FURTHER STUDIES IN THE EPISTLE OF ST.
JAMES, CHIEFLY SUGGESTED BY DR. HORT'S
POSTHUMOUS EDITION.

James i. 5, εἰ δὲ τίς ūμῶν λείπεται σοφίας, ἀιτείτω παρὰ τοῦ
didόντος θεοῦ πᾶσιν ἀπλῶς καὶ μὴ ὀνειδίζοντος, καὶ δοθήσεται
αὐτῷ. Ὑ., with the A.V. and R.V., here interprets ἀπλῶς by
the English “liberally,” “graciously,” and quotes many pas-
sages in which a corresponding sense attaches to the cognate
adjective (ἁπλός) and substantive (ἁπλότης). In my note
I went too far in denying that the adverb ever bears this
meaning. Ὑ. instances Polyb. xxxii. 14 (Scipio resolved)
πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλοτρίους τὴν ἐκ τοῦ νόμου ἀκριβείαν τηρεῖν,
τοὺς δὲ φίλους ἀπλῶς χρησάται καὶ δικαίως; and we should
probably give an ethical force to the same adverb in
Prov. x. 10, δς πορεύεται ἀπλῶς, “he who walks in single-
ness of heart.” But Ὑ. himself allows that, in the passage
which presents the nearest verbal parallel to this text
of St. James,1 “ἁπλῶς is not ethical at all, but retains
its common classical meaning, ‘absolutely,’ i.e. (in this
connexion) without a substantial equivalent.” Ὑ. adds
that, in St. James, the need for adopting this, the logical
meaning, is removed by the sufficient evidence for “gra-
ciously,” and further that it is excluded by the contrast
with “upbraideth.”

A single instance can hardly be considered to prove the
point, when it is a question of probabilities, and Ὑ. only
provides one instance of the meaning “graciously.” I
am rather inclined to think that St. James here had in mind
such words as we may read in Matthew v. 45, “Your Father
which is in heaven maketh his sun to rise upon the evil and

1 El δὲ ἀπλῶς διδόντος λαβεῖν ὡς εὐλογον, πῶς οὐ πλέων δε μηδὲ προῖκα; “If
it is unwise to accept an unconditional offer, how much more a mere
bargain.” Himerius, Eclog., v. 12.
the good, and sendeth rain on the just and the unjust,” with which we may compare Acts x. 34, xiv. 17, xvii. 15 foll.; Luke vi. 35; Isa. lv.; Philo, Alleg. M. i. 50, φιλό­
dωρος ὅν ὁ θεὸς χαριζεται τὰ ἄγαθα πᾶσι καὶ τοὺς μὴ τελείοις, Hermas Mand. ii. 4, τάσιν ὑστερομένους δίδου ἄπλως, μὴ διστάζων τίνι δός ἢ μὴ δός, τάσιν δίδου. This passage from Hermas, who was certainly acquainted with our Epistle (see my Introduction, pp. lxxxiv. foll.), might seem to be written to explain the ἄπλως of St. James, which, thus explained, may be taken to represent a higher degree of the quality implied by Dr. Hort’s interpretation.

It may, however, be objected that, though the blessings of nature are given to all without distinction, it is not so with the blessings of grace. In ch. iv. 3 we are told (1) that “we have not, because we ask not,” and again (2) that “we ask and receive not, because we ask amiss,” and in i. 6 we are told (3) what it is which makes our prayers unavailing, viz. our want of faith, our doublemindedness. But might not a similar objection be made to the phrase τάσιν διδόντος (which Hermas makes use of as explanatory of ἄπλως), and also to μὴ ὄνειδίζοντος, since we are told in Matthew ix. 20 τότε ἡρξατο ὄνειδίζεων τὰς πόλεις . . . ὅτι οὐ μετενόησαν, and in Mark xvi. 14, ὄνειδίσευν τὴν ἀπιστίαν καὶ σκληροκαρδίαν (of the Eleven). As God gives unconditionally, so we have examples of man asking unconditionally in the prayer of Socrates (Xen. Mem. i. 3. 2), εὐχετο πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς ἄπλως τἀγαθὰ διδόναι, ὡς τοὺς θεοὺς κάλλιστα εἰδότας ὑποία ἄγαθὰ ἔστιν. 1

