keep my commandments” are introduced by the writer of Deuteronomy in order to express that God punishes the children if they hate Him. If this is right, we see at once that the recension of Deuteronomy has been of influence upon the text of Exodus.

Probably the text of Exodus originally did not contain the reference to Genesis ii. 3. There seems to be no reasonable ground for the thesis that the writer of Deuteronomy will have omitted Exodus xx. 11. As far as we can see he cannot have had any objection to the theory that Jahve created the world in six days and that the Sabbath was a holy institution from the beginning.

The difference between the recension of the tenth commandment seems to me to be of no significance. Perhaps Exodus xx. 17b is an explanation of what is to be understood by “house” in verse 17a.

So the original form of the Decalogue of Exodus may have been xx. 2, 3, 5 (except “to my haters”), 6a; vii. 8, 9, 10, 12–17.

Now we must face the question, Which was the original place of this Decalogue in the tradition of Exodus?

B. D. EERDMANS.

STUDIES IN THE PAULINE THEOLOGY.

VII. THE END OF THE LAW.

(1) This Christian salvation, the deliverance of man from both the guilt and the power of sin in Christ Jesus, Paul offered to Jew and Gentile alike, for the necessity for it was as universal as the sufficiency of it. The right to make this offer to the Gentiles without any other condition than its acceptance in faith was, however, quickly challenged. When Paul and his companions returned from their first missionary journey to Antioch, “they rehearsed all things...
that God had done with them, and how that He had opened a door of faith unto the Gentiles" (Acts xiv. 27); but very soon after "certain men came down from Judæa and taught the brethren, saying, Except ye be circumcised after the custom of Moses, ye cannot be saved" (xv. 1). The issue thus raised was this: was submission to the Jewish law a necessary condition of acceptance of the Christian salvation? Must a man be circumcised in order to be forgiven and made holy in Christ? The assembly of the Church in Jerusalem decided in favour of Gentile freedom with certain restrictions (verse 20) intended to make easier social intercourse between Gentile and Jewish believers. Regarding the limitations of freedom in regard to food Paul asserts in principle absolute liberty, but in practice recommends renunciation of liberty in the interests of charity (Rom. xiv., 1 Cor. viii.). The propaganda of the view condemned in Jerusalem among the Pauline Churches compelled Paul to take up the question of the relation of the Law to the Gospel.

(2) In expounding and estimating his treatment of this subject it seems necessary to keep three facts in view. First of all, Paul was not engaged in an academic discussion regarding the moral and religious function of the law in the history of the Jewish people, or even the significance of law generally in man's moral development, but he was contending against a present, serious danger to the Churches which by the Gospel had been won from paganism. The victory of the Judaizers would have been the reduction of Christianity from a world-wide religion to a sect within Judaism. In the circumstances we need not be surprised if his judgment is not altogether so impartial as the modern scholar would desire.

Secondly, Paul was a Pharisee before his conversion, and so the law had weighed upon his own life as the heavy
burden which Pharisaic interpretations and applications of it made it. It had been not a help, but a hindrance to his recognition and acceptance of Jesus as Messiah. As long as he was under its authority he had felt himself condemned; it was apart from the law that he himself had found salvation. Here the personal equation must not be overlooked.

Lastly, the passage in Galatians iii. 10, seems to indicate that it was the curse the law pronounced on the mode of death which Christ endured which for a time stood in the way of Paul's recognition of the Messiah, confirmed his unbelief and stimulated his persecuting zeal. If the words do not mean exactly that the law condemned itself in condemning Christ, yet the distinctive character of the law as inflicting on mankind a curse only is writ large in its sentence on Christ. Christ's Cross made Paul feel a repulsion to the Law.

