

*JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH IN ST. JAMES AND  
ST. PAUL.*

It is probably beyond us absolutely to reconcile what St. James and St. Paul say on justification. The harmonist has to aim at clearing away apparent verbal, superficial discrepancies that the divergence which ultimately comes to view may be the more instructive. But it will not be right simply to take St. Paul's statement as the standard, and square in St. James how we can. While St. Paul's is the longer, more formal, fully reasoned exposition, St. James is not one whose words may be estimated according to their quantity or their formal completeness of argument or statement.

The point is well worn by controversy, but that at least witnesses to its importance, and the more one knows of the popular Christianity of England the greater does this seem here and now.

I should put it, then, that St. James as much as St. Paul accepts the doctrine of justification by faith. They differ in that St. Paul recognizes but one sort of faith exhibited in various ways but radically one; St. James, two things which may be called faith, a dead faith and by implication a living faith, whose vitality has to be tested, attaching justifying force exclusively to living faith. Assuming we are to harmonize, we must either say St. Paul would disown the dead faith of St. James from being faith at all, or make them mean different things by justifying.

“What doth it profit, my brethren, if a man say he hath faith, but have not works? can that (R.V.) faith

save him ? ” This abrupt beginning has, no doubt, some reference to the faith of *v. 1*. But obviously there is a major premiss understood, which the man introduced assumes and expects his hearers to grant, i.e. Faith saves men. Does St. James grant it? His argument shows that he does, provided it is not carelessly interpreted. Or we may say he distinguishes, but introduces the distinction gradually. For he himself answers for the man not having works, but puts into the man’s mouth the claim to faith, not committing himself at first to affirm or deny that he has faith, but after an illustration from ineffectual sympathy concludes that what the man has is dead faith, faith dead in itself. It is not that faith without works is insufficient, that it needs the co-operation of something else for joint efforts to effect salvation. It is not a barren parent to have as adopted children the works of the law or of morality. It is dead in itself quite apart from the question of works, though it is the absence of works that betrays this. Practically, his view is, a living faith does save a man, a dead faith cannot.

In *v. 18*: “Show me thy faith without thy works, and I will show thee my faith by my works.” It is plain he is speaking of a faith and of works vitally connected; and of that office of works which is to bear witness to the existence of faith.

In *v. 19*: In place of living faith and its fruit works we have the intellectual belief of demons and their shudder or horror. St. James does not say *φοβούνται*. Fear is indeed in itself a neutral word; but when the object is God it so uniformly stands for willing submission to awe of God’s majesty, that St. James avoids the word. Such a fear would be work. The outcome of the will is work, and there is no work where there is no will. But the horror, the thrill of the skin from external irritation of the nerves, is wholly

passive, even where it is a gracious symptom. The faith of the demons is a dead faith devoid of work though not devoid of result.

*vv.* 21–24: The case of Abraham. The intimate and inseparable connexion of faith and works is shown by St. James actually alleging Abraham's justification by works as a fulfilment of the Scripture which said he was justified by faith. Working is here little more to him than faith in energy.

So in *v.* 24. "A man is justified by works and not only by faith." He does not say partly by works. So far as they are mentioned at all, it is wholly by works. And yet it is not *and not by faith*, but *and not by faith only* (*μόνον*). For the explanation we have to look to the context. Faith occupies the whole ground as truly as do works. It is not merely the antecedent of works, the source of which works are the stream. It does not give birth to work, and then abdicate or vanish. It lives in work, though this may not be the Apostle's application of the figure of body and spirit.

*v.* 25: "Well, anyhow, it stands to reason that a harlot was not justified by works." Certainly she was. Her faith was a practical faith. She received the messengers, and sent them out another way. There is nothing intrinsically good in that action regarded alone, but it was a work, and that work the fruit of faith.

St. James gives two concrete instances of justifying works; and it is to be observed that they are not good works, like clothing the naked, feeding the hungry, preaching the Gospel. Child killing and treachery are *primâ facie* evil works, it is only by reference to their motive faith that they become good, and assume a justifying character.

*v.* 26: "As the body without the spirit is dead, etc." The strangeness of the illustration shows how faith

predominates, occupies the whole field in St. James' view. Living faith is everything, both body and spirit. He cannot imagine works in their doing, except as a function of faith. To say that a man is justified by works is to say he is justified by the action of faith. All good works are to him works of faith; and we might say, as St. Paul knows only one faith, so it is natural to St. James to think of all work as good work. Ἔργον and ποιεῖν and their cognates are almost solely used by him of what is good: to say a man is ποιητῆς ἔργου is itself a praise. The only exceptions are ii. 9, ἀμαρτίαν ἐργάζεσθε, and v. 15, ἀμαρτίας πεποιηκώς. (Cf. iii. 16, πᾶν φαῦλον πρᾶγμα.)

For some further notes on the passage.

v. 14: Μὴ δύναται ἡ πίστις σῶσαι αὐτόν; Σῶσαι shows that the ὄφελος expected by the man was σωτηρία, otherwise there might be various profitable effects falling short of salvation; i.e. it points to the assumption of a general law, Faith saves.

The benefit in question further on, vv. 21–25, is not salvation, but justification. St. Paul seldom connects salvation with faith, and not in his great argument; (Acts xvi. 21, 1 Cor. i. 21, Ephes. ii. 8, Rom. x. 9, 10; cf. 1 Tim. i. 16, Gal. ii. 20.) Elsewhere it is proportionately more frequent. Acts xv. 11, 1 Peter i. 5, 9, Heb. x. 39, and ἡ πίστις σου σέσωκέ σε of the Gospels, which must sometimes refer to more than bodily healing, Luke vii. 50, xvii. 19.

vv. 15–16: This is not an example of faith without works; it is an illustration from the analogous case of good feeling not issuing in works. The εἴπη of v. 16 is parallel to the λέγη of v. 14. In both cases the verb is assumed to represent some actual feeling or state of mind behind the saying; but the feeling in the second case has nothing necessarily to do with faith.

v. 20: θέλεις δὲ γινῶναι, κ.τ.λ.: Perhaps "Hast thou a

mind to know, or art thou blind because thou wilt not see ?” as Bengel: “Sane *inanes* homines nolunt scire et dissimulant.” Only the wilfully thoughtless (*κενός*) can fail to see what may be called tautological truth. The statement contains its own proof, or at least the beginning of it. “Art thou willing to recognize that faith apart from works is without work ; that what does no good does thee no good ?” *ἀργός* used with conscious reference to its derivation as in 2 Peter i. 8, *οὐκ ἀργούς οὐδέ ἀκάρπους* ; and *ἔργα* practically identified with the form of salvation.

*v. 22*: *ἡ πίστις συνήργει τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ*. Only in this word *συνήργει* are faith and the works of the faithful regarded as apart. One would have expected rather *ἐνήργει ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῦ*. But the figure is difficult anyhow. *Συνήργει* involves doing of *ἔργα*, works of faith alongside of works of the faithful. Dr. Scott, in the *Speaker's Commentary*, prefers the rendering, “wrought with him in his works” ; and maintains it by forcible arguments. This would not seriously conflict with the rest of the passage, but makes Faith too much a thing external to the man, and it is difficult to take *τοῖς ἔργοις* otherwise than dependent on *συνήργει*. Alford makes St. James in the last verse of the chapter view faith as the body and obedience as the spirit. Here then he understands “Faith wrought with obedience.” But even if in the final verse obedience is the spirit, the living faith is thought of as body and spirit together, and as in this *v. 22* the co-operating faith must be living faith, obedience must be in it and not a fellow-worker outside.

Knowing quotes a preferable interpretation of Bey-schlag's.

St. James views works here in a different way from elsewhere. These are not works in their doing, for in that they are inseparable from faith ; but works already done and now producing their sequence of effect under the control

of God alone; and yet forming providentially new material for the exercise of faith. Abraham's faith won him a son; here was a new field for his faith, which ultimately gave room for its crowning work, the offering of the willing victim in assurance of Resurrection. St. James, then, in quoting Genesis xv. 6, is fully aware of its relative date, as is shown indeed by *ἐπληρώθη ἡ γραφή*, as if it were the fulfilment of a prediction; he regards Genesis xv. 6 in its place as the applying to an undeveloped state of things a sentence which awaits the verification of development. So with Christ the *τῆς πίστεως ἀρχηγὸν καὶ τελειωτὴν*, every victory led to and furnished a field for a wider and more strenuous conflict, until in the Cross and Resurrection He became *εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα τετελειωμένος*.

*ἐκ τῶν ἔργων ἡ πίστις ἐτελειώθη*. This argument assumes justification by faith, for he regards Abraham's justification *ἐκ τῶν ἔργων* as proved when he has shown that the *ἔργα* were ancillary to the perfecting of his faith.

