PANTHEISM.

II.

The agnostic element in the philosophy of Kant may be said to have culminated in the Synthetic Philosophy of Herbert Spencer. There is an Eternal Energy immanent in the world; it is omnipotent and omnipresent, and from it all things proceed. None can escape from it, but its ways are past finding out. The old belief in the Personality of God, the ancient faith which rested in the self-conscious, purposive wisdom and love at the root of things has disappeared. It is quite true that Spencer equally discouraged other attempts at finding a dogmatic basis for Materialism, Atheism, and other -isms which had played a large part in the speculation of men. If he discountenanced the belief in a Personal God, he was equally decisive, in formal terms at least, against Materialism, and he had no sympathy with Atheism, taken as a dogmatic denial of the existence of God. His philosophy is antagonistic to any solution of the problem, or to any attempt to construe the ineffable mystery. He allows his readers to cast themselves prostrate before the majesty and mystery of the Ultimate Reality, but the reality remains for ever inaccessible to the knowledge of men. He will not deny any more than he will assert the existence of God, he will neither affirm Materialism nor deny it, he will only assert some Ultimate Reality, but what the reality is, he will not say. The ultimate reality cannot make itself known. Outside of the system in which it is, it has no way of manifesting itself, and all religious affirmations about God, or about any revelation He could make of Himself, and all religious affirmations about Him and His ways, are without a ground, and without a meaning. Yet the Ultimate Reality is an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed.
Nor has the influence of the tendency which culminated in Spencer been unfelt by the religious teachers of the time. The Spirit of the Age is always a real power over those who live within the age. Treatises appeared in which the agnostic philosophy of Hamilton played a conspicuous part. The classical illustration of the tendency is found in Mansel's Bampton Lecture, *The Limits of Religious Thought*. Many of these writers set themselves, with all diligence, to cut down the branch on which they sat, and cut it down between the place where they were perched and the place where it was attached to the tree. They sought to prove that science was as baseless as theology, and they sought a city of refuge in some appeal to authority. Nor can one forget the attempt of Matthew Arnold to find a substitute for the idea of a Personal God, which would yet preserve the essential function of Christianity—"a power, not ourselves, that makes for righteousness." Or, more elaborately, "the stream of tendency by which all things strive to fulfil the law of their being." This is not the place to speak of the graceful style of that fascinating writer, nor to appraise the literary worth of his attempt. We note that Arnold was under the impression that he was setting Christianity free from the burden laid on it by the Aberglaube of successive generations of Christians. Other illustrations might be given, but the main thing to note is that all these agnostic ways led back to Kant, and sprung from one side of his system. It is a fair question whether Agnosticism was a legitimate outgrowth of his philosophy. But that is too large a question to be discussed here. His distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge, and his attempt to find a regulative use for principles which he had already tried before the bar of Pure Reason, and had found incompetent, led in the direction of Agnosticism, whether it be of the type of Spencer
or of Arnold. The result has been that there was a belief in the immanence of a power in the universe, of which the only thing that could be said was that it was there. Agnostic immanence is the final outcome.

But another stream of tendency had its source in Kant. Absolute Idealism or, as it is sometimes called, Transcendentalism, though repudiated by him, still arose from his transcendental argument, mainly by a transformation of his procedure, which turned his philosophy into a metaphysical instead of a critical philosophy. Absolute Idealism may be briefly described as the system of philosophy which describes the universe as spirit. The idea of spirit is derived from the conception of spirit as experienced by ourselves. The human spirit as manifested in its moral, cognitive, and volitional activity is universalized, freed from limitations, and regarded as absolute. It has various forms, and one has a wide choice of works in which it may be studied at the present time. One may read it in Green, or in the Cairds, one may find expositions of it in Haldane's, or in Laurie's, or in Royce's Gifford Lectures. In fact, there are many works of pre-eminent ability in which readers may find expositions of the Idealism which has had so great an influence on contemporary life and thought. One thing common to them all, in their idealistic construction of experience, is that they derive existence from a single type, that the subject-object unity is the rubric of explanation of all reality and of all experience.

