

SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

VIII. SIN ORIGINAL AND ACTUAL—THE DEPRAVED STATE.

THE study of heredity in the previous paper brought us into view of the question of what is known in theology as Original Sin. Is there such a thing? What has modern thought to say about it? If there are facts on which the doctrine rests, what are they, and how is it proposed to explain them?

This, it is well known, is the fundamental point in which the Augustinian and the Pelagian types of theology separate—the former affirming, the latter denying, the reality of a hereditary corruption and inborn depravity of nature.¹ Between the two came the mediating view known as Semi-Pelagianism, revived in many forms since, which weakened down the Augustinian (later the Calvinistic) view, and allowed to man's will a remanent spiritual freedom, and share in renewal (synergism). The Arminian controversy, the New England controversy, in which Jonathan Edwards took a notable part in defence of Original Sin, recent discussions in the Ritschlian School—Ritschl himself keenly opposing the doctrine—the new phases of the controversy as the result of the rise of the doctrine of evolution, evince the vitality and abiding importance of the problem.²

I. The question *thus lives*, but with a difference. Few will dispute in these days, however they may account for it, that there are powerful impulses in man's nature impeding and thwarting the realisation of the good. Some, indeed, take the matter quite lightly. Sir Oliver Lodge, for example, writes: "As for 'original sin' or 'birth sin' or

¹ For these views see the writer's *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 153 ff.

² A recent discussion in criticism of the doctrine is in Mr. F. H. Tennant's *Origin and Propagation of Sin* (Hulsean Lects.) and *Fall and Original Sin*.

other notion of that kind,—by which is partly meant the sin of his parents,—that sits absolutely lightly on him [the higher man of to-day]. As a matter of fact it is non-existent, and none but a monk could have invented it. Whatever it be, it is not a business for which we are responsible. We did not make the world; and an attempt to punish us for our animal origin and ancestry would be simply comic, if any one could be found who was willing seriously to believe it.”¹

This, however, does not express the deeper temper of the time. The Rousseau theory of the inherent goodness of human nature, with the superficial eighteenth century optimism that accompanied it, is now as good as dead in serious thought. It was before shown how unsparing was the blow which Kant (certainly no monk) struck at this “heroic opinion,” which, he says, “has perhaps obtained currency only amongst philosophers, and in our times chiefly among instructors of youth,” in his doctrine of “The Radical Evil of Human Nature” in the opening of his book on Religion.² Pessimism, with all its extravagances, and works like Nordau’s and Zola’s, give lurid prominence to sides of evil in human nature, and monstrosities of vice, the disquieting spectres of which can never again be laid. Pessimism, as one has said, like Macbeth, has “murdered sleep.”³ A passage from Professor Huxley—bizarre, and to be taken, where needful, *cum grano*—may be quoted as revealing his sense of the awfulness of the reality which Christianity seeks to express in the doctrines we are considering. “It is,” he

¹ *Man and the Universe*, p. 220. Cf. Mr. Campbell’s ch. iv. in his *New Theology*.

² Cf. Abbott’s translation, *Kant’s Theory of Ethics*, pp. 325 ff., 335, 339 ff. No theologian uses stronger language. “That there must be such a corrupt propensity rooted in men,” he says, “need not be formally proved in the face of the multitude of crying examples which experience sets before one’s eyes in the acts of men” (p. 339). He adduces some of the examples.

³ Flint, *Anti-Theistic Theories*, p. 294.

says, "the secret of the superiority of the best theological teachers to the majority of their opponents that they substantially recognise these realities of things, however strange the forms in which they clothe their conceptions. The doctrines of predestination, of original sin, of the innate depravity of man and the evil fate of the greater part of the race [?], of the primacy of Satan in this world, of the essential vileness of matter [?], of a malevolent Demiurgus subordinate to a benevolent Almighty, who has only lately revealed Himself [?], faulty as they are, appear to me vastly nearer the truth than the 'liberal' popular illusions that babies are all born good, and that the example of a corrupt society is responsible for their failure to remain so; that it is given to everybody to reach the ethical ideal if he will only try; that all partial evil is universal good, and other optimistic figments, such as that which represents 'Providence' under the guise of a paternal philanthropist, and bids us believe that everything will come right (according to our notions) at last."¹