Both St. Paul and St. James seem to regard the justification of Abraham in Genesis xv. 6 not merely as a declaring him righteous with respect to that particular act of belief, nor only as regards his whole character and actions up to that point, but as regards his whole life and character absolutely. If so, the real difficulty is in the first verse of Genesis xxii., "God did tempt Abraham." Why, if He knew him to be already righteous, was there need to do so? At this point it seems to me the real difference comes in between the two Apostles. It is a matter that comes up in several places of the Old Testament, but perhaps not elsewhere in the New. It may point to a graduation of the Divine energy which not only logic but the very blaze of the Christian revelation conceals to us. God is regarded sometimes as omniscient, sometimes as acquiring knowledge experimentally; in

Genesis, as at Babel (xi. 5), Sodom (xviii. 21); in 2 Chronicles xxxii. 31, of Hezekiah; in Isaiah lxiii. 8, of Israel (as implied); and strikingly in Psalm cxxxix. : for that in a great part of it dwells on God's omniscience, but ends with the Psalmist's prayer that God may know him not only by searching but by testing, a paradox from which the Prayer-book translator has so far shrunk as to avoid the word *know* in *v.* 23.

The justification which St. James is thinking of is that sort to which is applied the unsatisfactory word *forensic*. For in *v.* 18 works are spoken of as evidence; and in the case of Abraham the works and obedience are in answer to a test; a test is not meant to create what is not, but to demonstrate what is.

The natural feeling with which St. James started seems to have drawn no practical distinction between faith and works; cf. St. Matt. xxi. 31, 32. He finds in possession aphorisms, Faith saves and Faith justifies, and has no intention of dislodging them, but for that very reason is less guarded in wording his argument in a way which an inattentive hearer may take for disparagement of faith, or anyhow an exalting of works at the expense of it. St. Paul for a certain purpose contrasts faith and works; St. James has no contrast between faith and works, but between no works and works, between a working faith and an unworking faith.

Faith without works is dead, given of course time for working, allowing it time to draw, so to say, its first breath. The connexion between faith and works assumed or pointed out by St. James must be closer than mere consistency and correspondence. What is Faith? Is a definition to be expected? In what terms can it be defined? Into what elements can it be analysed? To what points more surely fixed can it be referred? Faith, Hope and

Charity are classed together by St. Paul. Of these it is clear that *ἀγάπη* is incapable of definition because *ὁ Θεὸς ἀγάπη ἐστίν*. Then it is reasonable if not inevitable to infer that Faith too is elemental, not to be analysed or defined any more than an individual. This is borne out by such a discussion of the word *πίστις* as is in Sanday and Headlam's *Romans* p. 31 sqq.; the manifold uses and applications suggest some deep principle which comes to the surface or exhibits itself in various ways. A feature in Scripture points the same way. In the mention of faith the sequence of thought is sometimes not easy to follow, or at least not obvious. Thus Numbers xx. 12, at first sight one would have said the words of Moses and Aaron certainly showed faith, however censurable on other grounds, and that the fact proved it. So in Matthew xvii. 20 the disciples seem to have made the attempt in the full expectation and, as we might say, belief that they could cast out the evil spirit. In Luke xvii. 5-10 the Lord's answer is quite unexpected and the connexion of the following parable difficult.

But if Faith cannot be defined, it does not follow nothing can be said about it. Much may be said to identify and distinguish and describe it, the circumstances under which it acts, its method of acting and the results, as in Hebrews xi. 1. ("Not a logical definition of faith, but a description of its practical effect": Rendall *ad loc.*) But I think it impossible to question that it is a dependence upon or committal unto God or Christ of the whole man. If it were questioned, it might not be easy to demonstrate that it engages the whole man, but I venture to say that the Christian conscience revolts at anything less.<sup>1</sup> Faith

<sup>1</sup> "Faith is not an intellectual assent, nor a sympathetic sentiment merely. It is the absolute surrender of self to the will of a Being who has a right to command this surrender. It is this which places men



accepts God as the one principle of light and knowledge and so believes His word ; it accepts God as good, and so reposes trust in Him ; it accepts Him as Lord and commits the will to Him, submits the will to Him to will the things He wills, but something deeper offers the will itself to Him to be animated and inspired from the divine source. Will is involved in all energy of faith in believing and trusting as well as in obeying. In the case of obedience it is the will to do His will that is involved in Faith. Will is man's contribution to work. God giveth it a body as it may please Him ; and if the will is to do His will, the body He gives it is a good and righteous work accepted as evidence of the faith from which it proceeded. Believe in the Lord Jesus, and thou shalt be saved. Lord is not merely an honorific title, nor indicates only that He is able to do what is looked for, but reminds the inquirer that inherent in belief is obedient service of the Lord Christ. This committal of the will to God is not a lapse into passivity, not mere resignation. God is omnipotent apart from any concession on man's part. It is an active adoption of God's will as the man's own, actively carried on so far as lies within his power. To offer the will to God is not to destroy it, but to exercise it *κατὰ θεόν*. Then we might say that Faith without the spirit of obedience is not real faith, but the word used by St. James is not *unreal* but *dead*.

It is so universally agreed that *δικαιοῦν* is to acknowledge as just and not to make just, it might seem hopeless to say a word on the other side. (Perhaps we may call the first the *subjective*, and the second the *factive*, meaning of *δικαιοῦν* and such verbs.) When it is pointed out that the regular force of the termination added to an adjective stem

in personal relation to God, which (in St. Paul's language) justifies them before God. For it touches the springs of their actions."—Lightfoot's *Colossians*, p. 187.

is factitive, as *τυφλοῦν*, *to make blind*, the answer is that the case of adjectives of moral meaning, as in *ἀξιοῦν*, *ὀσιοῦν*, *δικαιοῦν*, is an exception. But why is it an exception? Because a moral quality cannot be imparted from outside, and so the form is left available for the next nearest meaning. Morals depend on the man's willing action. If a man is not by his voluntary goodness *ὀσιος*, it is inconceivable that he can be made so by external action. But this inconceivableness is at the bottom of all St. Paul's argument. It is implied by the necessity of the death of Christ. It was the impossibility of justification by any conceivable method (My will is perverse, nothing in me can straighten it, nothing outside me can work it) that was the awful burden on St. Paul's mind before he found a practical solution in Christ. His insatiable thirst was for a real righteousness. Was he one to be satisfied with anything but reality?

Then grammatically the assertion is not entirely true. There are forms in which the sense of *make* is available even with moral meaning, and consequently is used.

(1) The deponent uses must be derived from the factitive meaning; Psalm xvii. 26, *ὀσιωθήσῃ* parallel to *ἀθῶος ἔσῃ*, *ἐκλεκτὸς ἔσῃ*, *διαστρέψεις* *thou shalt behave piously*; Psalm lxxvii. 8, 37, *ἐπιστάθησαν*,<sup>1</sup> *they turned out actually faithful*, Sir. xxvii. 17, xxix. 3; and probably occasionally from *δικαιοῦν*, as Isaiah xlv. 25 *ἀπὸ κυρίου δικαιοθήσονται*, for there is nothing in the context to suggest accusation or acquittal and the previous verse speaks of actual righteousness; so Sir. xviii. 22, *μὴ μείνης ἕως θανάτου δικαιοθήναι*, xxvi. 29, xxxiv. 5, Gen. xxxviii. 26 (cf. Gal. ii. 16, 17). The natural English renderings would be *proved*, *showed themselves*, *were found*; but these, according to

<sup>1</sup> The Vulg. has indeed *nec fideles habiti sunt*; but the translator was not clear about the word rendering verse 8 curiously *non est creditus cum Deo spiritus ejus*, a confusion with *ἐπιστεύθη*.

modern idiom, are only formally subjective. And the same is true of the Greek in the instances last quoted. Even granted the *δικαιοῦν* formally subjective, the judge is assumed to judge correctly, and the whole weight of meaning is thrown on actually existing righteousness. Connotation is always apt to follow denotation; and as *δικαιοῦν*, to regard, comes from a *δικαιοῦν*, to make (imaginary if you will), so is it ready to revert if need be to the original and natural force of the termination.

(2) In the reflexive use the inconceivableness of meaning clearly does not arise; and so we have Psalm lxxii. 13, *ματαίως ἐδικαίωσα τὴν καρδίαν μου*, where a subjective or forensic force would be quite inapplicable (cf. Jer. iii. 11).

*ἀξιῶν* is always subjective; but here the meaning of the adjective itself naturally appeals to a judgment.

Then though the factitive sense of *δικαιοῦν* was excluded generally by unsuitableness, it was waiting there and ready to press in.

In Revelation xxii. 11 no one, apart from MS. authority, would hesitate to call *δικαιοσύνην ποιησάτω* the gloss on *δικαιωθήτω*; but as (if I may judge with all diffidence from Alford's Apparatus Criticus) *δικαιωθήτω* is in any case an early reading, the argument for my purpose is stronger if *δικαιωθήτω* was substituted as familiarly bearing the meaning of *δικ. ποιησ.* than if it were original and standing in need of a gloss.