It may be well to see how this transformation of the Kantian principle arose. Perhaps the shortest way to the apprehension of this transformation is to state again what Kant meant by the process which he called the "Transcendental Deduction." This was an analysis of experience with a view to discovering the categories, or formal principles of thought implied in its meaning. It was through the opera-
tion of these categories that experience was possible. Kant had accepted many non-philosophical truths. In particular he accepted the truths of science, and of the moral consciousness. The order of nature as formulated in the system of Newton, and the moral order as revealed in the consciousness of duty, were accepted by him. His inquiry was as to the ground on which these convictions rested, and as to the principles which gave them validity. Experience, the very least experience of which a man is conscious, was either an experience of nature or of duty. What is involved in such an experience? Any object experienced will be experienced within space and time. These he calls the forms of intuition. But an experienced object is experienced as something. It persists through changes of position and quality. It is related to other things, and so Kant reaches what he calls the categories of the understanding. For both intuition and understanding are necessary in order that an object may be recognized as an object. These principles of thought are shown to be implicit in all experience. They are universal and necessary, for they are the conditions not of any particular experience, but of experience in general. Their implicit presence in experience in general, Kant calls their transcendent character, and the process by which they become explicit is shown in what he calls the transcendental deduction.

It is necessary to remember the limited range which Kant ascribed to the transcendental categories. They do not apply beyond experience. In two ways the limitation applies as set forth by Kant. In the first place they have no meaning beyond experience. Categories without perceptions are empty, just as perceptions without categories are blind. The method of Kant thus suggested the conception of a standard Mind as the standard to which adequate experience might be referred. But while this was the
route chosen by his successors, it was closed to Kant, by the principle that the categories could work only in the way of setting in order what was given in the manifold of experience. In the second place the categories suggested that the orderly arrangements of experience implied a perfect system. The ideas and ideals of that system might possibly be set forth, but inasmuch as such a system is not indispensable to experience, Kant would not attribute reality to it. In other words, the system of Kant is a critical philosophy, a logical and analytical study of the special terms and relations of human knowledge. It is of worth within this sphere, it has no validity beyond it.

But with his successors a criticism became a system of metaphysics. The suggestion of a perfect mind which seemed to be latent in the Kantian system was taken as real, and what Kant regarded as mere abstract conditions became in their hands concrete and metaphysical realities. The ideals and ideas of a perfected system of knowledge, which in the Kantian system was limited to the actual experiences of man, became an absolute system which, whether applicable to human experience or no, was real to the standard mind. Kant "is dealing," he says, "not with any individual mind or consciousness, but with consciousness in general, with the conditions of possible experience," "the unity of possible consciousness," or, as he calls it in another place, with "the logical form of all cognition," with the ultimate nature, as we might say, of knowledge as knowledge. The transcendental logic, in a word, is a study of knowledge in abstracto. But just because of this perfectly general or abstract character which belongs to the investigation, the results of the investigation must also be perfectly general or abstract. They will be abstract conditions, not concrete facts or metaphysical realities. The analysis reveals to us, according
to its own claims, certain conditions which must be fulfilled in every instance of actual knowledge—certain categories or fundamental modes of connexion, and as a supreme condition, the unity of the pure Ego—but it deals itself with no actual knower, whether human or divine. It deals, in a word, with possible consciousness, or consciousness in general, which so long as it remains general is of course a pure abstraction. (Prof. A. Seth Pringle Pattison, *Hegelianism and Personality*, pp. 30–31.)

