FACTORS OF FAITH IN IMMORTALITY.¹

Prefatory Note.

The Drew Lectureship, which is connected with Hackney and New College, provides for the delivery and publication of an annual lecture on the Nature and Destiny of the Soul. The lecture is to have some special reference to personal immortality. The following pages represent with a few slight additions and modifications the lecture which was delivered in the Memorial Hall, Farringdon Street, on October 7, 1910.

The term immortality has been applied in such various senses, and the thing meant by it has been conditioned in such various ways, that it is necessary to make clear from the outset the assumptions on which the following discussion proceeds. It takes for granted that there has been such a thing in human history as a belief in the immortality of man—a belief, at the very lowest, in the survival by the human being of the blank experience of death. It does not make any assumption as to the constitution of humanity, or of any of its parts or aspects, such as body or soul. It does not proceed upon a doctrine of personality or individuality, whether incipient or absolute, such as leads directly to immortality as its conclusion. Rather it may be described as purely empirical. It starts with the belief in immortality as it has actually emerged in human experience, and tries to discover the causes and motives to which it owes its origin, and the significance which such causes and motives have for us. If the faith justifies itself on such scrutiny, I do not say to any formal logic or to any metaphysical system, but to a human being

¹ The Drew Lecture for 1910, by the Rev. Prof. James Denney, D.D.

interested in life with its problems and necessities, it may throw light upon the nature of the soul; but it does not seem to me hopeful to start with what we think the nature of the soul, and to deduce immortality from that. The soul reveals itself in its achievements, and surely it is one of its signal achievements that in a world in which nothing continues in one stay, and in which analogy is universally opposed to the idea, it has not only conceived but asserted its immortality.

The faith in immortality, as is well known, has existed in very various forms. In its primitive forms it is almost purely negative. It has its origin not in the ambition of man, nor in his sense of his own value, but rather in the impotence of his mind. He believes in the continuance of his being after death because he is incapable of forming such an abstract conception as that of his extinction. Broadly speaking we may say this is what we find in the earlier stages of religious history in races so unlike as the Hebrews and the Greeks. The Sheol of the Old Testament and the House of Hades in the Odyssey both belong to this stage. In both there is a world beyond death in which existence is continued, but men do not believe in it or hope for it under the impulse of motives which have any meaning or any value for us. They believe in it only because they are unable to realise the alternative of annihilation. But they have no use for it. It is not a motive in life other than death itself would be. It has not to be won. It is not a reward or a punishment. Nothing is done in it; it has no ethical character at all. It simply awaits men as a state from which life, meaning and value have departed, and it awaits them all alike. It does not need to be proved that faith in immortality, of this sort, has no power of conviction in it. It has no motive behind it which appeals to us, and it reveals, not the reach that
is in human nature, but the limitations of unexercised and undeveloped human faculty.