The forensic meaning of *δικαιοῦν* would start from the factitive; it would be originally *to make δικαίος*, only *δικαίος* according to a forensic standard. And taking the forensic meaning of the verb as subjective (which no doubt it becomes, i.e. *δικαιοῦν*=to hold or treat as absolutely *δικαίος*), it is only one branch of the subjective meaning. The word forensic is strictly suitable when *δικαίος* has the negative meaning of *not guilty* after accusation or suspicion

of guilt, as in Matthew xxvii. 19. But *δικαιοῦν* has also the meaning to regard as positively and actively righteous, as Romans ii. 13, *οἱ ποιηταὶ τοῦ νόμου δικαιωθήσονται*, where, on the one hand, the meaning must be subjective, for the doers of the law are just already and do not want making just, and on the other there is no suspicion of guilt to set aside. Still, as a rule, the subjective meaning of *δικαιοῦν* more naturally goes with the negative *δικαίως*, to declare not guilty. Where the thought is of positive active righteousness of actual men it would commonly, if the word allowed it, be more obvious to take a factitive sense, to make righteous.

Man has a continual debt of activity to God, and in the uninterrupted discharge of that debt, or at least in the spirit which leads to its uninterrupted discharge, *δικαιοσύνη* consists. Therefore to those to whom activity is possible there is no being negatively *δικαίως*, not guilty, without being actively righteous. There is apart from Christ a justification of sin at once factitive and forensic (as in classical use) provided in the original course of nature. It may be called a degenerate case of justification, *Ἡ ἁμαρτία ἀποτελεσθεῖσα ἀποκνεῖ θάνατον*, and *ὁ ἀποθανὼν δεδικαίωται ἀπὸ τῆς ἁμαρτίας*. It is not naturally beneficial to the justified, nor does it naturally justify God as the Creator of what has to be destroyed. But St. Paul has to show how through Christ it is adopted into the salutary process so as to help on both these ends.

There are places in St. Paul where it would be more natural were it allowable to take *δικαιοῦν* of making absolutely righteous. Romans iii. 26, *δικαίον καὶ δικαιοῦντα*, suggests that the righteousness conferred on man is like God's. Romans iv. 25, *διὰ τὴν δικαίωσιν ἡμῶν*, connected with Christ's Resurrection, is more naturally of positive righteousness. The *δικαίωσις* which is the abolition of guilt is rather associated by St. Paul with Christ's death. If so, the

subjective sense would have little force : it would be rather with a view to making than with a view to declaring righteous. So in Romans, v. 18, in spite of the parallel *κατάκριμα*, the *δικαίωσω ζωῆς* (as opposed to the *δικαίωσις θανάτου*, Romans vi. 7) is more naturally understood absolutely. One might add Romans iv. 5, *τὸν δικαιοῦντα τὸν ἀσεβῆ*, for *ἀσεβῆς* is not a word of forensic associations. Or again in Romans viii. 29, 30, the forensic sense seems hardly to fit in with the elevation of the passage, "Whom he did foreknow, them he did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son . . . and whom he did predestinate, them he also called, and whom he called, them he regarded and treated as blameless and innocent, and whom he thus exempted from suspicion of guilt, them he also glorified." This does not fill out the *συμμόρφους τῆς εἰκόνας τοῦ υἱοῦ αὐτοῦ* as one would have expected.

But no doubt St. Paul's use of *δικαιοῦν* is as a rule the subjective use. This (i.) because the justification with which his argument is specially concerned is the initial, the transition from guilt to innocence which naturally calls up to the mind a tribunal and a judge. But (ii.) still more from his feeling of a personal character and object in *δικαιοσύνη*. The only fault indeed he finds explicitly with the righteousness of the law is that it is not practically forthcoming ; but there is a feeling running through that it is at the best a cold impersonal dead righteousness, not worth calling righteousness beside that which is to the living God, that there is no true righteousness of the creature but such as is to God. I would word it that with St. Paul *δικαιοῦν* means to make forensically, subjectively, relatively righteous, but relatively to God. And relatively to God is to him identical with absolutely ; so the distinction between forensic and actual, between make and regard, is merged. It is possible to pass

without interruption from one to the other. But it is not as if mere will (so far as human intelligence can conceive) could make justice. Justice is not an independent standard to which God perfectly conforms; it is the expression of His will. But it is (if our thought may be exercised in such things) an element of the Divine character which can be revealed to our minds and approved by our judgments apart from the assurance of His personality. It can be exhibited in the creature, and when we say that God is just we mean that as far as we can compare different circumstances (and that is a very great limitation), the whole of His doings, whether we know enough to perceive this or not, does answer to that element justice of which we have already some real if imperfect knowledge.

I wish to maintain that the conclusion reluctantly reached by SH. that justification (in St. Paul's view) works by a fiction is not a sound conclusion, and to enter no more than absolutely necessary on the office of the Atonement in it, or on other points connected with it as the place in it and effect of Holy Baptism.

While thinking that arguments above adduced for a factitive sense of *δικαιοῦν* are worth consideration, I would not rest on that but rather on the necessity that what God does must be done in truth, and what He pronounces is incapable of fiction, and the certainty that this was the belief of St. Paul; and further, as pointed out by Newman (*Justification*, p. 84 sqq.), that the voice of the Lord is mighty in operation. "God's word is the instrument of His deed. When then He solemnly utters the command, 'Let the soul be just,' it becomes just." When God justifies the ungodly it is as when Christ heals the sick and raises the dead; the men cease to be ungodly, sick or dead who were previously denoted by these defects.

SH. say "The facts of language are inexorable . . .

*δικαιούν, δικαιούσθαι* have reference to a judicial verdict and to nothing beyond." This is rather beyond their own facts ; it is straining language to speak of judicial verdict in connexion with, e.g., Luke vii. 29. But a judicial verdict may be viewed from more than one point. But is it reasonable because St. Paul brings in a figure from human society to tie him down to the details of circumstance ? A judicial verdict declares a man just according to the standard of the local polity. God as judge speaks it with regard to His own standard. A human court excuses the fallibility of its verdicts by the inevitable imperfection of human insight. It cannot be so with God. On any standard human or divine those may fairly be classed among *δίκαιοί* who come under any one, not necessarily more than one, of these heads. (i) Those who never committed an *ἀδίκημα*. (ii.) Those who having done so have made it good, whether by compensation, or by exhausting the punishment due. (iii.) Those who having done so have got rid of the spirit of *ἀδικία*, and have gained, or been given by change of mind, the internal character of *δικαιοσύνη*.

As to (i.) it is naturally impossible that those who have committed *ἀδικήματα* should be classed, except by fiction among those who have not. Yet it is not clear but what this is divinely possible, not by undoing the past, but by separating the personality of the man from the past as by death and resurrection. But without insisting on this, in what ways is the *ἡδίκηκός* distinguished from the *δικαίος*. Answering to (ii.) he has incurred a debt to those outside him, whether to God or to His creatures ; and to (iii.) he has injured himself becoming burdened with a sense of guilt, and acquiring in greater or less degree the character and habit of *ἀδικία*. There is no common-sense impossibility in God remitting the debt to Himself, and compensating to other creditors their loss, nor again in the man coming to a better mind and getting

rid of the feeling of guilt. It is common experience that assures us of the difficulty of these things; and Christian doctrine and St. Paul's teaching are on the same side, aggravating the estimate of the debt, and instead of difficulty showing impossibility, apart from means held in reserve by God which could neither be anticipated nor imagined, nor now more than practically apprehended.

Then (ii.) though the figure of debt is not one applied by St. Paul to sin, he has what bears on this as in speaking of purchase and redemption. But it may be better not to dwell here but to go on to

(iii.) The just man is one possessing the character whose proper outcome is just actions. He has not of necessity performed just actions; time to do so may be wanting, the opportunity have not yet arisen. When it does arise, he may change and act unjustly and become unjust instead of just. The performance of just actions is the only criterion human witnesses can have of a just character, but we cannot deny to God an immediate discernment. Without then restricting God's justification to this third method, I take it that at least therein may be seen how God can justify without fiction. From two sides the mercy of God is set free to act in truth, on the side of Christ by death and resurrection, on the side of man by faith. There is a necessary attraction of God upon the being; unbelief resists it, faith abstains from resisting. But it has no instrument through which to act. The old nature, the flesh, as it is called, from what has become its dominant element is tainted; its members are incapable as yet of being even *ὄπλα δικαιοσύνης τῷ θεῷ*, much less, as they were meant to be, the natural organs of home-bred righteous energy. So though faith is righteous as far as it goes, it is not more than latent potential righteousness; and, moreover, has as yet no active conquering force to convert from evil into good the ungodliness of nature in



which it is imprisoned. And here parenthetically of faith before Christ. It is clear that then principles were not exhibited, in a sense mystical truth such as St. Paul teaches is not meant for exhibition ; but then the mercy of God was content with provisional arrangements not of lasting use except that they deferred inevitable results till Christ should come. There was the seed of corruption, the severance from God and from life ; but dissolution had not of necessity proceeded far ; there was, as there is, much in human nature that was relatively good, though it was separated from the only end in which it could be radically good, being incapable of love towards God.