By general admission, therefore there are impulses and tendencies in human nature at war with goodness. The thing which Original Sin stands for is present in the soul. But dispute arises on the borderland between religion, on the one hand, and science and philosophy, on the other, as to its turpitude, its origin and heritableness, and the degree of its evil. Are these wrong tendencies of the

¹ He adds: "I am a very strong believer in the punishment of certain kinds of actions, not only in the present, but in all the future a man can have, be it long or short. Therefore in hell, for I suppose that all men with a clear sense of right and wrong (and I am not sure that any others deserve such punishment) have now and then 'descended into hell' and stopped there quite long enough to know what infinite punishment means. And if a genuine, not merely subjective, immortality awaits us, I conceive that, without some such change as that depicted in the fifteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians, immortality must be eternal misery" (*Life and Letters*, II. pp. 303-4).

nature of *sin*, or is sin only in act? Are they hereditary—or how far? What is the explanation of them? The answer of the reigning scientific school has already been indicated. What the Church names Original Sin is, from the standpoint of science, an inheritance of man from his brute ancestry—an inheritance which, in its ceaseless struggle upwards, the race is increasingly throwing off.¹ This is the watchword of human progress.

“ Arise and fly,
The reeling Faun, the sensual feast;
Move upward, working out the beast,
And let the ape and tiger die.”²

These ape and tiger tendencies, it is held, are not sinful until voluntarily yielded to; even then the sin, through the all-enveloping ignorance of the subject, is hardly reckonable. The natural tendency is inheritable; not so, on the newer (Weismann) theory, the effects of the wrong volition. Christianity regards the matter in a totally different light. It sees in the existing perverted condition of human nature, not a natural result—no mere inheritance from the animal—but the baleful effect of a wilful departure from integrity in the progenitors of the race. It brands the state as evil, condemnable, a state of impurity abhorrent to God’s holiness. It acknowledges no laws or powers in human nature capable

¹ Cf. Fiske, *Man’s Destiny*: “ Thus we see what human progress means. It means throwing off the brute-inheritance,—gradually throwing it off through ages of struggle that are by and by to make struggle needless. . . . The ape and the tiger in human nature will become extinct. Theology has had much to say about original sin. This original sin is neither more nor less than the brute-inheritance which every man carries with him, and the progress of evolution is an advance towards true salvation ” (p. 103).

Prof. Huxley says, *Evolution and Ethics, Prolegomena*: “ That is their inheritance (the reality at the bottom of the doctrine of original sin) from the long series of ancestors, human and semi-human and brutal, in whom the strength of this innate tendency to self-assertion was the condition of victory in the struggle for existence ” (*Works*, ix, p. 27).

² Tennyson, *In Memoriam*.

of throwing off this evil inheritance through evolution or any natural effort ; but insists on the need of a spiritual renewal through divine agency. No middle path is visible between these two conceptions. It remains to be asked—which is the true one ?

II. It is not desired to cite Scripture in this connexion save as a witness to what *a given doctrine is*, or as any literature may be quoted, in testimony to *abiding facts of human nature*. This is an aspect of the use of Scripture too frequently ignored. Passages are freely admitted from ancient pagan writers, from Scriptures of other religions, from modern literature—poetry or fiction—from religious biographies, from narratives of missionaries and travellers, illustrative of human ideas, beliefs, customs, aspirations, follies, traits of character. But how seldom are the vast stores of experience presented in the Biblical books drawn upon for any similar purpose ! Here is an extensive literature, profound beyond comparison alongside any literature of religion the world contains, picturing human nature on all its sides in its relations to God, and in its ethical workings, yet it receives almost the complete go-by when the question is the scientific study of man's nature in its moral and spiritual relations. As with people who lay aside their Sunday books as too good to be read on week-days, the Bible is relegated to the closets of theologians, and, even when the subjects discussed are the most germane to its pages, is debarred an entrance to the sanctums of scientists and philosophers. Imagine Herbert Spencer introducing the Psalmists or St. Paul into his list of authorities on the subject of moral evil !

Yet, whatever else the Bible is, it contains undeniably the *classical literature* of the world on sin and righteousness, and on the experiences of men in these matters ; its testimony, therefore, ought not to be left unheard. The question here

is not one of adducing "texts" for dogmatic purposes, but of looking at the moral state of mankind in the clearest mirror ever held up to it in time. And what is the picture presented? How does it bear on the subject now under discussion?

