drunk, sometimes he justifies him in being drunk; his wisdom is maintained in each event. He also has an evasive explanation of Noah’s planting, on the line that God is the real planter, who plants the Cosmos. The coincidence between the Odist and Philo in the description of drunkenness as madness which takes away the mind, should be noted.

May we then say that it is in this direction that we must look for the explanation of the passages which follow in which the Odist explains his escape from the witchcraft of the deceivers who invite men to the banquet and give them to drink of the wine of their intoxication, and affirms that “he was made wise so as not to fall into the hands of the deceiver”? Perhaps, however, we are now moving too fast and too far. So at this point I rein in my steeds. The points which appear to come out of our discussion of the opening verses of the 38th Ode are these:

(i) That the Odist is sailing in a ship (the Light of Truth) to a haven of salvation.

(ii) That the original Ode was in Aramaic and not in Greek:

(iii) That the ship is imagined to be the ark, and the voyager to be either Noah himself or some one who shares Noah's experiences.

J RENDEL HARRIS.

THE HELLENISTIC ATMOSPHERE OF THE EPISTLE OF JAMES.

The more difficult problems of New Testament Introduction are often complicated by the varied character of the evidence brought to bear upon them. A large number of separate arguments are adduced, none of them, perhaps, particularly cogent, and the general impression left is one of sheer be-
wilderment. A greater advance would be made if a less ambitious task were attempted. When the data are elusive, it seems advisable to be content with one step at a time. If certain definite positions can be established, they are sure to invalidate others which have had a place in the discussion, and thus the ground will be steadily cleared.

This is the standpoint adopted in the present investigation. No assumptions are made as to the author of the Epistle. Certain of its prominent phenomena are recognised, and an attempt is made to arrive at their proper interpretation.

All scholars, whatever be their critical standpoint, are agreed as to the high level attained by the writer in the matter of language and style. The Epistle "is written," says so competent an authority as Professor J. B. Mayor, "in strong, simple Greek, used with no slight rhetorical skill" (Ep. of James 3, p. cclxii.). And he proceeds to argue convincingly that the work bears no trace of being a translation. The writer's idiomatic and expressive use of the Greek language prepares us for a feature in the Epistle, which is more impalpable, and yet no less conspicuous. That feature is its general atmosphere and milieu. We do not for a moment leave out of sight its obvious Old Testament background. Nor do we wish to minimise its well-marked connexions with the Rabbinic teaching, and with such products of Palestinian Judaism as the Wisdom of the Son of Sirach and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs. But we desire to emphasise its remarkable affinities with Hellenistic Judaism, as embodied in the writings of Philo, and the Wisdom of Solomon, as well as to estimate the hints which it affords of some touch with the Hellenic spirit which had left its impress upon these Jewish works. Our evidence is, to a large extent, drawn from the splendid collection of illustrative material provided by Professor
Mayor's Commentary (Ed. 3), supplemented from F. Spitta's *Zur Geschichte und Litteratur des Urchristentums*, Bd. ii., pp. 14–155, and Siegfried's *Philo von Alexandria*, pp. 310–314. The quotations from Philo are given according to the paragraphs of Cohn and Wendland's edition, so far as that has appeared. Otherwise, the references are to the pages of Mangey.