But faith, in spite of its evil surroundings and its own imbecility, is, so far as it goes, good, though not meritorious, and it is not in God to destroy good. It comes from what in man is central, inmost, deepest, most personal, all-pervading, and it is directed towards God the Author of all good. While hardly itself actual *δικαιοσύνη*, it is such as could, if it pleased God, without fiction *λογισθῆναι εἰς δικαιοσύνην*. It is at first an empty hand held out to receive, a channel into and through which goodness can flow and flow on ; in it the Almighty will graciously recognize an appeal for means of expression, instruments of effect, relief from the imprisonment of the old nature, in short, life. The thing is not too hard for the Lord, but it is no ordinary evoking even of Almighty power. To the faith which looks to him he sets forth His Son not only for the relief and abolition of guilt, but for the supply of a new nature in which righteousness can properly be expressed, a righteous nature because it is the nature of Christ become communicable. Faith in Christ, which is the form faith in God now takes, is not itself union with Christ. The union is the gift conferred in answer to the appeal of faith ; for I suppose we may fairly say from St John i. 12, " To them that

believe on his Name gave He power to become children of God." The first act of union must necessarily be to alienate the old nature, to divest the person of it before he can put on the new. This is the death spoken of in Romans vi. as in some way identified with the death of Christ; it is the first step in justification, involving the abolition of guilt, but not in itself as yet the actual saving process; it would, so St. Paul implies in 1 Corinthians xv., have no beneficial effect but that it is followed by resurrection, necessarily followed by a resurrection in some mysterious way one with the Resurrection of Christ, a new birth, the investing with a new nature. The old remains indeed severed but not yet removed. It is now in the sight of God a circumstance external to the man, but pressing very closely. It may furnish instruments for his service of God, or may exercise a foreign tyranny, or become a wilfully assumed ally; to it in its severance from God, as to forbidden ground, he may choose to return, instead of abiding in the new, and may make it the region of his acting and willing though no longer a home; for the old relation of the man to it, natural and divinely originated, is broken irreparably.

Faith was used by God as an instrument of uniting the man to Christ. Whether or no we may say he could not, anyhow apart from that he would not, have effected the union. The continuance is equally necessary to the maintenance of the union at least in this life. Galatians ii. 20, *ὁ δὲ νῦν ζῶ ἐν σαρκὶ ἐν πίστει ζῶ τῇ τοῦ υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ*; or 2 Corinthians i. 24, *τῇ γὰρ πίστει ἐστήκατε*; or Romans xi. 20, *τῆ ἀπιστίας ἐξεκλάσθησαν σὺ δὲ τῇ πίστει ἔστηκας*; or Hebrews x. 38, *ὁ δὲ δικαίος μου ἐκ πίστεως ζήσεται καὶ ἐὰν ὑποστείληται οὐκ εὐδοκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ μου ἐν αὐτῷ*.

We might have expected that God, all-seeing and foreknowing, would only at the first accept that faith which He either saw or at least foreknew would persevere. But it is

clear both from St. Paul and other New Testament writers, and from our Lord Himself, that it is not so. Three times (1 Cor. x. 1-13, Heb. iii. 7-iv. 11, Jude 5) the destruction of the people in the wilderness after their acceptance as the people of God is applied for warning to Christians, and therefore almost of necessity as a pattern of what does take place in the Christian Church. The use of the imperative (*Abide in Me* (John xv. 14, 1 John ii. 28) and the hypothetical *If ye abide* (John xv. 5, 7, Romans xi. 22, Col. i. 23) recognizes the possibility of not abiding. But, above all, our Lord's illustrations from fruit-bearing vegetation, the parables of the Sower and the Seed and of the Vine, show that that life, which is meant to be permanent in a man, may be received and the man actually live and grow in it, and yet fail of permanence in it. The fruit in an ordinary way is that which contains the seed. To insist on this is so accordant with New Testament analogy that it ought not to seem fanciful. At least in the parable of the sower we have to think of the fruit both as that which the plant gives up from itself to the planter, and as that which contains the perpetuation of life.

We are in the neighbourhood of profundities, but it is a question of popular theology which has brought us there. I wish to avoid them while recognizing their existence; to trace the shore, so to say, of the deep waters, but not attempt to sound their depths. It seems necessary to draw, in the case of human beings a distinction of person and nature in some respects like the one familiar in the doctrine of the Incarnation. The Catholic expression of that doctrine is wholly true and necessary to the Church, but it can only express truth up to a certain point. I would not offer the distinction in human beings generally as more than, so to say, the convenience of a rough outline, with which we may note in filling up the details how far they coincide. Per-

sonality is an elemental, insoluble idea. On it turn the questions which no one can answer, and from it come, in all appearance uncaused, the causative energies which defy calculation or prediction. Human personality can only be defined as that which the dress of human nature will fit. It is, we may think, apart from its manifestations, i.e. its workings, inscrutable to every created intelligence. Nothing is hidden from the Divine omniscience. In that God knows whether the faith which appears is an ingrained characteristic, or accidental function of the person; and it may probably be, too, that He also perceives a difference of the embryo which nothing short of Divine perfection of insight could penetrate to discern. But the creature's explicit knowledge goes on in time and is dependent on manifestations; and as it is part of the glory of God to justify His ways to created beings, the faith has to be tested whether it is genuine by workings. The *τὸ δοκίμιον τῆς πίστεως* of James i. 3 and of 1 Peter i. 7 seem to allow this expression, but St. Paul words it not that the faith is tested but that the man is tested with regard to the faith. 2 Corinthians xiii. 5, *ἑαυτοὺς πειράζετε εἰ ἐστὲ ἐν τῇ πίστει, ἑαυτοὺς δοκιμάζετε*. Previous to testing the man is faultless, the possibility of evil latent does not prevent his being rightly regarded as just till he acts otherwise. "Thou wast perfect in thy ways from the day thou wast created till iniquity was found in thee." In strange contrast to the initial, inexplicable uncertainty of what may come from personality is the persistency of character which it ultimately either acquires or develops. Adam was created *δικαιός*, i.e. both innocent of actual sin and with a nature suited to operate *δικαιῶς*, but he had to be tried personally whether he accepted that state and nature. In the case of the man justified in Christ, the facts which make for standing are stronger, for the nature of Christ is more powerful for good; but so, too, are the facts

which make for falling, for by comparison Adam's temptation was external. He then, too, after the fair start he is now enabled to make, has to be tested whether he personally wholly and permanently adheres to Christ, whether he has root in himself. This phrase of St. Matthew and St. Mark, to which it is hard to give an exact meaning either in the literalness of the parable or in its interpretation, does somehow convey to our minds the idea of personal persistency we want to express. At what point the character of persistency or otherwise is established in the person, God only knows and can see; for all others absolute knowledge has to wait till the testing is over. Faith justifies and saves, but does not itself convey the assurance of ultimate salvation. There is some difficulty in the wording of 1 John v. 17, but from the whole passage it is clear that assurance is the gift of love and perfect assurance the gift of perfected love; and this is confirmed by a comparison of John v. 24 with 1 John iii. 14; for in the Gospel the passage from death unto life is ascribed to faith, in the Epistle the knowledge of it to love.

What then is the faith which justifies, places in the justified state (such expressions are allowable, though what is meant is rather evokes the justification of God), and yet which needs to be tested? It is one thing to speak for direct personal edification, and another to enter on a question of more or less abstract theology, though I hope this may be not otherwise than edifying in its way. But in the former case faith is required in its fullest form, that is no faith which aims at a minimum of expression, while as a matter of theology there may be use in dwelling on the very small amount which God will accept. Speaking with the greatest reserve, I should say faith can take many forms, or rather may be exercised and exhibited in a variety of ways, intellectual belief, action on belief, obedience, trust. Where faith is

shown in any one way, there being in no other way wilful unbelief (and this applies to the faith of the Church presenting infants), it is accepted and receives the answer of grace, which will strengthen the receiver in enduring the test whether his faith is good in all directions and whether it is tenaciously held. Abraham's faith in Genesis xv. 6 was exercised on a limited point. It was the intellectual acceptance of God's prediction of an apparently improbable fact which would be to His honour. The event proved that that act of belief proceeded from a universal immovable faith. Until the sacrifice of Isaac his justification brought him present peace and friendship with God and a clearer-sighted trust for present and future ; but it did not give him assurance concerning his own self for the future (we do not know in what form this question would have presented itself to him), until in standing that great test his faith attained full stature.