How the mind escaped from this negative and impotent relation to death it is perhaps impossible clearly to tell. But it did escape. Look at what can be seen in the history of a single race. The Homeric Greeks, as has just been said, could not think effectively of life as coming to an end. In a sense, no doubt, death was the end of it; but it continued after death, for ordinary men, in an inconsequent and meaningless fashion, which it would be quite inept to describe as a triumph over death. It was no triumph; death, not life, was the real victor. There was no such thing as immortality, as a hope for man: as Rohde says, no expression is less conceivable in Homer than "immortal souls." But in the sixth century before Christ, two or three centuries after Homer, we find another condition of mind widely prevalent in Greece. It is in most respects diametrically opposed to the Homeric. In Homer, the body is real and living, and it is only in union with it and its vital forces that the soul can enjoy what is truly life; in the Orphic poetry or religion it is the soul which lives; the body is a tomb or a prison in which it is confined, and man's chief end is to achieve his soul's deliverance from it. The soul is divine—it might not improperly be called a god which lives in man—and it only attains to freedom and to true life when it breaks the chains which bind it to the body. At the stage of reflexion which is here represented it is not so much a philosophy with which we are dealing as a religion, and we must not exaggerate its philosophic aspects. Many of its ideas passed over into philosophy and were manipulated and interpreted there, but essentially the movement of mind which produced them was religious, not speculative. With religion of this kind there naturally comes
a corresponding morality. It is not the morality of the citizen, who has the ends of his life here, political and social; it is the morality of the member of a church, who has the ends of his life in a region which transcends the state; it is a disciplinary or ascetic morality. Its characteristic ideas are those of purification and liberation: men who have come, through whatever experiences, to take this general look at life, wish to be purified from the defilement of the body and delivered from its burden. I do not mean to consider the value for this purpose which was attached to ritual or sacramental acts of various kinds. Practically the problem was very hard. Ascetic living such as some Orphic sects practised, abstaining, for example, from animal food, was not sufficient to secure the emancipation of the soul. Even natural death was not sufficient. Though the soul survived in separation from the body, the Orphic thinkers seem to have been unable to realise its disembodied state. They shared in the widespread belief which we know as transmigration, but which they usually called παλιγγενεσία or μετενσωμάτωσις, new birth, or the entrance into a new body. The process of purification was supposed to go on through the successive embodiments of the soul, and each new embodiment answered in its comparative dignity or degradation to the comparative failure or success of the soul in the previous stages of its task. But a trace of the old inability to deal effectively with the idea of death always remained. The Orphic sects had no positive or satisfying conception of what the soul’s final emancipation meant. What they did represent with profound feeling of its truth was the idea that the soul is superior to the body and ought to be independent of it—that the body depresses and defiles the soul—that purity and emancipation from the body are ends for which men ought to strive. Something which
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may quite fairly be called the immortality of the soul is involved in this whole mode of thought.

