MODERN CHRISTIAN APOLOGETIC.

The power and vitality of the Christian religion are nowhere more manifest than in its adaptability to the changing intellectual conceptions of man. No doubt it is true that human nature remains the same in all places and at all times, and that it is to the fundamental needs of the human heart that the Christian message ultimately appeals. But the appeal, whatever be its objective, has to be cast in intelligible form, and that form must change with a changing mentality. The attempt to make this change, so far as it has meant a conscious process of adaptation, has been known by the not very suitable name of Apologetic. The name does not involve any such suggestion as that it is considered necessary to apologize for Christianity. It is rather accepted as a convenient general title covering numerous efforts to defend the faith, and to restate it in terms of current spiritual need and intellectual outlook. In theology it is that department which concerns itself with such diverse subjects as arguments for the Being of God, criticism of antitheistic, and anti-Christian systems, and the defence of the historicity and authenticity of the Christian records. It follows, therefore, that the study will be useful or otherwise according to the spirit and standpoint with which it is undertaken. If it merely means, as it too often does, the recital of stock theistic arguments, and the setting up and demolishing of theological men of straw, it will prove a very arid and even mischievous exercise. But if it means a reasoned attempt to distinguish between what is permanent and what is merely occasional in the Christian faith, to restate the Christian position in terms intelligible to the men of the time, and to meet the fresh attacks upon it with fresh dispositions both of offence
and defence, then it becomes not only a most necessary exercise but one that should be very fruitful in its results. To carry it out successfully will require not only that a man shall have a living and experimental knowledge of the Christian religion, and be fully acquainted with all its various phases and struggles in the past, but that he shall be extremely sensitive to all the changes in the intellectual atmosphere of the time in which he lives. Above all he must be free from dogmatic preconceptions and from the paralysing influence of that practical materialism which forms so large a constituent in the mental furniture of the present day.

For it will be generally conceded that the danger to which Christianity is exposed in these days is not that of any open attack, but rather of that impalpable thing called atmosphere. Agnosticism and atheism have both almost ceased to be militant, and, as aggressive forces, have become as much things of the past as that type of anti-Christian propaganda which found a first line of offence in the so-called "mistakes of Moses." Far more subtle and dangerous enemies than these are to be found in the spirit which is ready to accept all types of religion or none, and in the tone of mind which relegates everything spiritual to the realm of the unreal and derives all its standards of judgment from the things temporal and seen. It is always true that a man is very much as he believes, and that what he believes has everything to do with shaping and building up his life. Beliefs that lift a man very little higher than the average sentiment of society, and that are loosely and lazily held, will never produce great characters. Christians who are ready to eviscerate their religion of its deep moral content, who water down sin, and salvation and judgment, and who tend to substitute sentimentality for conviction, can do more to damage the faith than its most active and
open opponents. There is a practical atheism that confesses God with the lips and denies Him in the life, that is far more difficult to deal with than any denial of God based on theoretical and philosophical grounds. The temper of mind which assumes that God does nothing and is content to leave Him out of account in the reading of history and in the practical concerns of life is the characteristic feature of modern unbelief and needs to be met and combated at every turn. In order to accomplish this successfully it will be necessary for Theology to come down to the marketplace, and to concern herself, not merely with the problems of the schools, but with the needs of an average human nature.

The first difficulty that confronts us is as to what it is exactly that we have to conserve and defend. Christianity is a very wide term, and for the purposes of any effective apologetic it must be much more closely defined. Do we mean by it the whole body of doctrine which has at any time been accepted as Christian by the Church, or do we distinguish between the form and substance of the faith? Is it possible to arrive at any agreement as to what is fundamental to Christianity and must be preserved at all costs, and as to what may be regarded as but a temporary and accidental expression of the truth? Or again, how far can we make concessions to the time-spirit in any age without changing what ought not to be changed, and destroying the kernel while intending only to strip off its husk? The active discussion of these questions which is going on both in this country and in Germany has at least served to indicate the gravity of the problem involved, if it has not yet suggested any solution. The naturalistic world-view and the strict application of the critical and historical methods have sometimes been assumed to result in a reinterpretation of the Christian faith and the Person of its Founder which
strips both alike of what has hitherto been regarded as their fundamental characteristic. We are left with a religion which is only one among many others and has about it no elements of permanence other than theirs, and with a merely human Christ standing alongside Moses, Buddha and Mohammed, and contributing his element to man's religious development as they contributed theirs. Thus Christian theology is faced with the question as to whether Jesus Christ is the sole object of Christian faith or only its first subject.

