slavery, for example—which the Light of Christ was in
time to convict and to abolish. And both by the words
and by the actions of those to whom our deepest reverence
is due, we are warned that the faith which justifies is in
greater danger from religion and ecclesiastical rule than from
the common righteousness of the world.

J. LLEWELYN DAVIES.

SIN AS A PROBLEM OF TO-DAY.

III. SIN AND THE DIVINE HOLINESS—THE MORAL END.

HOLINESS, as Christianity understands it, is a name for
the undimmed lustre of God’s ethical Perfection. God is
“the Holy One”—the alone “Good” in the absolute
sense,1—and it is only when sin is lifted up into the light of
this moral glory of God’s character that its full enormity
and hatefulness are disclosed. The divine Holiness is a
postulate of the Christian doctrine of sin.

1. It is not necessary to spend time on philological
discussions as to the primitive meaning of the word “holy,” 2
or as to the stages of the growth of the idea in the Old
and New Testaments. It is more important to deal with
the essential elements in the idea, as these come out in the
result. On the former point—the origin and growth of
the idea—many questionable things are often said. “To
us,” Dr. W. R. Smith observes truly, “holiness is an ethical

1 Mark x. 18.
2 In Old Testament, ἁγιός, holiness; ἁγιός, holy. In New Testa-
ment, ἁγιός. The root-meaning of the Old Testament word is obscure.
Some (Gesenius, Dillmann, etc.), find the root-idea in “pure,” “clear,”
“bright,” or similar notion; others (Baudissin, etc.) find the idea in
“separation.” The latter is the view at present more generally favoured.
Dr. Robertson Smith apparently begins with holy places and things (Rel. of
Semites, Lects. iii.–iv.), but in Israel, at least, it was not so. “The probability
is,” as Dr. A. B. Davidson says, “that the application of the term
idea. God, the perfect being, is the type of holiness; men are holy in proportion as their lives and character are Godlike; places and things can be called holy only by a figure, on account of their association with spiritual things."

"This conception of holiness," he adds, "goes back to the Hebrew prophets, especially to Isaiah; but it is not the ordinary conception of antique religion, nor does it correspond to the original sense of the Semitic words that we translate by 'holy'." ¹ The assertion, accordingly, is common that ethical quality did not enter into the original conception of Jehovah as holy.² We hold, on the contrary, with Dillmann,³ that the ethical is an element entering into the idea of God's Holiness in the Biblical revelation from the beginning. The word "holy" is not, indeed, found in Genesis—as, however, we should expect it to be, if it was, as some think, a simple synonym for deity; but in Genesis the thing denoted by the word is present. God is the Judge of all the earth.⁴ He requires men to walk before Him, and be perfect.⁵ He accepts and saves the righteous.⁶ He overwhelms a sinful world, and sinful cities,⁷ with His judgments. Joseph must not do wickedness, and sin before God.⁸ Even were it granted, as Dr. Davidson holds, that "holy," as applied to Jehovah, was "a general term expressing Godhead,"⁹ the case is not

¹ Rel. of Semites, p. 132.
³ Dillmann finds the "principle," "the fundamental thought," "the characteristic mark," of the Old Testament religion not simply in its Monotheism, or (with Hegel) in its "sublimity" (Erhabenheit, exaltation of God above the creature), but in the idea of God as "Holy," with inclusion of the ethical element,—"the turning away from all evil and sinfulness, goodness and ethical perfection." He rejects the view that the demands for ethical holiness are "first late (prophetic or even post-prophetic) demands" (Alttest. Theol., pp. 25 ff.; 252 ff.).
⁴ Gen. xviii. 25. ⁵ Gen. xvii. 1; xviii. 19. ⁶ Abel, Enoch, Noah, etc. ⁷ The Deluge. ⁸ Sodom and Gomorrah. ⁹ Gen. xxxix. 9.
essentially altered. For it is allowed that "Godhead was never a mere abstract conception," and that "holiness" had its meaning filled out from the attributes ascribed to God. But among these attributes were the ethical.

2. As essential elements entering into the idea of the divine Holiness in Scripture, we seem justified, with Dillmann, Martensen, and others, in distinguishing these two. The term "holy" denotes God (1) in His distinction from, and infinite exaltation above, everything that is creaturely and finite; and (2) in His separation from all moral impurity, or, positively, in the splendour of His moral perfection. In the first aspect, which brings into view the awfulness, unapproachableness, majesty of God, "Holiness" does little more than express, as the writers above referred to contend, the idea of "Godhead"—hence even the heathen can speak of "the holy gods." In the second aspect, "Holiness" is something peculiar to the God of Israel. Even on the side on which it expresses the exalted-