A significant fact may first be noted. The quotations from the Old Testament in the Epistle agree with the text of the LXX, even when that differs from the Hebrew; e.g., in iv. 6: ὁ θεὸς ἀντιτάσσεται, ταπεινῶν δὲ δίδωσιν χάριν, which is by no means a literal translation of the Hebrew text of Proverbs iii. 34. The only variant in the LXX is κύριος, which, like ὁ θεός in James, translates the Hebrew pronoun נ. Θεὸς is also read in this quotation by Clement of Alexandria and Eusebius, while a good many cursives in James iv. 6 read κύριος. In James ii. 11 the seventh commandment is placed before the sixth, an order which corresponds with the text of B in the LXX of Exodus xx. 13, 15, and with that of Philo in *De Decal.*, chapters 24–25. The quotation of Genesis xv. 6 in James ii. 23 (a passage, by the way, to which Philo has at least a dozen references) is of special interest. The text of Ν and Β is not extant for this section, but A reads: καὶ ἐπίστευσεν Ἄβραμ (not in the Hebrew) τῷ θεῷ. James reads: ἐπίστευσεν δὲ Α., with Philo (*De Mutat. Nom.*, 177), two cursives of LXX, Paul (Rom. iv. 3), Clement of Rome, and Justin Martyr. In this same verse of James it is said of Abraham: φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη. The reference is to Genesis xviii. 17, where the LXX (A) reads: Ἄβραμ τοῦ παιδὸς μου. Philo quotes the words (*De Sobriet.* 56) as Ἄβραμ τῷ φίλου μου, in agreement with James ii. 23. These phenomena certainly suggest a Hellenistic rather than a Palestinian environment,
Even a cursory perusal of the Greek text of the Epistle reveals some features of rare occurrence in the literature of the New Testament. In chapter iii. 6, e.g., the tongue is described as setting on fire τὸν τροχὸν τῆς γενέσεως. It may be difficult to find an entirely adequate translation for the phrase, but in any case it seems strangely un-Jewish. The noun γένεσις occurs in the New Testament only in this passage, in i. 23, and in the nativity-narratives of Matthew and Luke. In these latter places it has the meaning which constantly belongs to it in the LXX, "birth" or "origin." In the LXX there is also common the easily derivable sense of "family" or even "generation." But in the Wisdom of Solomon a more abstract significance appears. In i. 14: σωτήριον αἱ γενέσεις τοῦ κόσμου, it seems to mean "kinds of being" (see Grimm ad loc.). In vii. 5 it can only denote "natural life." This is a sense already current in Plato, e.g., Timae. 29 D : λέγομεν δὴ, δὲ ἡμών αἰτήν αἱ γένεσις καὶ τὸ πᾶν τὸ δὲ ἡ ξυνιστάς ξυνέστησις. It is largely developed by Philo, who uses γένεσις repeatedly for "material being," or, "the sphere of material being," as contrasted with that unseen, eternal existence which belongs to God. A good example is De Posterit. Cain. 29: θεοῦ μὲν ἵδιον ήρεμία καὶ στάσις, γενέσεως δὲ μετάβασις τε καὶ μεταβατικὴ πάσα κίνησις. This more or less abstract sense belongs to the two instances of the word in James. But the association of γένεσις with τροχὸς in iii. 6 emphasises the influence of a Hellenistic atmosphere. Philo uses τροχὸς metaphorically in De Somn. ii. 44 : "the cycle and wheel (κύκλον καὶ τροχὸν) of unending necessity." A remarkable connecting link between this phrase and that of James is the passage quoted by Mayor from Simplicius on Aristotle, De Caelo, ii. 1, p. 91: τῷ τῆς εἰμαρμένης τε καὶ γενέσεως τροχῷ. And equally illuminating is the comment of Proclus on Plato's Timaeus,
v. 330 A: μία σωτηρία ψυχής, τοῦ κύκλου τῆς γενέσεως ἀπαλλάττουσα. Here the references have apparently in view the Orphic conception of a cycle of metempsychosis. That Philo should have been acquainted with this notion is thoroughly probable in the light of the researches of Bréhier, which show the influence upon him of the Neo-Pythagoreans, who carried on the Orphic tradition (Les Idées Philosophiques et Religieuses de Philon d’Alexandrie, pp. 23, 39 ff., 90 f., 165). It is needless to suppose that the author of the Epistle was in any direct sense moving within this circle of ideas; but even if we take the phrase in its most general sense, and interpret it as “the cycle (or, course) of material existence,” we cannot mistake the region of culture with which he must have been familiar.