Every one must feel that, open to criticism as it is, this Orphic mode of conceiving the nature and destiny of the soul appeals to us as the Homeric does not. The reason of this is that it does not represent a mere limitation of human faculty, an incapacity in our nature for forming definite ideas; it has experiences behind it to which we have the key, and motives to which our nature responds. No one will ever have any interest in immortality which counts—any interest which makes immortality a matter of moral consequence—apart from these experiences and from the appreciation of these motives. It is not possible, indeed, for us, to think of soul and body as so loosely related to each other as they were in the Orphic creeds, and transmigration, or the rebirth of the soul in another body, is accordingly incredible; my body is the body of my soul, and my soul is the soul of my body; but what corresponds to this Orphic distinction in our minds—corresponds to it in ethical import, of course—is the distinction between man and the world. The sense of the incomparable value of a person as compared with all things—the profound and immediate conviction that a person is absolutely distinct in kind from things and that his destiny is not involved in theirs—this, however it rises into consciousness, is one of the primary factors of faith in immortality. But it is reinforced here by a consideration which also appeals to us strongly. Man is essentially distinct from mere things, yet things exercise a strange tyranny over him. He is superior to the material and external world, yet it oppresses him, defeats him, humbles him at every turn. He is most conscious of this at the point at which he is in immediate contact with the world, his own body. It is there he finds concentrated and focussed all that thwarts,
defiles and degrades him. If he is ever to be himself, he
must achieve himself; he must win his soul; he cannot
take it for granted. That purged and emancipated life
of the soul in which he recognises his true mode of being
is a conditioned immortality; it is not there for every­
body, but for those who fight, who discipline themselves,
who endure and overcome. This is another primary
factor of faith in immortality. Just as no one can under­
stand such faith, or be in a position to appreciate it, who
is not conscious that persons and things are incommen­
surable, and that to argue from things to persons is invalid,
so no one can understand it, or be in a position to appre­
ciate it, who is not conscious of moral obligations in com­
parison with which nothing in the world counts. Life
itself is not to be weighed against them. This is the sense
of the superiority of personality to things raised to a new
power and intensity. In the common experience of our
race we do not find anything that can be called the natural
immortality of the soul, except that neutral and mean­ing­
less continuance of its existence represented by Hades
and Sheol; wherever there is real immortality, a continuance
of existence which has meaning for us now, and by which
death is overcome and deprived of its finality, it is morally
conditioned. It may be a doom, or an achievement,
but it belongs to the moral not to the physical world. Ideas
like that of the indestructibility of the soul have never been
factors of faith in immortality in any real sense. They
have never functioned in real life so as to beget such faith.
If they had, we might talk of natural or unconditional
immortality; but so far as we know historically, positive
and significant faith in immortality has always been con­
ditioned in such ways as I have described. Just as no
one can know the meaning of good or evil except by taking
part in the life of a moral world, so no one can know whether
man is what we mean by immortal or not except by entering into the experiences in which men have been assured of the incomparable value of personality, and have felt themselves summoned to a life in view of which all transitory things lost their reality and their value at once. I do not propose it as an equivalent of the ideas into which the Orphic sects of Greece read the riddle of human nature, but the pith of them all, especially in relation to immortality, is in our Lord's question: What shall it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose himself? It is out of the sense of his own value, as contrasted with that of the whole world, that a genuine hope of immortality springs for man; and if we wish to have such a hope we must cherish at once this sense of the value of man, in ourselves and in others, and of all the moral obligations which it imposes. These, I repeat, are primary factors of faith in immortality.