2 We take it, therefore, to rest on erroneous theory when it is affirmed: "In early [Biblical?] times, at least, the holiness of the gods had no definite meaning apart from the holiness of their physical surroundings" (Hastings' *D. B.*, ii. p. 397; cf. Smith, *Rel. of Semites*, p. 141). It seems equally unwarranted to declare that in Ezekiel "the divine holiness appears to denote no other attribute than that of majesty, exhibited in the exercise of irresistible power (*Ibid.*; cf. Davidson, *Introduct. to Com. on Ezekiel*). This would, indeed, be an extraordinary descent from earlier prophetic teaching; but facts do not bear it out. Ezekiel had the intensest convictions of the divine righteousness (e.g., chap. xviii.; cf. Davidson, *in loc.*); this must have been included in his conception of holiness. He was, besides, a man whose mind was saturated with the ideas of the ritual law [*"It appears to me that the Book of Ezekiel shows that before his day the ritual was almost the same as it became after the Restoration," Davidson, *Theol. of Old Testament*, p. 19], especially with the ideas and language of the so-called "Law of Holiness," in which, unquestionably, the word "holy" has a strong ethical, as well as ceremonial, connotation (Lev. xix. 2 ff., xx. 7, 8, etc.). It was by their *sins* the people had profaned the holy name of Jehovah (Ezek. xxxvi. 21-27).


4 Daniel iv. 8, 19, etc.; the inscription of Eshmunazar (Phœnician).
ness and majesty of God, however, it is important to notice that "Holiness" is not a mere natural attribute, but involves an ethical element. God is not "holy" simply through the fact of His majesty; the word expresses rather a determination of His will, through which He maintains Himself in His distinction from the creature, and cannot permit any derogation from His honour.\(^1\) Just as, on the other side, the moral character of God is raised by its connexion with His absoluteness to a height of sanctity which inspires the profoundest awe, dread, and reverence in the worshipper.\(^2\) It is this awful moral purity of God,—this light of Holiness in presence of which evil cannot stand,—which, in the Old Testament, is God's chief glory; in the New Testament its sublimity, while as fully recognised,\(^3\) is softened by the gentler radiance of love. Only as Holiness is morally conceived, has the command, "Be ye holy, for I am holy,"\(^4\) any meaning. In Isaiah's vision, only the ethical could call forth the prophet's confession of uncleanness.\(^5\) In the New Testament it is the ethical aspect of Holiness which is the prominent one in both God and man.

3. The two aspects of Holiness here signalised are one in the nature of God, but become known to man through the fact of God's self-revelation. It is not as man grows in moral conceptions that he gradually creates for himself the image of a God of stainless perfection; it is, conversely,

\(^1\) Cf. Martensen, *op. cit.*, p. 99. Oehler says: "It follows that the divine holiness, even if, as absolute perfection of life, it involves the negation of all bounds of creature finitude, is nevertheless mainly seclusion from the impurity and sinfulness of the creature, or, expressed positively, the clearness and purity of the divine nature, which excludes all communion with what is wicked" (*op. cit.*, i. p. 160).

\(^2\) Isa. vi. 1–5; cf. 1 Peter i. 16, 17, iii. 15. The connexion between the holy majesty and ethical character of Jehovah is seen in such passages as 1 Sam. ii. 2, 3; Hab. i. 12, 13.

\(^3\) John xvii. 11; cf. xii. 41; Heb. x. 31, xii. 18–29; Rev. xv. 4, etc.

\(^4\) Lev. xi. 44, xix. 2; 1 Peter i. 16, 17.

\(^5\) Isa. vi. 5.
in the light of the revelation of God's Holiness that man comes to know himself as sinful, and has set before him an ideal of Holiness to which he aspires. Philosophy pleads for autonomy in ethics. But there is one word to which philosophical ethics cannot give its proper meaning—this word "Holiness." Religion gives the word its significance by interpreting it to mean ethical purity like to God's. It is much of itself to have the obligations to which conscience naturally testifies united with the idea of a divine Being, whose will they represent, and with whose character they correspond. As thus lifted up, obligation is magnified and strengthened. It acquires an awfulness and solemnity it could not otherwise possess. A sense of responsibility of peculiar sacredness is developed. The very elevation to which duty is now raised—the consciousness of new duties to God, the call to love, trust, and worship—exalt the moral ideal, while they deepen the sense of personal unworthiness. Vastly greater are the effects produced, when to the quickening of natural conscience is added the disclosure of God's own character as holy and gracious in the words and deeds of his special revelation: when, as in Israel, Holiness is seen manifesting itself in works of power and mercy, in judging and punishing transgression, in fidelity to promise and covenant, in righteous laws, in demands for faith and obedience, in the uniting of blessing with ethical conditions. The supreme revelation of God's Holiness, however, as of everything else in God, is again that given in Christ—the holy and incarnate Son. Be

1 "While religion without morality cannot, in our day, count on many advocates, morality without religion finds no lack of such" (Martensen, op. cit., p. 15).

2 Ceremonial ordinances take a lower, if still necessary, place in this process of education. In the Bible they are truly part of a divine economy—"shadows of the good things to come," as the Epistle to the Hebrews represents them (chaps. ix., x.).
the process of development what one will, the result is indubitable: God is conceived of in Christianity as the absolutely ethically perfect Being—the Holy God, if also the God of Fatherly Love, to whom moral impurity in every form and degree is abhorrent.