Another incidental expression opens out a similar vista. After warning those exposed to temptations against attributing them to God, and showing that desire (ἐπιθυμία) is the agent in all temptation (i. 13–16), the author urges that to God must be ascribed, on the contrary, all good gifts, and he designates God (ver. 17) as “the Father of lights (τῶν φῶτων) with whom there cannot be παράλλαγή ἡ τροπὴ ἀποσκίασμα.” “Lights” must refer here to the heavenly bodies, which, in their brightness, reflect the character of God who is their source. We may compare a remarkable passage in Philo (who constantly likens the sun to “the Father and ruler of all,” e.g. De Somn. i. 73): “God (De Somn. i. 75) is light, and not only light, but also the archetype of every other light” (παντὸς ἐτέρου φωτὸς ἀρχέτυπον). In view of this context it is natural to interpret the terms παράλλαγη and τροπή with reference to the alterations of the heavenly bodies. Such an interpretation receives some colour from a passage in the Wisdom of Solomon, a book which, as we shall see, had an unquestion-
able influence upon our author. *Wisd.* vii. 17, 18: "Himself gave me . . . to know . . . the operation of the elements . . . the alternations of the solstices (τροπών ἀλλαγάς) and the changes of seasons" (μεταβολὰς καῦρων). Spitta presses this explanation, basing a strong argument on the well-known "Book of the Courses of the Luminaries of Heaven" (*Eth. Enoch*, ed. Charles, chaps. 72–75). He would interpret τροπή of the circuitous course described in *Enoch* as traversed by the sun, moon, and stars, from east to west, and from west to east, at certain positions of which their light becomes invisible and gives place to darkness. It is quite probable that this range of ideas lies in the background of the writer’s mind. But I thoroughly agree with Mayor that the real elucidation of τροπή is reached by way of Philo. Philo, of course, knows the astronomical usage (see, e.g., *Quis Rer. Div.* 149, and cf. Bréhier, *op. cit.* pp. 162–170); but for him τροπή has a highly technical sense which it is somewhat difficult adequately to analyse. It may be said to designate the mutability which belongs to all created beings as opposed to the unchangeableness of God, as, e.g. in *Legg. Alleg.* ii. 33: "the whole of created being must necessarily change (τρέπεσθαι), for this is its property, even as unchangeableness (τὸ ἀτρεπτὸν εἶναι) belongs to God." But in the entire context of this passage (e.g., §§ 19–70), τροπή is closely connected with the subordination of the mind (νοῦς) to mere sensation (αἰσθησις). This subordination issues in evil. Hence Philo can assert (*op. cit.* 34) that ἡ τροπή is the destruction of the soul (δέλερος ψυχῆς). Thus, Noah’s sin of drunkenness is described as τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς τροπῆ (op. cit. 62).

But James has just been dealing with the psychology of temptation. Desire (ἐπιθυμία), which he describes as an enticing force (διελεύξειν, a word employed by Philo, as we shall see, in this very connexion), plainly associated
with external stimuli (perhaps \textit{aiσθήσεις}?), leads to sin. Sin, when its power of fulfilling its functions is matured (\textit{ἀποτελεσθείσα}), produces death. I can scarcely think it a mere coincidence that in \textit{Legg. Alleg. ii. 63} Philo speaks of the soul \textit{ὅς μὴ τρέπεσθαι} \textit{μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων, ἁμαρτάνειν}, “not merely turning but also sinning by means of actually accomplished effects.” Now the whole discussion which culminates in James i. 17–18 has turned on the blessedness of the man who uses his trials and temptations for testing and confirming his character. When he has become approved (\textit{δόκιμος}), he shall receive the crown of life (ver. 12). Is it without bearing on the affinity for which we are arguing that in the context to which reference has so frequently been made Philo eulogises “the unchangeable (\textit{ἄτρεπτον}) and fire-tested (\textit{πεπυρωμένον}) and approved (\textit{δόκιμον}) nature” (\textit{op. cit. 67})? The interpretation of the passage may now be stated concisely. God is in Himself unclouded light. Any shadow that darkens human life is cast by its own changing. Possibly the author may have some consciousness of the heavenly bodies in the language he employs, but it can hardly be doubted, that the usual connotation of the term \textit{τροπή} in Philo has been regulative for his thought.

The two passages which have been discussed strikingly exemplify a strain which may be traced throughout the Epistle. We shall give instances. Chapter i. 2, 3: “Count it pure joy when ye light upon divers trials, knowing that the testing (or, proved character, \textit{τὸ δοκίμων}) of your faith worketh out endurance.” It is certainly possible to find in these words a reminiscence of \textit{Wisd. iii. 5, 6}: “Having borne a little discipline, they shall receive great benefits, because God tried (\textit{ἐπείρασεν}) them, and found them worthy of himself: as gold in the furnace he proved (\textit{ἐδοκίμασεν}) them.” This is made all the more likely by
the remarkable affinity between the whole context of James i. 1–8 and various passages in *Wisdom*.

Verses, 4, 5: “Let endurance have her perfect (τέλειον) work, that ye may be perfect (τέλειοι) and complete. But if any of you lack wisdom, let him ask of God.” Cf. *Wisd.* ix. 6: “Even if a man be perfect (τέλειος) among the sons of men, yet if the wisdom that cometh from thee be wanting, he shall be held in no account.” Vv. 6–8: “But let him ask in faith, nothing doubting . . . . Let not that man suppose that he shall receive anything from the Lord, a double-minded man.” Cf. *Wisd.* i. 1–3: “In singleness of heart seek him: because he is found of them that tempt him not, he is manifested to them that do not distrust him. For crooked thoughts separate from God.”

