about the Person of Jesus they contain, are indebted to the transfiguring faith of a later time. Little consideration has been given to the question, once more coming into prominence in the work of Wellhausen, Bousset and others, of the Partition theories of the Gospel. The aim of these papers has been solely to emphasise an aspect, and that, too, a governing aspect, of the Fourth Gospel, which runs great danger of neglect. It is the aspect of the true humanity that everywhere underlies quite as clearly as in the Synoptics, the portrait of Jesus in the Fourth Gospel.

R. H. Strachan.

STUDIES IN THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. II. THE "COMPLETION" OF THE LAW.

In Luke vi. 27 after the Beatitude on those who shall be reproached, and the corresponding deprecation of popularity, the Speaker continues: "But to you that hear I say: Love your enemies, do well to those that hate you, bless those that curse you, pray for those that insult you." In Matthew v. 43, 44 the same maxim occurs, but in the following form: "Ye have heard how it was said: Thou shalt love thy neighbour and mayest hate thine enemy. But I say unto you: Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you."

Thus LS; CS and PS alter the form thou shalt or thou mayest into the imperative "Love [for] thy neighbour and hate [for] thy enemy." The purpose of this alteration is to substitute a reference to the Peshitta of the Old Testament for one to the LXX. For the first words of the quotation occur in Leviticus xix. 18 Pesh. in the form represented by CS and PS. On the other hand, LS corresponds with the Greek. Further, CS adds after "it was said" the

1 Unless the alteration is in the other direction; but this seems unlikely.
words "to [or by] the ancients"; and JS, which restores the Greek form of the quotation, adds "unto you."

Under these changes we can read a great deal. The text

**thou shalt love thy neighbour and mayest hate thine enemy**

occurred nowhere. The first half, however, could be identified from the LXX of Leviticus xix. 18. The question then arose, By whom or when was all this said? CS replies "of old," i.e. by Moses. JS replies "to you," i.e. by the Rabbis of your time.

The quotation, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself" is so familiar that it may seem a paradox to say that it occurs nowhere in the Hebrew Old Testament, and belongs to the LXX, where it is a mistranslation; yet this is the fact, and it can further be proved that the Palestinian exegesis knew of no such text. The Hebrew words mean, "Thou shalt love for thy neighbour as [for] thyself"; they cannot mean anything else. However, their actual sense is less important to us than their interpretation in Palestine. Ibn Ezra construes them rightly; he, however, was a great scholar. So does his great predecessor of the ninth century, R. Saadyah Gaon. His translation is almost identical with that of the Prophet MOHAMMED, and this is a very great advantage; for, on the one hand, we can produce an independent French translation of the Prophet's words, on the other we can quote the comments of native Arabic scholars so as to show how they understood them. This

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1 In the Syriac version of Eccles. vii. 16 occurs the clause: "love not thyself more than the men that are with thee," or "than the men of thy people." This, however, is merely a mistranslation of the original, correctly rendered in the Greek μὴ προσολογίζου σεαυτόν ἐν πλῆθοι ἄμαρτωλῶν, Heb. אַלּ דָּתַהְוּ בָּכִּי לְמָרָעַו (made up of Psalms i. 1; xxvi. 5; and Numbers xxxiii. 9). The Syriac read either בָּכִּי אוֹרָה or בָּכִּי רֶחֶם. The sense then seemed to be "do not love yourself in the congregation more than friends."

2 אַלּ דָּתַהְוּ לָכֵּי חַבּ אָּל מָסְדֵּקַ מַאָּל בָּכִּי. So the printed edition; the Bodleian MSS. vary greatly.
is how M. Houdas renders them: 1 *Aucun de vous n'aura vraiment la foi s'il ne désire pour son prochain ce qu'il désire pour lui-même.* The commentator Nawāwi says this means 2 "he must desire for his brother [or neighbour] such pious acts and such permissible objects as he desires for himself." Another commentator 3 says, "loves or desires goods of this world and the next."