The view maintained here is that the justification of St. Paul is a making just, or at least involves a making just, and that by no remote deduction, whether or not from the grammatical meaning is a minor point, but what God says must be. And it is not a mere conferring of innocence as regards the past. That would be justification only for the dead, and would come in due course without Christ, for the living it would leave the future blank. But it is the imparting of a righteous character, a capacity for righteous action i.e. for good works, and this from an engrafting in Christ ; so that the righteousness and the good works may with equal correctness be described as the works of Christ and the works of the believer, just as we may properly say the tree bears the fruit or the branch bears the fruit. They are as truly the believer's works and doings as any doings whatever, good or evil, godless or indifferent, can be the doings of a man. In them his personal agency is exercised and stirred up

to the full ; all the principles of agency, will, belief or knowledge, counsel or resolution are there exercised, but in the way of faith in God through Christ. There is a view which recognizes the importance of good works, but, contrary to St. John xv. 2, 6, regards them as the necessary effect of the vital union with Christ. The believer is not to aim at doing them himself, Christ does them, not he. This is to regard the regenerate nature as devoid of the highest and deepest energies, it is a sort of Apollinarian mutilation. Christ does them and he does them. "He that believeth in me, the works that I do shall he do also." As in so many cases, the relation of the believer to Christ is assimilated to the relation of the Son to the Father. "Whatever things [the Father] doeth, these doeth the Son in like manner"; and this comes soon after that verse St. John v. 17, *My Father worketh hitherto, and I work*, which implies that the Son's is as truly and as fully agency as the Father's. We have indeed, *I live, yet not I, but Christ liveth in me; I laboured, yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me*. These are parallel to *My doctrine is not mine, but His that sent me. The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me. The Father that dwelleth in me, He doeth the works*. Will any one deny that Christ was in the fullest sense the doer of them, that what He said and taught He spoke with full and intelligent assent, by free act and willing intention? *He that is joined unto the Lord is one spirit* is in its measure parallel to *I and my Father are one*; and so the believer's agency is sometimes identified immediately with the agency of God. (Phil. ii. 12, 13, Heb. xiii. 21.)

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was only found in a few MSS. ; those mentioned by Berger are probably not a twentieth of the whole number, and there seems to be no reason to doubt the obvious conclusion drawn from the facts by a whole series of scholars who have agreed in thinking that the Amiatine capitulations point to a short recension, though they have differed widely enough in their explanation of the fact.

It is obvious that the Latin version implied by the Amiatine capitulations is not the Vulgate, but was ante-Hieronymian, and further traces of the existence of the short text can be found in Latin in Cyprian and in Tertullian. In the case of the former the evidence is merely the dangerous *argumentum e silentio*, but is a very strong example of its kind. In his *Testimonia* he gives a collection of texts from every possible source arranged according to their community of meaning, so as to serve as an arsenal of proof-texts for various dogmas. It is certainly a fact that he does not clearly quote anything from chapters xv. and xvi. of Romans, and each must judge for himself whether this can be accidental. The main point is, that in Test. iii. 68, 78, 95, Cyprian musters the passages enjoining the duty of avoiding heretics, under the three headings, 68 *Recedendum ab eo qui inordinate et contra disciplinam vivat.* 2 Thess. iii. 6. 78. *Cum hereticis non loquendum* Tit. iii. 10 f. ; 1 John ii. 19 ; 2 Tim. ii. 17. 95. *Bonis convivendum malos autem vitandos* (1 Cor. xv. 33). Why does he not quote Romans xvi. 17, " Now I beseech you, brethren, mark them which are causing the divisions and occasions of stumbling, contrary to the doctrine which ye learned, etc." ? It is instructive to note that in the spurious *de singularitate clericorum* (Cyprian, ed. Hartel, appendix, p. 212), 2 Thessalonians iii. 6 is quoted and a few lines further down Romans xvi. 17, Thomasius, i, 489, and the Amiatine capitulations in Tischendorf's edition of the *Codex Amiatinus*.



which shows how naturally any one who knew Romans xvi. would have used it in this connexion. It seems to me exceedingly probable that Cyprian had the same short text<sup>1</sup> as the Amiatine capitulations and that this text must be provisionally regarded as having obtained in Africa in the third century. The evidence of Tertullian is, if anything, stronger; for not only is there the same *argumentum e silentio* in the fact that he nowhere quotes chapters xv. and xvi., but in *adv. Marcionem* v. 13 he quotes Romans xiv. 10 and says that this verse comes "in clausula," i.e., in the closing section of the epistle. It is true that he is contrasting the end with the beginning, and Hort (cf. Lightfoot, *Biblical Essays*, p. 335) argued that this need not imply the absence of the two last chapters. This might be admitted if it were not for the other evidence for a short recension; as it is, the natural interpretation of the facts is that Tertullian, like Cyprian, used a short text of Romans. Moreover, though it be true that the *argumentum e silentio* is much less strong in the case of Tertullian than in that of Cyprian, because he quotes so much less, it is noteworthy that Romans xv. and xvi. are so full of passages opposed to the doctrine of Marcion that it is suggested (by Sanday and Headlam and by Corssen) that the short recension is a Marcionite production: yet Tertullian never alludes to these passages, either to throw at Marcion or to comment on his excision of them,—and he was by no means disposed to pass over Marcion's emendations (real or supposed) in silence, even though he endeavoured to answer the heretic out of his own text.

Thus there is good reason for believing that in Africa, in the second as well as in the third century, the Epistle to the Romans was used in a short text which omitted chapters

<sup>1</sup> The same, that is to say, in extent. It is not probable that the text used by the maker of the Amiatine capitulations was African.

xv. and xvi. The Amiatine capitulations were made for a similarly short text, and suggest that this recension was closed by the doxology which we usually read in Romans xvi. 25–27.

It is, however, improbable that the Amiatine capitulations represent an originally African text. Riggensbach has shown that in the summaries given the text of the epistles is sufficiently closely followed to enable us to identify its character. It is not African; and it is not Vulgate, but represents the European type which was current in Italy before the days of Jerome. Moreover it must have been an early European type, for Ambrosiaster, who represents the later form, did not use the short text. Thus we have early European as well as early African evidence for the short recension. It is at present impossible to say whether there was originally one or more Latin versions; so that we do not know whether this agreement between African and European Latin ought to be taken as representing one or two Greek originals. It is, however, in any case, clear that the evidence takes us back to the second century in Africa, and probably also in Europe.

Another witness, but a suspected one, to the same short text is Marcion. For our knowledge of this fact we are indebted to Rufinus' translation of Origen's commentary on Romans xvi. 25–27. He says, *Caput hoc Marcion, a quo scripturae evangelicae atque apostolicae interpolatae sunt, de hac epistola penitus abstulit; et non solum hoc, sed et ab eo loco ubi scriptum est "omne autem quod non est ex fide, peccatum est (xiv. 23) usque ad finem cuncta dissecuit.* The meaning of this passage is one of two things. Clearly it implies that Marcion removed the doxology altogether (*abstulit*), but there is room for doubt as to what he did with the rest of the epistle. What is the meaning of *dissecuit*? The obvious meaning, which is nearly always adopted, seems to be "cut away," but the objection, first made, I think, by Hort, is that this is not

the true meaning either of *dissecuit* or of the Greek which it may be supposed to represent—*διέτεμεν*; it ought rather to be translated “separated off.” This argument gains strength if we try to distinguish between *abstulit* and *dissecuit*. It is perhaps impossible to decide the point; if *dissecuit* be used loosely, it means that Marcion cut away not only the doxology, but also chapters xv. and xvi.; if it be taken strictly, it means that Marcion separated Romans xv. and xvi. from the rest of the epistle, and cut out the doxology which came at the end of chapter xiv. Probably the former view is right, and the difference between *abstulit* and *dissecuit* is to be explained as merely due to a desire for variation.

No MS. exists in any language which preserves the short recension in a pure form; but traces of its influence on the history of the text are obvious. In the Epistle to the Romans as it stands at present in critical editions the arrangement of the contents of the last three chapters is as follows: (1) xiv. 1–23 is devoted to the question of the propriety of observing a distinction between lawful and unlawful food; (2) Romans xv. 1–13 continues the argument on more general lines; (3) Romans xv. 1, 4–33 is chiefly concerned with St. Paul's plans for the future; (4) Romans xvi. 1–20a is a list of greetings to members of the Church to which he writes, and a commendation of Phœbe of Cenchrea; (5) Romans xvi. 20b is a benediction; (6) xvi. 20–23 is a postscript of greetings from companions of St. Paul; and (7) Rom. xvi. 25–27<sup>1</sup> is a closing benediction. It is clear that there is no serious break in thought between xiv. 23 and xv. 1, and that the doxology is in a natural place at the end of everything. Yet in the Antiochene text represented by the great majority of Greek MSS. the doxology comes not at the end, but between chapters xiv. and xv. Moreover, it is certain that this represents an early text, which was adopted, to use

<sup>1</sup> Rom. xvi. 24 is omitted by the R.V. and all critical editors.