The transformation of the critical philosophy into a metaphysic is found in the works of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. The same transformation has reappeared within the past few years again in German philosophy. The analysis of consciousness in general led on to the hypothesis of a universal self-consciousness for which the world is. The subject-object view, which lies at the basis of human knowledge, was universalized, and made into a formula of explanation both of the world and of God. The conclusion inevitably follows that the world is the other of God, and that the world is as necessary to God as God is to the world. But this development, though suggested by the Kantian system, was illegitimate on his principles. For the analysis of consciousness in general was undertaken by him with a view to the vindication of human knowledge, as a possible experience. With this aim he abstracted consciousness from any particular knower, and considered it simply as the presupposition of knowledge. Abstraction of consciousness from every particular self of experience does not imply that we are analysing an absolute self-consciousness or the self-consciousness of God. The transcendental theory of knowledge necessarily implies a single self, or logical subject. But it is a long step to assume that this analysis of consciousness in general gives us the right to infer only a single intelligence for which all things are. It may
explain the experience of a single self or intelligence, it is powerless to state whether there are more intelligences than one.

This is, however, precisely the step which is taken by all absolute idealists, and it necessarily leads to a unity which is really pantheistic. It is one thing to show how a manifold of sense is organized into unity and order by the application of the categories of the understanding, and, further, to show that the order thus attained is possible only on the presupposition that this is a rational universe; it is another thing to assume that this is possible only on the supposition that the universe as it is, is only one experience, and that the experience of an absolute self. The problem of knowledge is one thing, the problem of metaphysics is another, and epistemology cannot become a metaphysic simply by assuming that the abstract concept rules the universe.

To trace the process by which the concept of consciousness in general became the absolute single experience of absolute Idealism would be to trace the process of philosophy from Kant through Fichte, Schelling, to the absolute intellectualism of Hegel. It would be necessary also to go outside that stream, and to say something about Schopenhauer and his successor Van Hartmann. It might be noticed also that a similar movement has risen in Germany in the present century, and German philosophy has run a parallel course to that which obtained in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and to-day, after a period of eclipse, the system of Hegel is again in the ascendant. We quote from an able account of "Philosophy in Germany" in the May number of the Philosophical Review from the pen of Dr. Oscar Ewald. "The strictly intellectualistic tendency of modern German thought culminated in Hegel. By looking back we can fix upon three tendencies that dominate our time, all of which find in Hegel their starting
point. In the first place, the transcendental, logical tendency which, excluding all empiricism and psychologism, aims to deduce the fundamental characteristics and categories of knowing from pure concepts. "Secondly, the metaphysical tendency, which was active in Neo-Fichteanism, as well as in the Philosophy of the Unconscious, and which manifested itself as a reaction against the strictly immanent principle of Positivism. Thirdly, the monistic tendency, which clung to the unitary character of the metaphysical ultimate. These several tendencies found support in Kant's philosophy, but could not be brought to equilibrium in it. Because of his being divided between psychology and logic, Kant could not be a pure transcendentalist. Further, because he established no distinct boundaries between immanent and transcendent reality, he never became a clear metaphysician. Further, he was and remained a dualist, so far as he advocated the irreconcilability and incompatibility of sensibility and reason, of the empirical and intelligible worlds. Hegel, on the contrary, is a pure logician, for he ascribes to the self-unfolding concept dominion over all reality, over form and content. He is a metaphysician, for he hypostatizes the concept; he must hypostatize it, because a productive principle that creates reality represents not merely essence but an existence, a real being. He is a monist, in so far as he is a panlogist, in so far as he identifies the universe with a logical function." (The Philosophical Review, May, pp. 249–50.)

The main question of present philosophy in Germany is as to the value to be assigned to the categories of the transcendental logic. It is agreed that they are constitutive for our knowledge and for our conception of objective reality. Are they to have the same reality and independence claimed for the formal laws of thought, or are they to be
regarded and applied merely as rules for the relating of psychological processes? The Neo-Hegelian school tend to the view that they are valid, and are eternal, though no human beings were ever conscious of them.