Orphic ideas about the soul and its destiny reappear, though without much reflexion upon them, in many of the earlier thinkers of Greece. They can hardly be said to be native to philosophy: they are borrowed by the philosophers from the priests. It is not till we come to Plato that we find a genuinely philosophical discussion of the subject. Whatever we may think of its historical or speculative importance, the *Phaedo* is a supreme work of art, and it is as much through the immediate impression which it makes upon us in this character as through a minute study of its arguments that we can discover the factors of Plato's faith in immortality. Partly, it is evident, the Orphic ideas have done their work. The speakers and the audience alike have been brought up to believe in the value and the immortality of the soul: that is the orthodoxy which they would naturally profess. But it is challenged at the moment by the presence of death.
Objections to it cannot be evaded or treated lightly: if it is to be justified or defended it must be with all seriousness and truth. The formal argument in which Socrates vindicates the immortality and indestructibility of the soul hardly interests us. It is like what is called the ontological argument for the being of God: it either proves nothing, to the simple mind, or it proves nothing interesting or relevant. The soul—so it runs—is that to the essence of which it belongs to live, just as to the essence of duality evenness belongs, or to the essence of the triad oddness; hence life and soul are inseparable, and soul can never die. It is difficult to lean one's weight on this, and fortunately it is not necessary. What is of greater importance is to notice, as we can do indirectly, the motives which prompted the construction of such questionable aids to faith. It is in these motives, and not in the arguments contrived to support them, that the real factors of the belief in immortality are seen. One is formally connected with Plato's theory of ideas. The ideas—truth, goodness, beauty, for example—do not belong to the transient and sensible world, but to a world which is supersensible and abiding. But the soul has an affinity for these ideas, a latent affinity it may be; it is in the soul to apprehend them, to appreciate them, in some way or other to become identified with them and to share their transcendent and immutable being. The soul's state in the body is unequal to its true nature, and the aim of the philosopher is by a daily dying to the body to attain—or, as Plato would say, to get back—to its true state. Philosophy is the soul's occupation with universal and eternal objects, and a being which can occupy itself with such objects is surely not destined to a merely temporary life. As Plato's philosophy was vital as well as abstract there is a real affinity between this and the religious idea that
it is in communion with an eternal God that man is raised above his own mortality. The motive to faith, the impulse which originates and sustains it, is the dawning sense of a kinship with the divine, asserting itself as the soul becomes conscious that in philosophy and science it can give itself to absolute ends unaffected by time. There is an incongruity in the idea that such a being should die as the brute creatures die. But there is more than this in the *Phaedo*. The faith in immortality is connected also with Plato's belief in the moral government of the world. True philosophers are completely freed from the body by death, and enter at once on the blessed life of pure souls. But the bad would have too good a bargain if for them death was the end of all. Plato knows quite well the limitations of his knowledge here, and that he is mythologising when he borrows the Orphic idea of transmigration to embody his moral convictions as to the future of wicked or imperfect men; but he knows also that the moral law extends into this region, and inspires our faith as well as shapes our thoughts about it. The moral sense of what the soul deserves, as well as the philosophic sense of what it is, are essential factors of his faith in its future. Both of these, however, and much more to which it is not easy to give abstract expression, are concentrated in the one great argument for immortality which the *Phaedo* presents, namely Socrates. It is not the dialectic which impresses us, but the person and the character. In such a presence we feel the indignity of death. It is monstrous that brute necessities should sentence such a being to extinction—that nature should assert itself, as it were in lawless violence, against such a spirit. This, of course, is a value judgment, and from this point of view it may be said that what we find in the *Phaedo* is not so much arguments for the immortality
of the soul as a demonstration or exhibition of the immortality of Socrates. And I believe this is the truth. What we find is the picture of a human being so wonderful that in his presence a mind which sees and feels what he is cannot but bestir itself to assert against the arrogance of death the might and value of the soul. The process may not be absolutely convincing, but surely the motive is intelligible. We may say, if we will, that it only leads to pragmatist convictions, and to conditional immortality; but pragmatist convictions may be all that are open to us in the way of experience, and if unconditioned immortality is only the meaningless inability to think death which we have looked at in Sheol and Hades, we need not be scared by the words. It is the whole moral phenomenon which impresses us in the _Phaedo_, and unless we are impressed by it as Phaedo himself was, we shall never understand the factors of Plato's faith in immortality. “I had a singular feeling,” Phaedo says, “at being in his company. For I could hardly believe that I was present at the death of a friend, and therefore I did not pity him, Echecrates; his mien and his language were so noble and fearless in the hour of death that to me he appeared blessed. I thought that in going to the other world he could not be without a divine call, and that he would be happy, if any man ever was, when he arrived there; and therefore I did not pity him as might have seemed natural at such an hour.” Only, I repeat, when this impression is renewed in us can we do justice to Plato's arguments. They are convincing only so far as each of them is the reflexion of something in Socrates—his devotion to universal and eternal truth, his kinship (to put it so) with the divine, his absolute recognition of moral law. There the motives lie which alone give interest to arguments for immortality, because they beget them; and wherever
there is real faith in immortality, not a nominal inherited belief or traditional orthodoxy in the matter, these are factors of it.

