THE TEACHING OF PAUL IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY.

XV. SIN AS A FORCE AND POWER OVER MAN.

As regards the relation between God and man we are always encountered by the difficulty both of expressing and of understanding its nature. This relation is, obviously and necessarily, a unique thing in the universe of our knowledge. There is not, and there cannot be, any other relation similar to it; we cannot aid understanding by comparing it with anything else; and all metaphors fail to fit the conditions fully. Like everything else that concerns God, this relation of man to Him has to be perceived by direct intuition, or, as Paul would put it, through the power of faith, which is for us "a conviction of things not seen."¹ Just as we recognise and know through faith that God is and that God is good, without being able to demonstrate by logical argument that either axiom is true, so we recognise and know that, as was pointed out in the previous Section, mere increase in the distance that separates man from God, or (to use our other form of expression) increasing unlikeness of man to God, does not remain a mere abstract proposition but becomes a force or power acting on the will in such a way as to weaken the sympathy of the human for the Divine nature, to lessen in man the power of recognising the Divine character and purpose, and to enfeeble the desire of man for reunion with God.

If we are challenged to prove this assertion that increase of distance from God becomes a power of evil, we cannot demonstrate it. It is involved in the nature of our relation to God. We feel it and we know it. It is an ultimate or

¹ Hebrews xi. 1.
primary fact from which we have to start. In Pauline language, we live by faith alone.

This truth, however, is simply another form of the axiom that God is good: He is good because He draws man to Him naturally. Like seeks to like through a sort of attractive power which the one exerts on the other; and the lesser, i.e. man, moves towards the greater, i.e. God. Such is the natural fact, or the purpose of God, which acts and is so long as man has not lost his simple and natural character. Yet even this metaphorical expression that "like draws to like" is utterly inadequate as a statement of the relation: it is only a figurative description which in some degree helps comprehension, but it is both incomplete and positively inaccurate in some important respects.

The term, "attractive force," then, is merely another metaphor by which we attempt to express the relation between the Creator and the created. The righteous action is the actualising of this force; and the performance of such an action makes the power stronger, so that we feel righteousness as a force in us, in which the force of faith is merged. The two become indistinguishable in fact, though distinguishable in language. Such is the nature of this force and the law of its action.

It is only another side of the same law and nature, which rules and constitutes righteousness, that the failure to perform the righteous act—which is tantamount to the performance of the unrighteous act in the supposed situation—not merely weakens the force attracting the individual to God, but actually brings into existence a counter-force, the power of evil, which tends to draw the individual away from God, to intensify his unlikeness towards God, to increase continuously his distance from God.

These various ways in which we have attempted to state
the nature of sin are merely metaphors drawn from human experience to aid comprehension, and not philosophical definitions. Sin, therefore, is a force and a power, not simply a fact. When we speak of sin widening the distance from God, that metaphor is insufficient to suggest that sin thereby strengthens itself and establishes its hold on the man's will. Such, however, is the law according to which this failure to do righteously works: it is not a mere negation, it is more than simple non-righteousness. It is, or it becomes, the power of evil ruling the will of man.

Yet for this we have no more proof than there was for the previously stated axioms, or rather forms of the same axiom. Such we know: such we perceive: the experience of the world in past history and in contemporary life is inexplicable otherwise.

Hence arose the intensity of Paul's hatred for sin. This hatred is his heritage from his Hebrew ancestry, from the past history of his people, from the dealings of God with the forefathers. It was a flame burning more intensely in him than in other Jews, because his native power was stronger; but it was a purely Jewish force, and utterly unlike anything Hellenic.

The Jews in Paul's time began life on a higher moral platform than the Gentiles. The Law had been a stern and salutary master (*paidagogos*), forcing them onwards in some degree, but unable to force them beyond a certain point: they could not obey it completely: it was a yoke imposed as an external thing: it was not able to produce real righteousness, but only the semblance of righteousness, because the acts which it enforced did not spring from the free will of the individual, i.e. from the Divine element in him seeking of its own initiative towards the Divine end. Hence the act, which was outwardly
right, did not result in sufficiently vitalising and strengthen­ing within the man that force which is righteousness.

Yet this action according to the Law, although it could not make the individual man righteous, did produce an effect on the nation, and so ultimately on the individual through the nation. It produced a national righteousness, in other words a national standard of judgment according to the knowledge of moral principle, which was embodied in the law. It developed conscience and the consciousness of sin through the fact that the prohibition of sin stood always placarded before the nation in the law.1 It is a true fact of psychology that such a national standard of judgment about sin, and such a national conscience, may be developed by generations of contemplation of a moral law; and the modern phrase “the Nonconformist con­sience” attests the result as a historical fact in a living instance.

This national conscience, and this national standard of righteousness, produces a powerful effect on the individual member of the nation. He commonly has the national righteousness, being pushed forward to it by the compul­sion of social requirements. This national or racial right­eousness in a person, for which social compulsion and not the will and character of that person is responsible, may be described metaphorically as static, not dynamic righteous­ness. It does not remake the individual. It does not re­create and reinvigorate his nature. He is not born again. Commonly, its effect is to make him more self-satisfied, more complacent, less conscious of the Divine.2 Only

1 “I had not known sin except through the law,” Romans vii. 7. “Through the law cometh the knowledge of sin,” Romans iii. 20. Compare Romans vii. 13.