From the Prophet Mohammed we go back to the oral tradition of the Jews. That the ordinary rendering is a mistranslation can be seen by the ghastly results which it produces; so J. Levy renders a passage of B. Sanhedrin, "Love thy neighbour as thyself: i.e., choose for him a seemly death." 4 A strange way of exhibiting affection! What the Rabbi there cited asserts is that "Love for thy neighbour" means "Choose for thy neighbour"—a very different proposition. If you have to choose between deaths, then choose for some one else as you would in a similar case choose for yourself. In another place the interesting question is discussed whether a son who medically bleeds his father is liable to the death penalty for "smiting" his father. The answer is in the negative, on the ground that "thou shalt love for thy neighbour as for thyself" 5; which Rashi rightly explains as meaning that Israel are only forbidden to do to their neighbours what they would not do to themselves. Substitute "love thy neighbour" for "love for thy neighbour," and the application will be obscure. There is a salutary counsel to men not to betrothe themselves to women whom they have not

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1 El-Bokhari, i. 13 (*Publications de l'Ecole des langues Orientales vivantes, 2e série, tome 3*). The Arabic words are: حتّى يحب لآؤره (or ما يحب لشّه) (אחים).  
2 Margin of Kastalani, ed. 6, i. 330.  
3 On Ibn Majah, i. 19.  
4 *Neuhebräisches Wörterbuch*, iii. 109.  
5 B. Sanhedrin, 84b.
seen; "possibly he may see some flaw in her, and she will be displeasing to him; and the Scripture says, 'Love, etc.'" Where J. Levy deals with the word rendered "displeasing," he translates it "seem ugly to him"; but where he renders the whole passage, he translates "be hated by him," thinking that the application is, "if you find your fiancée ugly you may hate her; and you are told to love your neighbour as yourself." But this is not the application, for, as Maimonides observes, you have the option of divorcing her (to which, as Merx has noticed, there is an allusion in Matthew i. 19: by Jewish law a fiancée can be divorced no less than a wife). If, then, the danger lay in hating any woman who was ugly, the only expedient would be to have all women veiled. The application, then, is, "do as you would be done by"; by betrothing yourself to a woman whom you have not seen, you incur the danger of wounding some one's feelings—hers (or, more probably, her father's), if, when you see her, you find the marriage cannot take place.

The text was construed in the right way by R. Akiba, who called it, as it is called in the Gospel, "a Great Principle of the Law," meaning, "do not to others what you dislike yourself." But even in pre-Christian times it was interpreted in the same way by Ben-Sira, whose evidence is all the more conclusive, because he quotes the first commandment of the Law in the familiar form, only accommodated as usual to his nine syllables with three beats (vii. 30); "with whole might love thy maker." But his paraphrase of the second commandment of the Law is very different (xxxiv. 15): "Guess your neighbour's tastes by your own"; that this is a comment on Leviticus xix. 18 is

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1 L.c. i. 347; cf. iv. 250. The phrase is ליטא לולא שחק. 2 Ἰουδαία, iii. 19. 3 Sifra, ad loc. 4 Evidently בכל לו אוהב את עצים.
shown by the note in *Sifra* on xix. 34, where the same (Hebrew) idiom occurs: "thou shalt love for him [the stranger] as for thyself; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt." This means, says the Halachic commentary, "know what the soul of strangers is like, because ye were strangers yourselves." If the words cited in the note be compared, the justice of this inference will scarcely be doubted.¹

Finally, it may be observed that if the commandment of love had been recognised as a Great Commandment of the Law, it could not be called a *new commandment*, given first by Christ Himself (John xiii. 34).

It is clear, then, that the commandment to love one’s enemies could not have been either a “completion” or an “abrogation” of this text, which is only intelligible if it be cited in full; the person who so applied it must have been no Palestinian. And even had the text been used in Palestine in the sense required, still the inference “you may hate your enemy” could not have been drawn from it; (1) because the Rabbinic logic is after all logic, and the inference which might be drawn is not that you may hate others, but that you need not love them; (2) because the word “neighbour” can scarcely be interpreted of personal friends, but refers to Israelites, or at least fellow-tribesmen.