(3) What Paul had primarily in view when he was dealing with the relation of the Law to the Gospel was the Mosaic Law. Thus when he describes the Gentiles as those who have no law (Rom. ii. 14), he is thinking only of the Jewish law. The reference in v. 13, "sin is not imputed when there is no law," might appear more general, were not Moses expressly mentioned in the next verse. When he speaks of the operation of the law in his own experience, he is referring to the Jewish law in its Pharisaic interpretation (vii. 7). He did, however, recognize a moral law beyond the Mosaic. The Gentiles who have not the Mosaic law are a law unto themselves, in that their conscience excuses or accuses them (ii. 15). Christ is the end of the law not in the specific sense only, but also in the general. The rite of circumcision was what the Judaizers were most concerned about; and it was from the ceremonial law of Judaism, including the precepts regarding
clean and unclean, that it was Paul’s main purpose to assert the freedom of the Gentiles. In discussing the question of the obligation of the law on the Christian it is clearly the moral law that is prominent in Paul’s mind; for his problem is a moral problem, how can man be forgiven and made holy? We should, however, be introducing our modern points of view in emphasizing the distinction between the ceremonial and the moral law; for Paul there was but one law. We must, however, note carefully that it is not the abolition of rites and ceremonies only or mainly Paul has in view, but that from his Christian standpoint morality as law has yielded to something higher.

(4) Although his argument to disprove the claim of the law on the Christian requires him to demonstrate its moral ineffectiveness, its inevitable result in the condemnation of men and its subordinate function in the divine purpose, yet he remains sufficiently the Jew to regard it as of divine origin and authority, and consequently as deserving honour. The law is "holy, just, and good," and "spiritual" (Rom. vii. 12, 14). With indignation he repudiates the suggestion that his view of the relation to sin of the law is intended to place it on the same moral level. "Is the law sin? God forbid!" (verse 7). He is careful to explain that he is so far from making the law of none effect through faith, that he establishes the law (iii. 31). Compare with this Jesus’ saying, "Think not that I came to destroy the law or the prophets: I came not to destroy, but to fulfil." There is no opposition between the law and the promises of God (Gal. iii. 21). It is doubtful whether Paul regards it as a proof of the dignity and authority of the law that "it was ordained through angels by the hand of a mediator," for the next verse suggests that there is a more direct and unconditioned action of God possible. "Now a mediator is not a mediator of one, but God is one" (verses
19 and 20), and this he sees in the promise to Abraham, fulfilled in Christ. It is certain that with all his honour and praise of the law he does not recognize fully the function it served in the moral development of the nation, nor has he the delight in it the saints of old had (Ps. cxix. 97).

(5) The law is inferior to the promise of God; it comes in between the promise and the fulfilment "because of transgressions" (either to restrain or to provoke, probably the latter), so that all things may be shut up under sin when the promise is fulfilled (Gal. iii. 19–22). "The law came in beside" (παρεισηλθεν, Rom. v. 20), as an "after-thought," or "parenthesis." The term seems to be chosen thus to emphasize the temporary and subordinate character of the law, although other interpretations have been suggested. Meyer and Weiss give the prosaic explanation, "It entered alongside of sin," but this seems to contradict Paul's express statement that there was an interval of time between the entrance of sin into the world and the introduction of the law (verse 13). When Pfleiderer expands the meaning of the words thus, "It entered between sin and redemption, as a means to the end of the latter," he certainly does not import a meaning foreign to the context, for Paul did regard the law as so provoking transgression that by it the sin did abound which was the occasion of the more exceedingly abounding grace, but he does not give its full force to the word παρεισηλθεν. A comment of Chrysostom is quoted in Sanday and Headlam's Romans (p. 143), which brings this out: "Why did he not say the Law was given, but the Law entered by the way? It was to show that the need of it was temporary, and not absolute or claiming precedence." The law is of God; but it is not God's highest abiding revelation of Himself.