4. For the rest, it may be sufficient to say that, if "Holiness" be the most comprehensive name for the divine moral perfection, the lustre of this perfection, in the separation of its rays, yields what we designate as the special moral attributes. These are grouped, perhaps, most conveniently under "righteousness" (truth, faithfulness, justice, zeal, etc.), and "love" (goodness, pity, mercy, longsuffering, etc.), though in reality all are but expressions of the one undivided life. It is plain, further, that, if Holiness has been rightly described, it cannot be regarded as simply a passive perfection of the divine Being—a "glory" or "beauty" of character—but must be thought of as an intensely active principle, a living energy, asserting itself in the upholding of the good, and the condemnation and judgment of the bad. Against sin, from eternity to eternity, the holy God cannot but declare Himself. "Wrath" is not extraneous to His nature, but is a vital element in His perfection. "Our God is a consuming fire." But judgment is no delight to Him, and the ultimate end which Holiness strives after is, not the destruction of the sinner,

1 1 Peter i. 16, 17.
2 B. Stade, whose views on the development are radical enough, says that the view of God in the revelation of Jesus is not related to that of the Old Testament as its opposite, but as its completion and perfecting. It includes the following "weighty and characteristic" features, received from Judaism: "that God is supramundane Spirit, World-Creator and World-Preserver, therefore eternal, all-powerful, all-knowing, and ethically holy, i.e., acting according to the most perfect standards, and that His creation and preservation of the world stand in the service of a plan of salvation for mankind, and have for their end a Kingdom into which all men are called" (Bib. Theol. des A.T., p. 79).
3 Heb. xii. 29.
but the restoration of the divine image, and the union of all beings in love.¹

It must now be apparent how deeply the idea of the divine Holiness enters into the Christian conception of sin. Where this idea is absent, or where "holy" is only an unethical predicate of the gods viewed as removed from men, there may still, from the promptings of the natural conscience, be a sense of sin and guilt, moving to penitential utterances, and to acts for the removal of that guilt. There can never, however, be the same sense of sin's awful evil, and of its hatefulness in the sight of God, as where, in the light of revelation, God is truly known, and the impression of His Holiness is deeply felt. It is, indeed, singular how sensitive the natural conscience sometimes is, even in heathenism, to wrongdoing as sin, and how unerringly, often, it pierces the grossest veils of polytheism in its conviction of a Power that judges righteously, and punishes the evildoer.² Tertullian makes effective use of this spontaneous testimony of the soul to the true God ³—the "soul naturally Christian," as he calls it in his Apology; ⁴ and heathen literature of all ages abounds in illustrations of the same thing. In the Egyptian Precepts of Ptah-hotep,⁵ e.g.,

¹ Ezek. xviii. 32, xxxiii. 11; Eph. iv. 13–17; Col. iii. 10.
² Mr. A. Lang does service in collecting the evidence, much of it recent, to the higher religious conceptions and the connexion of religion and morality among low savages, where the existence of such ideas had been denied. (See his Making of Religion, chaps. ix., xiii.) Livingstone testified of the Bakwains: "Nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them as otherwise"—polygamy excepted (Miss. Travels, pp. 158: in Lang).
³ De Test. Animi, c. 2. "Thou affirmest Him to be God alone to whom thou givest no other name than God. . . . Nor is the nature of the God we declare unknown to thee: 'God is good,' 'God does good,' thou art wont to say. . . . So thou art always ready, O soul, from thine own knowledge, nobody casting scorn upon thee, and no one preventing, to exclaim, 'God sees all,' and 'I commend thee to God,' and 'May God repay,' and 'God shall judge between us.' How happens this, since thou art not Christian?"
⁴ "Animai naturaliter Christiana," Apol. c. 17.
⁵ Cf. Renouf, Hibb. Lects. on The Rel. of Ancient Egypt, pp. 99–103;
and in the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, God is appealed to as directly and simply as in the Book of Genesis. But the darkening polytheism and immoral mythology are there in these religions; and even the noblest of Babylonian or Vedic penitential hymns fall immeasurably short of the ethical intensity of the Hebrew Psalms, just because the idea of a perfect Holiness in God is wanting. The Babylonian penitent reiterates: "O my God, seven times seven are my transgressions; forgive my sins! O my goddess, seven times seven are my transgressions; forgive my sins! O God, whom I know and whom I know not, seven times seven are my transgressions; forgive my sins!" But the sins confessed are chiefly ritual offences ("The cursed thing that I ate I knew not. The cursed thing that I trampled on I knew not"). In the Rig-Veda Varuna is piteously appealed to for mercy; but sin is conceived of as infatuation. "It was not our own doing, O Varuna, it was necessity, an intoxicating draught, passion, dice, thoughtlessness." How profound, in comparison, the language of the Psalmist: "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned, and done that which is evil in Thy sight. . . . Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me!"

and B. G. Gunn's translation of the book. There are several similar collections and fragments (Renouf, pp. 75-6; 101-2; Gunn). Mr. Gunn translates "the God," where Renouf renders "God"; "a Power without a name or any mythological characteristic, constantly referred to in the singular number" (p. 100). But Mr. Gunn also says: "There is nothing said as to duties to the Gods . . . So simply and purely does Ptah-hotep speak of the God that the modern reader can, without the least degradation of his ideals, consider the author as referring to the Deity of Monotheism" (pp. 33, 36). The qualities attributed to God are ethical. He rewards diligence and punishes sin, is the giver of good things, observes men's actions, loves His creation, etc.