In Germany the reaction against the extreme negative position is taking forms the variety of which indicates the confusion with which the subject is still surrounded. The general aim of the writers who set themselves to frame what they call a modern Positive Theology is to retain the fundamentals of the old Christian faith and express them in terms of modern thought. But just what these "fundamentals" are and just what constitutes "modern thought" they are by no means agreed. For example, Theodor Kaftan, in his Modern Theology of the Old Faith, finds in Kant the best representative of the new spirit and makes the "practical" character of religious knowledge and the independence of the gospel both of philosophy and theology fundamental points in determining what a modern Theology should be. At the same time he expresses the "old faith" in distinctly theological terms and tends to make of it a creed rather than a faith. On the other hand, men like Seeberg and Grützmacher seek the same end as Kaftan by a process of modernizing the old doctrinal systems without showing any of his hostility to metaphysics. They agree in affirming the theoretic and objective character of theological knowledge, and Grützmacher stoutly contends that faith and theology are inseparable. Seeberg, whilst he makes Christian doctrine but
an intellectual expression of the Christian life and experience, conceives that life too much in terms of mere feeling. Diverse as these positions are, the school which they represent has done good work in emphasising the necessity for some re-statement of the Christian position in terms of the modern mind, and in combating the view that this must lead to a denial of everything that is really distinctive in Christianity. The need for a positive rather than a critical or even merely historical exposition of Christianity is more urgent than ever it was.

We are still, however, faced with the problem as to what are the exact differentia of the Christian position. No real apologetic is possible unless we know and can state clearly what it is we have to defend, and what is the ultimate deposit of truth or fact beyond which we cannot go. Modern historical criticism has so far altered the balance of things that it is no longer justifiable to begin the defence of the faith by advocating a spiritual view of the universe, and by urging philosophical arguments for theism. These are useful and necessary in their place, but they are secondary to the main consideration, which is to establish the historical trustworthiness and present-day pertinence of the Christian appeal. And it needs always to be remembered that this appeal came to the world first neither as history nor as doctrine but as a gospel. There was a gospel at work among men before any of the New Testament was written, and it was the gospel or spoken word that was the cause of the written word and not vice versa. We have, therefore, to begin with the gospel and to beware of confounding it with the various later explanations and justifications historical or otherwise. The nature of this gospel must no doubt be studied mainly in the effects it produced, but there is no lack of material. For there is no denying the effectiveness of Christianity as a moral and spiritual force when it
first burst upon the world. In dealing with it we have to deal not merely with a theory but with a dynamic which can be felt and measured. The gospel came to men as a word of hope and power. It delivered them from age-long fears and mental oppressions, it read life to them in larger terms, renewed their moral energy, changed their perspective and brought God near. The familiar terms in which it was described, Word, Power, Life, were very characteristic, and were, all of them, abundantly justified. They appealed not so much to the philosophic mind as to the religious temper, and they found their first expression in character rather than in theorising. Just as behind all systems of physical science is the reality called life, so behind all theologies is the gospel, the datum from which they start and the fact which brings them into being. Long before they came to write the story of Him men had learnt to know what they called the "Spirit of Jesus" as a living and active force. However little we may be able to use their terminology, the experience to which they pointed is still familiar to us, and we, like them, may find the beginning of our religion in that personal contact with Jesus Christ which still means, as it always has meant, new life and peace for men.