1 It may be well to add here, some further quotations from Heisen’s thesaurus in illustration of ἄπλως, Aelian V.H. ix. 32 (speaking of the statue of Phryne erected by the Greeks) οἷς ἐρῶ δὲ ἄπλως τούς Ἑλλήνας . . . ἄλλ’ οἱ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀκρατέστεροι: Plut. Vitae p. 90 (of Solon’s legislation), οὐ μὴν ἄπλως τὰς δόσεις ἐφήκειν, ἀλλ’ εἰ μὴ νόσων ἕνεκεν κ.κ.λ. In relaxing the old law of inheritance Solon did not allow the estate to be unconditionally distributed in presents, but only under special circumstances. The word occurs also in Wisdom xvi. 27 τὸ ὑπὸ πυρὸς μὴ φθειρόμενον
I. 7, 8, μὴ γὰρ οἰέσθω οὗ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος ὅτι λήμψεται τι παρὰ τοῦ Κυρίου, ἄνὴρ δίψυχος, ἀκατάστατος ἐν πάσαις ταῖς ὁδοῖς αὐτοῦ. In my edition I have followed the R.V., translating, "For let not that man think that he shall receive anything from the Lord; a double-minded man, unstable in all his ways," taking ἄνηρ δίψυχος as in apposition with ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, the doubter of the sixth verse, which forms the subject of λήμψεται. H., on the other hand, understanding ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος of the man who lacks wisdom in ver. 5, makes ἄνηρ δίψυχος the subject to λήμψεται, translating, "Let not that man think that a man of two minds, unstable in all his ways, shall receive anything from the Lord." The reasons assigned by H. for his interpretation are (1) that the obvious way of setting aside the last person (i.e. the waverer of ver. 6) and pointing back to the person before him (i.e. ὁ λειτομένος σοφίας, of ver. 5) would be, in Greek, the use of the pronoun ἐκεῖνος. But the following passages will show that the use of ἐκεῖνος is not limited to such references, but is often employed for emphasis, as in Mark xiv. 21, οὐαὶ δὲ τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ ἐκεῖνῳ δὲ οὐ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἄνθρωπον παραδίδοται· καλὸν αὐτῷ εἰ σὺν ἐγενήθη ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος: Matthew xii. 45, γίνεται τὰ ἔσχατα τοῦ ἄνθρωπον ἐκεῖνον χείρονα τῶν πρῶτων: John i. 6, ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ Θεοῦ, ὥσπερ αὐτὸ Ἰωάννης· οὗτος ἦλθεν εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ἵνα μαρτυρησίν περὶ τοῦ φωτός, ἵνα πάντες πιστεύσωσιν δι’ αὐτοῦ. οὐκ ἦν ἐκεῖνος τὸ φῶς,

ἀπλῶς ὡς βραχεῖας ἀκτίνως ἡλίου θερμαίνου ἐν ἐτέκτο (when it was just warmed by a faint sunbeam), 2 Macc. vi. 6 ἦν ὡς ὁ δὴ σαββατιστὶν ὡς ταῦτα διαφυλάττειν, ὡς ἀπλῶς Ἰουδαίων ὡμολογεῖν εἰναι (nor absolutely to confess that he was a Jew). Priceus, in Critici Sacri, quotes ἀπλῶς οἷς προσφέρεσθαι from Antoninus (without further reference) for the meaning 'generously.' It occurs in xi. 15 ὅς κιβθήλεος ὁ λέγων, ἐγὼ προσφέραί ἀπλῶς οἷς προσφέρεσθαι (but this should have been stamped upon his brow), ὁ ἄγαθός καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ εὐμενής ἐν τοῖς ἵμμασιν ἔχουσιν τούτῳ, where I prefer the meaning 'straightforwardly.' This also seems to me the best translation in two other passages of Ant. iii. 6 ἀπλῶς καὶ ἐλευθερώς ἐλθέ τῷ κρίτῃ καὶ τούτῳ ἀντέχου, and iii. 16 ἀπλῶς καὶ αἰθημάνως καὶ εὐθύμως βιοῦ.
THE EPISTLE OF ST. JAMES