1 C. H. W. Johns, Oldest Code of Laws, pp. 18, 19, 24, 25, 50, etc.
2 Sayce, Hibb. Lects., Rel. of Ancient Babylonians, pp. 350-1.
3 Rig-Veda, vii. 86, 89 (Müller's Anc. Sanskrit Lit.).
4 Ps. li. 4, 10.
Thus then the case stands as regards revelation. In Habakkuk's words, speaking of Jehovah, his "Holy One":
"Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on perverseness." 1 Reverting now to the question which mainly occupies us, we have to ask how the thought and speculation of the day stand related to this postulate of a Divine Holiness, in the light of which, in Christianity, sin appears so infinitely hateful and condemnable.

If what has been said is correct, it follows that any teaching which negates God's existence, or denies or weakens the truth of the Holiness of God, must, in the degree in which it does so, weaken or subvert the Christian conception of sin. In last paper, however, it was seen that, both as a general question of Theism, and as a special question of ethical character in God, it is precisely this Christian postulate of a Holy God which, at the present hour, is being, from many sides, vehemently assailed. The bearings of these assaults must now be looked at more narrowly. The point to be regarded is—their effect on the idea of sin.

1. Atheistic and materialistic views of the world, such as have sometimes prevailed, may be set aside at once as incompatible with any serious view of sin. Here the negation of God is absolute: of necessity, also, the negation of the spiritual nature of man, and of inherent moral distinctions. "Man is what he eats" (Feuerbach) affords no basis for ethics. By the last century materialists, Feuerbach, Büchner, Vogt, Moleschott, the consequences were remorselessly drawn out. 2 There is no sin, free-will, accountability. "Ethics," in words of Luthardt, "are transformed into a bill of fare." 3 Such crass doctrine,

1 Heb. i. 13.
3 Fundamental Truths of Christianity, p. 131 (E.T.). Abundant quotations are given by Luthardt and others. E.g., "Sin is that which is unnatural, and not the choosing to do evil" (Moleschott). "In fact, there
though popular for the time—Büchner's *Kraft und Stoff* ("Force and Matter") went in twenty years through fourteen editions, and was translated into almost every language in Europe—could not survive. There came a reaction on the part of leading thinkers. The monistic, agnostic, and materialistic-idealistic theories (Haeckel, Spencer, Huxley, etc.) which took its place can hardly be described as an improvement, since, even where distinction is made between mental and physical facts, it is held that Science can deal with the former only when interpreted in terms of matter. Freedom is denied. Man becomes an automaton. Material law rules the whole domain of human life. What place is left for sin?

2. Dillmann justly says that "Holiness" contains the notion "of a living, intelligent, free Personality, for only of an I, of a free Personality, can Holiness in the full sense is no such thing as sin, and therefore no justice in punishment." [So to-day, Mr. Blatchford.] Vogt says: "There is no such thing as free-will, and, consequently, such things as the responsibility and accountability which ethics and penal law, and God knows what else, would still impose upon us." The outcome is as in 1 Cor. xv. 32. Luthardt quotes from one of many epitaphs on ancient monuments: "Friends, I advise you, mix a goblet of wine and drink it, with your heads crowned with flowers; earth destroys what is left after death" (p. 381).

1 Haeckel, in his *Riddle of the Universe*, bemoans that most of the leading thinkers, as Virchow, Du Bois-Reymond, Wundt, who had at first adopted a materialistic standpoint, later abandoned it, and came over to a spiritualistic view.

2 "It follows that what I term legitimate Materialism . . . is neither more nor less than a shorthand Idealism" (Huxley, "On Descartes," *Lay Sermons*, pp. 157, 374).


4 Thus Huxley, Shadworth Hodgson.

5 "As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future extend the realm of matter and law, till it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action" ("On Physical Basis," *Ibid.*, p. 156).
be predicated."\(^1\) It results that all Pantheistic systems, with theories of idealism which exclude, or inadequately affirm, the divine Personality, are hostile to Christian views of sin. History, again, shows this to be everywhere the case. Spinoza, whose system had such a fascination for later minds, declared repentance to be a weakness.\(^2\) God is the sole cause. Sin has no reality.\(^3\) Schleiermacher, owing to the Pantheistic basis of his thinking, seriously weakened the idea of sin. God's is the one causality in the universe. Sin is the form of growth ordained for us by God with a view to the redemption in Christ. The guilt-consciousness (a subjective experience) is a spur to lead us to seek that redemption.\(^4\) Absolutist systems generally reject "Personality" in its application to God as an anthropomorphic and inadmissible conception. It is a moot question whether Hegel, who claimed to change Spinoza's "Substance" into "Subject" (Spirit, Reason, Idea), in any sense attributed Personality to God. The whole genius of his system seems to forbid it,\(^5\) and expositors and critics like Professor Pringle-Pattison\(^6\) and Dr. Ellis McTaggart\(^7\) are certain he did not. The effects on his views of sin are thus summed up by Dr. McTaggart:

\(^1\) Op. cit., p. 28. If we are to keep the name of God at all, or any equivalent term, says Prof. Pringle-Pattison, "an existence of God for Himself, analogous to our own personal existence, though doubtless transcending it infinitely in innumerable ways, is an essential element in the conception" (Hegelianism and Personality, p. 222). Dr. McTaggart says: "It is better not to call an impersonal Absolute by the name of God" (Heg. Cos., pp. xi. 93).

\(^2\) "Repentance is not a virtue, or does not arise from reason; but he who repents of an action is doubly wretched and infirm" (Ethics, pt. iv., prop. 54).

\(^3\) "Good and evil, or sin, are only modes of thought, and by no means things, or anything that has reality" (cf. his "Short Treatise," Wolf's Spinoza, pp. 51, 60, etc.).

\(^4\) Der christ. Glaube, Sects. 51. 1; 80, 81.

\(^5\) A defence can only be made by regarding time-development as illusory (see below on Green); even then the idea of Personality is not that in Christianity.

“Defects, error, sin, are for Hegel only imperfectly real. . . . All sin is for Hegel relatively good . . . Christianity habitually attaches enormous importance to the idea of sin. . . . This idea is entirely alien to Hegel. I do not wish to insist so much on his belief that all sin, like all other evil, is, from the deepest point of view, unreal, and that sub specie aeternitatis all reality is perfect. . . . The real difficulty lies in Hegel's treatment of sin as something relatively good. . . . There is no trace in Hegel of any feeling of absolute humility and contrition of man before God. . . . Sin is a mere appearance. Like all appearance, it is based on reality. But the reality it is based on is not sin. Like all reality, it is perfectly good. The sinfulness is part of the appearance.”¹ Is it not a similar effect that is seen to-day in the belittling of sin in “The New Theology”?²

3. The outlook may seem more promising when we come to the distinguished thinkers of the Oxford Neo-Hegelian school, headed so ably by the late Mr. T. H. Green. Here, at least, we have the recognition of, in Mr. Green’s phrase, an “Eternal Self-Consciousness” at the basis of the universe; therefore, it may be thought, of something like Personality. Mr. Green’s own profound religious feeling, as well as his ideological views of Christianity, are well brought out in Mr. Nettleship’s “Memoir,” and in his various writings on religion: God, to him, was a conscious Being who is in eternal perfection all that man has it in him to come to be—“a Being of perfect understanding and perfect love”—an infinite Spirit, towards whom “the attitude of man at his highest and completest could still only be that which we have described as self-abasement before an ideal of holiness.”² So Dr. Edward Caird

¹ Ibid., pp. 218, 239, 243. See the whole discussion.
² “Memoir,” in Green’s Works, iii. pp. 92, 142.
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speaks of "the divine principle of all things" as "a living God, the inspiring source and eternal realisation of the moral ideal of man"—"an intelligent or self-conscious being." Both Mr. Green and Dr. Caird, however, would shrink from applying the term "personal" to God—Dr. Caird argues against it—and with too good reason in the metaphysical implications of their system. For what, after all, is this "Eternal Self-Consciousness" of Mr. Green's Prolegomena? In strictness, only the ideal unity of the system of thought-relations we call the universe—its central point or focus—the still pool, if we may call it so, in which the system of relations eternally reflects itself. Time falls away from this Consciousness, and from the relations it sustains, for it is "a consciousness for which the relations of fact that form the object of our gradually-acquired knowledge already and eternally exist." Freedom does not belong to it, for the relations are what they are by eternal logical necessity. The Consciousness has no contents but these relations which constitute the world—no being in and for itself. It is Kant's "Synthetic Unity of Apperception" deified. God and the universe are, in short, on this view, but two sides—the inner and outer—of one and the same fact: individual selves are but "the Eternal Consciousness itself, making the animal organism its vehicle, and subject to certain limitations in so doing."