(6) The law given by Moses is inferior to the promise
made to Abraham, and Abraham obtains the promise not as a reward of any legal righteousness, but because faith is reckoned to him for righteousness. "The works of the law" and "the hearing of faith" are opposed to one another; and Abraham is cited as an instance of the latter; "Even as Abraham believed God, and it was reckoned unto him for righteousness." To him was the Gospel preached beforehand (Gal. iii. 5-8). The promises made to him could not be disannulled by "the law which came four hundred and thirty years after" (verse 17). Abraham was not justified by his works, but by his faith; and the promise came to him not by the law, but even while he "was still in uncircumcision" (Rom. iv.). However Rabbinic the argument in its details may now appear to us, the essential idea may be detached from the antiquated forms of speech in which it is presented to us, and it is simply this. The legal relation between God and man, God as the lawgiver and judge, and man as incurring penalty by disobedience, or securing reward by his merit, is not the ultimate and permanent one. As it does not meet the needs of man, so it does not fulfil the will of God. Man is by his nature dependent on God, and cannot live his best life without God. God is by His nature gracious to man, and cannot withhold from man the help which he ever needs. The legal relation may be more prominent in certain stages of human development; but it must give place to a relation more satisfying to God and to man.

(7) Such a relation has been revealed in the Cross of Jesus Christ. The problem for the Christian Church in Paul's age was not the abandonment of the legal relation for a lower; but the attempt to perpetuate that legal relation when another was possible. For Paul there was, as for the Judaizers there was not, an essential and,
therefore, inevitable opposition between the Law and the Gospel. They were rivals, and could not be companions. If in the Cross man is saved both from the power and the guilt of sin, he needs nothing else or more; and to claim that he does, as the Judaizers did, is to deny the sufficiency of the Cross. The Cross was vainly endured if it cannot efficiently save without the observance of the law. "If righteousness is through the law, then Christ died for nought" (Gal. ii. 21). If men look to the law to save them, they disown the salvation the Cross offers. "Ye are severed from Christ, ye who would be justified by the law; ye are fallen away from grace" (v. 4). It is because in Paul's experience the Cross has proved to him absolutely the power and wisdom of God unto salvation that he cannot tolerate any other relation between God and man than that of grace on God's part and faith on man's as constituted by the Cross. Christ is sufficient for holiness as for forgiveness; and the desire to add any prop or bond of the moral life is the denial of that sufficiency. Can we suppose that Law, with its rewards and punishments can serve either as substitute for, or supplement to the Gospel which offers the grace of God to men's faith?

(8) Paul's experience had made him certain that the Gospel could do what the law could not; for he had known both the impotence of the latter and the efficacy of the former. An important link in his chain of argument is the proof of the purpose of the law. So far is it from restraining sin that it rather provokes it. (i.) In the first place it is the law that awakens the consciousness of sin. "Through the law cometh the knowledge of sin" (Rom. iii. 20). A man becomes aware that his impulses, appetites or actions are wrong when he gets to know the law which forbids and condemns them. Paul had probably in a very acute moral crisis become aware of this opposition
between desire and duty. "I had not known sin, except through the law; for I had not known lust (R.V. margin) except the law had said, Thou shalt not lust" (vii. 7). Whatever the natural desire may have been, it was not known as sin until its condemnation was found in the law.