Without entering further into the history of the theory of absolute Idealism, it may be well to state briefly some forms of it which are in vogue at the present hour. There is essential agreement about the truth of Idealism by the advocates of that view, whether we read the works of the Cairds, of Royce, of McTaggart, of Laurie, of Bradley, or of Professor Baillie. They all regard the universe as experience, as that of a single life, or as the expression of an absolute, single Self-Consciousness. No doubt there are differences, and each of these distinguished men has something peculiar to himself. Royce, for example, strives to get away from the intellectualism of Hegel, and to recognize what is true in the contribution of Schopenhauer. So he lays stress on the meaning, on the purpose, on the will, and seeks to do justice to all interests. McTaggart seeks to find the ultimate reality in a "Harmonious system of Selves," and to regard it as a community in which there may not be a universal self-consciousness, but only a system of selves conscious of one another; but there is no self-consciousness for which all things are. Green, again, thinks that the universal self-consciousness is active in every particular consciousness. Let us have some specimens.

"And now what our fourth conception asserts is that God's life—for God's life we must now call this absolute fulfilment which our fourth conception defines—sees the one plan fulfilled through all the manifold lives, the single consciousness winning its purpose by virtue of all the ideas, of all the individual lives, and of all the lives. No finite view is wholly illusory. Every finite intent, taken precisely in its wholeness, is fulfilled in the absolute. The
least life is not neglected, the most fleeting act is a recognized part of the world's meaning. You are for the divine view all that you know yourself at this instant to be. But you are also infinitely more. The preciousness of your present purposes to yourself is only a hint of the preciousness which in the end links their meaning to the entire realm of being.” (The World and the Individual, pp. 426-7.) He sums up his view in his controversy with Professor Howison as follows: “The entire world of truth, natural and ethical, must be present in the unity of a single absolute consciousness.” (The Conception of God, p. 329.) The full development of his subtile and fascinating view will be found in his various works, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, The Conception of God, and in the two volumes of his Gifford Lectures. Professor Royce strives to do justice to all interests, and almost alone of all idealists strives to pass beyond the intellectualism of Hegel, and to do justice to the aspects of will and purpose. He strives also to save the individual self from being a mere aspect of the universal self. But, with all respect to his profound and elaborate argument, we do not think that all interests have been conserved. Of this more in the sequel.

As to the thesis of Professor Royce quoted above, that the entire world of truth must be present in the unity of a Single Absolute consciousness, it may be well to hear what Mr. McTaggart has to say. Dr. Rashdall, in Personal Idealism (p. 393), had written regarding Mr. McTaggart: “Mr. McTaggart feels that the world must be a unity, that it consists not merely of souls but of related and interconnected souls which form a system. But a system for whom? The idea of a system which is not 'for' any mind is not open to an idealist; and the idea of a world each part of which is known to some mind but is not known as
a whole to any Mind is equally difficult. Where, then, in his view, is the mind that knows the whole? i.e. the whole system of souls with the content of each.” To which argumentation the significant reply is made: “I cannot see that it is at all necessary for an idealist to admit that nothing can exist except that which is for a mind. There is no doubt a school of Idealism which maintains this. It has been that to Be is to be Perceived, or that to Be is to be Thought. To such Idealism, certainly, Dr. Rashdall’s argument applies. If all reality is a system, and if only that has being which is known, then some person must know the system, and so know all reality.