There is, however, a verse in the neighbourhood which will serve the purpose better, xix. 17: “Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart; thou mayest reprove thy neighbour.” On the latter part of the verse we possess the comments of Ben-Sira (xix. 13, 14); and the question how many times a neighbour may be reproved before he is considered incorrigible is discussed in Matthew xviii. 22 as well.

¹ Ecclus. υβει τα του πλησιος εκ σεαυτου. Syr. י תובורהנא רוקל. *Sifra*, 91a, דוע מושיל על רימ.
as by the Rabbis. That the variation between "brother" and "neighbour" [a different word from the neighbour of verse 19] attracted attention in early times may well be believed. The suggestion that "brother" meant personal friend is made by Ben-Sira, who quotes the verse (xxxvii. 26) in a context that leaves no doubt on the subject.

Two Rabbinic comments on this text are preserved. The words "thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart" admit of the emphasis being laid on either the brother or the heart. In the Halachic commentary the second view is taken: "in thy heart, otherwise we might have thought it meant 'do not curse, smite, or buffet him.' " The former view is preserved in a discussion on the phrase "the ass of thy hater" in Exodus xxiii. 5: "the hater referred to is an Israelite, not a Gentile hater. But is one permitted to hate in the former case? Is it not written, 'thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart'?" Clearly, then, some persons inferred that it was lawful to hate one who was not a "brother," whatever sense might be assigned that word.

It was noticed above (p. 48) that there seems to have been some uncertainty whether the word rendered "hate" might not also be rendered "reproach"; and of this there is further evidence. Perhaps in the gloss quoted, where "hate" is said to suggest "curse," there is an allusion to this. This takes us back to verse 21, a passage not found in Luke: "Ye have heard how it was said by [or 'to'] the ancients: thou shalt not kill, and whosoever killeth shall be answerable to a court." This quotation is a combination of Exodus xx. 13 with Numbers xxxv. 12, where we read, "The murderer shall not be slain till he have stood before

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1 B. Pesahim, 113b.
the congregation for judgment." The Halachic commentary on Exodus\(^1\) naturally combines the two passages. In Matthew v. 22, 23 it is argued that he who reviles his brother must also be answerable to a court or assembly (rightly rendered in the Syriac versions; wrongly in the Greek by *synedrion*). The steps appear to be the following. "He that hateth his brother is a murderer." This precept is quoted by St. John (1 iii. 15), though it is perhaps not found in the Oral Tradition. It is based on the story of Cain,\(^2\) and probably of Joseph and his brethren, and possibly of Absalom. Every murderer is to be tried by a court (Numbers xxxv. 12). The verb "to hate" also means to revile; and this includes such phrases as "Raka" and "Fool." Thus there is a Mishnah which defines what expressions come under the terms "vow" and "oath."

Of all this the same seems to hold good as of the "spurious" beatitudes; the teaching is after the style of that of the Scribes, by reasoning which they would have employed or approved. But the part of the teaching which Luke preserves is not after the style of the Scribes; it is not deduced by logic from Holy Scripture, but is a new principle authoritatively formulated.

We may now turn to the preface to the teaching which Matthew gives. V. 17 (LS): "Think not that I am come to abrogate the Law or the Prophets; I came not to abrogate, but to fill them." (CS, "to abrogate them," etc.; PS, omits "them" in both places.) Merx has an interesting and ingenious discussion on the readings of LS and the other Syriac versions here, but its results appear to be unsound. The verse that follows reads in LS: "For Amen I say unto you, till heaven and earth pass away, not one Jod (letter) shall pass from the Law till all shall be." CS and

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\(^1\) *Mechilta*, ed. Weiss, p. 86a.

\(^2\) By דני reasoning. See Schwarz, *der hermeneutische Syllogismus*. 
PS omit "letter" and add "or one stroke" (using different words). JS alters somewhat: "shall pass from the Law or the Prophets till all be done." JS makes it clear that it understands by "fill" fulfil; and it lays stress on the Prophets, because we think of prophecy being fulfilled in a different sense from that in which a law is fulfilled. The interpretation of LS, etc., is rather that "fill" means complete; and since it is the Law which permits of supplement rather than the Prophets, these authorities lay stress on the Law. Finally, PS, like the Greek, leaves us our choice between these two widely different interpretations.