(ii.) In the next place the knowledge that a wish or a deed is thus condemned instead of restraining from indulgence or commission, rather provokes thereto. "But sin, finding occasion, wrought in me through the commandment all manner of lusting; for apart from the law sin is dead" (verse 8). "When the commandment came, sin revived" (verse 9). The commandment itself is like a challenge, which sin at once accepts. The sin, which unrestrained had been inactive, is aroused to violent disobedience. The appetites become more clamorous when their gratification is forbidden; the passions more vehement, when a restraint is put upon them. That this is assuredly not the purpose of the law, Paul recognizes in this passage: "The commandment was unto life," for it is "holy, righteous, and good." But nevertheless it is, he holds, the result. Elsewhere Paul speaks as if the law were given for this very end. "The law came in beside, that the trespass might abound" (v. 20). The law "was added because of transgressions" (Gal. iii. 19). Although the phrase is vague, yet probably the meaning is not to check, but to provoke transgressions. We have in explanation of this inconsistency to remind ourselves that a Jew would regard such a result as not accidental, but as intended by God. But Paul himself expressly indicates this intention. The character of sin could not be fully revealed, and its condemnation be completely expressed, until it had realized the utmost possibility, until it had reached the last stage of its development. That the law which was intended to restrain should result
in provoking sin put beyond doubt or question the essential and permanent antagonism of the law and sin. "Sin that it might be shown to be sin, by working death to me through that which is good; that through the commandment sin might become exceeding sinful" (Rom. v. 13). Why should it be necessary that "sin might become exceeding sinful"? Paul has an answer to this question also. Man must become conscious to the uttermost of his moral depravity and impotence in order that he might fully discover his need of the divine grace: and the law in thus both condemning and provoking sin was a preparation for the gospel. Sin was made by the law to abound in order that grace might abound more exceedingly. The moral issue between human sin and divine law had to be fully worked out before God's solution of the problem could be desired or welcomed. "God hath shut up all unto disobedience that He might have mercy upon all" (Rom. xi. 32).

(iii.) Lastly, that the law provokes the transgression is due to the nature of sin, but that it fails to restrain it has a reason in the nature of the law itself. It is an outward precept, and not an inward power. It is written on tables of stone, and not on tables that are hearts of flesh (2 Cor. iii. 3); it is not spirit, but letter (verse 6). It can condemn the transgression, but cannot secure obedience; it is thus the letter that killeth, and not the spirit that giveth life. Its inefficacy through its externality is shown in the moral and religious condition of the Jews, who made of it their boast. "Thou who gloriest in the law, through thy transgression of the law dishonourest thou God?" (Rom. ii. 23). A man might profess his allegiance to the law, and yet withhold his obedience. "He is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh; but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision
is that of the heart, in the spirit not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God” (verses 28 and 29). In the flesh, the law had an antagonist with which it was unequally matched. It could not bring into the field of choice motives as potent as the flesh could; and only the grace of God in Christ could be a match for the flesh. “What the law could not do in that it was weak through the flesh, God, sending His own Son in the likeness of sinful flesh and for sin, condemned sin in the flesh; that the ordinance of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not after the flesh, but after the spirit” (viii. 3-4).

(9) In this proof of the purpose of the law it must be frankly admitted there is a great deal that is foreign to our modes of thought. Paul was arguing against Judaizers, and he had to use the terms and modes of proof that they could understand. Without entering into any justification of the details of the argument, we must face the question whether there is any corresponding reality in our moral experience to that which is here depicted. As regards the first point, it is when the conscience, which reproduces the moral judgments of the human environment, awakens in the child that some of his actions and desires are first of all recognized by him as wrong; in this sense by the law is the knowledge of sin. In respect of the second point, that the law provokes, and does not prevent, sin, are we not reminded of the proverb “Stolen fruit is sweet”? Even in the child restraint does stir up opposition. There is in man a self-will, a self-seeking, and a self-sparing that resists control, limitation, and obligation. Conscience may be met with defiance. That law always provokes, and never restrains sin would be an unwarranted generalization; but that mere prohibition, unless accompanied by an adequate motive to obedience, does irritate and excite, cannot be doubted. More difficult is it to follow Paul when he
maintains a divine purpose in allowing sin to run its full course as a condition of man’s welcome of God’s grace. In the next Study on the purpose of God, Paul’s interpretation of the ways of God will be more fully discussed. Meanwhile we have but to try and answer the question, whether there is any advantage in the realization of the possibility of sin in its completeness. Is it good that sin might become exceeding sinful? It is a fact that the higher moral life does not begin in some men until they have passed through a moral crisis in which the opposition of desire and duty was most acutely experienced, until they realized how much there was in themselves at war with their higher aims. Nay, even a fall into some sin which conscience condemns has made a man at once aware, as he had not been before, how empty of moral worth his whole life has been. Gross sins are not necessary conditions of moral development; but an intense experience of the inward opposition seems to be. Concerning the third point, the absence in the law of constraining motive, and its consequent impotence, we must admit that Paul’s view is abstract. Law as law is no match for passion; but as a rule law does not come alone. God’s goodness to Israel enforced the claim of the law on the Jew; the family affections reinforce the commands of the home. Fear of its penalties, and hope for its rewards do give the law some influence. Paul is arguing in vacuo.