The phrase τέλειοι καὶ ὀλόκληροι in James i. 4 is very significant for our investigation. The testing of faith, by trial, James declares, produces endurance (ὑπομονή), which Philo describes (*De Congr. Erud. Gr.* 37) as the “sovereign and queenly virtue (δεσποινὴς . . . καὶ βασιλίδος ἀρετῆς).” “But let endurance have her perfect (τέλειον) result, that ye may be τέλειοι καὶ ὀλόκληροι.” Already in Stoic usage τέλειος was the designation of the noble man διὰ τὸ μηθερίας ἀπολείπεσθαι ἀρετῆς (*Stob. Ecl.* ii. 198). Possibly the influence of Stoicism may account, as in so many other instances (see Bréhier, *op. cit.* pp. 250–259), for the constant use by Philo of the verb τέλειοῦν and its cognates in portraying the struggle of the pious man with evil, e.g. *De Somn.* i. 131: ψυχή . . . τέλειῳδείσα ἐν ἄθλοις ἀρετῶν. The τέλειος, the man who has attained the highest reach of virtue, he frequently contrasts with the προκόπτων (the man who is advancing), and, what is specially interesting for our passage, again and again associates τέλειος with ὀλόκληρος, as, e.g., *De Abr.* 47: ὁ μὲν γὰρ τέλειος ὀλόκληρος ἐξ ἀρχῆς.
Striking parallels are found in Philo to James i. 5: “Let him ask from God that giveth to all men unconditionally (ἀπλῶς) and upbraideth not.” Cf. especially De Cherub. 123: “God is not a seller, lowering the price of his goods, but a generous giver of all things, not desiring any return” (ἀμοιβής οὐκ ἐφιέμενος), and De Migrat. Abr. 121.

James i. 11: “Let the humble brother glory in his exaltation, but the rich in his humiliation, for as the blossom (ἄνθος) of the grass he shall pass away. . . . So also shall the rich man fade (μαρανθησεται) in his ways.” Cf. Philo, De Spec. Leg. i. 311: “Let God alone be thy boast . . . and pride not thyself either on riches or fame or leadership . . . reckoning that these things have a swift crisis of change, fading (μαρανόμενα) before they had securely blossomed (ἀνθησαται). This parallel may be no more than a coincidence, but James i. 13 reveals a deeper affinity. “Let no man when he is tempted say, I am tempted by God. For God cannot be tempted by evil things, and he himself tempteth no one.” Philo, Legg. Alleg. ii. 78, in the very same context which we have already seen to be influential for James i. 17, observes how “the mind, when it sins and becomes detached from virtue, accuses the Divine (τὰ θεῖα), attributing its own turning (τροπῆν) to God.” But God “has no participation in evil” (De Cherub. 86). “He alone . . . is blessed, without share in any evil (παντὸς μὲν ἀμέτοχος κακοῦ), full of what is perfectly good” (ἀγαθὸν τελεῖν, De Spec. Leg. ii. 53). This last quotation clearly recalls the transition between James i. 13 and i. 17. That connexion is even more strikingly brought out in De Spec. Leg. i. 224, where God is described as “having no mixture of evil (ἀμηνή κακῶν), generously bestowing good gifts (τὰ ἀγαθὰ δωροῦμενον).”

But we must return to the thought of i. 14. “Each is tempted, being allured and enticed (ἐξελκόμενος καὶ
δελεαξόμενος) by his own desire (ἐπιθυμίας).” Philo, like James in this verse, compares ήδονή to a courtesan (ἐταιρίς) who entices (δελεάσασα) the mind and gets it under her sway (De Opif. Mundi, 165, 166). Some passages are very suggestive for our investigation. E.g., Quis. Rer. Div. Heres, 270: “Desire, having a luring (δικόν) power . . . compels the pursuit, etc.”; De Agricult. 103: “There is no living creature which is not enticed and lured (δελεασθὲν εἰλκυσταί) by pleasure, and entangled in her nets of many meshes”; and Omn. Prob. Lib. 22: πρὸς ἑπιθυμίας ἐλαύνεται ἡ ὑφ' ἠδονῆς δελεάζεται. The simile is somewhat daringly continued by James in ver. 15: “Then desire, having conceived (συλλαβοῦσα), gives birth to (τίκτει) sin, and sin, when its powers have been matured (ἀποτελεσθεῖσα) brings forth as its offspring (ἀποκύει) death.” Philo, in his more abstract discussion, moves in the same circle of ideas. For, speaking of sensation, which is the temptress of the mind, he says: “She conceives (συλλαβοῦσα) and becomes pregnant (ἐγκύμων) and straightway is in travail (ὡδίνει) and gives birth to (τίκτει) the greatest of the evils of the soul” (De Cherub. 57).