Despite language, therefore, about a "realised moral ideal," it is very obvious that we have not here a view of God fitted to sustain a Christian doctrine of sin. God's

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2 Ibid., p. 82. Cf. Mr. Bradley, Ethical Studies, pp. 290, 304-5.
3 Ibid., p. 82.
4 Prol. to Ethics, p. 75. Time-development is here in principle denied. Process in nature is not a matter simply of "gradually-acquired knowledge," but a reality of the objective system.
5 Ibid., pp. 72-3.
life being merged in that of the universe, sin, so far as it is real, is taken up into God's own life. But sin, in truth, is not real. Sin belongs, as in Hegel, to the realm of appearance, and for God, the unity of the whole, simply does not exist. As Mr. Nettleship interprets: "The imperfection which in man is never wholly overcome, but remains a positive and final fact separating him from God, exists in God, not as sin, but as an element in the divine perfection, in which its finality, and therefore its sinfulness, is done away." ¹ So to Dr. E. Caird sin is a necessary step in the dialectic movement of spirit which conducts to goodness. "The turpidity of the waters only proves that the angel has come down to trouble them, and the important thing is that, when so disturbed, they have a healing virtue." ² It begins to be apparent that the "realised perfection" of this theory is something very different from the divine Holiness of the Christian gospel. It is only what might be looked for, therefore, to find the type of thought the theory represents, so replete with contradictories, developing, in the hands of Mr. Bradley, who emphasises these, into the doctrine of an Absolute for whom good and evil wholly disappear, and, under Dr. McTaggart's unsparing logic, into a doing away with the "Eternal Self-Consciousness" altogether.

4. Enough was perhaps said in last paper in illustration of Mr. Bradley's general standpoint in his work, Appearance and Reality. The consciousness in which Mr. Green sought the key to the meaning of the universe Mr. Bradley finds to be involved in insoluble contradictions, which show that it works in a region of "appearance"—one may say,

¹ "Memoir," p. 94.
² *Op. cit.*, i. p. 231. St. Paul is criticised for not adequately seeing the unity of the negative and positive sides of this process (ii. pp. 207, 211-13). It is instructive to notice, that the words "Sin" and "Evil" do not occur in Dr. Caird's *Index*. 
illusion. The appearances are held to imply an absolute Reality of which we can assert little more than that it is the sum of them, but is, in some unknown way, self-consistent and harmonious.¹ [How this last proposition is established is not clear.] Neither thought, nor will, nor Personality, nor morality, can be affirmed of the Absolute. To it there is nothing good or bad.² It may only be noticed now how this final product of the hyper-acute dialectic of the Neo-Hegelian school lands us in a species of semi-pessimistic Spinozism, very different from the buoyant confidence with which the school set out. “Is there,” asks Mr. Bradley towards the close, “in the end, and on the whole, any progress in the universe? Is the Absolute either better or worse at one time than another? It is, clear that we must answer in the negative, since progress and decay are alike incompatible with perfection. There is, of course, progress in the world, and there is also retrogression, but we cannot think that the whole either moves on or backwards.”³ The Christian ideal of a Kingdom of God finds little support here. It need not be said that the hope of immortality is rejected.⁴

5. If Dr. McTaggart, in his Some Dogmas of Religion, is as hyper-subtle as Mr. Bradley, he attacks the problems in his own way, and arrives at different, if equally negative, conclusions. His polemic is directed against the ordinary doctrines of God, Freedom and Immortality, all of which, he is satisfied, must go, when brought to the bar of reason. By God is meant “a Being who is personal, supreme, and good.”⁵ The usual arguments to prove the existence

¹ *Appear. and Reality*, pp. 242, 457. ² *Ibid.*, p. 411. ³ We do not seem to get much beyond the doctrine of Celsus, whom Origen combated. “There neither has been, in former times, nor is there now, nor ever shall be, an increase or diminution of evil. The nature of the universe is ever identical, and the production of evil is not a variable quantity” (*Contra Celsum*, bk. iii. 62). ⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 501-10. ⁵ *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 186.
of such a Being are weighed and found wanting. A chief reason for challenging the omnipotence and goodness of God is the existence of evil in the world. A non-omnipotent God is declared to be no solution of the difficulty; besides, there is no evidence for His existence either. The case for Theism thus falls. Obviously it is needless to talk of a divine Holiness, and of a doctrine of sin built on it, when the very existence of a personal and supreme Deity is negated. It may safely be replied, however, that in his ingenious reasonings on these subjects, Dr. McTaggart overreaches himself by his cleverness. The problem of evil in its relation to Theodicy belongs to a different part of the argument, but a few words may be said on the general issue. The question of Theism, on its intellectual side, resolves itself, in a sentence, very much into this, Is there a rationally-constituted universe? On its moral side, into this, Is there an essential distinction between right and wrong? For if the universe is rationally constituted—and who will say it is not?—it seems but the other side of the same proposition to affirm that there must be Reason behind it—that it has a rational mind for its Cause. Hypotheses which postulate Thought without a Thinker may be left, for the majority of human beings, to look after themselves. Some of the objections offered by Dr. McTaggart on the theoretic side are extraordinary. E.g., How can God be omnipotent, if He is bound by the laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Excluded Middle? If He cannot, at will, make $A = \neg A$ ! or, say, make $2 + 2 = 5$ ! Again, in his argument—here following Hume—that, given sufficient time, "chance," in its innumerable combinations, is capable of producing all the appearances of

design in the universe. Not by such reasonings will the pillars of a rational belief in God be shaken.