Painting mankind in every light and shade, the Bible does no injustice to the gifts, virtues, affections, or religious susceptibilities, even of those whom it refuses to recognise as godly.¹ Will it, however, be denied that, on the subject of sin, its picture, from first to last, is that of a world turned aside from God, in disposition alienated from Him and rebellious, seeking its own ways, and never, till He in grace seeks and recovers it, finding its way back to Him or to holiness? A treatise like that of Jonathan Edwards on *Original Sin* may seem harsh in some of its aspects, but there is no escaping the remorseless logic of its accumulation of the Scriptural evidence on this crucial point. The Bible teaches *the universality of sin*, and the picture it presents unmistakably bears out the charge it brings. The facts are so familiar that it is hardly necessary to dwell on them. Leave aside the story of the Fall—though that, in substance, as said before, is needed to explain what follows,—suppose, if one will, that the Priestly writer (P) "knows nothing" of this catastrophe that lay before his eyes in the J primitive history,²—it is still the case that the first picture we get of the world in antediluvian times from both writers (J and P) is "that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually,"³ that "the earth was corrupt before God, and the earth was filled with violence . . . for all flesh had

¹ Take, e.g., in Genesis, the generosity of the King of Sodom, the courtesy of the sons of Heth to Abraham, the sense of honour of Abimelech at Gerar, the liberality of the Pharaoh of Joseph.

² It was before mentioned that Wellhausen assumes P's acquaintance with the history of the Fall in J.

³ Gen. vi. 5.

corrupted their way upon the earth.”¹ The condition after the Flood is presumed to be not better (“the imagination of man’s heart is evil from his youth”²), and the subsequent history shows it was not. Sodom was only an acute anticipation³ of the rapidly developing corruption of the Canaanitish nations which led, after a period of forbearance,⁴ to their being swept out for their intolerable iniquities.⁵ A godly seed was preserved in the line of Abraham, but how much sin interweaves itself with the patriarchal histories! Regarding the Israelites themselves, every one knows how, despite their exceptional privileges, the Biblical narratives are little else than a rehearsal of their ingratitude, rebellions, murmurings, and unfaithfulness to Jehovah. Let one of many passages from the prophets suffice to sum up the whole. “For the children of Israel and the children of Judah have done only that which was evil in my sight from their youth; for the children of Israel have only provoked me to anger with the work of their hands, saith the Lord. For this city hath been to me a provocation of mine anger and of my wrath from the day that they built it even unto this day.”⁶ Is this language regarded as morbid? It is not so according to the standard by which the Bible uniformly measures sin. The idolatry, cruelty, immorality of the nations surrounding Israel are pictured in the same prophetic pages.

The testimony of the New Testament regarding the prevalence and malignity of sin, and the hopeless condition of mankind under it, is not less pronounced. Jesus in the Gospels stands over a sick world as the only physician who can give it life.⁷ For Him, while the beauty and innocence of childhood furnish a rebuke to the self-seeking ambition

¹ vi. 11, 12.

² viii. 21.

³ Gen. xiii. 13; xviii. 20; xix.

⁴ Gen. xv. 16.

⁵ Lev. xviii. 24-28.

⁶ Jer. xxxii. 30, 31; cf. Ezek. ii. 3, 4.

⁷ Matt. ix. 12. It is not to be supposed that Jesus accepts the Pharisees as being “whole.”

that excludes from the Kingdom,¹ the seat of sin is still in the heart,² and no language is stronger than that in which He pictures the foul streams that issue from this source, "For out of the heart come forth evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, railings."³ There is no one born of flesh, He teaches Nicodemus, in a discourse the genuineness of which need not be doubted, but needs regeneration.⁴ How else, indeed, save through an awful and rooted ungodliness of spirit, explain the rejection and crucifixion of One so holy? The light shone in darkness, but the darkness apprehended it not; ⁵ "He came unto His own, and they that were His own received Him not."⁶ St. Paul's teaching is too well known to need detailed elucidation. Jew and Gentile are alike under sin.⁷ The world, knowing God, parted with that knowledge, and sank into grossest corruption.⁸ They that are in the flesh cannot please God.⁹ The Gentile condition is vividly depicted: "Being darkened in their understanding, alienated from the life of God, because of the ignorance that is in them, because of the hardening of their heart."¹⁰ "Among whom we also all once lived in the lusts of our flesh, doing the desires of the flesh and of the mind, and were by nature children of wrath, even as the rest."¹¹ Specially valuable, because personal, is the apostle's description of his own experience. "I know that in me, that is, in my flesh, dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me, but to do that which is good is not. . . . I find then the law,

¹ Matt. xviii. 1-4.