Thus the process of verifying the Christian facts must be psychological as well as historical. This does not mean, however, that we may be content with a purely subjective view, and that the historicity of Jesus is a matter of indifference. It is true that there is much in the traditional story of the life of Jesus of which we cannot be sure, but this does not alter the fact that behind early Christian experience there is a Person and a life sufficiently great to have caused it and to have made it what it was. The important point for the moment, however, is as to the power of this Person over His followers, and as to the forms which His relation
to them assumed. What we want has been admirably set forth by Mr. T. R. Glover in his book on *The Conflict of Religions in the early Roman Empire*.¹ “Freedom from daemons, forgiveness and reconciliation with God, gladness and moral strength and peace in the Holy Spirit—of such things the early Christians speak and they associate them all invariably with one name, the living centre of all. . . . Jesus is pre-eminently and always the Saviour: the author of the new life: the revealer of God: the bringer of immortality. It made an immense impression on the ancient world to see the transformation of those whom it despised—women, artisans, slaves and even slave-girls. Socrates with the hemlock cup and the brave Thrasea were figures that men loved and honoured. But here were all sorts of common people doing the same thing as Socrates and Thrasea, cheerfully facing torture and death “for the name’s sake,”—and it was a name of contempt too. “Christ’s people”—Christianoi—was a base Latin improvisation by the people of Antioch, who were notorious in antiquity for impudent wit: it was a happy shot and touched the very centre of the target. “The name” and “His name” are constantly recurring phrases. But it was not only that men would die for the name—men will die for anything that touches their imagination or their sympathy—but they lived for it and showed themselves to be indeed a “new creation.” “Our Jesus” was the author of a new life and a very different one from that of the Hellenistic cities. That Christianity retained its own character in the face of the most desperate efforts of its friends to turn it into a philosophy congenial to the philosophies of the day, was the result of the strong hold it had taken upon innumerable simple people, who had found in it the power of God in the

¹ P. 161.
transformation of their own characters and instincts, and who clung to Jesus Christ—to the great objective facts of His incarnation and His death upon the cross—as the firm foundations laid in the rock against which the floods of theory might beat in vain.” To this testimony we may add that of Harnack ¹ to the same effect. “Behind and in the gospel stands the Person of Jesus Christ who mastered men’s hearts, and constrained them to yield themselves to Him as His own, and in whom they found their God. Theology attempted to describe in very uncertain and feeble outline what the mind and heart had grasped. Yet it testifies of a new life which, like all higher life, was kindled by a Person and could only be maintained by connexion with that Person.” Here, then, we reach what was central and paramount in the early Christian teaching. The worth and power of it have been evidenced again and again not merely by historical inquiry but by observation and experiment. Under certain conditions the Christian message makes its appeal to the universal human consciousness quite unerringly and independently of the thought-forms in which it may be cast. We have much to learn still from the psychological study of normal Christian experience, but already we know enough to understand that the Christian Gospel is a living and fruitful force in human life and that given free play its results may be reckoned upon. The gospel addresses itself to the whole personality, emotions, intellect and will, and works out in an ethical transformation of character that is both regular and distinctive. Its operation is to be distinguished from anything in the nature of sentimental illusion by the practical results produced. In the life of joyous confidence in God, freedom from the fear and condemnation of sin, and willing self-sacrifice and service which are characteristic of the Christian profession, we find the

¹ *History of Dogma*, vol. i., p. 113. Eng. trans.
The tendency thus indicated to appeal to experience is characteristic of modern thinking both in religion and philosophy. It is likely to prove effective in many ways, but at the same time it must be received with caution. It may easily be pressed to a point where it becomes too subjective and individual. While it provides valuable material for Christian Apologetic the material itself needs to be tested and classified before it can be used to any good purpose. The rule "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus," while it is not always applicable in regard to the intellectual expression or ecclesiastical organisation of religion, is much more applicable in regard to its psychological and experimental expression. As has already been said, human nature itself does not change greatly with the changing years and the religious fact or message which finds men under very varied conditions and produces fruit in life and character, has some prima facie right to be regarded as reasonable. The pragmatic test of the fruit borne is not one from which Christianity need shrink and its application in the case of the ethical results of Christian experience is never without effect. The familiar contention that the best evidence for Christianity is a Christian, and that it is useless to criticise Christianity till it has been tried in experience, has a certain scientific importance. When it can be demonstrated on a large scale, as, e.g., in the missionary enterprises of the modern church, it leads to an accumulation of material which has a very high evidential value when it is properly weighed. All the same, however, great care must be taken not to press arguments of this kind unduly. It is much to be able to discover in the history of religious experience the naturalness and universality of religious ideas. This may give us a presumption of their truth, but it gives us no more.
The psychology of religion can do nothing to establish the truth of religious beliefs. It needs to be supplemented always by metaphysic and by the appeal to reason. There is an immediate and intuitional appeal in religious experience that is of the utmost value to the individual, but is without any universal validity. The moment it comes to be explained or stated it involves some form of intellectual theory, and this has to be judged on its merits. Part of the merit, no doubt, is the result which it produces in experience, and it is always useful in this way to realise how creed and life act and react the one upon the other. We are forced to conclude, therefore, that experience in religion can give us a method, but that it cannot give us proofs. But here the method is half the battle. We begin with the facts, facts not of history merely, for these are always more or less elusive, but of experience—of a life lived and a duty done. It is on the basis of these that we must begin to build our edifice of proof, and they will supply us with much of our material. Christian theology should never be a mere war of words or discussion of theories. The processes of observation and experiment are as necessary to it as they are to any of the natural sciences, and the inquirer must keep in touch with his facts all the time if he is not to lose himself in a mist of vain speculation. At the same time he must recognise in them only material to be used. He must be prepared to exchange his psychology for a metaphysic and boldly to launch out on the inferences which his facts justify, and on the theories needed to justify them. Even if it be possible to conclude on psychological grounds that religion is natural to man, and that the Christian religion is the most adapted to human needs, that is only to lay the foundation of the work which the apologist has to do.