In the parable of the houses built, one on the rock, the other on sand, which closes the Sermon on the Mount, both are referred to as οἱ ὀίκιαι ἐκεῖνη; by way of heightening the contrast between them. In the present case I think the reader would naturally interpret ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος of the man spoken of in ver. 6: it seems to me unnatural to put the warning intended for the waverer into the mouth of him who lacked wisdom, and whose rôle in the argument comes to an end when he has connected ver. 4 with ver. 6 through λευτόμενος and αἰτεῖτω. I think, too, that Alford rightly questions whether the writer would have introduced a rare word like διψυχός as the subject of a new clause. If it is merely added in apposition to the preceding ὁ διακρινόμενος, a clue to its sense has been already given.

H.'s next argument is derived from St. James' use of the word ἄνθρωπος, which occurs six times in the Epistle, but 'nowhere with a trace of reproach.' But is there no reproach in ὁ ἄνθρωπος κενέ (ii. 20)? Elsewhere we read ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῆς ἀνομίας (2 Thess. ii. 3), ἄνθρωπος φάγος καὶ αἰνοπότης (Matt. xi. 19), see also Jude 4 παρεισεδύσαν τινας ἄνθρωπον ἀσεβεῖς, 2 Peter iii. 7 εἰς ἡμέραν ἀπωλείας ἀσεβῶν ἄνθρώπων. H. maintains that, wherever ἄνθρωπος occurs in St. James, it is in emphatic opposition to other beings, here to the Lord, in ii. 20 to devils, and probably also in ii. 24. We may allow this characteristic of the word in iii. 9 καταράμεθα τοὺς ἄνθρωπον τοὺς καθ' ὅμοιωσιν Θεοῦ γεγονότας, but I think there is something arbitrary in the distinction between ἄνηρ and ἄνθρωπος which H. makes in his notes on the passages where the words occur. For instance, in the note on i. 8 he insists that ἄνηρ is wholly without emphasis, while of πᾶς ἄνθρωπος in i. 19 he says the
expression is "not equivalent to πᾶς standing alone, but
 calls our attention to every one of the human race, that race
 which is God's offspring, endowed by Him with a portion
 of His own light." On the other hand, of ὄργη ἄνδρός in the
 next verse, he says, "It is not exactly the broad distinction
 of human, as against divine wrath (which would require
 ἄνθρωπον or τῶν ἄνθρωπων), but a single man's anger, the
 petty passion of an individual soul." On τέλειος ἄνήρ in
 iii. 2 the note is, "ἄνήρ cannot have the sense that ἄνθρωπος
 would have had 'one showing the perfection of humanity':
 it is simply 'one that is perfect.'" On iii. 8 τὴν δὲ γλῶσσαν
 οὐδέλες δαμάσας δύναται ἄνθρωπων ᾿H. offers two renderings,
 "The tongue no one can tame—no one, that is, of men"
 (which I consider to be the true rendering, reminding us of
 Mark x. 27 παρὰ ἄνθρωποις ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ Θεῷ);
 but prefers "No one even of men, even of those beings so
 highly endowed, of whom he had just been speaking."

In my note on i. 8, I have distinguished between St. James'
uses of ἄνήρ and ἄνθρωπος, as follows: ἄνήρ is generally
accompanied by some characteristic epithet, such as δι-
ψυχος, μακάριος, ὄργη, κατανοῶν, χρυσοδιακτύλιος, τέλειος,
while ἄνθρωπος, as a rule, either stands alone, or is
accompanied by some quasi-pronominal word, such as
ἐκεῖνος, πᾶς, οὐδέλες. This agrees fairly with the use in
the LXX., the Gospels and the Acts, while, in the other
Epistles, ἄνήρ is generally opposed to γυνή.