² Matt. v. 21, 22, 27, 28, etc.

³ Matt. xv. 19.

⁴ John iii. 3-7.

⁵ John i. 5.

⁶ Ver. 11.

⁷ Rom. iii. 9, 19, 20.

⁸ Rom. viii. 8.

¹⁰ Eph. iv. 18.

⁹ Rom. i. 18 ff.

¹¹ Eph. ii. 3.

that, to me who would do good, evil is present. For I delight in the law of God after the inward man ; but I see a different law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity under the law of sin which is in my members. Wretched man that I am ! who shall deliver me out of the body of this death ? ”¹ Here is a testimony which science dare not ignore, any more than any other fact of experience, in its theorising upon sin.

This *universal fact* of sin, so deeply imprinted in the history of mankind, demands an adequate explanation. What is that explanation ? To speak of education, evil example, environment, as causes, save in a secondary respect, is futile. It is, as has often been pointed out, but to explain the evil of the world by itself.² The problem remains, Whence this prevailing ungodliness ? this powerful bias to sin ? this disposition in the heart, of which every one is conscious, to go astray ? Why no powerful and victorious counter-strain ? The confession is without exception : “ All we like sheep have gone astray : we have turned every-one to his own way.”³ Is blame cast on the constitution of nature—of human nature, or of the world ? Then Sir Oliver Lodge would be right : “ It is not a business for which we are responsible. We did not make the world.”⁴ Re-

¹ Rom. vii. 18–24. The verbal parallel in Ovid (*Met.* vii. 19) is familiar : *Video meliora proboque, deteriora sequor.* Kant quotes Horace (*Sat.* i. 3, 68) : *Nam vitis nemo sine nascitur.*

² The remarks of Jonathan Edwards are still pertinent on example : “ It is accounting for the thing by the thing itself. . . . For, that bad examples are general all over the world to be followed by others, and have been so from the beginning, is only an instance, or rather a description, of that corruption of the world which is to be accounted for. If mankind are naturally no more inclined to evil than good, then how come there to be so many more bad examples than good ones, in all ages ? . . . If the propensity of man’s nature be not to evil, how comes the current of general example, everywhere, and at all times, to be so much to evil ? ” (*Original Sin*, Works, i. p. 570).

³ Isa. liii. 6. A singular corroborative proof is the unwillingness of modern writers to grant even the freedom of Jesus from sin. On this later,

⁴ *Ut supra.*

sponsibility rolls back on the Creator, for it is He who has appointed the constitution which works out these evil results. Is it then free-will? But behind "free-will" stands this propensity which apparently issues in free-will being universally abused to sin. Or is it, mayhap, only a temporary handicap, an incentive to progress, from which the race is gradually working itself free? So evolution says, but in the teeth of the experience of the ages. Barbarism does not cure its own evils. Civilisation does not spell freedom from vice—witness the European countries of to-day. The finest civilisations of antiquity ended in moral bankruptcy. One looks in vain to Mohammedan, Buddhist, Hindu lands to work out their moral salvation. We are compelled to probe deeper in our search for an answer to these questions!