2 Romans x. 3, “Being ignorant of God’s righteousness, and seeking to establish their own, they (i.e. the Jews living according to the law and the national righteousness) did not subject themselves to the righteousness of God.”
dynamic righteousness, which springs from the individual striving towards reunion with God, can make him a new man; and such righteousness cannot come except through the force of faith, which is a possession of the individual soul.

The national righteousness, of which we have been speaking, has many advantages. When the individual falls short of it, he is conscious that he is untrue to the national character. This consciousness that one is falling below the national standard continues so long as the law remains a living force in the race or in the individual. If the law comes to be felt only as a dead prescription of works, it ceases to be a master that forces the nation on towards its standard; and yet even then it has not lost all its power and usefulness.

Paul always felt that the Jews, even though they were not gaining true righteousness through the law, were starting on a higher standard of judgment and knowledge than the ordinary Gentiles. "I bear them witness that they have a zeal for God, but not according to a right intuitions." 1 It is much to have this zeal for God; but the zeal requires to be guided by a right perception of His nature and of man’s relation to Him through Christ. Without that perception the Jews, in the issue, set up their own instead of the righteousness of God. 2

Accordingly, Paul, like other Jews of his time, started with the immense advantage of this strong hatred for sin and zeal for God. Sin kept him from God. He regarded the force and power of sin almost as a personal enemy: it was to him Satan.

Sin, even more than righteousness, can be national and racial. As we have just seen, that national righteousness,

1 Romans x. 2.
2 Romans x. 3, quoted in the last note but one.
IN TERMS OF THE PRESENT DAY

though in itself a good thing, never attained to be the true dynamic righteousness in the highest sense of the term; but sin that is national and inculcated through the national standard of judgment can be just as harmful, as dangerous, and as hostile to right, as when it proceeds from the individual initiative. Satan, the power of evil, can rule in a nation and set up his throne in its capital, and be all the more powerful and terrible in consequence. Then, in Paul's estimation, the political and social conditions, whether Imperial or municipal, which impeded his work of spreading the Gospel, were hindrances put in his way by Satan, the enemy.

Whether, or how far, Paul considered Satan as literally and strictly a personal being, must remain uncertain. He had not entirely freed himself from a lingering belief in "principalities and powers" intermediate between God and man; and thus, on the one hand, it was easy for him to believe in such a purely evil power, subordinate to God, while on the other hand through the stimulus of his intense hatred for sin it was also easy for him to fall into the use of metaphorical or half metaphorical language, picturing the power of sin as a personal being whom he could abominate, and against whom he could more easily rouse in his pagan correspondents the same intense hatred that he himself cherished. Strong emphasis is in Paul often due rather to emotion than to intellect, even in cases where the subject and the purpose seem to be properly intellectual. The emphasis is not so much intended to enforce attention on the part of his readers, as forced out of him by the intense passion of his own convictions, which were not matter of cool intellectual assent, but ruled his whole emotions and the depths of his nature. Thus, however his language about Satan may suggest in some cases a personal enemy, I would not venture to assert that this implies an
intellectual belief in the existence of such a personal power.

After all, Paul was before everything a preacher and a missionary. To him the first and supreme duty was to make his converts hate sin and love righteousness; and it was far more important to make them dread and detest a personal Satan than to lead them into philosophical speculation about the purpose of God in permitting sin and about the whole problem of evil. If they began to theorise about the purpose of God in a creation of which evil forms a part, and about the necessity which imposed itself on the Creator, as a condition of creative action, to leave open the possibility of evil, i.e. separation from God, such vague and profitless theorising, and the logomachies which would arise out of them, could only distract them from the first business of their life, viz. to be good; and that danger was already apparent to Paul, incipient in the Corinthians, more advanced in the Colossians, and fully developed in the Asian churches when he wrote to Timothy.

XVI. THE FIRST ADAM AND THE SECOND ADAM.

How largely the idea of racial sin bulked in the mind of Paul appears in his treatment of the man Adam, and the primal sin which Adam committed and whose effects “the second Adam” obliterates. “Through one man”—viz. Adam, whose perfectly historical character as the first-created man Paul unquestioningly assumes—“sin entered into the world, and death through sin; and so death passed unto all men, for that all sinned.” 1 The way to salvation was closed by Adam, and reopened by Jesus as “the second Adam.”

The first man was the first sinner; and thus death, which is the wages or consequence of sin, began, and has ever since continued to reign in the world. As Dr. Denney says, 2

1 Romans v. 12. 2 Commentary on Romans v. 12.
Paul uses 'death' to convey different shades of meaning in different places, but he does not explicitly distinguish different senses of the word; and it is probably misleading rather than helpful to say that in one sentence (here, for example) 'physical' death is meant, and in another (vii. 24 e.g.) 'spiritual' death. The analysis is foreign to his mode of thinking. All that 'death' conveys to the mind entered into the world through sin.' He adds that in the second part of verse v. 12 Paul explains "the universality of death": it rests upon the universality of sin.