It is on the ethical side, however, that the weight of the objection presses, and here the question of the divine Holiness is most nearly touched. On this the reply may be made that, however, in theory, the validity of moral distinctions may be challenged, there is hardly a writer who does not, in practice, admit that it is impossible to believe in a God who is less than the realised ideal of moral perfection. Either such a God, even the Agnostic will say, or no God. Mr. Bradley would be the first to scout the possibility of believing in a God who was capricious, cruel, or vindictive, in His dealings with His creatures. This much, at least, Christianity has done for serious thinking. An illustration is afforded in Mr. J. S. Mill's famous outburst, endorsed by Dr. McTaggart, in denunciation of what he took to be the kind of Deity depicted by Mr. Mansel. "If, instead of the glad tidings that there exists a Being in whom all the excellencies which the highest mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that 'the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving' does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may... Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do; he shall not compel me to worship him. I will

1 Ibid., pp. 243-5, 259. Cf Hume, Dialogues Concerning Nat. Rel., pt. viii.: "It must happen, in an eternal duration, that every possible order or position must be tried an infinite number of times." It is overlooked that there are some combinations that never would arise under fortuity, even in an eternity—those, viz., due to an ordering intelligence (a "Hamlet," for instance).
2 Ibid., p. 214.
call no being good, who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures” [the closing part of the passage we may omit]. Here is assertion enough of absolute moral values. On whatever grounds we believe in a supreme, ruling Power in the universe, even the perplexity of evil in the world cannot shake our faith that this Power must be ethically good.

6. It is possible, however, to go a step further. Allusion has been made to the tempting plea of philosophical writers—of Dr. McTaggart among the rest—for an autonomous morality, a morality which shall be independent of religion. In the interest of both morality and religion—indirectly, of a doctrine of sin—it may be claimed that, with the recognition of absolute moral standards, this plea cannot be sustained. It is not merely, as formerly urged, that morality needs imperatively to be vitalised from a higher source, and only when taken up into a higher relation, that of religion, obtains the power needed to sustain it, to give it the breadth adequate to man’s need, and to make it a living reality in men’s hearts. The deeper truth is that the ethical ideal, with its unconditional claim on man’s obedience, has for its necessary implication an Ethical Power at the basis of the universe. The ideal in conscience is not its own explanation. It drives us back on the Power

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1 Exam. of Hamilton, p. 103. Mr. Mansel’s reply may be seen in his Philosophy of the Conditioned, pp. 168 ff. The words quoted do honour to Mr. Mill’s heart: whether he was justified in using them by his philosophy is another matter. It is to be granted that, while endorsing Mill’s words, Dr. McTaggart in other places seems to take a different view. “It is not impossible that the director of the universe should be worse than the worst man... I cannot see, therefore, that any reason has been given for supposing a director of the universe to be good rather than bad” (op. cit., pp. 255–6). But, paradoxes apart, Dr. McTaggart would object to worship such a being. He would judge him by the moral ideal, and condemn him.

2 Matthew Arnold’s “Power not ourselves that makes for righteousness” is a testimony in the same direction, but falls in not explicitly recognising that such a Power must be personal.
on which our whole being depends, and is itself one of the
surest grounds of our faith that this Power is personal,
and ethically perfect. It discovers to us that man, as a
moral being, is not a self-sufficing unit, capable of living
for himself and to himself, but is intended to live his life
in dependence on God, drawing daily his supplies of grace
and strength from Him. His sin is, fundamentally, that
he does not so live, but seeks to realise a false independence.

The idea of the divine Holiness, in union with Personality
and Freedom—God's "Thou" answering to the "I" in man—is thus one profoundly in accordance with reason
and the highest dictates of morality. Yet it is to be repeated
that the full meaning of Holiness, final certainty in regard
to it, and the irresistible impression of its power, are only
to be obtained through God's historical self-revelations,
and above all through His personal revelation in Jesus
Christ. "The only-begotten Son, who is in the bosom
of the Father, He hath declared [ἐξηγήσατο, interpreted,
given the 'exegesis' of] Him." In Christ we have, as
Herrmann would say, the overpowering impression (Ein-
druck) of the grace and truth, but not less of the holy
purity, of the Power, "greater than all things" that rules
the world. The Gospel parallel to Isaiah's confession,"Woe is me! because I am a man of unclean lips," is
St. Peter's cry in the boat, "Depart from me; for I am
a sinful man, O Lord." In his recognition of "the inviol-
able justice of God's moral order," which Jesus reveals,
and at the same time vindicates, Herrmann goes beyond
Ritschl, who, in exalting love to the exclusion of everything
judicial and punitive in God's character, weakens the
ideas of both sin and guilt, resolving the former largely

1 Thus Augustine rightly conceived of man.
2 John i. 18.
3 Communion with God, pp. 78 ff., 107-10 (E. T.).
4 Is. vi. 5.
into "ignorance," and the latter into an alienation and distrust which better knowledge of God removes.¹ It is, in truth, the revelation of God's Holiness in the gospel which gives grace all its value. Resentment against sin, as Professor Seeley in Ecce Homo teaches, is the background of mercy.² In Christ the flame of anger at wilful transgression is ever accompanied by pity for the weak and erring.