No new light, or none of importance, is cast on our subject either by the faith or the scepticism of the ages succeeding Plato. But one point ought to have particular attention. In the *Phaedo*, as in the Orphic type of thought, in general, an absolute distinction is drawn between the soul and the body. It is the soul which is immortal, and the soul is only a part of man. Further reflection seemed to make it doubtful whether even the whole soul could be immortal—the soul, that is, with all the determinations and qualifications which constitute its individuality. As far as it could be identified with, or regarded as akin to, the universal soul or *anima mundi*, it was immortal; but so far as it was the seat of emotions and passions it was determined by transitory things and could only be transient like them. As soul it was immortal; but not as *my* soul, or *yours*, or *his*. In Philo, for example, who is typical here, it is only the higher part of the soul, variously designated *πνεῦμα*, *νοῦς*, *διάνοια*, *λόγος*, or *τὸ λογικόν*, which is immortal. All that goes to constitute individuality, to distinguish one man from another, is necessarily under the ban of death. In the world of science in which the philosopher lives you have to discount the personal equation, and the personal equation here means everything by which any man is distinguished either from God or from his neighbour. Science and philosophy deal only with universal and eternal truth, and no such personal *differentiae* can enter into their sphere.

A philosophy like this may use the language of faith, and speak of the immortality of the soul, but it wholly fails to do justice to what this expression means in ordinary use. The immortality, for example, in which Plato was
interested, and in which through the *Phaedo* he interests
us, is not the immortality of soul; it is in some sense or
other the immortality of Socrates. He had convictions
and motives which made it practically impossible for
him to believe that death could extinguish such a being;
and whatever the worth of these convictions or motives
may be, it is no satisfying of them to be told—and this
is all that in some philosophers is meant by immortality—
that science and virtue are eternal, and that in their eternal
life the soul, so far as it is at one with them, is beyond the
reach of death. The abstractions which we call science
and virtue, or universal and eternal truth, or reason and
law, are not more real than man, and it is not for man
to be intimidated by their imposing names. We do not
rise into a higher world when we attach ourselves to such
abstractions and leave behind us the concrete universe
in which real human beings live and pass through real
experiences. What we do is to lapse from an ethical to a
non-ethical view of man; in other words, we pass into
a region where some at least of the most potent factors of
faith in immortality are out of our sight. This is what
is done by all philosophies and religions which offer us
the eternity of the spirit as an equivalent or a substitute
for the immortality of man. There have been many such
in all nations and in all ages—Hindu, Greek, and modern;
and all that can be said of them is that they are neither
equivalents of the faith in immortality, nor substitutes
for it; they are simply irrelevant to it, because they ignore
in the main the impulses in which it originates. The
eternity of spirit, if we can tell what that means, may be a
presupposition of the immortality of man, but it is not the
same thing. Some kinship with eternal spirit may be
indispensable, some native and indefeasible kinship even,
if the soul, or—to use less compromising language—if man,
is to be capable of immortality; but something different from this, something conditioned by the convictions and motives already so often referred to is meant, when we speak of the hope of immortality as a power which has actually come to birth in the human race, and operated to moral ends in human life.

It would be tempting to survey the religions in which death and what comes after death has a great place, and to examine the motives to which their peculiar character is due. Among these religions those of Persia and Egypt are conspicuous. But it is impracticable to do this here, and I content myself with a single remark. While the faith in immortality can always be connected in its origin with distinctly ethical interests—while it never receives any development except under moral motives—there seems to be a tendency in religions to moral degeneration, and to the provision for their devotees of other than moral means of dealing with situations which have no being nor significance except as moral. The inexorable and the absolute of the moral world are negotiated somehow. It was moral sense which evoked for the Egyptian the future he could not shun; but a great part of his religion consisted of rites, mysteries, sacraments, by which the moral sense was drugged, and moral situations managed by non-moral means. The truth is, that when it originates spontaneously under the co-operation of such factors as we have seen to enter into it, the outlook on immortality may be a fear as well as a hope, and the immoral sophistries by which men bemuse and stupefy conscience in this world may be extended from it into the next. This does not prove, however, that immortality is an illegitimate conception which ought not to have had a place in religion at all, and which can only act as a demoralising force. What it proves is that faith in immortality, where it exists at all,
cannot exist as dead matter, so to speak; it is vitally connected with man's life and character as a whole, and is affected in its quality by all the influences which make him what he is.

From these general considerations I pass now to look at the faith in immortality as it appears in our own religion. I use the expression to cover the whole of the experiences recorded in the Old Testament and the New, and also in the books of the Greek Bible which partly fill the interval between them. At a first glance we might think the two stages in the history of our religion were strongly contrasted in the very matter with which we are dealing. In the Old Testament, it may be said, immortality is conspicuous by its absence; we search for it, and search again, and usually (it would seem) in vain. In the New Testament it is as conspicuous by its presence. It dominates everything. It is what is meant in the New Testament by hope. What Christ has done is to vanquish death and to bring life and immortality to light. It is a deeply felt summary of the gospel which says, "We have worn the image of the earthly man, and we shall wear the image of the heavenly." Yet though it is not till we reach the New Testament that we see this hope full blown, the factors which enter into it are at work in the Old Testament: the blossom, so to speak, is being prepared beneath the soil.