For us, however, who are attempting to rethink in modern terms the thought of Paul, it is absolutely necessary to attempt to distinguish in the process of our thought what side of the idea "death" should be determining and dominant in our mind, when we re-form or re-express a Pauline principle. Paul, as Dr. Denney says, never consciously defined to himself, or thought of defining, the different senses in which he seems to use the word: he had the whole idea "death" in his mind, when he used the word. Yet, when he speaks of "death" as the wages of sin and as the lot of the wicked, he must have been conscious that this death is something different from its appearance as a stage in the path of righteousness, or even as the earthly end of that path.¹ "For me to live is Christ, and to die is gain": this "death" is not the lot of the wicked: it is simply a process in the transformation of his body into the spiritual body like that of Christ. So when he says, "I through the law died, unto the law that I might live unto God," he regards the death through which he passed as the end of the older stage in his experience and the entrance on the new life: through death he enters on life.

¹ John's phrase "the second death" may perhaps indicate a certain consciousness, common in the early Church, that the word has more than one meaning, Rev. ii. 11, xx 6, 14, xxi. 8.
In this passage, Romans v. 12, he seems to regard “death” as the removal from God, the final exclusion from God, the definite separation from God, which is consummated at the physical death, but has been going on throughout the career of sin. This is the “second death” of which John speaks.

His words in Romans v. 12, however, have been interpreted as an assertion that all men sinned in Adam and fell with Adam. What does this mean? Why should we now be punished in respect of anything that Adam has done, or rewarded in virtue of anything that Jesus has done? That is a question which rises first in any human mind; but the question is wrongly put, and the point of view implied in it is false. Paul does not say that all men are punished because Adam sinned, or because they were made guilty in Adam’s guilt, but that all men, in proportion as (or because) all have during their own life sinned, are punished through the death which began with Adam.

The sin of Adam inflicted incalculable injury on the human race, not by implicating all men in itself, but by involving them in its consequences. Such is the fact of the world: such is the experience of life: such is the law of nature. Every day it is exemplified. The innocent suffer from the sins in which they have no share. The nation as a whole may be ruined by the folly or the crime of one man. This is the fact to which we must accommodate our life, and from which we must start in our philosophy. Paul saw in it the opening for the grace and kindness of God to show itself. If we suffer through the sin of the first Adam, it is in order that the second Adam may have scope for the

1 “On the ground that,” or “in the proportion that,” seems to be the strict sense of ἐφ’ ὧν πάντες ήξισσαν. “On condition that” is the most typical sense of ἐφ’ ὧν, and the use here naturally arises out of that, and is nearly identical in force with it. Death got power over them on condition that they sinned.
infinite power and mercy by which He rescues all men, and justifies the Divine plan.

In the first place, Adam is the typical man, i.e. a fair and typical specimen of the genus man: not less, but if anything more favourably situated than the ordinary man. With every advantage, with no inherited taint, he failed, and with him all men fail, because it is impossible that they should succeed where he could not succeed. Subsequent generations of men have in themselves less chance of success than he, because they are born and nurtured amid surroundings already corrupted. Paul holds fast by the old Hebrew doctrine that the children suffer in the sin of their parents for generations. Sin affects society, brings disease, physical and moral, into the nation, causes a racial deterioration through which the descendants of Adam have all suffered. History is the record of the stages through which the initial disobedience to law has worked out its consequences. Social and medical science trace the laws according to which those consequences are worked out. Adam is the test case: such is Paul's view. If he failed, none of his descendants can succeed through their own effort and initiative.

In the second place, if it be objected that this was an insufficient test, and therefore unfair, that objection misses Paul's meaning. Paul does not rest his argument simply on the one test case of Adam. He appeals to all history and experience. Throughout the whole passage, i. 18–iii. 20, he has laboured to prove that all have sinned, and failed to attain righteousness; and in v. 12 he briefly sums up that proof in the phrase "for that all have sinned."

His purpose in v. 12 is not to argue that all are guilty of sin in virtue of Adam's primal sin, but that, as death came over all men through Adam's sin, so life becomes the portion open to all men through Christ's triumph in death over death.
Reference to Paul's words elsewhere makes this quite plain. Compare 1 Corinthians i. 21: "As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive." In this chapter of Romans the same statement is repeated in the immediate sequel: v. 15, "By the trespass of the one the many died"; v. 17, "By the trespass of the one death reigned through the one." Men all die with Adam, because all sin: i.e. men all fail to attain righteousness, and need a Saviour.