Luke has not the first of these verses, but gives the second in a very different context (xvi. 16, 17): "The Law and the Prophets were till John; from that time the Kingdom of God is preached and every one forces himself into it. And it is easier for heaven and earth to pass away than that a single stroke of the Law should pass away"; so LS and PS; CS fails; HS with the Greek "should fall"; JS fails. The verses in Luke appear to involve a contradiction: The Law and the Prophets were until John; consequently they were not after or since John. Yet it would be easier for heaven and earth to pass away than for the Law to pass away, even the most trifling atom of it! What this proposition means must be something quite different; something that is not even an exaggeration, but a truth that every one must recognise; viz., that a Law of God cannot pass away; a law in that sense (a law of nature), whether great or small—supposing it were possible to distinguish—could not be annulled without the whole universe dissolving. Hence we find the Syriac versions rightly hesitate between the Greek and Jewish words for Law. The Jewish word should have been used with the first sentence, the Greek with the second.

This tremendous proposition, which is nothing less than
The substitution of scientific morality for sacred Codes, was clearly too hard for the school represented by Matthew. The absolutely true proposition that the Laws of God must be conterminous with the existence of the universe has to be adapted to the identification of the Law of God with the Torah and the Prophets; and reconciled to the fact that the new legislation dealt ruthlessly with the precepts of the latter. One method of dealing with the difficulty was to identify the new legislation with the practice of the Scribes, who fully believed in the literal inviolability of the Torah, yet perpetually added to it. This process was called—at any rate at a later time—Gemārā, or completing. As the example reconstructed shows, it involved no abrogation of any precept, but only interpretation and application. Hence it was deemed desirable to enucleate the great precept "love your enemies" out of precepts of the Torah, and we see part of the process. Some of it must have been done by Palestinians, others by persons who only knew the LXX.

The saying about the eternity of the Law, correctly recorded by Luke, was made to mean that the Law could not be abrogated till it had been completed. Another suggestion was that it could not be abrogated until it had all been fulfilled; and yet a third laid stress on the Prophets, and, supposing that the Law was prophetic also (being a system of types), held that all had to be realised, but could not pass away till such realisation had taken place. The trivial alterations of the Syriac texts reflect all these different ideas.

Finally, the variations in the rendering of the "stroke" take us once more into the laboratory. What is meant by "a stroke" of the Law? The smallest letter, replies LS, i.e. the yod or "jot." CS gives us both text and comment—only in inverted order—"one letter yod or one stroke"; and finally PS (with the Greek) has "one yod
or one stroke.” And the Church has puzzled long as to the nature of the stroke to which reference is made.

That Christ abrogated the Jewish Law is a historical fact, unaffected by the question whether He executed every precept, realised every type, or supplemented every gap—supposing that any of these propositions were tenable. Mohammed puts into His mouth the words, “I have come acknowledging the Law which was before Me, and to make lawful for you some of those things which were forbidden you.” ¹ Mohammed was fabricating when he dictated this, but in a manner which in ancient (and to some extent even in modern) times was regarded as legitimate—putting into words what he genuinely believed to have been his Subject’s thoughts. Carlyle does not shrink from doing the same even when he declares that “in all this History one jot or tittle of untruth that we could render true is perhaps not discoverable.” Mohammed’s view of Christ’s work was based on his observation of Christian practice; in the matter of food and sacred days, the Christian of his time was far freer than the Jew. No moral stigma attaches to the person who interpreted that work as “Matthew” interprets it, although it is clear that that interpretation is as erroneous as Mohammed’s.

But one other result is of some interest, viz., that between the actual reporters and the Editor of the Gospel many intermediaries must have had a place. For as has been seen, the comment whereby the maxim “Love your enemies” is evolved is applied to a wrong text, by some one familiar with the LXX only. But the application of the maxim to a text at all must be the work of some one acquainted with the Hebrew text and with the Rabbinic logic. And the loss of the right text and substitution of the wrong one probably belong to a reporter intermediate between these.

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¹ Kur’an, iii. 44.