Westcott and Hort's expression, by the "Syrian Revisers," because we have the express evidence of Origen that this reading was that of some of the texts which had not been corrupted by Marcion: "*In nonnullis etenim codicibus post eum locum quem supra diximus, hoc est, Omne autem quod non est ex fide peccatum est, statim cohaerens habetur. Ei autem qui potens est, etc.,*" though he was also acquainted with others which put the doxology at the end of the epistle, and, like modern critical editors believed that this was the right place for it. The same text was used by Chrysostom and Theodoret, so that, leaving out the Latin version for the moment, it would seem as though the Eastern text outside Alexandria had the doxology after chapter xiv., and that in Alexandria it was moved to the end of chapter xvi., though in the time of Origen the MSS. known to him differed on the question.

The history of the Latin text on this point is not easy to follow, owing to our almost complete ignorance of the Old Latin text of the epistle. The facts, however, seem to be these: there were in Latin before Jerome three types: (1) with the doxology at the end of the epistle, used by Ambrosiaster, probably owing to Alexandrian influence; (2) with the doxology after xiv. 23, *Codex Guelpherbytanus* and a fragment at Monza<sup>1</sup> (cod.  $\frac{1-2}{9}$ ); and (3) without any doxology, used by Priscillian and found in *Codex Ambrosianus* E. 26. It is also probable that the archetype of the Graeco-Latin MSS. DEFG ought to be added either to the second or third of these categories.

The most probable solution of these facts seems to me to be that the earliest type of Old Latin had the doxology after xiv. 23 and that the texts of Priscillian and Ambrosias-

<sup>1</sup> For the fullest statement of the facts about this MS. see Dom D. Bruyne, *Des deux derniers chapitres de la lettre aux Romains*, *Revue Bénédictine*, 1908, p. 423 ff.

ter represent the Spanish and Italian attempts to emend an obviously difficult reading. It is, I think, an illustration of the fact that, with the exception of the Alexandrians, the Greeks were less apt to be struck by textual difficulties than the Latins.

It will now be possible to sum up the probabilities of the case with regard to the doxology. It is very improbable that this was originally anywhere than at the end of the epistle, wherever that was: therefore all the MSS. which insert it after xiv. 23 are really evidence for the existence of the short recension, and confirm the witness of Tertullian, Cyprian and the Latin capitulations.

Moreover, it is exceedingly unlikely that any scribe who had the short recension before him, and also knew the long text, would pick out the doxology from xvi. 25-27 and insert it after xiv. 23: he would have added the whole of what was lacking in his text. Therefore it is improbable that the doxology really belongs to chapter xvi. at all; it is more probable that the short recension originally closed with the doxology,<sup>1</sup> while chapters xv. and xvi. ended with the "Grace" followed by a postscript. The textual history of the doxology seems, then, to be explicable as the result of the various efforts of scribes to combine these two. The simplest method was simply to add chapters xv. and xvi., leaving the doxology where it was. This was the course followed by the Antiochene text, and possibly by the archetype of DEFG. A slightly different method was to begin the transition from one text to the other just before the doxology, thus omitting it, and this is the course followed

<sup>1</sup> Dom Bruyne raises the interesting question whether the doxology was not preceded by the "Grace" (xvi. 20*b*). It appears to have been so in the Monza MS., and this would help to clear up the residuum of difficulties concerned with the text of xvi. 20*b* and 24,—a point which I have thought it unnecessary to deal with above. Perhaps Dom Bruyne is right; but the evidence is small. In any case, the point is not of the first importance for the general problem.

by Priscillian. A third course, taken in Alexandria, or at least in circles known to Origen, consisted in moving the doxology from xiv. 23 to the end of the epistle, and this was also done by Ambrosiaster and Jerome. These are the three principal methods, and all the other textual variants seem to be combinations and conflations of them.

The most important conclusion from these results is that there are no longer extant any pure MSS. either of the short or of the long recension; granting the existence of the short recension, it is plain that it now only exists in conflation with the long text, and similarly the existence of the doxology in almost all MSS. is a proof that the long text has been contaminated by the short. The only possible witnesses to the long text, uncontaminated by the short, are Priscillian and MSS. known to Jerome (cf. his comment on Eph. iii. 8); but it is by no means certain that these do not imply omission of the doxology rather than the use of a text which never had it.

In any case, there is, I think, quite convincing proof that in the second and third centuries a short text of Romans was widely used, though it was universally abandoned<sup>1</sup> by the official texts of the fourth century.

It is necessary to go on to show that this short text probably omitted the references to Rome in the first chapter. For this there are three direct witnesses, Origen, Ambrosiaster and *Codex Boernerianus* (G), and the last probably represents in this case the archetype of DEFG.

The evidence of Origen is given directly in *Codex Athous Laurae* 184, a MS. which E. von der Goltz discovered in

<sup>1</sup> It would perhaps be true to say that the process of extinction had already begun in the third century. Origen's text shows clear signs of the short recension, but he certainly regarded the longer text as the only right one, and attributed the short form to Marcion. No doubt the text changed at a varying pace in various places. The short recension seems to have lasted longer in Africa and perhaps in Italy than in Alexandria.

1897<sup>1</sup> to contain a text of the Epistle to the Romans made from the last Greek of the commentary of Origen. This MS. gives, it is true, the words ἐν Ῥώμῃ in Romans i. 7 and 15, but the scribe has been honest enough to add a note to the effect that this was not in his original “ τοῦ ἐν Ῥώμῃ οὔτε ἐν τῇ ἐξηγήσει οὔτε ἐν τῷ ῥητῷ (i.e., the section of text at the head of the comment) μνημονεύει.” The unexpressed subject of this sentence<sup>2</sup> is of course Origen. Von der Goltz is, however, probably mistaken in thinking that this reading is not confirmed by the Latin text of Origen made by Rufinus. It is true that the words in dispute come in the text, but, as Lightfoot pointed out long ago in *Biblical Essays*, p. 287, the comment does not imply them.

It is possible that Origen knew MSS. containing the word ἐν Ῥώμῃ, but it is at least certain that he preferred to follow others which omitted them, and it is therefore probable that this was the old Alexandrian reading as distinguished from the later recension found in our extant MSS.

Similarly the evidence of Ambrosiaster claims the omission of ἐν Ῥώμῃ for the European Latin, for he says, “ *Quamvis Romanis scribat, illis tamen scribere se significat qui in caritate Dei sunt.* Again, it is true that the text accompanying the comment is *qui sunt Romae in caritate Dei*, but from the comment it is clear that the word *Romae* is a later addition of the scribe, and that the text commented on is *qui sunt in caritate Dei*, which represents in Greek τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ. This is actually the reading found in G, which seems here to have the original text of the archetype of DEFG, while D (if one judge from a comparison of the Latin d and of the copy E), had the conflated reading which is now found in

<sup>1</sup> E. Freiherr von der Goltz, *Eine textkritische Arbeit des zehnten bezw. sechsten Jahrhunderts*, in Gebhardt and Harnack's *Texte und Untersuchungen, neue Folge*, ii., 4, 1898.

<sup>2</sup> The same note, but without any explanation, is found in MS. Bodl. Roe 16 (Cod. Paul 47).

the text of Ambrosiaster, *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Ῥώμῃ ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ*. This is also found in *Cod. Amiatinus* and *Fuldensis* of the Vulgate : either they represent the opinion of Jerome, or are introducing Old Latin readings.

Thus the absence of the words *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* from the oldest form of the European Latin is as certain as their absence in some Alexandrian MSS. Seeing that the same type of Latin is, through the Latin capitulations and the evidence of the doxology, one of the chief witnesses for the existence of the short text,<sup>1</sup> it is reasonable to think that the omission of *ἐν Ῥώμῃ* was a characteristic of the short recension ; this conclusion is strengthened by finding Origen witnessing both to the omission of the two words, and also to the existence of MSS. which, by their treatment of the doxology, point to the short recension, is supported by the fact that Codex G, which omits *ἐν Ῥώμῃ*, also implies a knowledge of the short form, and would be absolutely proved if Corssen be right (as I believe he is) in thinking that the reconstructed original of DEFG shows that a different textual character in chapters xv. and xvi. from the rest of the epistle,—for it would then be direct evidence that in MS. of the short recension the reference to Rome was wanting.

All the available evidence seems to show that the short recension of Romans was widely known in the second century, and that it was not universally supplanted by the longer form until after the third ; the question then arises whether the same can be said for chapters xv. and xvi., and, if so, whether they ought to be regarded as genuine Pauline writings directed to the Church at Rome, or—whether Pauline or not—intrusive matter.

It is well known that—quite apart from the question of the short recension, doubts have been raised as to chapter xvi.