III. The problem resolves itself into several parts.

1. A first question is—Does sin consist solely in voluntary *acts* (thus Pelagius and others), or does it inhere also in *dispositions*? Are there sinful dispositions as well as sinful acts? More generally, have dispositions, or states of soul, an ethical quality equally with acts? It is impossible not to agree with Mozley in his acute discussion of the Augustinian and Pelagian positions on this point in his treatise on *Predestination*, that there is a goodness and a sinfulness in dispositions as well as in acts.¹ Our ordinary moral

¹ *Op. cit.*, 3rd edit., pp. 62-70. "The general sense of mankind acknowledges what are called good natural dispositions; that some persons have by nature a good bias in one or other direction, are amiable, courageous, truthful, humble naturally, or have a certain happy configuration. . . . It would be absurd to say that such dispositions as these were not virtuous, and that such natural goodness was not real goodness." Similarly, as regards evil: "Amid the obscurity which attaches to this class of questions, something to which mankind had borne large testimony would be relinquished in denying the existence of bad natural dispositions. . . . The general sense of mankind is certainly on the side of there being good and bad natural dispositions" (pp. 64-5, 70-1). See also the writer's *Progress of Dogma*, pp. 156-7. What is here said of good dispositions is not in-

judgments and the usage of language alike recognise the fact. There are affections—benevolence, unselfishness, fidelity, etc., which we unhesitatingly pronounce ethically good; there are contrary dispositions—e.g., malevolence, cruelty, envy—which we as clearly declare to be evil. There are evil feelings, evil desires, evil habits, evil *character*. To these wrong dispositions, and the propensities to evil that go with them, we attach, with the Apostle,¹ the character of “sin.” Even Ritschl, with his uncompromising polemic against hereditary sin, yet acknowledges that the sinful deed reacts on the soul that produces it, and creates a sinful propensity (*Hang*), then a habit, from which results evil character.²

2. A deeper question next arises as to the *voluntary origin* of good and evil dispositions. Are we entitled to pronounce those dispositions alone good or evil which are the products of our own voluntary acts? Some take this ground, which seems favoured by what has been said of the connexion of will with morality. Ritschl, e.g., maintains that nothing can be pronounced evil which does not spring from the moral decision of the individual.³ Mozley, on the other hand, speaks of a “natural and necessary” evil, as well as of a “natural” goodness.⁴ Augustine has a view

consistent with that lack of godliness and sin-ward tendency which the doctrine we are considering affirms (cf. Mozley, pp. 56 ff.).

¹ Rom. vii. 13, 14, 17, 20, 23, 25.

² “Through actions, according to the direction they take, the will acquires its nature, and develops into a good or evil character” (*Justif. and Recon.*, pp. 336-7, E.T.). This rather conflicts with Ritschl’s objection to original sin as derived from his theory of knowledge, which allows no subsistence to the soul other than in its activities. Permanent character as much as heredity implies a permanent basis.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 337: “Only if we discern in the individual action the proof-mark of the independence of the will can we ascribe to ourselves, not merely individual actions, but likewise evil habit or evil inclination.” Kant would explain the evil disposition by a *supersensible* act of freedom; Julius Müller by *pre-existent* volition, etc. On Coleridge’s peculiar theory cf. Mozley, *Op. cit.*, note xii.

⁴ *Op. cit.* p. 70.

which seems deeper and truer, for it is necessary here to make a distinction between good and evil. Of *good* dispositions—here Mozley is surely right—it cannot be affirmed that they must be voluntarily produced in order to be good. On the contrary, unless the good disposition were there to begin with, there could be no acts of good will at all. It is the old question raised by Aristotle—Is a man virtuous because he does virtuous acts, or are the acts virtuous, because they are the acts of a virtuous man? ¹ The latter is surely the correct view.² Take, for instance, the supreme command, that we love God and our neighbour. Love to God, plainly, is not the product of acts of love; the love must precede the acts by which it is expressed. Unless there is antecedent love in the heart, how can the acts be loving? How can the command to love be even understood, not to say fulfilled? What is true here is that to constitute character, habits, in the full sense of the word,—to deepen, establish, strengthen, confirm love,—love must be taken into the will, and embodied in action. “Whoso keepeth His word,” the Apostle John says, “in him verily hath the love of God been *perfected*.” ³

This applies to goodness. But it does not follow that the same law applies to *evil*. Just because it is held that evil is not an original endowment of human nature, but has its origin in perversity, it must be contended that dispositions, so far as they are evil, or the disorder of the soul that makes them evil, are not natural, but have always a *voluntary origin*. That is, what we cannot affirm of primary good dispositions, we must affirm of all evil ones. Here again, however, it is necessary to distinguish. Evil dispositions

¹ *Nic. Ethics*, ii. 4; cf. Luther, *Com. on Galatians*, on ch. iii. 10; Edwards, *Op. cit.*, Works, i. pp. 177–8.