(10) But if the law has failed to make men righteous, if its result has been to provoke and multiply transgressions, yet it has remained as a witness against sin, although not a victor over it. It has made it impossible for the man who knows the law to be at ease in his sin. It has secured the reverence of the better elements in man. It has driven to self-despair. It has made the soul in its helplessness and misery eager for, and ready to welcome
the deliverance which comes in the Gospel. Paul’s description of his own inner life in Romans vii. 7–25 justifies his confession, “For I through the law died unto the law, that I might live unto God” (Gal. ii. 19). Without the moral discipline of the law Paul would not have discovered as he did either the law’s insufficiency or the Gospel’s efficacy. He had not been a Pharisee altogether in vain. His more intense moral experience gave him a more penetrating moral insight, which has enabled him to give an interpretation of the Gospel which has appealed most convincingly not to men of moral commonplace, but of moral genius. His own experience Paul confidently generalizes. Addressing the Galatians, he declares, “The law hath been our tutor to bring us unto Christ” (iii. 24).

But here a doubt arises, Had the Galatians passed through such an experience as Paul’s? Had they worked out the moral problem as he had? If not, were they able to understand aright what freedom from the law meant? One cannot but ask whether the legal discipline may not be necessary as a preparation for the evangelical freedom; and whether the faith in Christ which has behind it no moral experience is yet fit for the freedom which implies moral maturity.

(11) Be that as it may, Paul was sure that in Christ he had died unto the law; the relation to God which that stood for he had once for all left behind, because he had entered on a relation to God entirely different. He was now a son; he had put on Christ, because he had been baptized into Christ (Gal. iii. 26, 27), and that means that he had been crucified and had risen again in Christ (ii. 20). He requires all Christians to pass through the same change. “Wherefore, my brethren, ye also were made dead to the law through the body of Christ, that ye should be joined to another, even to him who was raised from the dead,
that we might bring forth fruit unto God” (Rom. vii. 4). To be dead to the law might mean moral licence, did it not in the Christian result from death to sin and life unto God. He is free from the restraints of the law, and from its commands only because he has renounced sin and consecrated himself to God. In his freedom he is “under law to Christ” (ἐννομος Χριστῳ, 1 Cor. ix. 21); “Christ is the end of the law (τέλος νόμου) unto righteousness to every one that believeth” (Rom. x. 4). “We are not under law, but under grace” (vi. 15). Grace delivers from the power as well as the guilt of sin, and therefore the man under grace is free, not to sin, but from sin. It is necessary to insist on all these qualifications as Paul’s doctrine can be so easily misunderstood, as it has been in antinomianism; it may even be misrepresented as a plea for libertinism. The claim for freedom is made only for those who are dead unto sin, and live only unto God.