Since the typical and representative man failed, and human nature is thus shown to be in its own power incapable of resisting sin, the only cure lies in another representative man, who triumphs over sin. This second typical man is Jesus: He must be in the fullest sense man, otherwise His case will not prove anything for other men or help them in any way: He stripped Himself of His high position and became the representative man; and He proved what men can attain to in virtue of the Divine nature which is in them. That is an essential part of Paul's teaching, that there is this Divine element in man, which can grow until it dominates his whole nature. What man needs is some force to start him on the course of growth towards the truth. As we have already seen, Paul finds this force simply in Faith, in the belief that it can be done because Christ has shown that it can. For that growth towards the truth it is necessary that the man should, as Paul expresses it, die to sin: i.e., he must cease to move on in the way towards sin, and begin to move in the opposite direction towards righteousness. The beginning to do this is already accepted as salvation: the seed that is planted contains in it already the mature tree. The man who has believed in the possibility has got the driving force which will impel him on in the course, hard as it is; and this force is the fact that Jesus died for each individual man,
separate and single, and by dying to the world of transience and mutation resumed His Divine personality.

The appearance of Jesus as a figure in human history does not bring the Divine nature nearer to man. It only brought the Divine nature within the cognizance of human faculties and perceptive powers; thus this event seemed to bring God closer to man, because it made the cognizance of God by man easier.

So far as I can understand the thought of Paul, he assumes this as fundamental truth. Jesus becomes real to us, a real power for us, only in so far as the belief in the power of His death enters into us and becomes part of our living self with the force that a great idea and an intense enthusiasm exert on the nature and action of the man who feels them. Ultimately He becomes, through the progress of our spiritual life, the whole of our living self: "it is no longer I that live, but Christ that liveth in me." The human self and the human nature is identified with the Divine nature, and yet the human personality and self-identity remain. This is eternal life in Paul's doctrine. This is salvation.

XVII. THE OPENING OF FIRST CORINTHIANS XIII.

I may be pardoned at this point for digressing from the proper order of treatment.

His Excellency Dr. Harnack's study of the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians, the Hymn of Heavenly Love,¹ of which the first part appears, in an authorised translation from the Berlin Sitzungsberichte, in this number of the EXPOSITOR, is a work of the highest interest. Beginning after the thoroughgoing and methodical German fashion

¹ This name is applied to the chapter in the writer's Pictures of the Apostolic Church, 1910, p. 232 (published 1909 in the Sunday School Times). I took it from Spenser's "Hymn of Heavenly Love."
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from a minute study of text and words, it moves onward to a broad and lofty survey of religious thought; and in the discussion of the words used by the Apostle it sometimes throws a brilliant light on his thought and on his outlook over the world and man and God. One hardly ventures to praise a writer who stands so high as Dr. Harnack. We learn from him, and are thankful to him; but he stands as a classic, above the level of mere laudation. One learns method and nobility of thought from studying him, even when differing from some detail in his interpretation; and the result is to strengthen our conviction that Paul is, in one way, the greatest among those who interpreted to men the religion of Jesus, and that we never understand the Apostle rightly until we take him on the highest moral plane to which human nature is capable of rising.¹

The title Hymn is naturally applied by every reader to this chapter, das hohe Lied von der Liebe. It is not written in plain prose. It has the measured stately movement and rhythm of a Hymn. We notice that when Paul's religious emotion rises to the highest pitch, it has a certain note of enthusiasm—in the literal sense of the Greek word, possession by the Divine power—which tends to impart to the verbal expression a rhythmic flow. This Dr. Harnack brings out by printing the Greek text and his own German rendering in shorter verses and in three longer measures. It is especially when he speaks of the unspeakable and illimitable kindness of God or His love to men that Paul's expression casts itself in a lyric form. Hence the renewed study of 1 Corinthians xiii. only deepens our conviction that the lyrical tone of 1 Timothy iii. 16 springs out of the heart of the writer, and is not due to the verse being

¹ Pauline and Other Studies, p. 38.
quoted from a contemporary hymn. Amid marked diversity on the surface the deep-lying psychological resemblance in nature between the Epistles to Timothy and the earlier letters of Paul is the most powerful argument that they are all the work of one mind and heart.

The Hymn, as Dr. Harnack says, stands in close relation to the needs and defects of the Corinthian character; and yet rises far above any individual and personal reference to a perfectly universal expression of the nature of God and His relation to men. The quality of which the Hymn sings "embraces the most comprehensive and the strongest kind of good-will to all men, a deep and burning desire to seek after the progress of the race and the benefit of every individual with whom we are brought into relations; it develops the side of our nature in which we can approximate nearest to the Divine nature, because it is the human counterpart of the feeling that God entertains to man."

That is the invariable character of Paul's letters. He never applied superficial remedies to mere external symptoms. He treated the failing or evil in a congregation as the outward effect of a deep-seated want or misapprehension to which all human nature is exposed; and he tried to raise the Church to a higher view of life by purifying and elevating their conception of the Divine nature. The only way in which a merely individual and external treatment comes into play is when penalty and punishment must be applied: this is apportioned according to the individual circumstances. Otherwise he treats all errors by moral and religious principles, which are absolutely universal in their application.