² Mozley, *Op. cit.*, pp. 64–5.

³ 1 John ii. 5.

must have a voluntary origin, but it does not follow that they have this origin, as Ritschl holds, solely in the individual. We are not simply individuals. There is a *racial* life in which, as already seen, all are involved. The voluntary origin of the evil disposition may lie far behind the individual—may go back even to the beginning. This does not destroy its evil character. It is evil through its *very nature*, no matter at what stage in the development of the race it originated. Selfishness, pride, malice, falseness, are evil qualities, and their evil cannot be got rid of by pleading that, to some degree, they are inherited. We do not exonerate a thief when we learn that he has an innate propensity to thieving,¹ or a liar when we are informed that the tendency to lying seemed born with him. We rather judge him to be a *worse* character on this account, though we may allow that he is not personally so responsible as if he had wilfully formed the evil habit. We both pity and condemn him. The place of will here, as before, is seen to be to confirm, strengthen, *fix*, the hereditary disposition. But it may also, under better influences, resist and overcome it.

3. We are thus brought back to the question of *heritableness*, and with it of *responsibility*. The general possibility of the transmission of vitiated tendencies, originating in wrong volition, was touched on in the previous paper, and may receive light in what follows. Traducianism and Creationism have long fought their battles, probably each with some measure of truth, as to the mode of the propagation of a corrupted nature, but their disputes need not disturb our present inquiry. God's concurrence is no more involved in the hereditary transmission of an evil quality than it is in its presence and continuance in the individual soul, however originated; nor, if psychical traits are transmitted from parent to child, as assuredly they are, is any

¹ A form of insanity, like kleptomania, is differently judged.

contradiction implied, unless on a basis like Weismann's, already discussed, in the [inclusion in the transmission of elements of perversion and disorder. It is granted that it is impossible to conceive of such transmission, as modern theories tend to conceive of heredity, as a purely physical or mechanical process. The fault here, however, lies with theories which suppose that the transmission of *any* physical characters can be thus explained. Soul-life is more than any subtle, even if infinitely complicated, arrangement of particles.

There remains still the difficult question of *personal responsibility* for inherited evil tendencies—a difficulty to which the remarks formerly made on responsibility under heredity in part apply. Paradoxical it certainly seems to be—yet true as paradoxical—that there is a sinful root in our natures, yet that we are responsible for the sin that proceeds from it.¹ That the tendency is evil even natural conscience affirms; that we are responsible for yielding to it, and embodying it in act, is a not less universal experience. Here, on the other hand, the idea of race connexion, of organic constitution, of corporate responsibility, comes in as against an exaggerated individualism. We are not separable units, but parts of a whole, the abilities and disabilities of which we perforce share. On the other hand, deeper even than race-connexion is the reality of *personality*. The individual is conscious of a bondage, yet knows it is not *fate*, but a power of *sin*—a something which *ought not* to be—from which he seeks deliverance. This carries with it a feeling of responsibility for the sin of thought, word, and deed, which springs from the evil state. It may be a mitigated responsibility, but it is a responsibility; for the act is *his*, and it is *evil*. This irrespective of the ultimate origin of the wrong tendency. In personality at the same time,—this *uninherited*, original part of man's being,—lies

¹ Cf. Mozley, *Op. cit.* pp. 56 ff.

the hope of his redemption. Deliverance, it may be said with reverence, would be impossible, if sin had really penetrated to the depths of personality,—if the individual were *identified* with his sin, as is the case in the stage of obduracy,—if it were not possible, so to speak, to get behind the sinful decisions of the will, and present it with a new alternative, that which “the law of the mind”—the better self (*νοῦς*) has held before it from the first.¹ Man’s misery, then, is great, but not so great that he is not redeemable. Sin is at first a principle, a tendency undeveloped; in its development the will is enthralled; but there is a power greater than sin that can break the bondage, if the original enmity is overcome.²

IV. In the light of these considerations, we are better able to judge of the *counter-theories* in explanation of Original Sin. If there are really, not simply natural, but positively evil tendencies in the soul,—if there are God-denying tendencies,—if these, in their nature as evil, imply a voluntary cause,—then the “brute-inheritance,” the “ape and tiger” theory of Original Sin is already *ipso facto* condemned as inadequate. The essence of the mystery is untouched. One wonders, as hinted earlier, why “ape and tiger” should be introduced at all. “Ape” characteristics are comprehensible, if man has descended through the apes; but why “tiger,” through whom he has not descended? Or why not extend the list to vulpine, bovine, serpentine, swinish, and all the other animal traits which reproduce themselves as conspicuously in different individuals? Does man, on evolutionary lines, combine all, though descended from none? But even if all animal propensities are accounted for, man’s existing moral condition is not explained.