It is thus the extent to which men are able to objectify the facts of Christian experience that justifies them in
finding in these facts the ground and norm of their Christian belief. In the light of them it becomes at once possible and necessary to re-read the great Christian dogmas and to rediscover the bases of religious authority. For example, the theistic argument can never be complete so long as it is stated as an exercise for the schools and left unrelated to the needs and experiences of the human soul. So again to rely on the authority and inspiration of Scripture is not necessarily to escape the charge of subjectivity. For there is no real authority in Scripture apart from the extent to which it "finds" and speaks to the human spirit and human needs. In the development of Christian doctrine also experience has played a very large part, and ultimately it is in its appeal to experience that its objective validity consists. There is at least one direction in which this principle is being pressed at the present time, and in which it is calculated to do good service from the apologetic point of view, namely, in regard to the modern tendency to exaggerate the view of God as immanent in the universe. This itself is in answer to the undue emphasis laid on His transcendence with its necessary result in removing Him from any intimate touch with human nature or with mundane things. It is good that this should be corrected, but it cannot be corrected by being done away with. A god both transcendent and immanent may be a speculative necessity, but he is also much more. Only such an one can answer the needs of the religious consciousness and moral nature of man. Neither deism nor pantheism, whatever may be said for them on intellectual grounds, have it in their power to satisfy the moral conscience and spiritual aspirations of mankind, and no conception of God which fails here can in the long run hold the field. The modern conception of personality as not necessarily involving finitude but manifesting itself as "the form of an infinite content," allows us to speak of
God even as immanent in personal terms. But the Christian thought of God cannot rest here. It is not as a mere influence or tendency, however great, that He appeals to us, but as a Person who shows Himself in character and will, with whom we have affinities but by whom we are dominated. In this connexion it may be well to note that type of psychological and experimental apologetic which has become familiar to us in the teaching of Eucken. This points, on the one hand, to a type of universal religion which rests on our independent spiritual life in the world, the expression of a transcendent spiritual activity: and on the other to a characteristic religion which makes the unfolding and development of this spiritual life dependent on a definite religious belief. In other words, both the function and justification of religion are discovered through its relation to life, which is always to be interpreted as the home or sphere of spiritual activities.

On the more strictly philosophical side the task of the Christian Apologist is by no means so difficult as it has often been in the past. Fifty years ago it was almost taken for granted that no other than a materialistic view of the universe was possible. There was nothing surprising in this. The rapid growth of physical science and the vivid and practical appeal which it presents to the senses made it easy for men to believe that it accounted for everything, and that outside its range there was nothing worth a moment's consideration. So it came about that a scientific view of things became identical with a materialistic view, in the sense that matter was held to contain in itself the promise and potency of all life. But closer investigation and more profound reflection have brought about a change. It has been recognised that all speculation about the ultimate nature and constitution of the Universe is philosophical whether the terms used be those of the physical sciences or
not. Even the so-called materialistic explanations leave the problem for philosophy just where it was. The larger the place assigned to matter in the constitution of things the more necessary does it become to inquire into the constitution of matter itself. Physics lead inevitably to a metaphysic, and the interesting fact in the present situation is that the physicists themselves have made the discovery and are, as it were, shivering on the brink of the new world to which their speculations and theories have introduced them. The very matter with which they deal, instead of being the simple background of the Universe, is seen to be itself almost infinitely divisible. The atoms of which it was said to be composed are themselves not the final datum of analysis, but bodies of a highly complex order. In the recent work of Professors Larmor and J. J. Thomson it is almost impossible to say where physics end and a metaphysic begins. The atoms and electrons with which they deal are really metaphysical creations arrived at by the method of hypothesis rather than by actual observation or experiment. In their theories there is no doubt much that is open to criticism from the point of view of the physicist, but what we are concerned with here is the fact that these purely scientific speculations as to the composition of matter seem to justify if they do not demand a philosophical view of the Universe. Indeed, it may be said that if some of the theories current among modern physicists were pressed to their logical conclusions, they would lead to a rather advanced form of critical idealism. Those, therefore, who seek to justify a view of the Universe other than that of the materialist have not now to fight, as once they had, for bare standing ground. Their right to make good their claim is conceded to them beforehand.