<sup>1</sup> I can find no satisfactory evidence either way as to the African text of Rom. i. 7. Cyprian never quotes the verse.



Here, it is said, we have much more probably a short note of commendation from St. Paul to the Church at Ephesus. Doubtless there is much to be said on this matter, but I must content myself here with a reference to Zahn, Riggensbach, or Sanday and Headlam, and the expression of my belief that there is no reason to doubt the tradition connecting chapters xv. and xvi., or that both of them were—in some way—sent by St. Paul to Rome.

In this case the problem is to account for the existence of two texts, both equally genuine, in the sense that all the whole sixteen chapters were written by St. Paul.

*The "Marcion hypothesis."*

The most popular solution at present is certainly that offered by Sanday and Headlam, and recently supported with a wealth of learning by Dr. Corssen, to the effect that the short recension was made by Marcion. The arguments for this view are that Marcion undoubtedly did alter the text in some way in order to suit his own purposes, and that it is possible to find passages in Romans xv. and xvi. which may have offended him, so that he cut those chapters off altogether. In any case, he certainly had a text which omitted the doxology, and probably also the two last chapters. The weak point of the argument is not so much in regard to chapters xv. and xvi., as to the omission of the reference to Rome. It is said that Marcion wished to manufacture a general treatise on Christianity instead of a letter to a single Church, and therefore omitted ἐν Ῥώμῃ. But there is no evidence in favour of this, and in the Marcionite prologues<sup>1</sup> the epistle is described as *ad Romanos* in the usual way, which is, of course, no proof that Marcion read ἐν Ῥώμῃ in i. 7, but at least shows that he did not try to

<sup>1</sup> See Dom Donatien du Bruyne, *Prologues Bibliques d'origine Marcionite* in the *Revue Bénédictine*, 1907, p. 1 ff.

treat the epistle as a general treatise. Therefore, supposing that Marcion used the short recension, it is, so far as the omission of ἐν Πώμῃ is concerned, more probable that he used it because he found it already existing than that he manufactured it.

Moreover, in the Marcionite Prologues there is a difference of reading between the various manuscripts as to the place from which *Romans* was sent. The majority say from Corinth, as is the usual tradition, but some say from Athens. Corssen is inclined to regard the latter reading as original, and I believe that he is right, for it is easy to understand how Athens came to be altered to Corinth, but the reverse process is unintelligible. The tradition naming Corinth is generally recognized to be an obvious (and correct) deduction from chapters xv. and xvi. ; if this be so, is it not probable that the tradition mentioning Athens is based on a text, known as it is to have existed, which omitted these chapters ? In this case it would seem more likely that Marcion, the author of the Athens tradition, used the short recension because he found it already in existence, than that he fashioned for the first time. If he had known—but rejected—chapters xv. and xvi., he would surely have chosen Corinth rather than Athens.

Finally, there is the objection that, if it be true that Marcion made the short recension, the influence of the Marcionite text must have been much greater than has hitherto been recognized. This may be the case ; but if so, it is exceedingly important for the history of the text of the Pauline epistles

Various other theories have been invented by various critics to account for the existence of the short recension ; but they have for the most part had but a short and feeble existence, and are now decently buried in the pages of Zahn and similar books. One of the simplest was suggested by

Bishop Lightfoot,<sup>1</sup> who thought that St. Paul may have made the short recension himself in order to give a general account of his position in the controversy between Jewish and Gentile Christians. To this theory the decisive objection is the improbability that any one who was not animated by dogmatic prepossessions, as Marcion is supposed to have been, would ever have split the epistle at xiv. 23. The natural divisions are after xi. 36 ; xiii. 14 ; or xv. 13. Moreover, it is doubtful whether it is on general grounds so likely that an originally local letter was turned into a general treatise, as that the reverse took place.

*An alternative hypothesis : the priority of the short recension.*

Ought not more attention to be paid to the possibility that the short recension is the original form of the text which was afterwards expanded? This view was suggested, in a complicated and somewhat fantastic form, by E. Renan in the introduction to his *L'Apôtre Paul*, and was decisively criticized by Lightfoot in the Essay just mentioned. Yet after all Lightfoot only answered Renan's form of the hypothesis, and I should like to plead that a hearing should be given to a simpler one, as an alternative to the popular Marcionite hypothesis.

The main features of the problem which must be taken into account are two : (1) there was from as early a time as evidence on textual points reaches an epistle to the Romans which stopped at Romans xiv. 23 with or without (I think probably with) the doxology, and without any reference to Rome in chapter i. ; (2) nevertheless, chapters xv. and xvi. are clearly genuinely Pauline, and are never found except as a continuation of the other chapters. I suggest, as a working hypothesis, that the short recension represents a

<sup>1</sup> *Biblical Essays*, pp. 287 ff. It is perhaps not unnecessary to note that this is a reprint of the articles often quoted from the *Journal of Philology*, 1869-71.

letter written by St. Paul at the same time as *Galatians*, in connexion with the question of Jewish and Gentile Christians, for the general instruction of mixed Churches which he had not yet visited. It had originally nothing to do with Rome. Later on he sent a copy to Rome, with the addition of the other chapters to serve, as we should say, as a covering letter.

The arguments in favour of this hypothesis may be formulated somewhat as follows. Assuming that St. Paul first wrote an epistle which in i. 7 read<sup>1</sup> τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν . . . ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ, κλήτοις ἁγίοις, and ended with xiv. 23 and (possibly) the doxology, what are the probabilities as to its date, the place from which it was written, and the Christians to whom it was addressed? Dealing with the last point first, it is clear that there is nothing whatever to indicate any one community, though the general tone points to those in which Jewish and Gentile Christians came into contact with each other. We have to deal with a general epistle, devoid of address, or of concluding greetings. That is to say, exactly the same phenomena as are found in the best text of *Ephesians*. In that epistle the words ἐν Ἐφέσῳ are omitted by the critical editors, and the generally received explanation is that it, which we call *Ephesians*, and Marcion called *Laodiceans*, was originally designed exclusively for neither of these Churches, but was a circular epistle in which the name could be filled in according to circumstances. As companion letters to *Ephesians* we have *Colossians*, and *Philemon*, and it would seem that *Ephesians* is the general epistle to the Christians in Asia, *Colossians* an epistle to a special Church in that province, and *Philemon* a private note to an individual Christian either in Colossae or a neighbouring town. The connexion in thought between *Ephesians* and

<sup>1</sup> I reserve the justification of this reconstruction of the text to the end of the article.

*Colossians* is scarcely plainer than that between *Romans* and *Galatians*, and if we take the short recension, the parallel is almost perfect. Why should it not be, then, that *Romans* was originally a general epistle written by St. Paul at the same time as *Galatians*, to the mixed Churches which had sprung up round Antioch, and further on in Asia Minor? In that case we should have another instance of St. Paul's custom of writing a general epistle, and supporting it by a series of letters to the separate Churches<sup>1</sup> in the district for which it was intended.

If this argument be sound, it follows that if you can date *Galatians* you can also date the short form of *Romans*. The date of *Galatians* is no easy problem: but there seems to be a growing consensus of opinion that it ought not to be placed far from the Apostolic Council at Jerusalem. My own view is that it was written before the Council, but soon after is a more popular view. In any case, the circumstances can probably be roughly described thus. In the fifth de-cennium of the first century the two main centres of the Christian Church were Jerusalem and Antioch; in the former the community was essentially Jewish, held to the Jewish law as a matter of course, and had not at first contemplated the possibility of the admission of Gentiles to the Messianic kingdom. The episode of Cornelius finally convinced the Christians of Jerusalem that this possibility was to be reckoned with, and they were theoretically persuaded that the Gospel ought to be preached to the Gentiles. But the problem as to the relation of Gentile converts to the law had never struck them as a practical question: naturally, it was thought, a Gentile who became a Christian would accept

<sup>1</sup> *Galatians* is of course not a letter to a single Church as *Colossians* was. But it was sent to a sharply defined and probably comparatively small circle of Churches—Lystra, Derbe, Iconium being the chief if not the only ones.

the customs of the Jewish Christians who were the original members of the Messianic kingdom. In Antioch, on the other hand, the majority of the Christians were Gentiles, who saw no necessity for accepting all the obligations of the Jewish law, and distinguished between what the original Christians did because they were Christians, and what they did merely because they had been born Jews.

Thus came into existence the two parties which ultimately discussed their differences in Jerusalem. We know from the *Acts* that the Jerusalem Christians, once they saw the gravity of the situation, sent representatives to make propaganda in Antioch and in the daughter churches of Antioch, such as those of Galatia. It is also clear that this campaign was stoutly resisted by St. Paul. Is it not practically certain that *Galatians* belongs to this period and was written to the Galatians in answer to the efforts of the emissaries of the conservative party at Jerusalem,—whether before or after the Council is for the present purpose less important,—and is not the short recension of *Romans* exactly what he might have written at the same time, as a general epistle to be circulated in the neighbourhood of Antioch? <sup>1</sup>

So far there is not much difficulty, and probably no one would deny that, if the present text of *Romans* did not exist and we had only a short form with no reference to Rome, and neither of the two chapters which are now at the end, the similarity of thought to *Galatians* and of form to *Ephesians* would be regarded as sufficient proof that the theory just set out is *primâ facie* probable.