We have already examined an important part of the content of i. 17, but there are still one or two relevant observations to be made. James has warned his readers against ascribing any evil experiences in their lives to God. “Every good gift (δόσις ἀγαθή) and every perfect boon (δώρημα τέλεων) is from above, descending from the Father of lights.” Here it is instructive to notice a distinction which Philo also emphasises, that between δόσις and δώρημα. Cf. De Cherub. 84: τὰ μὲν χάριτος μέσης ἡξιώται, ἡ καλεῖται δόσις, τὰ δὲ ἀμείνονος, ἡς δοῦμα οἰκεῖον δωρεά. Obviously the choice of the epithets ἀγαθή and τέλεων in James corresponds precisely to the shade of distinction indicated by Philo. The main thought of the passage occurs fre
quently in the latter, e.g., *De Decal.* 176: θεός . . . μόνων ἄγαθῶν αἴτιος, κακοὶ δὲ οὐδενός; and *De Sacrif. Ab. et Caini,* 57: “Perfect and complete (διὸκλήρου καὶ παντελειῶς) are all the gifts (δωρεῖς) of the uncreated one.”

In i. 18 James summarises the aim of the new life imparted to Christians in the statement, “that we should be a sort of firstfruits (ἀπαρχῆν τίνα) of his creatures.” A very noteworthy parallel occurs in Philo which we can scarcely avoid connecting with this passage. Speaking of the Jews, he declares that “they were assigned out of the whole human race as a sort of firstfruits (οἰα τις ἀπαρχή) to their Creator and Father” (*De Constitut. Princ. M.* ii. p. 366). Here is a comparison of the “new Israel” to the old by means of the same rare metaphor.

The simile of the mirror in i. 23, although not found in the Old Testament or, apparently, in Palestinian Jewish literature, is, of course, one that might occur to a Jewish writer quite independently. But it is worth while observing that it is extraordinarily common in Philo, who, in employing it, usually wishes to emphasise that not the object itself but only a picture of it is thus seen (see especially J. Weiss in Meyer on 1 Cor. xiii. 12). Such a suggestion, however, is not discernible in *Vita Mosis,* ii. (iii). 139: ἵνα καὶ αὐτὸς οἷα πρὸς κατοπτρον αὐγάζῃ τὸν ἰδιον νοῦν. This passage has an interesting parallel in the apophthegm of Blos (in Stobaeus, *Flor.* 21. 11): θεώρει ὁσπέρ ἐν κατόπτρῳ τὰς σαυτοῦ πράξεις ἵνα τὰς μὲν καλὰς ἐπικοσμῆς, τὰς δὲ αἰσχρὰς καλύπτῃς. And they both indicate the Hellenistic background of the metaphor as used by James.

We may consider together the remarkable descriptions of the New Law in i. 25, ii. 8, and ii. 12: (a) νόμον τέλειον τὸν τῆς ἐλευθερίας (=νόμον ἐλευθερίας of ii. 12); (b) νόμον βασιλικῶν. In the first of these it is easy to trace a certain affinity with Paulinism. But νόμος in any form is more or less
alien to the Pauline standpoint. So the more immediate atmosphere of the phrase is probably to be found in Hellenism. Cf., e.g., Epictetus, Diss. 4. 1. 13: "This path (i.e. obedience to the Divine will) leads to freedom, this alone is deliverance from slavery." Philo supplies the link of connexion between such a saying and that of the Epistle. In Quod Omn. Prob. Lib. (M. ii. p. 452), in a context closely resembling this of James, he declares: "Of those men in whose lives anger and desire or any other passion . . . holds sway, all are slaves, ὡσοι δὲ μετὰ νόμον ξώσιν ἐλευθεροί." The second passage is aptly illustrated by Poster. Cain. 101, 102: "The way which leads to him (i.e. God), inasmuch as it belongs to a king, has rightly been called royal (βασιλική). . . This royal way . . . the law calls the utterance and word of God."