1 If there was such a hymn, it is more likely to have been founded on Paul than quoted by him.
2 Expositor, April, 1912, p. 359.
3 Pictures of the Apostolic Church, p. 230.
I may be permitted, in gratitude for what I have learnt from Dr. Harnack's study of this *Hohe Lied*, to add some remarks on three points. In the first I am obliged to differ from him, not I think in a contrary direction, but rather through proceeding further in the same direction and thus appreciating more highly the beauty of Paul's tone. In the other matter, where he compels perfect assent, my aim is to proceed to certain arguments about the authorship of the Pastoral Epistles. Amid the differences which divide those Epistles from the earlier letters of Paul, there reigns a psychological unity and a real identity of originating heart, which prove the authorship; and Dr. Harnack's exposition of the Hymn recalls to my mind analogous phenomena in the Pastorals.

I. Dr. Harnack is fully justified in laying much stress on the transition by which Paul passes from the general exposition to this lyric and emotional Hymn, and in studying closely the manner in which the passage is effected in the last verse of chapter xii. This throws a strong light on Paul's character, and on the tact and delicacy of his dealing with the Corinthians. As to one point, however, of xii. 31 in Dr. Harnack's interpretation I regret to be unconvinced by his arguments: a view diverse from his seems to place Paul's thought and tone and method on a higher level. Westcott and Hort here differ from him in placing the paragraph division in the middle of xii. 31, and incorporating the second clause of that verse in the Hymn, ch. xiii.; whereas he (like most scholars) connects closely the two clauses of xii. 31 (in which he seems to me to be right).

According to the interpretation of xii. 31, for which Dr. Harnack contends, Paul places his own "super-excellent way" in marked contrast with the Corinthian way. The Corinthians admire spiritual "gifts," and eagerly desire
them as the crown of the Christian career; but Paul, on the contrary, advises these young converts rather to admire and strive after the Christian virtues, and indicates this to them as a more excellent way than theirs of leading the Christian life.

Such a pointed and strong contrast between the Corinthian and the Pauline way seems, however, not to be in harmony with Paul's tone in this part of his letter. He here studiously suppresses his own individuality, makes light of his own merits, and avoids anything that could seem like pressing his way on the Corinthians or depreciating their way. Anything of that kind is out of keeping with the tone of chap. xiii. The delicate and gracious courtesy which lights up this part of the letter is quite remarkable. By a skilful use of the first and the third person he avoids suggesting either that the Corinthians are lacking in love (though their want of it prompts the praise of its excellence and necessity) or that he himself possesses love. "All hint of fault is put in the first person singular": if I have every merit and good action, but have not love, I am valueless. On the other hand, where he in positive terms praises the quality of love, he avoids the first person singular, lest this should seem like a claim to the possession. 1 There is no trace of the irony, subtle and polished and gentle as it is, that rules in chaps. i.–iv. The time for that has passed, or perhaps one should rather say the Apostle's mood has changed. 2

1 Pictures of the Apostolic Church, p. 232 f.
2 That the longer Epistles of Paul were written, not at a single effort, but in parts with some interval between each, seems to me to be the explanation of many of the phenomena in both First and Second Corinthians. A dictated Epistle, which treats of such varied topics in a tone so lofty and legislative and philosophic, was thought out in sections. This was stated in my Historical Commentary on Corinthians, §§ xxxix.–xliv. (Expositor, March, 1901, pp. 220 ff.). This might be illustrated from Spen-
Paul sees what is lacking in the Corinthians' spirit and conduct; but he does not, as yet, criticise or find fault with their way. He merely praises what is good in their way, but gradually leads them up to a higher level of judging and acting.

There is in xii. 31 no comparison, no direct contrast between Paul's way and theirs. The adverbial expression, καθ' ἑπερβολή, which at first sight appears rather awkward as attached to a noun, is carefully chosen to avoid any suggestion of contrast. The connexion is made by "and," not by "but"; only the εἰς imparts to the "and" a touch of hesituation and pondering: "and still, along with the excellence of your conduct in desiring eagerly the gifts, you should always remember that there is a way, a super-excellent way," viz. the way of love, which is then described in the Hymn.

Like the introduction of the Hymn, so is the conclusion, xiv. 1, with which Paul resumes his didactic exposition in plain prose. "Pursue love; hunt it as a hunter seeks his prey, determined to get it; but strive after the spiritual gifts, and especially the gift of prophecy." Here, again, the two ways are mentioned side by side: both are worthy of eager desire: neither is recommended exclusively or even preferentially (unless διώκειν can be interpreted as a markedly stronger term\(^1\) than ζηλαστεῖν). The parallel between xii. 31 and xiv. 1 is perfect, though the order must of course be reversed: in the introduction the way of

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\(^1\) This suggestion can hardly be justified; both are strong and emphatic terms.

*ser's first letter to Gabriel Harvey; Gregory Smith in his edition recognises that the end of the letter is written a week earlier than the beginning; but my friend Mr. J. C. Smith points out to me that the end of the letter was written and sent as a separate letter, and lost on the way, so that Spenser repeats it at the end of his new letter, after explaining the cir. cumstances. The dates are 16 and 5 Oct. 1579.*
love has to be mentioned last, in the conclusion it is necessarily placed first.