It is not trifling to say that the Bible doctrine of the creation of man underlies the Bible faith in his immortality. "God created man in his own image." Without pretending to define this too narrowly, we may surely say that it expresses the sense of man's affinity to God. It expresses also the sense of man's worth to God. The place which man has in the creation is all his own; he is not only the consummation of nature but its sovereign; it is given to him for his inheritance, and he has a value to God which is in-
commensurable with the value of all created things. This is latent in his creation in the divine image, and it is strictly parallel to what we have seen elsewhere enter as a primary factor into the belief in immortality. But in Scripture it long remains latent. The interest of the Old Testament is not in man's aspirations towards God, but in God's condescension, His approach, His redemption of man. Its central conception is that of God's covenant with His people. God really and historically enters into or establishes such a covenant. Within its conditions God and His people form one society. God is not shut out of the human world, but enters into it and finds in His people the instruments for the achievement of His purposes on the earth. The people, on the other hand, are not shut up to a merely natural or secular existence, to a life in things which perish while they use them; they are partakers in a divine life, and fellow-workers with God in a work which can never perish. The historians of Old Testament religion have marked the distinction between the period when the nation existed and was the proper subject of religion and its hopes, and the later period when the dissolution of the nation gave importance to the individual and his relation to God. It is only at this later stage that the faith in immortality emerges with any definiteness. For the purpose in hand I do not think it is of much consequence to trace the foreign influences, Iranian or other, which may have helped to put this faith into particular forms. The forms are not the main thing, but the conviction which found expression in them, and that conviction, there is no reason to doubt, was native to Israel, and rooted in experiences of God. An original affinity of the human and the divine, such as is asserted in the doctrine of the creation of man in the divine image, is or may be presupposed in such experiences; a being for whom
God cares, as in the experience of pious Israelites he cared for them, must be one akin to God and dear to Him. But the experience of God’s love in life, a providential and redeeming love, of which man was as sure as he was of his life itself, is the primary and the ultimate factor in the faith of immortality as it appears in the true religion. It is God’s demonstrated and experienced goodwill to man on which a hope of such inconceivable daring rests.

It is not possible to exaggerate the importance of this at any stage of the true religion. The high water mark of faith, in the Old Testament and the New alike, touches this very point. Men did not at first grasp all that was implicit in the faithful and loving providence of God. They did not dream of what it was in the love of God to give and in the soul of man to receive. It was only by degrees that the infinity of the divine goodness dawned upon them, and the unimagined possibilities of the nature on which it was so unweariedly and inexhaustibly bestowed. It was not every day nor every hour that they could realise it, but there were high hours in which great spirits were uplifted on it as on a tidal wave, and gave expression to it in deathless words. “Nevertheless, I am continually with thee: Thou hast holden my right hand. Thou shalt guide me with Thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory. Whom have I in heaven but Thee? And there is none upon earth that I desire beside Thee. My flesh and my heart faileth; but God is the strength of my heart and my portion for ever.” There are scholars, as every one knows, who exclude immortality from this sublime utterance. It must be admitted that there is no doctrine of immortality in it. There is no express statement in it that man is immortal, or even that the soul of the pious man is so; there is no doctrine in it of any kind. But there is an experience in it of the perpetual presence, love
and power of God, and a triumphant hope and assurance based on this experience, that nothing can ever come between God and the sinner; a hope and assurance which are the very nerve of faith in immortality where that faith is most explicit, and which seem to me unquestionably to rise to the height of that faith here. The words, in short, are on a level with the words of Jesus in John x. 27—on a level, I mean, as indicating the same ultimate factor in the faith in immortality: “My sheep hear my voice, and I know them and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life: and they shall never perish, and no one shall snatch them out of my hand. My Father, which hath given them unto me, is greater than all, and no one is able to snatch out of the Father’s hand.” “No one is able to snatch out of the Father’s hand”: there, in the true religion, is the primary factor of immortal faith. It is the same in the wonderful passage in which Paul gives inspired and adoring expression to what the redeeming goodness of God has wrought into his mind: “I am persuaded that neither death nor life, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord.” It is just as true to say of this passage, as of the one from the 73rd Psalm, that it does not teach immortality. Neither of them teaches anything at all. Neither the Psalmist nor the apostle, as they wrote, breathed in a region where philosophical theorems or theological doctrines were of any interest: but each of them put his whole soul into the utterance of an experience of God which neutralised all that either life or death could do to separate him from the divine love. This is the only real form in which faith in immortality can exist. Whether immortality itself is conditional or not, such faith
in it is assuredly conditioned. It is conditioned not speculatively but practically. It is conditioned by an overwhelming experience of the love of God—a love intimate, patient, redeeming, the first and last of all realities to the soul.