“There is, however, another form of Idealism—the form which seems to me to be true—which is not liable to these criticisms. This form of Idealism does not say that nothing can be real except what is known. It says that nothing can exist but persons—conscious beings, who know, will and feel. To the traditional expression of the first-mentioned school, esse est percipi; the adherents of the second view might, for the sake of antithesis, oppose the maxim esse est percipere. But it must always be remembered that such a formula sacrifices accuracy to antithesis, since persons have other activities as fundamental as knowledge. Now, if we take this view, there seems to be no difficulty at all in saying that certain aspects of reality are unknown to every one.” (Some Dogmas of Religion, pp. 251–2.) The main contention of McTaggart is contradictory to the thesis of Professor Royce cited above. For he affirms that if spirit is the only reality, we may conceive the universe (a) as a unity in which selves are united by laws of a mechanical nature, in which case there would be some difficulty in dispensing with the idea of a directing mind, though not so much as if the existence of matter was admitted. If we conceive the universe (b) as a unity which
possesses spiritual significance and value, there is no need for a directing mind to account for traces of order in it. The existence of such a unity would then be a fundamental fact of the universe. What is fundamental to such idealists as Royce, the Cairds, and other exponents of the Absolute Self-Consciousness as the pre-supposition of a real universe is calmly set aside by Mr. McTaggart, by the assumption that while the whole may be known by the parts, the parts are, or may not be known by the whole. "God is a community, and every man is part of it. In a perfect unity, such as God is, the parts are not subordinate to the whole. The whole is in every part, and every part is essential to the whole. Every man is thus a perfect manifestation of God. He would not be such a manifestation of God, indeed, if he were taken in isolation, but being taken in the community, he embodies God perfectly." (Hegelian Cosmogony, p. 243.) Still another form of Idealism is found in Mr. Bradley's various works, specially in his Appearance and Reality. In some respects it is peculiar, as it is certainly the most thorough-going and the most drastic in his criticism of what he calls appearance and reality. What is not complete, self-explanatory, consistent, and without contradiction is appearance for him and not reality. Thus all finite things and finite selves can only be appearance, there is no reality, or only certain degrees of reality, in anything save the Absolute. It is consistent, self-explanatory, free from contradiction, but the Absolute has to pay a large price for its perfection and completeness. "The Absolute is not personal, nor is it moral, nor is it beautiful or true. And yet, in these denials we may be falling into worse mistakes, for it would be far from incorrect to assert that the Absolute is either false, or ugly, or bad, or is something even beneath the application of predicates such as these. And it is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute
impersonal. But neither mistake should be necessary. The Absolute stands above, and not below its internal distinctions. It does not eject them, but includes them as elements in its fulness. To speak in other language, it is not the indifference, but the concrete identity of all extremes. But it is better in this connexion to call it super-personal.” (Appearance and Reality, p. 533.)

These may suffice as indications of the idealistic solution of the problems of life and thought. Discounting for the moment the individual differences manifested in the expositions of Royce, McTaggart and Bradley, or the differences of exposition of such writers as the Cairds, Haldane, Laurie and Baillie, we note that there are fundamental points affirmed by the whole school. The ultimate unity may be a community according to McTaggart, or according to others it must be “single life,” one experience, or an Absolute Self-Consciousness for which all things are. Discounting the individual differences of exposition, the common result may be thus expressed. They all hold that there is but one reality, one substance which is spirit, which is the absolute cause and ground of all phenomena, and that this reality is the deeper self which we find at the core of our own self-consciousness. It protests that it does not deserve the name of Pantheism. It asserts itself to be the true Theism, which lies between the extremes of Deism and Pantheism, and, avoiding the partial view of both, sets forth the truth in fulness at which they severally aim.

Nor can we forget that many of this school claim that they alone give to Christianity its rights, and that their view alone can vindicate its claim to be the absolute religion. We recall Hegel’s tribute to Christianity, and his translation of Christian dogmas into the formulae of his own philosophy. Nor can we forget the number of treatises
on Dogmatic written by theologians under the influence of Hegel. It may be well to remember also the performances of the negative school of the Hegelian tradition, and think of Strauss and Vatke and others who applied the Hegelian formulae to history and religion. As to Hegel's own interpretation of Christianity one had better read McTaggart's account of it in *The Cosmogony of Hegel*. The most fascinating application of the principles of Absolute Idealism to the explanation of Christianity is to be found in the writings of the late Principal Caird, and of his brother the Master of Balliol. These writings may be described as an Apology for Christianity. It is recognized now by all Christian apologists worthy of the name that to defend Christianity with Hegelian weapons is to surrender at the outset all the distinguishing marks of Christianity. It transforms Christianity beyond all recognition. Facts disappear, doctrines vanish, experience distinctively Christian is evaporated, and we are left with nothing save the ideas disembodied in the religion. History and Fact are merely scaffolding useful for the introduction of the Ideas, but as soon as the ideas are there the facts may usefully disappear.