Hence Paul does not use the comparative degree of an adjective; he does not say "I will show you a more excellent way," for that would suggest a comparison of his own way with the Corinthian way. He does not even employ the definite article, for that form would suggest that he is showing "the way," the one true and supreme way. So perfectly chosen is the language here, that even the addition of "the" would spoil it. Dr. Harnack's interpretation misses this; hence he is a little surprised at the omission of "the," and feels the want of the article to be rather awkward, and even points out that occasionally in Paul the article is omitted carelessly. On the contrary, the language here is so perfectly chosen that the smallest change would weaken the delicate effect.

We might attempt to express in rough modern words the run of the expression thus: "all the gifts of the spirit are good and desirable, each in its own way; they are, however, diverse, and they vary in dignity, and men cannot possess them all: all cannot be prophets, or teach, or speak with tongues. But strive ye after the gifts in proportion to their worth. They are good. They are excellent. Be eager to attain them. And yet—and still—there is a super-excellent way, and this I show you in the Hymn.

The term "gifts" must therefore be understood in the same sense throughout chaps. xii.—xiv. It would be an obscurity very unlike Paul's style to pass in the middle suddenly to a different sense for the word, and then return to the former sense. The difficulty of his style arises from other causes: his reasoning moves with rapid and long steps which are not easily followed; often he sees intuitively rather than reasons, giving an argument that seems to us arbitrary or far-fetched to justify his intuition; but he
does not commonly operate with terms whose meaning he consciously changes completely back and forwards in the chain of his expression.

Still, if the supposition of such rapid change gave a better flow to the passage, we should have to accept it. We find, however, that it misinterprets the spirit and harmony of Paul's thought.

Against the uniformity for which we contend in the meaning of the term "gifts" throughout this passage, Dr. Harnack brings the objection that the Apostle, who has recently described the "gifts" as imparted by God according to His free will and choice, could hardly advise the Corinthians to "strive after" those same gifts. There is, however, no real inconsistency; it is only an apparent difference that is felt when one contemplates the situation with too narrowly logical a view. It is truly and perfectly consistent with the Pauline and the Christian philosophy to strive earnestly after the gifts of God: they are the free gift of God, imparted at His own will, and yet men may and should eagerly desire them and strive after them. Such is the nature of the Divine gifts and graces: such is the true relation of the Christian man to his God.

The common interpretation of xii. 31, which Dr. Harnack mentions, is rightly rejected by him: it is indefensible from every point of view, and fails to catch the gracious and lovely current of Paul's thought. As he says (and I assume that he is right in this: I have not read carefully their exegesis), almost all the commentators understand that, in the first clause of xii. 31, Paul advises the Corinthians to strive by preference after those spiritual gifts which serve best for edification, i.e. to prefer prophecy or teaching to glossolalia.

This is to be rejected for two reasons. In the first place it disregards the order and natural connexion of words:
The force is not to be regarded as if the words were equivalent to τὰ μείζωνα χαρίσματα or τὰ μείζωνα τῶν χαρισμάτων.

In the second place it is not the Apostle's purpose here to draw hard and fast distinctions, or to insist that the Corinthians should make glossolalia a secondary matter: what he means is that all gifts are good, and should be sought after in proportion to their goodness. By his form of expression he leaves open for the moment the possibility that some may be better than others; that topic will come later. Yet even when in xiv. 1–4 he gives the preference to prophecy over speaking with tongues, he immediately adds in xiv. 5, "I wish you all to speak with tongues, but still more that you should prophesy." This is just a re-emphasising of xii. 31a, and xiv. 1; but now, after the distinction has been drawn in xiv. 2–4, the statement of the thought becomes more definite and precise: "All gifts, however, are good: glossolalia is good: my wish is that you should all have that gift, but still more that you should have the power of prophecy as a higher and greater gift."

This gradual movement towards definiteness about these gifts is evident, when xii. 31a is correctly interpreted. The movement continues through xiv. 12 "since ye are eager strivers after spiritual gifts, seek that you may be rich unto the edifying of the church," to xiv. 39 "strive after the power of prophecy, and forbid not to speak with tongues." Here prophecy alone is prescribed as an object to strive after; and glossolalia is "not forbidden." This is the climax.

The whole passage xii.–xiv. is concerned with the gifts of the spirit; with infinite courtesy and tenderness Paul
tries to raise the Corinthians’ minds to a higher outlook and a nobler aspiration. In the middle of this passage it is not allowable to interpret “the gifts” once in a totally different sense as the fundamental Christian virtues.

All that I have said regarding the delicacy of Paul’s attitude towards the Corinthians’ way would be falsified, if Weiss’s view were correct that already in xii. 29 f. Paul “has reproved and found fault with the Corinthians’ habit of ambitiously striving after the higher gifts.”¹ This meaning I cannot gather from Paul’s words. Weiss introduces into xii. the depreciation of one gift (not of all gifts), which is expressed in xiv.; and he expresses this gentle, delicate depreciation in harsh and strong language, which has no resemblance to, and no justification in, the kindly, yet emotional, words of the letter. It would be quite justifiable if Weiss expressed his own opinion about the Corinthians in the language that best suited the strength of his feeling; but he is here giving a résumé of Paul’s words. One feels obliged to say that the exegesis of Paul which expresses in such strong, sledgehammer style the courteous and gracious language of the Apostle is dooming itself beforehand to misunderstand Paul’s attitude.