From the point of view of the true religion, therefore, which (as we have seen) is essentially the same, so far as immortality is concerned, in the Old Testament and in the New, there is something beside the mark in a challenge addressed to religion from without to defend this element of its faith. It is not the primary duty of religion to be ready with a doctrine of man or of the soul in which the most rank outsider may see that immortality is necessarily involved in premises which he cannot dispute. Immortality is not an implication of some philosophical conception of the soul; so far as it has a vital place in religion, it is an inference from a peculiar experience of God. The business of religion is not to give a demonstration that man is immortal, independent of this experience; it is to propagate the experience out of which the faith in immortality springs. There is no way to produce such faith but so to preach the revelation of God that that assurance of his love will take possession of the heart which makes death impotent. Reduced to its simplest terms, the question of immortality is the question of how much God will give, and how much man is able and willing to receive; and it cannot be conceived, much less discussed, by those to whom God and man, and the interrelation and interaction of the human and the divine, are unreal. The biologist who answers it in the negative, from the plane of his own science, is wasting his time. No one believes in immortality on that plane: all the essential factors of faith are given in an experience in which physics and biology are already transcended.

The history of the true religion, however, enables us
to speak of this with more precision. The hope of immortality had a legitimate birth in Old Testament times: it awoke in hearts profoundly impressed with the friendship of God. But for long it filled only a comparatively small place in the spiritual life. What, apparently, was needed to vitalise it, to make it contagious, to raise it to a high power among the constituents of religion, was an experience which would compel men to take the idea of friendship with God in all seriousness. Such an experience came through persecution for religion. The great monument of this in the Old Testament is the Book of Daniel. Written during the persecution of the faithful Jews by Antiochus Epiphanes, it breathes the spirit of the time. The Lord’s battle is raging, and it is written to encourage those who are on the Lord’s side. The Lord’s victory is eventually sure, and the conviction forms inevitably in pious hearts that those who have fallen in the good fight will not be excluded from the victory when it comes. It is in Daniel, the Old Testament book of martyrs, that we have the clearest proclamation of immortality. “Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake: some to everlasting life, some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars for ever and ever.” This is the temper of the Maccabean period, in which the belief in immortality became a piece of orthodox Jewish religion; it is the temper also of the Christian religion, in the age of Nero and Domitian, as we see it reflected in the New Testament apocalypse; and of other persecuting and suffering epochs, like the Covenanting one in Scotland. If there could be such a being as a mere spectator, or, as it is sometimes said, an impartial spectator, of the moral conflict going on in the world, he might easily be sceptical of immortality; ex
hypothesi, the factors which enter into and produce faith in it are unknown to him. But the martyrs are not sceptics. And they do not die, really, because they believe in immortality—though once immortality has become a commonplace of faith it may be put so; immortality is revealed and becomes sure to them because they find it in their hearts to lay down life itself for God.

JAMES DENNEY.

(To be continued.)

THE JÂHÛ TEMPLE IN ELEPHANTINE.\(^1\)

The last century has been a period of discovery in the history of the ancient East. The earth has been forced to give forth her treasures; old writings have been deciphered, and the stones have begun to speak; an entire past world has arisen before our astonished gaze. But (until the present moment), the Old Testament has had too small a share in the great discoveries. For some time past the soil of Palestine has been diligently dug and searched. Yet, though remains have been found of various ancient civilisations, documents have, as yet, been few. We have still gained all our knowledge of David and Solomon from the Bible. We have had the Israelite-Moabite inscription of King Mesa; and one book was recently found of the later period, the volume of Jesus-Sirach, in its Hebrew dialect. But now, for the first time, Jewish papyrus writings, of the later Persian period, have come to light, and amongst these one which has excited interest far beyond the circle of "savants." It refers to an episode in Jewish history, hitherto unknown, and confirms several important suppositions concerning the life of the nation.

The site of the discovery is the extreme south of ancient

\(^1\) From Deutsche Rundschau. Paetel, Berlin. Translated by Mary Gurney, with additions by the author.