In dealing with synonyms, however, it is not only neces-
sary to ascertain their different shades of meaning, at any
given period of their development, by comparing the pas-
sages in which they occur: we must also endeavour to trace
back the later meaning to its original. It is plain, to start
with, that the concept "human being," expressed by
ἄνθρωπος and homo, is a more general term, has a wider
extension and a narrower connotation than the word ἄνήρ.
or *vir*, which excludes the woman, the child and the slave, and stands for the head and protector of the family, being supposed to possess the qualities which belong to that position, courage, endurance, self-control, forethought, etc. These qualities are often known by names derived from the word for "man," as *virtus, ἀνδρεία*. Hence we read in Herodotus (vii. 210) πολλοὶ μὲν ἄνθρωποι, ὄλιγοι δὲ ἄνδρες; hence the citizens of Athens were addressed as ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, the early Christians as ἄνδρες ἄδελφοι. Hence, I think, we have μακάριος ἄνὴρ in i. 12, in consequence of the manly quality of endurance by which that blessing had been won (ὅς ὑπομένει πειρασμόν). So we read of ὄργη ἄνδρος because, as Plato tells us in his Republic, anger is the raw material of courage. In iii. 2 ἄνὴρ is joined with τέλειος probably because the word ἄνὴρ implies full age (as in 1 Cor. xiii. 11). "In Homer it is used chiefly of princes and leaders, but also of free men, though, to mark a man of rank, a qualifying word is mostly added, as ἄνηρ βουληφόρος, ἄνηρ βασιλεύς. In later Greek ἄνὴρ was commonly joined with titles, professions, etc." (L. & S. s.v. ἄνηρ). Perhaps this may account for the phrase ἄνηρ χρυσοδακτύλος in ii. 2, for ἄνηρ προφῆτης used of Christ in Luke xxiv. 19, for φιλόσοφος ἄνηρ in Plato, Phaedo 95 c., ἄνηρ μάγος in Ἀριστοτέλης 371. Such complimentary additions, like our "Mister" or "Esquire," soon lost their meaning, as we may see from the comic ἄνδρος θεοί, and such phrases as πᾶς ἄνηρ, which scarcely differs from πᾶς τις.

There is a similar degradation of ἄνθρωπος from its highest mark in Psalm viii. 4, in which the Son of Man stands above all other created beings, as the image of God, till it becomes used as a contemptuous term for a woman or a slave, especially in the vocative ὦ ἄνθρωπε. While used, like ἄνηρ, of the title or profession, it does not in general add dignity (though we find ἄνθρωπος βασιλεὺς in Matt. xxii. 2), but
the reverse, as in ἀνθρωπος γόης. Both lines of degeneration meet in the ἀνθρωπος ἄμαρτωλός of John ix. 16 and the ἀνήρ ἄμαρτωλός of Luke xxiv. 7.

I. 17, πάν δόριμα τέλειον ἀνωθεν ἐστιν καταβαίνων ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τῶν φώτων, παρ’ ὅνκ ἐν παραλλαγῇ. This verse establishes the truth of ver. 13, that God tempts none. “It is good, good of every kind, that flows from Him.” The contradiction involved may not be strictly logical, since it leaves it possible that evil also may proceed from Him (see Isa. xlv. 7). In my edition I have called attention to the probability that we have here a poetical quotation, in which strict logic is out of place. H. follows Erskine’s interpretation: “Every giving is good and every gift perfect from its first source, descending etc.” But gifts may be bad, as well as good, e.g. Pandora or the Trojan Horse. H. is therefore obliged to explain that St. James must mean by “every gift” every gift of God, which is really assuming the point at issue. Nor can I think that ἄνωθεν is to be understood here as in Luke i. 3, when we have two other passages in this Epistle (iii. 15, 17), where it is allowed that ἄνωθεν can only mean “from above.”