There can be little doubt that the references in chapters ii. and v. to the oppression of the poor by the rich are more or less coloured by a recollection of the famous passage in Wisd. ii. 10-20. Cf. e.g., James ii. 6: ὄψις οἱ πλούσιοι καταδυναστεύουσιν ὑμῶν with Wisd. ii. 10: καταδυναστεύσωμεν πένητα δίκαιον; and James v. 6: κατεδικάσατε, ἑφονεύσατε τὸν δίκαιον with Wisd. ii. 20: θανάτῳ ἁγχύμοι καταδικάσωμεν αὐτόν (i.e. the δίκαιος of ver. 18).

Mention may be made, in passing, of the suggestive parallel in Philo to James ii. 13: "Judgment is without pity to him that showed no pity: pity glories over judgment." Cf. Quod Deus sit Immut. 76: "Not only after judging does he pity, but also after pitying he judges: for pity is a higher thing with him than judgment." The connexion, in each case, between the two clauses is certainly significant.

In chap. iii. 3 f. the metaphors call for some attention. The main point to be established by the comparisons introduced seems to be that control of the tongue, which is
apparently so insignificant a part of the organism, really means control of the whole bodily nature. This is illustrated by two examples from everyday life. So large and powerful an animal as the horse is governed by the bit in his mouth. So huge a bulk as a ship is completely directed by the very small rudder which the steersman holds. Aristotle has an extraordinarily similar statement of the power of the rudder in *Quaest. Mechan.* 5: "The rudder, although small, and at the end of the ship, has such power that huge hulks of ships are moved by a small tiller and the strength of one man quietly used." We would not go so far as to suppose, with Spitta, that the author of the Epistle has this passage expressly in mind. But we can imagine the idea filtering down into common Hellenistic usage. Indeed, in a fragment preserved by the late Byzantine writer, Theophylactus Simocatta (Ep. 70), the guiding of horses and the steering of ships are combined, as in James, and, as by him, compared to the governing of the tongue. "With reins and whips we direct horses, and sometimes with sails unfurled we navigate a ship, at other times we moor it, bridling it with anchors. So also must we govern the tongue." Philo has the same blending of images in *De Agricult.* 69: "The rider, when he intends to mount, puts on the bridle, and then, leaping up, seizes hold of the mane upon the horse's neck, and while he seems to be borne along, to tell the truth, he directs that which carries him, like a steersman. For the steersman, although he is apparently conveyed by the ship which he is steering, is really conveying it and directing it to the harbour for which he is aiming."

In iii. 10 James speaks with horror of the same mouth as praising (εὐλογία) God, and cursing (κατάρα) men. And he proceeds to use the image of the fountain (πηγή) which cannot supply fresh water and salt at the same time.
De Decal. 93, Philo, who has been warning against reckless swearing, declares it to be “impious that by the same mouth which utters the most sacred name, anything base should be spoken.” And in another passage, De Migrat. Abr. 117, he connects the uttering of blessings and curses with the image of a fountain: 

μηδὲν . . . μὴ τῶν εἰς εὐλογίαν καὶ εὐχάς, μὴ τῶν εἰς βλασφημίας καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν προφοράς διεξόδους ἀναφερέσθω μᾶλλον ἡ διάνοιαν, ἀφ᾽ ἂς ὁσπέρ ἀπὸ πήγης ἐκάτερον εἴδος τῶν λεχθέντων δοκιμάζεται.

James brings his exhortations against sins of speech to a climax in a paragraph which appeals to the wisdom of his readers. “Who is wise and of understanding (σοφὸς καὶ ἑπιστήμων) among you: let him, from a worthy life, show his deeds in meekness of wisdom (iii. 13).” There is a wisdom which is not from above but is earthly (οὐκ . . . ἀνωθεν ἑπίγειος, ver. 15). The heavenly wisdom is beyond all things pure (ἀγνή, ver. 17). Ver. 13 finds a close parallel in Philo, De Praem. et Poen. 83, 84: “Who would not say that that alone is a wise race and of great understanding (σοφὸν γένος καὶ ἑπιστημονικότατον) to whom it was granted not to leave the divine exhortations to them bereft of corresponding actions, but to carry out God’s commands in praiseworthy deeds.” Here it is plain that the contexts of the two passages have a marked similarity. The phrase used by James in ver. 15, ἡ σοφία ἁνωθεν κατερχομένη, is found in various connexions in Philo, e.g., De Fuga, 166: σοφίαν ἁνωθεν ὄμβρηθείςαν ἀπ᾽ οὐρανοῦ. Cf. Mutat. Nom. (M. ii. p. 1083): οὐράνιον σοφίαν ἁνωθεν ἑπιτέμπει. Perhaps the description of σοφία as pure (ἀγνή) in ver. 17 has some affinity with the famous eulogy of wisdom in Wisd. vii. 22 ff., in which emphasis is laid on its purity: e.g., vv. 25–26: “(Wisdom) is a pure effluence ἀπὸρροια εἰλικρινῆς of the glory of the Almighty: therefore nothing defiled can find entrance into her. For she is an effulgence from
everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God."

