοί*) to the same effect: *αἰτοῦμαι τὸ αὐτὸ <τῷ αἰτῶ> ὡσπερ ποῖω καὶ ποιῶμαι, πλὴν ὅτι τὸ μὲν αἰτῶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ζητῶ, τὸ δὲ αἰτοῦμαι τὸ μεθ' ἰκεσίας*. Besides

these, Sturz quotes Ammonius and Thomas Magister for another distinction (asking for a loan, as opposed to asking for a gift) which, though not applicable to our present purpose, is yet borne witness to by the practice of the best authors, τὸ μὲν αἰτῶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἄπαξ τι λαβεῖν καὶ μὴ ἀποδοῦναι· τὸ δ' αἰτοῦμαι ἐπὶ τοῦ χρῆσασθαι εἰς ἀπόδοσιν. Cf. Thuc. vi. 46 τά τε ἐξ αὐτῆς Ἐγγέστης ἐκπώματα καὶ χρυσᾶ καὶ ἀργυρᾶ ξυλλέξαντες, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγυῶν πολέων αἰτησάμενοι, and Lysias 154, 24. This meaning is of narrow scope as compared with the others, but is often found in business documents, as in the Greek papyri.¹ Sturz gives a long list of passages in which αἰτοῦμαι is used in prayers to the gods or in earnest entreaty to men. And this distinction is not a mere matter of usage, but flows naturally from the subjective and intensive or dynamic force of the middle, as seen in αἰρῶ and αἰροῦμαι, φράζω and φράζομαι, ποιεῖν and ποιέσθαι, ἰδεῖν and ιδέσθαι (cf. the grammars of Winer, p. 319 foll.; Krueger, § 52, 8, 10; Donaldson, pp. 432–453; and Viteau's Essay, *Sur la Syntax des Voix*, in the *Rev. de Philologie* for Jan. 1894, pp. 1–41). This special

¹ Blass, who admits this comparatively unimportant distinction, gives a very unsatisfactory account of the wider distinctions noticed in Stephanus and Sturz, and even says (*Gr. of N.T.*, p. 186) that a son's request from his father or a man's petition from God is usually expressed by αἰτῶ. I quote one or two examples from Aristophanes on the other side, *Ranae*, 1126, 7 Ἐρμῆ χθόνιε πατρῶ' ἐποπτεύων κράτη, σωτήρ γενοῦ μοι σύμμαχος τ' αἰτουμένῳ; *Vesp.*, 555. 6 ἰκετεύουσιν θ' ὑποκόπτουτες, τὴν [φωνῆν] οἰκτροχοοῦντες οἰκτερόν μ' ὦ πατέρ, αἰτοῦμαι σ', εἰ κατὸς πάποθ' ὑφέλιου. Of course exceptions may be found. The special middle sense is a refinement upon the old active, in which it was originally included, as μεταπέμπω, "to send after," is often used by Thuc. in the sense of μεταπέμπομαι, "to send for." In the verse of St. James, which we are considering, as well as in i. 5, 6, we find αἰτεῖν, as well as αἰτεῖσθαι, used of prayer to God, and in Matthew vii. 11 we have πόσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ πατήρ ὑμῶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς δώσει ἀγαθὰ τοῖς αἰτοῦσιν αὐτόν; The shorter and simpler form is used, where there is no danger of mistake. Another strange perversity of Blass is that, while allowing "the N. T. writers to be perfectly capable of preserving the distinction between the active and middle," he still considers that these distinctions are arbitrarily set aside by St. James in iv. 2, 3. Compare Moulton in his *Prolegomena to N.T. Greek*, p. 190.

force of the middle *αἰτοῦμαι* is excellently shown in the pathetic appeal of the Plataeans to the Spartans (Thuc. iii. 59. 2 foll.) *ἡμεῖς, ὡς πρέπον ἡμῖν καὶ ὡς ἡ χρεία προὔγει, αἰτούμεθα ὑμᾶς, θεοὺς τοὺς ὀμοβωμίους καὶ κοινοὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπιβοώμενοι, . . . καὶ ἐπικαλούμεθα τοὺς κεκμηῶτας μὴ γενέσθαι ὑπὸ Θηβαίοις, μηδὲ τοῖς ἐχθίστοις φίλτατοι ὄντες παραδοθῆναι . . . ἐπισκῆπτομέν τε μὴ Πλαταιῆς ὄντες . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑμετέρων χειρῶν καὶ τῆς ὑμετέρας πίστεως, ἰκέται ὄντες, ὧ Δακεδαιμόνιοι, παραδοθῆναι :* and again in the like appeal of the Spartan envoys to Athens, when they were in similar straits after the disaster of Sphacteria (Thuc. iv. 18) *γινῶτε δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς ἡμετέρας νῦν συμφορὰς ἀπιδόντες οὔτινες ἀξίωμα μέγιστον τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἔχοντες ἤκομεν παρ' ὑμᾶς, πρότερον αὐτοὶ κυριώτεροι νομίζοντες εἶναι δοῦναι ἐφ' ἃ νῦν ἀφυγμένοι ὑμᾶς αἰτούμεθα.*¹ Contrast this use of the middle with that of the active in i. 27 *αἰτεῖν Θηβαίους χρήματα*, viii. 44, 85, *αἰτεῖν δίκας* i. 140, *αἰτεῖν ἀναίρεσιν τῶν νεκρῶν* vii. 72.