**Uses of ἐνι and ἐνεστι.**

ἐνι is simply the Ionic form of the preposition ἐν, but often stands for ἐνεστι, both in the earlier and later stages of Greek, just as πάρα, ἀνα, μέτα, πέρι are used, with inverted accent, for πάρεστι, etc. Its simplest use is to denote the position of one material object within another, as in Odysss. x. 45 ἀργυρος ἀσκφ ἐνεστων, Herod. vii. 112 ἐν τῷ (οὐρεῖ) χρύσεα ἐνι μεταλλα, Xen. Anab. v. 3, 11 ἐνι δὲ τῷ ἱερῷ χώρῳ καὶ ἀλος. A derivative use is that which denotes feelings or faculties existing in a person, as in Il. xviii. 53 ἐμῷ ἐνὶ κηδεα θυμίς, Od. xxi. 288 ἐνὶ σοὶ φρένες οὔδ’ ἡβαιαλ, Thuc. ii. 40 ἐνὶ τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς οἰκεῖων ἀμὰ καὶ πολιτικῶν
"ἐπιμέλεια, Diphilus Syntr. ἄγαθος βαφεύς ἐνεστὶ ἐν τῷ παιδίῳ, Luc. Text. 35 μεγαλούργον ἐν αὐτῷ ἢ ἀνδρεῖον ἐνοῦ ὑδέν, Aristoph. Nub. 486 ἐνεστὶ δῆτα σοὶ λέγει ἐν τῇ φύσει; λέγει μὲν ὦκ ἐνεστὶ ἀποστερεῖν δ' ἐν, Soph. El. 527 (Clytemnestra avows that she slew her husband) τόνδ' ἄρνησις ὦκ ἐνεστὶ μοι ("it is not in me to deny it".), El. 1031 (Electra dismisses her sister with the words) ἀπελθε- σοὶ γὰρ ὀφέλησις ὦκ ἐν, to which Chrysothemis replies ἐνεστὶν ἀλλὰ σοὶ μάθησις οὐ πάρα (where ἐν, ἐνεστὶν and πάρα have much the same force), Herod. vi. 109 ἐν σοὶ νῦν ἐστὶν ἢ καταδουλώσαι Ἀθῆνας ἢ —, where ἐν σοὶ ἐστὶν has the same force as ἐν σοι, "it lies in you." Epict. Diss. ii. 21. 7 ἐν τε καὶ τῷ ξηλοτύτῳ τοῦ ἀκούσιον, Test. xii. Patr. p. 733 ὅπου γὰρ ἐνι φῶς τὸ σκότος ἀποδιδράσκει, Acta Xanthippae (in James, Apocr. Anecdota, p. 70, Camb.) λεγέτω ὁ κυρίος τὸ διαρ, καὶ ἰδωμεν ἐἰ ἐνι διάλυσις ἐν αὐτῷ (if it affords any key to its interpretation). The third use of ἐν is where it denotes not the presence of one material object in another, or the relation of thought or feeling or faculty to a living person, but the relation of fact or thing, whatever it may be, to the nature of things in general, the order of the world, or some other abstraction, where the verb is often impersonal, as in Isocr. De Pace, p. 187, ἐνεστὶ δ' ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις πράγμασιν ἡμᾶς τυχεῖν τῆς τιμῆς ταύτης. "In such a state of things it is included as a possibility (involved as a necessity), that we should obtain this honour." The words ἔστι, ἐγγίνεται, ἐνδέχεται are similarly used. I think scholars have sometimes been too ready to assume that this was the only possible use, even where the verb was personal, and where a simpler meaning gives all that is required. Thus L. & S. translate ἐνεσται χρόνος (Thuc. i. 80) "time will be necessary," where the literal "there will be an interval of time" gives the thought more exactly. Again, in Soph. El. 527, which I have cited above, and in
all similar cases, they translate οὐκ ἐνι or ἐνεστών by “It is impossible,” where “it is not in me” seems truer to the Greek. In Plato, *Phaedo*, 77 ε, ἵσως ἐνι τις καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν παις¹ (referring to Socrates’ words spoken just before on the childish fear of death, δοκεῖς δεδέναι τὸ τῶν παιδῶν) L. & S. say that ἐνι means “possible.” As this passage is also adduced by Hort in support of his theory that ἐνι “adds a playful irony (‘perhaps it is not impossible that even amongst us, etc.’), and can never become a bare equivalent of ἐστῖν,” it may be well to give Stallbaum’s quotation from Themistius (*Orat.* i. 13), as showing that the latter understood it in the manner objected to by Hort: ἐστὶ γὰρ τις ἐν ἡμῖν οὐ παις, ὡς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλ’ οἶν τις εὐγένης νεανίας.