The difficulty is to show that this *primâ facie* probability is not destroyed by chapters xv. and xvi., and that a reason-

<sup>1</sup> The idea has struck me that the title *πρὸς Ῥωμαίους* may possibly have been attached to it from the beginning. *Ῥωμαῖος* does not mean an inhabitant of Rome, but a member of the Roman Empire, and it might have been used in this sense in Antioch. But I attach no importance to this suggestion.

able hypothesis can be suggested which retains the advantages of this theory, and yet explains how the two chapters in question came to be attached to the epistle so as to form the long recension.

Sanday and Headlam (who fully accept the existence of the short recension) have long ago pointed out that no theory is satisfactory which does not recognize a connexion of thought between chapters xiv. and xv. This is incontrovertible, but the conclusion which is drawn by them from the fact is unnecessarily far-reaching. They argue that therefore no theory can be accepted which does not regard the short recension as later in time than the long one. If this were the case, I think we should be forced to accept the Marcionite hypothesis with all its important consequences as to the history of the text and the value of existing MSS. But it is not necessary to accept this reasoning. An alternative theory is that St. Paul himself sent a copy of the "short recension" to Rome when he was in Corinth, and added the last two chapters as a "covering letter," in which he naturally took up and expanded the theme which was found at the end of his enclosure. A more or less imaginative reconstruction of the circumstances would be the following :—St. Paul was in Corinth, on the point of departure for Jerusalem, when he was told that Phœbe of Cenchrea was going to Rome, and would like an introduction to his friends in Rome. This was the occasion of his sending a short letter introducing Phœbe and explaining his plans for visiting Rome on his next journey. But he knew through Aquila that in Rome there were difficulties between the Jews and Christians.<sup>1</sup> Now this was just the subject which had been

<sup>1</sup> This is not imaginative, but a legitimate deduction from the statement of Suetonius that the edict of Claudius, which led to Aquila's withdrawal from Rome, was due to an uproar among the Jews—*impulsore Chresto*. How Christianity reached Rome we do not know: but the evidence of Aquila and Suetonius shows that it did so before the year 50 A.D.

the cause of his writing the "short recension" some years previously, so he enclosed a copy and made his "covering letter" begin in such a way as to carry on the thoughts with which he had ended formerly.

The only objection that I can see to this hypothesis is St. Paul ought to have described in his covering letter the contents of his enclosure. It is true that would have been more natural, especially had he been using modern paper and envelopes. But I take it that what happened was that St. Paul told Tertius to make a copy of the "short recension" and then dictated the remainder. If the Romans wished to know any more about the form of the document, and why it so plainly consisted of two parts separated by the doxology, they must ask Phœbe, or quite possibly Aquila knew the facts about the short recension already and would see what St. Paul had done.

The history of the epistle after it reached Rome is another problem which can never be solved with certainty, yet I think that we can form a fair guess. The growth of the *corpus Paulinum* is practically unknown to us. All that we know is that in the second century the progress of collecting Pauline epistles was going on in more than one place, so that in one locality there was one order, in another something different. That is to say, at an early period churches began to exchange copies of St. Paul's epistles, not because of their intrinsic value as letters, but because they were Pauline. It was for that reason that the Epistle to Philemon came into the canon. Considerably earlier than this must have been the time when the letters were copied not simply because they were Pauline, but because they dealt with important subjects. During this time no epistles are more likely to have been copied than *Romans*—in the short form—and *Ephesians*, and as a matter of fact there is no epistle, except perhaps 1 *Corinthians*, which is so well attested in



the subapostolic period as these two. A scribe in Rome would be likely to copy the short form of Romans down to the doxology after xiv. 23, but not to go on to add the "covering letter"; thus the short form would come into circulation from Rome, and it is also probable that other copies were circulating in the East which were from the beginning independent of the Roman tradition. As soon, however, as the emphasis of interest came to fall not on the contents but on the authorship of the epistles the tendency was to copy and circulate everything which was Pauline, and so in future copies of *Romans* made in Rome the "covering letter" would be added, and the original form of the "long recension" (with the doxology still in the original place after xiv. 23?) would come into circulation, copies of the short recension would be amplified by the addition of the fresh material, and the complicated textual process described at the beginning of this article would begin. A parallel to this process may probably be found in 2 Corinthians. The remarkable book of Dr. Kennedy ought, I think, to convince every one who takes the trouble to study its pages that this epistle is really a combination of the fragments of two letters,<sup>1</sup> copied out in order in Corinth at a time when interest in anything Pauline had become a dominating feature of Christian literary activity. The interval evidence is here much stronger than it is in *Romans*, but on the other hand there is no trace of any textual evidence. It is perhaps interesting to ask why the textual tradition should be less strong in the case of 2 *Corinthians* than in that of *Romans*. Probably the answer is to be found in the

<sup>1</sup> J. H. Kennedy, *The Second and Third Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*. Methuen & Co., 1900. I fancy that this learned book has not generally received the recognition that it deserves. In spite of a certain obscurity of style, it seems to me to be far away the best book on the subject in any language, and to state the case in a way which avoids the objections usually made to the Vier-Capitel-Hypothese.

independent circulation of the short form of *Romans*, and in the fact that *2 Corinthians* seems to come into general use much later than *1 Corinthians*—Dr. Kennedy suggests only after the Epistle of Clement drove the Corinthians to look at their archives and find various fragments of an almost forgotten correspondence.

That the theory which is suggested as to the history of the Epistle to the Romans can never become more than a possible hypothesis is, of course, obvious, nor would I venture to claim that it has self-evident probability. But the fact that a "short form" did exist in the second and third centuries is certain, and has to be dealt with somehow. The theory which holds the field is that of a Marcionite recension: feeling that this is unsatisfactory, I have ventured to suggest an alternative which, though not simple, seems to me to do more justice to the facts, which are also not simple, and to be supported by the analogy of other epistles.

It only remains to deal with some subordinate points which could not be discussed advantageously in the course of the main argument.

(1) What was really the original text of *Romans* i. 7? We have in the oldest authorities a choice between *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν Πώμῃ ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ*, and *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ*. I suggest that the original was *τοῖς οὖσιν ἐν . . . ἀγαπήτοις θεοῦ*, with a blank for the name of community (just as seems to be the case in *Ephesians*). If the name were not filled in and the blank space not left we should get in connected script **ΤΟΙΣΟΥΣΙΝΕΝΑΓΑΠΗΤΟΙΣΘΕΟΥ**, and a very natural correction would be the removal of the **ΤΟΙΣ** before **ΘΕΟΥ**. If this be not so, I think *ἐν ἀγάπῃ θεοῦ* is probably the right reading and *ἀγαπήτοις* a stylistic emendation, though the point is difficult to decide.

(2) An advantage of the theory suggested is that it enables us to bring *Romans* and *Galatians* chronologically together,

and to have fewer doubts as to the true date of *Galatians*. It may be said in general that the most obvious lines of argument tend to place *Galatians* before 1 *Corinthians* and close to the Apostolic Council, but there has always been the difficulty that *Galatians* is so like *Romans*, and *Romans* seemed to be fixed after 2 *Corinthians*. This has been felt especially by Lightfoot and Askwith, and their arguments have never been answered but only put aside. If, however, *Romans* i. to xiv. be separated from xv. to xvi. the position is turned, and we can bring *Galatians* and *Romans* i.–xiv. together without difficulty.

(3) It may be said that the early date suggested for *Romans* i. to xiv. is negatived by a comparison between *Romans* xiv. and 1 *Corinthians* viii. This is a really serious point, but I think that the argument can and ought to be turned. *Romans* xiv. implies a difference of opinion about food in general; this is the situation implied by the Apostolic Council, and by the episode of St. Peter in Antioch, which ought probably to be placed just before the council. To my own mind it is most easily explained (as in *Galatians*) if it be placed before the agreement represented in the Apostolic decrees. On the other hand, 1 *Corinthians* viii. is not concerned with food in general, but with *εἰδωλόθυτα* and the practical working of the Apostolic decree against *εἰδωλόθυτα*, and this is the background against which the whole chapter must be placed in order to be understood. Placed against this 1 *Corinthians* viii. is intelligible,<sup>1</sup> and *Romans* xiv. is obscure—at least not to me—but it becomes clear as soon as it is placed against the different background which is earlier than the Apostolic decrees.

KIRSOPP LAKE.

<sup>1</sup> I would, however, guard myself against seeming to admit that the Apostolic decrees represent a Food-law,—but that is another question, and not a short one.