We now proceed to consider how this characteristic force of the middle voice tends to explain the contrast between *αἰτοῦμαι* and *αἰτῶ* in James iv. and similar passages. As opposed to the middle, the active suggests outward action as opposed to inward feeling. Thus *αἰτῶ* means prayer of the lips, as contrasted with prayer of the heart. The meaning, then, of the sentence will be "You have not, because you do not pray with the heart. You pray with the lips, and receive no answer, because your heart's prayer (however correct your words may be) is not prayer for what

¹ So far as there is any truth in the view that the middle *αἰτοῦμαι* goes with the accusative of the object, this is to be explained by the fact that earnest entreaty is aroused rather by the thought of the object desired than of the person from whom it is sought; but, as we see from the appeal of the Plataeans, the feeling for or against persons may greatly intensify the longing for the object.

God wills, but for worldly and carnal objects which He has forbidden.”

Other passages in which *αἰτῶ* and *αἰτοῦμαι* are contrasted are Mark vi. 22–25, where Herod’s thoughtless promise to the daughter of Herodias is expressed in the words *αἴτησόν με δ’ ἐὰν θέλῃς*, and again with an oath *ὃ ἐὰν με αἰτήσῃς δώσω σοι ἕως ἡμίσεως τῆς βασιλείας μου*. The determination of Salome to make the most of the opportunity is shown by her going out at once to consult her mother (ver. 24, *τι αἰτήσωμαι*), and returning with her mind fully made up to demand John’s head in a charger (ver. 25, *καὶ εἰσελθούσα εὐθύς μετὰ σπουδῆς πρὸς τὸν βασιλέα ἠτήσατο*). In Matthew’s shorter account there is no contrast, the word for ask (*αἰτήσεται*) only occurring once. Similarly the ignorant request of the other Salome for her sons (in Matt. xx. 20–22), is introduced by the words *προσκύνουσα καὶ αἰτοῦσά τι παρ’ αὐτοῦ*, while the true meaning of her request is introduced by the words *οὐκ οἶδατε τί αἰτεῖσθε*, and there is the same change in Mark x. 35 foll., where the verbal request is marked by *αἰτεῖτε*, and our Lord’s interpretation (ver. 38) by *αἰτεῖσθαι*. So in John xvi. we have the contrast between the prayers of the disciples before the outpouring of the Spirit, ver. 24 *ἠτήσατε οὐδὲν ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου*, and the prayers which should follow the outpouring, ver. 26 *ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἐν τῷ ὀνόματί μου αἰτήσεσθε*. Compare also 1 John v. 14 foll. *αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ παρρησία ἣν ἔχομεν πρὸς αὐτόν, ὅτι ἐὰν τι αἰτώμεθα κατὰ τὸ θέλημα αὐτοῦ, ἀκούει ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐὰν οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἀκούει ἡμῶν ὃ ἐὰν αἰτώμεθα, οἶδαμεν ὅτι ἔχομεν τὰ αἰτήματα ἃ ἠτήκαμεν ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ*, where the general sense seems to be “if we pray in spirit and in truth according to His will, we know that we have the objects of our petitions.”

This distinction between the active and middle of *αἰτέω* is confirmed by glancing at Redpath’s Concordance of the

O.T. The word does not occur at all in Genesis. In Exodus the active is found four times, always in reference to the Israelites asking for jewels from their Egyptian neighbours. In Deuteronomy the middle alone occurs, once of prayer to God (xviii. 16), once of God's demands upon Israel (x. 12) *τί Κύριος αἰτεῖται παρά σου, ἀλλ' ἡ φοβεῖσθαι Κύριον*. In Joshua the middle is used several times of requests for land, water, etc. : the active never. In Judges we find the active in similar petitions, except in the case of Gideon, who begged the people to give him gold earrings out of their spoils, to devote to God (viii. 24). In 1 Samuel the middle is always used of the prayers of Hannah, but the prayer for a king is sometimes referred to in the active, sometimes in the middle. In 2 Samuel xii. 10 the active is used of David calling for bread ; in 1 Kings ii. 10, 20, 22 the middle is used of the petitions of Adonijah and Bathsheba to Solomon. In 1 Kings iii. 5, 10, 11, 13 the middle is used regularly of Solomon's prayer for wisdom ; in x. 23 of the Queen of Sheba. In Job vi. [22 we have Job's scornful answer to Eliphaz, *μήτι ὑμᾶς ἤτησα* ; "did I make a request to you," and immediately afterwards the middle is used, *οὐ παρ' ὑμῶν ἰσχύει αἰτοῦμαι*, "it is not from you that I look for help." A similar contrast appears in Isaiah vii. 11, 12 *αἰτησαι σεαυτῷ σημεῖον παρὰ Κυρίου . . . καὶ εἶπεν Ἄχαζ, οὐ μὴ αἰτήσω οὐδὲ μὴ πειράσω Κύριον*, "Pray for a sign from the Lord" . . . "I will not make any request, or tempt the Lord."

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