None the less, however, both philosophers and theologians are compelled to recognise that the scientific method has
come to stay and must regulate for the future both their arguments and investigations. But they must beware of confusing method with results, and they must be ready to accept the obvious limitations of the scientific point of view. When Professor James says,¹ "The aspiration to be scientific is such an idol of the tribe to the present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it, and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided subjective interest which it is": he is uttering a much needed warning and pointing out a very real danger. Science deals after all with only one aspect of truth, and in so far as her method is limited to the treatment of experience, of causal connexions and of phenomena, she tends to set problems rather than solve them. Under these limitations, however, the scientific method holds the field for the moment, and the modern theologian may find in it a powerful weapon ready to his hand. Among the first effects of it is the discovery that religion, like all other phenomena, has a history, and that its history is but another illustration of the working of the law of development. Anthropology and the comparative study of religions stand now at the threshold of any reasonable theological system and present us with data of immense value which have to be taken into account. They can no longer be regarded as more or less inconvenient addenda to a theological course of study. They stand rather for a point of view the neglect of which will vitiate every theological system. With all the reconstruction they may involve they are yet able to contribute elements of a positive kind. Primitive anthropology, while it enables us to trace religion back to its earliest forms, shows us at the same time that it is something natural to man, springing out of his

deem needs, and profoundly affecting the whole course of
his development. The study of comparative religions
helps us to realise the fundamental and universal character
of the religious impulse in spite of the immense variety in
its forms of manifestation. Both in its primitive as well
as in its more highly developed phases, religion stands for
a composite of ideas and emotions more or less conducive
to action. It can best be studied perhaps in the various
forms of action to which it gives rise, and it is not without
significance that this action should be found to be closely
allied to the instincts of social advancement and racial self-
preservation. The apologist is not greatly concerned with
the disputes of anthropologists as to the origins of religious
ideas and as to the right nomenclature of primitive religious
conceptions. These things belong to method, and though
they have an interest and importance of their own, they do
not greatly affect the results with which he has to do. Nor,
on the other hand, does he share the popular feeling as to the
stigma attaching to the anthropomorphism of primitive
religions, or to the superstitions which gather round the
belief in spirits, or the idea of an “unknown without.” He
has long since abandoned the notion that a lowly origin
detracts from the value of anything. A mother does not
think any the worse of her grown son because he was once
a puling babe. In the same way no reasonable man will
accord to religion any less respect or belief because it can
be traced back to animism or fetishism and the like.
The essential point to note is that these things have in them
the possibility of higher forms of life. They do not, as it
were, represent merely blind gropings in the dark but the
effort of an age to adapt itself to a light that grows with its
capacity to receive it and to see by it. The study of the
development of religious ideas not only in their intrinsic
truth, but in their value for the moral and social advance-
ment of the race, serves still farther to indicate how they occupy a legitimate and essential place in the human mind and in human experience. Nor is such a study really open to the reproach of being merely subjective in its results. Nothing is more certain than that, in its broader aspects and relations, religion is among the most powerful of all the factors that make for the progress of mankind. It is not only that it advances *pari passu* with the general advancement, but that it is itself a main cause in furthering the onward movement. It supplies the most powerful motives for human action, and tends to safeguard social well-being. In order to discover this it is no doubt necessary to take wide views and to abandon any expectation of finding a smooth and intermittent course of development in human history. Progress is often by reaction as well as by action, and much ground has to be covered and many data gathered before its course can be traced. But a truly scientific treatment of the data under observation makes it abundantly plain that in the religious phenomena of human history we have a body of truths which are not to be put down either to fraud or illusion, but are an essential part of man’s equipment for life and work.