II. Dr. Harnack’s defence (which, in the present writer’s opinion, is perfectly successful and conclusive) of the reading καυχήσωμαι in verse 3, is one of the most delightful and illuminative things that I have ever read about the character of Paul. It shows us the great Apostle in his relation to the Pharisaic and Judaic view of life; it illustrates the influence which the strictly Pharisaic way of thinking exercised on his mind, and his invariable custom of taking that thought on the highest level of which it is capable; and,

¹ Nachdem er sieben das ehrgeizige Streben nach höheren Gaben zurückgewiesen und gemahnt hat . . . (v. 29 f.).
finally, it lets us trace his triumphant emergence from the Pharisaic view to a still higher level.

This gradual victory over Pharisaism—in other words, the whole life of Paul in his relation to the Pharisaic mode of thinking—might be illustrated at greater length; the path which Dr. Harnack has here indicated might be followed throughout a wide range of ideas; but I here refer to it only in order to draw an inference from it. Without intending it, Dr. Harnack's exposition makes it easy to see why an idea like this, which is in Paul's letters so frequently expressed by the verbs καυχάμαι, ἑγκαυχάμαι, and the nouns καύχησις, καύχημα, never occurs in the Pastoral Epistles.

Those Epistles differ as regards vocabulary from the other letters, not merely in using many words not found in the letters, but also to some extent in making little employment of certain ideas and words which are much more frequently used in the earlier letters. None of those four Greek words, which occur fifty-five times in Paul's earliest eight letters, are found in the three Pastorals.

Now, to quote Dr. Harnack's own words, "the Pharisaic fashion of thinking was fundamentally amended by Paul, until he at last did away with it entirely." It is true that this group of words is absent from the Pastorals; but also it is the case that none of them occur in Colossians, and there is only a single occurrence in Ephesians.

The Apostle was naturally most prone to use this form of expression where he was most on the defensive, and where he was recommending and fortifying against attack his own conception of the Gospel: therefore the words are most frequent in Second Corinthians. The same way of contemplating his own life was exemplified in the opening words of his Apologia before the Sanhedrin—an Apologia which was never completed—see Acts xxiii. 1, where
there is the expression of a strong and self-confident, almost
thoroughly Pharisaic καύχημα, though the word itself is
not used. If his action were attacked he would defend it,
and with good reason glory in the purity of his motives and
conduct. Yet, as he grew older, he rose above this way
of defence, and used it and the words which express it less
and less.

These words are almost wholly confined to Paul in the
New Testament. Besides him James thrice uses them,
one in the Pharisaic good sense (i. 9), and twice in the bad
sense (iv. 6): James too had something of the markedly
Judaic character. In Hebrews also the noun καύχημα is
once used; but only as a synonym and completion of
παρρησία, which precedes, limits and defends it.¹

This word παρρησία, denoting freedom in expression and
thought, is the Christian term and idea, which is charac-
teristic of the later books in the New Testament. It
originates as a Christian term with Paul, being used by him
both in the noun and the derived verb παρρησιάζομαι. In
First Thessalonians ii. 2 the verb is employed in a some-
what hesitating way, conjoined with λαλεῖν, “we used
freedom . . . to speak to you the Gospel.” In Ephesians
vi. 20 the verb is used more freely “to speak boldly (as I
ought to speak)” ; and Luke in the Acts uses the verb fre-
quently ² in this sense, catching it from the lips of Paul.
The verb is Pauline and Lukan. The noun occurs regu-
larly in the later Pauline letters, Second Corinthians twice,
Ephesians twice, Philippians, Philemon, First Timothy.
It is also a characteristic word in Luke ¹ and still more in
John (both in the Gospel nine times and in the first Epistle
four times).

¹ Hebrews xxx. 6, ἵνα τήν παρρησίαν καὶ τὸ καύχημα τῆς ἑλπίδος μέχρι
tῆς ἐκλογῆς ματάκας κατάσχωμεν.
² Only in Acts, not in the Gospel, where he was under the influence of
the earlier tradition: the noun occurs once in Mark viii. 32.
The mere statement of the facts shows how, in harmony with Paul, the language that expressed to the Church the Christian ethics lifted itself above the Pharisaic standpoint. The word παράβοςία is entirely free from the unpleasing connotation of καύχησις. The latter carries with it the suspicion of self-confidence: Paul himself feels this, and apologises for the word and the idea of καύχησις in Second Corinthians xii. 1 and 5. It commonly has degenerated in Greek speech and acquired a thoroughly bad sense: in Second Corinthians x. 13 and Ephesians ii. 9 there is the suggestion that such degeneration is possible, while in First Corinthians v. 6 the degeneration is actually exemplified. Regularly, however, the word has in Paul the better sense vindicated for it by Dr. Harnack in the Hymn, verse 3. In James iv. 16 the bad sense of καύχησις is complete. The word thus comes to connote much the same as ἀλαζονία or κενοδοξία: the latter is purely Pauline 1 (found twice, Phil. and Gal.), the former is found in James, in Romans, in First John, and in Second Timothy (each once). The development therefore is from the use in a good sense of a term that is readily capable and even suggestive of a bad sense to the full and proper distinction between the good and the bad sense by two contrasted terms, and the disuse of the doubtful word or the condemnation of it to the bad sense alone.