At the opening of chapter iv. James traces back conflicts and quarrels (πόλεμοι καὶ μάχαι) among his readers to the pleasures which war in their members (τῶν ἡδονῶν . . . τῶν στρατευομένων) and which stimulate desire (ἔπιθυμείτε). Philo views the ἀλογοι ἡδοναί from precisely the same standpoint, speaking, e.g., (De Ebriet. 75) of τὸν ἐν ψυχῇ τῶν ἔπιθυμιών ἐμφύλιων πόλεμον. Cf. De Opif. Mundi, 79: ἐὰν μήτε αἱ ἀλογαὶ ἡδοναί ψυχῆς δυναστεύσωσι . . . μήτε αἱ δόξαι ἡ χρημάτων . . . ἔπιθυμια τὸ τοῦ βίου κράτος ἀνάψωνται.

We shall conclude our evidence with a striking parallel in Philo to James iv. 17: “To him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to him it is sin.” Cf. M. ii. p. 518: “To him who sins through ignorance of what is better is pardon granted. But he who does unrighteousness with knowledge has no excuse.” We have made no reference to many impressive images which James has in common with Philo. Some of these are grouped together by Siegfried (op. cit. p. 311) from the larger collection in Schneckenburger’s Annotatio ad Epistolam Jacobi perpetua, Stuttgart, 1832.

We are well aware that the illustrations of our thesis which have been adduced will appeal with varying degrees of cogency to different minds. But it seems difficult for any unprejudiced enquirer to evade the conclusion that the Jewish writer of this Epistle moved with more than ordinary freedom in the region of Hellenistic culture; and that the writings of the famous religious philosopher of his own nation had left their stamp upon his mind, while, to a less degree, he was influenced by another product of Alexandrian Judaism, the Wisdom of Solomon. We shall not venture, in the meantime, upon any surmises as to author-
ship. But the evidence which we have exhibited might well support some definite connexion with Egypt.¹

H. A. A. KENNEDY.

STUDIES IN CONVERSION.

V. THOMAS HALYBURTON.

The conversion of this worthy shines like a star because of the darkness of the period to which he belongs. His date is easily remembered; for he was ordained to the ministry in the parish of Ceres, Fifeshire, in 1700. Ten years later, in 1710, he was transferred to the chair of divinity in the University of St. Andrews; ² but, shortly afterwards, in 1712, he died in his thirty-eighth year—an age often fatal to genius. He had a most triumphant deathbed; and the account of these last days, lighted up with a seraphic glow, has made his Memoir a favourite book among his countrymen. But the portion contributed by his own hand is also of unusual interest; and it is almost entirely occupied with his conversion.

Halyburton's autobiography cannot, however, be said

¹ On the strength of the type of ecclesiastical organisation indicated by the Epistle, Dr. Moffatt compares the community with which it was connected to some village churches in Egypt, referred to by Dionysius of Alexandria (Introduction to N.T., p. 464, note).

² In the Inaugural Oration, in Latin, with which he took possession of his professorship, there is unfeigned acknowledgment of the scantiness of his scholastic acquirements; but, after his premature death, his friends were able to publish convincing evidences of his ability and erudition in a work entitled Natural Religion Insufficient and Revealed Necessary to Man's Happiness, in reply to the writings of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, and a shorter treatise entitled The Nature of Faith, or the Ground on which Faith assents to the Scriptures, in which the attitude recently taken up by Evangelical scholars to the Scriptures is, in important respects, anticipated, and the argument from Christian experience is elevated to its rightful place. These posthumous works were recommended to the public by the foremost names of the time, that of William Carstares heading the list.