I proceed now to examine the passages in which ἐνι occurs in the N.T. and to give my reasons for dissenting from renderings supported by the combined authority of two such scholars as Lightfoot and Hort. The passages are Galatians iii. 26–28 πάντες νικὸς Θεοῦ ἔστε διὰ τῆς πίστεως ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. δοκεῖς γὰρ εἰς Χριστὸν ἐξαπτώθητε Χριστὸν ἐνεδύσασθεν· οὐκ ἐνι Ιουδαίος οὐδὲ Ἑλλάς, οὐκ ἐνι δουλός οὐδὲ ἐλευθερός, οὐκ ἐνι ἄρσεν καὶ θηλύς πάντες γὰρ ἡμῖν εἰς ἐστε ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. Lightfoot explains this in terms with which I entirely agree. “In Christ Jesus ye are all sons, all free... The conventional distinctions of religious caste or social rank, even the natural distinction of sex, are banished hence. Ye are all one man, for ye are all members of Christ.” Where I disagree, is in the note which follows on οὐκ ἐνι, “‘there is no room for,’ ‘no place for’; negativing not the fact only but the possibility.” I see no reason why we should not keep the ordinary meaning of the word ἐνι. “In the body of Christ distinctions disappear, Jew is not, Greek is not.” What more is needed? If we will go out of our way to

¹ Compare the lines of Diphilus quoted above.
introduce the idea of impossibility, we must change the personal to the impersonal construction, οὐκ ένι Τουδαίον εἶναι οὐδὲ Ἑλλήνα τον ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ. St. Paul repeats in Col. iii. 9-11 with slight variation what he had said in the Epistle to the Galatians, and Lightfoot gives the same explanation as before.

The next example of ἐν occurs in 1 Corinthians vi. 5, where St. Paul blames the Corinthians for appearing before Gentile courts, and asks whether the Church is so entirely wanting in wisdom, that they could find no man who would be able to act as an arbiter in cases in which Christians were concerned, οὕτως οὐκ ένι ἐν υμῖν οὐδείς σοφός, δὲ δυνήσεται διακρίναι ἀνέ μέσον τοῦ ἄδελφον αὐτοῦ; Lightfoot nowhere touches on this passage (though, in his note on Gal. iii. 28, he cites James i. 17 as an instance of the denial of a possibility); but Hort refers to it in his note on James, and gives to the simple question "Is there no one among you who could act as an arbiter?" what seems to me the artificial and exaggerated shape, "Is it impossible that there should be among you, etc." He ends his note with the words, "There is no reason to think that ἐν ever becomes a bare equivalent of ἔστιν." I should rather say that, wherever ἐν is accompanied by a pleonastic ἐν, as in many of my citations, there ἐν may be replaced by ἔστιν. Compare the quotation from Herod. vi. 109 given above.

We have still to consider the passage from James i. 17 παρ' ὧν ἐνι παραλλαγῇ. Here ἐν is personal, having for its subject παραλλαγῇ, "In the father of lights there is no variation." This would be perfectly regular if παρά were replaced by ἐν. We have seen a similar irregularity in Soph. El. 1031, where Chrysothemis replies to her sister's taunt, σοι γὰρ ὄφελησις οὐκ ἐνι, with the retort, ἐνεστίν. ἀλλὰ σοι μάθησις οὐ πάρα. This use of παρά is not uncommon in the O.T., and is explained by Hort from the Hebrew
instinct of reverence, which preferred the expressions "in the presence of God," "with God," to "in God." He instances Psalms xxxvi. 10 παρὰ σοί πηγή ζωῆς, Psalm cxxx. 7 παρὰ τῷ Κυρίῳ τὸ ἔλεος καὶ πολλὴ παρὰ αὐτῷ λύτρωσις, etc. See the following quotation from Job, where μετά is equivalent to ἐν. 1

It may be worth while to cite here the instances of ἐν and its equivalents in the O.T. Job xxviii. 14 Ἀβουσσος εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνοστιν (al. ἔστιν) ἐν ἐμοὶ ἡ σοφία, καὶ θάλασσα εἶπεν οὐκ ἔνοστι μετ' ἐμοῖ, Sirac. xxxvii. 2 οὐχὶ λυπή ἐν ἔνος θανάτου φίλος τρεπόμενος εἰς ἕχθραν; "Is there not in it (friendship) a grief unto death, a friend changing to hatred?" 4 Mace. iv. 22 (where ἐν is impersonal) "He heard that the report of his death caused the greatest possible joy to the Jews (ὅτι ὡς ἐν χαϊροιεν).

J. B. Mayor.

1 On the construction of verbs compounded with prepositions, see Winer, Gr., pp. 529–540.