The language of the Pastorals stands in this matter on the level of the developed Christian usage. The question is whether there is reason to think that this level was attained in the lifetime of Paul, or not. If not, there would result a probability in favour of the opinion that the Pastorals cannot be the work of Paul; but, on the other hand, if it is probable that Paul himself gradually attained to this level, those Epistles would, so far as this matter is con-

1 The noun and the adjective are lumped in the statistics.
cerned, retain the place which, in our opinion, properly belongs to them as the latest stage in the expression of his thought.

The statistics already quoted seem to place the answer beyond question. The middle Epistles approximate to this level, whereas the earlier are remote from it. Dr. Harnack's argument that Paul was gradually emancipating himself from the Pharisaic point of view, until he triumphed over it completely, is perfectly correct. The group of Epistles of the Captivity approximate to this level. Indeed, if we except Philippians, the three closely connected Asian Epistles come very near it, as there is only one occurrence in them of these words; but even in them the thought still lingers that καὶ χήνης before the judgment of God is justifiable. This process is completed in the Pastorals; but the steps are clearly marked in the preceding Epistles and nearly completed in the latest of them. In this as in so many other matters we need the Pastorals to justify Paul, and to consummate our picture of him.¹

III. In the Hymn we find that verses 4–7 are a good example of Paul's way of heaping together a long series of characteristics and modes of action in order to express the real nature of the topic which he is discussing. In doing so he employs a rich vocabulary, and exhibits great carefulness in regard to delicate shades of significance. Any one of these enumerations of a series of words shows the mind of the philosophically educated man. Only a person who has been accustomed to think much and to philosophise can practise such refinement in language. In such a list Paul's

¹ It should not be omitted that the argument of the great German scholar regarding this reading is a complete vindication of the skill and judgment applied by Westcott & Hort in the formation of their text. Alone among modern scholars (with the partial exception of Lachmann) they preferred καυχήσομαι and placed it in the text, relegating καυθήσομαι to the Appendix as "Western and Syrian."
tendency also was to employ strange and rare words, or even to invent new words. It is a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator in language.

χρηστεύομαι is found only here in the New Testament, and in later Christian writers is probably taken from Paul. Dr. Harnack suggests that Paul derived it from a recension of Q, which was used and quoted by Clemens Alexandrinus.

περπερεύομαι is found only here in the New Testament: it is rare in Greek, as is the noun περπερεία.

φυσίω is never used in the New Testament except by Paul, who has it six times in 1 Corinthians, and once in Colossians.

ἀσχημονεῖν is never used in the New Testament except twice in 1 Corinthians. In this place Dr. Harnack follows Clement of Alexandria, and rejects the sense "behave unseemly," which suits better the other occurrence of the word (vii. 36).

παροξύνομαι occurs only twice in the New Testament. The other instance is in Acts xvii. 16, where Luke uses it about Paul's indignation at the idolatry practised in Athens, probably catching it from the Apostle's own lips. The word was therefore probably a characteristic Pauline word, but it is only once found in his writings. Occasion to use it positively would be rare. Here alone there is a need to use it negatively.

στέγειν, used four times by Paul (twice in 1 Cor.) and not elsewhere in the New Testament, has its sense doubtful here: yet it is evidently a characteristic Pauline word like the three preceding.

In such a list Paul tends to refinement in language, he seeks out rare words, some of which remain peculiar to himself in the New Testament; and of these some were characteristic of him at one stage of his life and in one letter.
Now, if one turns to the Pastorals one finds many such lists of qualities and characteristics. The subject lends itself to them. There also many of the words are rare, and found only once in the New Testament, or found only in one Epistle, or confined to that stage of Paul’s life when he was writing the Pastorals. It was a Pauline characteristic to be an innovator and experimenter in a certain class of philosophic moral terms. This philosophy he was expounding to the world in terms that would be generally intelligible. The fact that the author of the Pastorals is an innovator and experimenter in language is no proof that he was not Paul, but rather affords psychologically a presumption that he was Paul, because he shares with Paul a certain deep-seated character.

W. M. Ramsay.

**PERSONALITY AND GRACE.**

V. A GRACIOUS RELATIONSHIP.

Grace, as we have interpreted it, is not a name for direct forces acting upon us impersonally and in no way requiring our personal consent any more than it requires our personal co-operation. It is on the contrary the personal relation of life to us whereby we can have a right personal relation to it, and of which the possibility of maintaining this right personal relation is the supreme evidence.

Direct forces may pass through the personality as through all created things. Yet, in so far as they are merely direct forces, they are not personal but only the material for personality. Therefore, in the strict sense, they are neither moral nor religious, but only experiences to which we ought to have a religious and moral relation. They are simply talents given to us, not really different from natural endow-