¹ Rom. vii. 21-3. Ritschl is wrong in thinking that the doctrine of Original Sin recognises no *grades* in sin within that initial separation from God in principle which results from the primal transgression.

² Rom. vi. 12 ff.; viii. 1-11, etc.

1. The state in which man finds himself is, it has been seen, one in which the lower desires and passions hold an *undue ascendancy* over the higher and spiritual, and, the spiritual bond that should hold them in check being cut, are themselves, turbulent and disorderly. The higher nature is in "bondage" to the lower. The "flesh" rules. This is not a state which the mere presence of animal propensities can explain to the satisfaction of moral law.

2. It is not animal propensities alone that man is aware of in his nature; he is conscious of principles, tendencies, dispositions, implying reason and will, which are *themselves evil*, and which produce only evil results. St. Paul's list of the "works of the flesh" is recalled here;¹ also Christ's saying, already quoted, on the evils that proceed from the heart.² The Apostle speaks of "evil desire"³ and of "the passions of sin"⁴ in the nature.

3. It was found that sin, in principle, is traceable back to a God-denying "egoism"—to a self-will that exalts itself above God and moral law alike. It is this aspect of sin as "ungodliness" on which the supreme stress is laid in Scripture. Man has forsaken his Creator, is ignorant of His character, disobedient to His will, unresponsive to His calls, cleaving foolishly and recklessly to his own worldly and sinful ways.⁵ Only familiarity can veil from us the awful heinousness of such a state; only thoughtlessness can hide the

¹ Gal. v. 19-21.

² Matt. xv. 19.

³ Col. iii. 5.

⁴ Rom. vii. 5. These representations seem opposed to purely *privative* theories of Original Sin, favoured even by Jon. Edwards (*Works*, i. pp. 217-19), according to which man's state results from withdrawal of supernatural gifts, and his being left to the sway of "natural and inferior principles," which then work corruption. On patristic views of Original Sin, see Mozley, *Op. cit.*, ch. v.

⁵ E.g., Ps. x. 4; Isa. i. (cf. G. A. Smith *in loc.*); Rom. iii. 18; Eph. ii. 12; iv. 18. Striking historical illustrations of the alternate attraction and repulsion of the idea of God are given in an older work, McCosh's *Method of the Divine Government*, 10th edit., pp. 48 ff.

marvel involved in it—that beings made in God's image, and capable of knowing, loving, and serving Him, should yet repel, shun, dislike, flee from Him; should resent being reminded of Him, should *wish* to be without Him! Surely no one thinking rightly will say that this is even *natural*. There is more than naturalness, or even *unnaturalness* in it—there is *sin*, guilt.

The explanation of such a perverted moral condition it goes far beyond the province of "evolution" to furnish. It points to a world-wide defection traceable back to disobedience in the beginnings of the race.

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THE PLACE OF REWARDS IN THE TEACHING OF CHRIST.

II. EXAMINATION OF CHRIST'S TEACHING ON THE SUBJECT IN VIEW OF THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST IT.

THERE is one point in connexion with the rewards which Christ holds forth, which may tend to differentiate them from the vulgar reward referred to above, which becomes a direct bribe to virtue—viz., that they are almost always referred to as rewards laid up for us *in heaven*. It is true that in answer to Peter, who speaks of the great privation he and his fellow-disciples have endured, Christ declares that "there is no man that hath left house, or brethren, or sisters, or father, or mother, or wife, or children, or lands, for My sake, and the gospel's, but he shall receive an hundredfold *now in this time*, houses, and brethren, and sisters, and mothers, and children, and lands, with persecutions; and in the world to come eternal life" (Mark x. 29 f.). But it is evident from the terms in which Christ refers to the restitution to be made that it is no material