(12) We must again test the truth, and prove the worth of this teaching. It will be generally conceded that Paul was absolutely right in claiming the freedom of the Gentiles from the Jewish law as a national code, ritual, polity. Circumcision and the complex system of ceremonial purity could not be imposed on the Gentiles. “Let no man judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of a feast day or a new moon, or a sabbath day” (Col. ii. 16). Who now would challenge such a claim? But the Jewish law enshrined moral principles and precepts of permanent and universal value, the expression of a severe moral discipline, and long moral development. Did Paul mean to reject these, or to refuse the Gentiles the moral guidance and guardianship which these might offer? Surely not. “Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honourable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely,
whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things” (Phil. iv. 8). Even if he was thinking of Gentile standards and customs what he says of them he doubtless would have applied to the treasures his Holy Scriptures contained. His own letters abound in counsels, commands, exhortations, and prohibitions. He discusses moral problems in detail, and offers his own solution with confidence that he is interpreting the mind of God. By Christian freedom he does not mean that each man is thrown back on his own conscience, and that he must exercise his moral judgment in isolation. As Paul’s teaching might in this respect be misunderstood, it must be insisted that there is a moral inheritance and a moral environment by the aid of which alone the moral individuality can be developed. While the morally immature are not to be subjected to a bondage of commands merely, they must be kept under a guidance of moral counsels. The spirit of Jesus in the individual conscience is not independent of, or opposed to the spirit in the Christian community. The insight of to-day is not separated from the garnered wisdom of the ages. Necessary as was Paul’s claim for freedom from the law, we must not misapply it, as has sometimes been done, into a justification of an individualistic mysticism which substitutes its own impulses for the ideals and standards of the Christian society. That the individual conscience may and must challenge the judgment even of a Christian society is to be fully admitted. This is the condition of progress. But the conscience which makes this claim must be instructed, sympathetic, responsible. What one does miss in Paul’s discussion is a recognition of the different stages of moral development, and the varying degrees of spiritual maturity. It is an ideal rather than an actuality he describes. He regards
his own experience as more generally typical than it is. If a man has died to sin, and if he is alive unto God, if he is crucified and risen with Christ, he is dead unto law; he can live in the freedom of the Spirit. But if he is but slowly rising from the lower to the higher life, he still needs constraints and restraints, counsel and command, guidance and guardianship of more advanced Christians, or of the Christian society. As long as he is a child morally and religiously he must be under guardians and stewards. While we must respect the individual conscience, while we must recognize the presence and operation of the enlightening and quickening Spirit of God, while we must gratefully acknowledge that even the simple soul that is in communion with Jesus Christ is endowed with a moral insight which often puts to shame the wisdom of the learned, yet there seems to be an urgent necessity that the Christian society should give its members moral guidance and guardianship. Casuistry, or the attempt to regulate the moral life of each Christian by a recognized rule in every case, instead of encouraging the exercise of an instructed individual conscience, must be avoided as a moral plague. But the application of the Christian moral ideal to the complex moral requirements of society to-day is a task which requires a wider knowledge and a keener insight than most individual Christians possess; and it, therefore, belongs to the Christian society as such, to be discharged on behalf of all by such of the members as have the special competence. To freely use the help thus offered is not for the Christian a return to the bondage of the letter, but is an exercise of the freedom of the spirit, which will secure the common good. Paul's practice in his moral instruction of his converts supplied the necessary qualification of his abstract discussion of the relation of law to Christian life; and thus in urging these considerations
EZEKIEL, CHAPTER IV.

A PSYCHOLOGICAL AND PATHOLOGICAL PROBLEM.

The fourth chapter of Ezekiel has always been a puzzle to Bible students. The things signified are, of course, obvious enough. The city was to endure the horror of a long and trying siege, including a famine in which food would become very scarce, and much of it of a poor and even horrible description. The capture of the city was to be followed by a forty years' exile in a country of idolaters. The only difficulty that here arises concerns the 390 years which seem assigned without any known reason to Israel's exile. But this difficulty practically disappears if we read with LXX. 190 in v. 5, and understand the 150 of the LXX. in v. 4 to refer in round numbers to the part of the Israelitish exile which was already past, excluding the forty years still predicted for both kingdoms. In this case we must understand Ezekiel as meaning that the exile of both kingdoms would end simultaneously when that of Israel had lasted 190, and that of Judah 40 years (cf. what is said of the two kingdoms in xxxvii. 15-22). The further question concerning the fulfilment of the prophecy does not now concern us.

But though the interpretation of the prophecy thus presents no serious difficulty, what is to be said about the means employed by Ezekiel to represent these predictions? What in fact did Ezekiel really do or not do? To take the passage throughout as a detailed description of an acted parable involves great difficulties. To begin with the