God, then, is Holy. One corollary from this truth, of no small importance for the doctrine of sin, is the right determination of the moral end. Moral life, in the true idea of it, as philosophy has recognised from the time of Socrates, is life directed to an end. What is that end? Religion alone, in its doctrine of the Holy God, holds the answer to that question. If God be holy, embracing in His divine perfection righteousness and love, it follows without further argument that His final end in the universe must be a moral and personal one. Kant, Lotze, Ritschl, most theologians of rank, agree here. From it they deduce, in harmony with Christianity, that God's final end in His universe must be a "Kingdom of God," or Kingdom of the Good.³ Dorner in his Ethics has a fruitful discussion of the question, What is the relation of the ethical nature of God to the other determinations we ascribe to Him? And he reaches the conclusion that "the non-ethical distinctions in the nature of God [the natural attributes] are related to the ethical as means to an end; but the absolute end can only lie in morality, for it alone is of absolute worth."⁴

This conception of the end of God yields the true standard

¹ Justif. and Recon., pp. 376-84 (E. T.).
² Ecce Homo, chap. xxi.
³ Cf. Kant, Religion within the Limits of True Reason, bk. iii.; Lotze, Phil. of Rel., p. 127 (E. T.); Ritschl, Justif. and Recon., pp. 279-80 (E.T.).
⁴ Christian Ethics, p. 65 (E. T.).
for the end of man. The older theology, mounting to the highest point, defined the last end for both God and man as "the glory of God." And truly all things are created and exist ultimately for the glory of God.\(^1\) Man’s sin is that he comes short of that glory.\(^2\) But the question needs nearer determination; for obviously each created being gloriﬁes God only as it fulﬁls the end for which it was itself created. What then is the end of man’s creation? Kant, again, is right in saying that it can only be the moral; that the end is wrongly conceived if sought in anything outside morality—in pleasure, happiness, self-satisfaction, in anything to which morality is related merely as a means. It is not relation to the end that creates morality, but morality that imposes the necessity that the end must be a moral one. The end may include both virtue and blessedness; but the virtue must determine the blessedness, not vice versa.

But this is not the whole. From the religious standpoint, which is the ultimate one, man does not exist for himself. His end, therefore, cannot lie within himself, but must lie in his making God’s end his own. The powers derived from God are to be used for God’s ends, not for his own; are to be used, as was said, for God’s glory.\(^3\) That is, in the view taken of God’s end, they are to be used for the ends of His Kingdom. Here, in the Christian conception, is man’s chief end—his chief duty and chief good—to live for God’s Kingdom; to seek ﬁrst the Kingdom of God and its righteousness.\(^4\) That Kingdom, begun on earth, perfected in eternity—established through Christ in redemption from sin—is to be the goal of all endeavour, the object of all hope.

\(^1\) Ps. xix. 1, cxlv. 10–12; Rev. iv. 11, etc.
\(^2\) Rom. i. 11, iii. 11.
\(^3\) 1 Cor. x. 31; 1 Pet. iv. 11. Cf. Rom. vi. 13, 22.
\(^4\) Matt. vi. 33.
How entirely every such conception of the end, whether of man or of the universe, is swept away by the theories above commented upon, will be obvious to every one who reflects on their denials of God, of Freedom, and of Immortality, and on the views which are substituted of the grounds of moral conduct, and the aims of human existence. Illustrations will appear in later parts of the discussion.

JAMES ORR.

LEXICAL NOTES FROM THE PAPYRI.*

XVII.

νηφάλιος.—In Syll. 63124 (iv/b.c.), νηφάλιοι τρές βωμοὶ may refer either to altars at which only wineless offerings were made, or perhaps to cakes made in the form of an altar, free from all infusion of wine: see Dittenberger’s note. The verb is found along with ἀγνεύω to mark the proper state of intending worshippers, Syll. 79041 (i/a.d.), ἀγνεύοντες καὶ νήφοντες: cf. ibid. 5641, ἀπ’ οἴνου μὴ προσέναι, and the metaphorical application in 1 Peter iv. 7, νήφατε εἰς προσευχάς.

νίκη.—An interesting example of this word occurs in the letter of the Emperor Claudius incorporated in the diploma of membership of The Worshipful Gymnastic Society of Nomads, in which he thanks the club for the golden crown which it had sent to him on the occasion of his victorious campaign in Britain in a.d. 43—ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ Βρεταννων νίκῇ, BM III. p. 21612. For the later form νίκος, as in 1 Esdr. iii. 9, 1 Cor. xv. 55, 57, cf. BU 100214 (b.c. 55).

νοεῖν.—The phrase νοεῖν καὶ φρονέων is common in wills, both of the Ptolemaic and Roman periods, the testator

* For abbreviations see the February and March (1908) Expositor, pp. 170, 282.