But the application of the historical method to religion involves certain dangers against which the inquirer needs to be warned. It can only be carried out successfully if it is kept free from dogmatic presuppositions, and if the facts with which it deals are suffered to tell their own tale. It must beware of mistaking mere resemblances between various religious types for organic relations, and it must avoid the danger of turning hypotheses into dogmas. The history of religious thought abounds in illustrations of these errors. In this field it is almost impossible to find an unbiassed investigator, so profoundly are men affected by their own religious or anti-religious feelings and prejudices. And
on the other hand, the most acute and open-minded observers are never quite free from the danger of being ensnared by their own cleverness. Some quite brilliant hypothesis framed to account for a certain set of phenomena, and justified so far as those phenomena are concerned, may easily be stretched too far until it becomes a source of obscurity rather than of light. Recent eschatological interpretations of the work of Jesus Christ may be cited as a case in point. Within certain limits these are very highly suggestive and fruitful, but they are sometimes pressed so far as to become most misleading. The first necessity for scientific historical inquiry is the open mind and the willingness to believe that "there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy." And in dealing with religion the necessity is greatest, because there is the greatest danger of prejudice and theorising. This fact itself affords strong testimony to the imperious power of the religious instinct in the heart of man.

The problem with which we are concerned, therefore, is the recognition and interpretation of what is normal in religious consciousness and experience: and the method of dealing with it must be psychological as well as historical. The religious phenomena which history brings under review need themselves to be interpreted by being brought into relation to the needs and nature of humanity, and this can only be done by some process of psychological analysis and classification. The danger of this process is the tendency to lay undue stress either on individual experience on the one hand, or on the abnormalities of the collective religious experience of races or nations. The problem can only be dealt with satisfactorily by keeping a due balance between individual experience and the study of historic religions. As both of these alike seem to point to the existence of certain permanent factors in the religious development of the race,
we arrive at material with which the psychologist may deal with some hope of success. Here many difficulties will be avoided by maintaining the position of the newer psychology as to the unity of the mind and as to the difficulty of dividing it up into compartments and functions which may be supposed to exist and act independently of one another. In the religious consciousness no doubt will, feeling, and intelligence are all operative. But they are not separate and mutually exclusive factors, and it is by no means always possible to identify their action. They have to be supplemented also by the action of the subconscious mind, which is an element of increasing importance for the religious as well as for many other aspects of the human consciousness. But without entering further into the complex questions here indicated we may confidently assert that psychological study of the phenomena of religious consciousness points yet more and more persistently to the fact that religion is not merely the product of environment or social custom or tradition, but that it is a normal and necessary expression of man’s inner life and has its roots in his very nature and being as man. Such considerations as these provide a standing ground for the defence of religion the strength of which is more easily recognised than that of one which rests on logical or ontological arguments alone.

But, as has already been suggested, we cannot stop here. The metaphysical side of apologetics is not so entirely discredited as would sometimes seem to be the case. The familiar ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments, if stated in the newer terminology and confined strictly to their proper sphere, still remain valid, and offer suggestions which no student of the subject can afford to ignore. The difficulty in regard to them, however, is that they involve very large assumptions and that it is necessary to do a good deal of preliminary work before we can claim the right to
occupy the ground which they may be said to cover. As Professor Ward 1 says, "The notion of building up a metaphysic without presuppositions, one that shall start from nothing and explain all, is futile." It may be argued without much fear of contradiction that our knowledge of the finite as finite involves presuppositions which lead us up from Nature to God. But this is only one way by which we can reach the goal, and it is not always the first or the best. Feeling and experience as well as cognition have their part to play, and by the due balance and co-operation of them all do we attain the desired end. In the universality, persistence and progress of religion on the one hand, and in the spiritual interpretation of man and of the Universe on the other, do we find our justification of the faith that is "the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen."

W. B. SELBIE.

NOTE ON THE ELEPHANTINÉ PAPYRI.

I have to thank both Mrs. Lewis and Mr. Cook for the courteous tone of their contributions to this discussion. The suggestion that the Elephantiné papyri are forgeries is scarcely paradoxical, since Mr. Belleli impugned the authenticity of the Sayce-Cowley documents shortly after their appearance, and was encouragingly reviewed in the Literarisches Zentralblatt.

My objection to Papyrus 8 is not that its language is mixed, but that it is mixed with modern languages, chiefly modern Persian, a dialect the beginnings of which come well within the Christian era. I will justify this statement, since Mr. Cook appears to have misunderstood its bearing.

1. In line 17 occur the words hinduwānah zarnikh

1 The Realm of Ends, p. 225.