To objective Idealism there is only one principle of explanation, whether the thing to be explained is our own existence or the existence of the universe. Science and religion are two forms of the same spiritual movement, and what we call matter is the lowest mode of the manifestation of spirit. The criticism of this is reserved for the next article. Meanwhile it may be well to track the influence of this movement on those who are not formally objective idealists, but who have been so far influenced by it. The name of these is legion, and when they deal with the question they deal with it mainly under the name of the Immanence of God. How widely spread is this movement every reader knows. One finds it in sermons, in religious treatises, and
in formal works of theology. It is sometimes stated rashly, as if St. Paul had said God lives and moves and has His being in us, instead of what he actually did say, "In Him we live and move and have our being." The Immanence of God may be stated in such a way as to obliterate all distinction between Him and the world.

One illustration of this tendency may be taken from Lotze, of whom and of whose works we would speak with the highest admiration. Of his contribution to the great category of Personality, and of the possible Personality of the infinite we need only say that it is of the highest value for theology and for life. But even Lotze, in his search after a principle of unity, yielded to the desire to find the principle in what Professor James calls "one block." He could find no ground for interaction between the various beings of the universe save on the hypothesis that they have one ground. "There cannot be a multiplicity of independent things, but all elements, if reciprocal action is to be possible between them, must be regarded as parts of a single and real being." (Lotze’s *System of Philosophy, Metaphysics*—English translation, p. 125.) The view of Lotze has been expounded and illustrated with great ability by Professor Bowne, of Boston, in his various works, specially in his *Metaphysic*, his *Theism*, and in his latest work, *The Immanence of God*. The question we raise at the conclusion of this article is whether in our search after unity the only possible solution is that of a unity of one kind, whether that kind is represented as the unity of one Experience, or that of a single life, or that of a universal self-consciousness, or that of a single and real being? Are we limited to that quantitative sort of solution? Or may there be a unity of another kind, which will allow us to think of God as something in and for Himself, and of the world as real, and of the selves in it as real and related to the world, to each other,
and to God in a spiritual system, not the less real though it is not expressed in a quantitative fashion? We shall seek to answer this question in our next article.

JAMES IVERACH.

THE NEWLY RECOVERED TREATISE OF IRENAEUS.

This volume gives us a work, hitherto lost, of Irenaeus. It is true that it does not contain very much that we did not know before of Christian teaching towards the end of the second century; and yet it is important because it outlines, in a concise and simple way, the catechetical instruction communicated by a bishop of that age to an educated believer. An orthodox and cultivated clergyman of this generation contrasting this *summa theologica* of Irenaeus with his own beliefs will note two chief points of difference. On the one hand the importance which Irenaeus attaches to the proof from prophecy; for two-thirds of the work are an elaboration of the theme that Jesus of Nazareth was Messiah, because every phase and act of His life fulfilled and fitted in with some prophecy or another—a type of argumentation which a better informed Hebrew learning is rapidly banishing among modern divines, although it was the *staple* for many centuries of Christian apologetic. On the other hand, there is barely any hint of the great Christological controversies which were to rend the Church asunder in the fourth and fifth centuries. However, as Harnack notes in one passage, chap. 47, Irenaeus draws very close to the Nicene position. I translate it:

Accordingly the Father is Lord and the Son is Lord, and the Father is God, and the Son God, because he that is begotten of God