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a wanton violation of symmetry! I really see no more reason for disjoining the Epilogue than the Prologue; and the cohesion is illustrated by my inclination to take 13–17 with what precedes. Do let St. John keep his triads, if you can. Also consider how very short you would make the last division.

W. replies: Very well. Let us see the effect in print.

The Westcott and Hort Greek Testament was published in May, 1881, and a second edition with a considerable number of corrections was issued in December of the same year. In that interval the divisions of the First Epistle of St. John were again considered, for in October, Dr. Hort, apparently in reply to a suggestion from Dr. Westcott that iv. 1-6 should be transferred from the third to the second main division,¹ wrote:

Would you mind glancing over the old papers on the divisions of 1 St. John? See especially what is marked with red.² It seems to me that the second and third divisions (ii. 18 ff.; iv. 1 ff.) both begin with errors or authors of error; and that the first division (after the Prologue) implicitly does the same (i. 5–8), while another similar implication closes the Epistle (v. 21). The antichrists seem to belong to the second division (the Son), as the false prophets (or their spirits) do to the third (the Spirit). It is remarkable that with the solitary exception of the close of iii., striking the keynote for what follows, παρθένω is confined to iv. and v.

As far as I can see the symmetry of the Epistle cannot be restored if iv. 1–6 is thrown back.

PANTHEISM.

Any adequate account of Pantheism, and any sufficient criticism of it would take many volumes, and would need for their fulfilment a knowledge of the history of human thought since man began seriously to think. For there has always been a tendency towards the pantheistic solu-

¹ In Bishop Westcott’s own Commentary on 1 St. John, iv. 1–6 is placed in the second main division.

² The passage marked with red is that on p. 485 f.: “The base of all ... God’s own manifested love, iv. 7–21.”
tion of the problem of knowledge and life. The desire after unity in life and thought, the recoil against dualism or pluralism, have ever led towards Pantheism. The pantheistic solution is so obvious, so ready to hand, that one is not surprised that it should have been early reached and that it should be with us at the present hour. From the time of Lao-tze onwards the thought of the unity which is at once the path and the pathgoer, the eternal road and those who walk on it, has been the common property of systems in the Eastern and the Western worlds, in ancient and in modern times. Yet with the thought of an all-comprehensive unity, there has been a difference of view as to the factor which really constitutes the unity. Taking the word itself as the first clue to its meaning, we may point out that as we lay stress on the πᾶν or the θεός it may mean either (1) that the All is God, or else (2) that God is all, that the only existence real and active is God. That is, it may signify (1) that the sum-total of particular existences is God, that the universe is itself the only real being: or (2) it may mean that God, the Absolute Being, is the only real being, that all finite being is only appearance, and is only illusion. Pantheism may thus be equivalent to a denial of God, or it may mean a denial of the reality of the world. It may be atheism or akosmism. In any event it means an absolute identification of God and other being. It either merges God in the universe, or the universe is merged in God.

As a matter of fact Pantheism has manifested itself in the history of thought in these two forms. The first form which naturally arises is that which identifies the world with God and merges Him in the world. For in the childhood of man and of the race man lives an external life. Men are merged in the objective world. They do not seem to be conscious of themselves, reflection has not even
begun. Savages seem to live almost entirely outside of themselves; objects, as they stand outside, seem to move them; their passions are like natural forces; they do not seem to feel as if they were distinct from their passions, and able to control them in any way or to any end. The savage thinks of himself simply as an object among other objects, and all existence is for him a localized existence in space and time. Man at first looks outward and not inward, and this outwardness rules all his thinking and all his living. It is quite natural also at this stage of his development that he should think of all objects and all men as having feelings, thoughts, and passions like his own. For it is quite within the power of the unreflective consciousness to be conscious of its own reactive activity, of its feelings, passions, desires in relation to things and persons in the external world. This rough and ready consciousness is transferred to all objects, and thus we have the animistic state of mind. It is not necessary to describe Animism at any length, or to enter into the controversy as to its nature and character, or to ask whether it is really primitive, as Tylor affirms, or derivative, as Spencer contends. Sufficient for our purpose is the acknowledged fact, that it is at all events relatively primitive and widely prevalent. Early man, then, regarded his own experience as universal, and looked at all things as like himself. Stones, trees, rivers, mountains, stars, all things which were present to his senses, were taken in their simplicity, as they appeared, and their reality was never questioned. They were there in their concrete reality, they could be touched or seen, and they had their position outside of himself, and remained whether he was present or not.

To him also these appeared to have a life of their own, and just as he reacted against outward things, so they reacted against him. Out of this animistic belief arose,
as reflection increased, the further belief that the objects with which he came into contact had their feelings in relation to him, as he had feelings in relation to them. They were hostile or friendly, or they might be made so, and out of this feeling arose certain rules and rites which would make hostile objects friendly, and place their assistance on his side. Thus beliefs hardened into customs, and customs in their turn gave rise to further explanations, and mythology came into being. But at the base of it all seems to lie the fundamental belief that all things had a life of their own, and that their attitude to the individual depended on his behaviour.

Some of these beings seemed to the primitive man to be capricious and changeable; and he could never say what their attitude to him might be. Some, again, were the same yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. And some were now stable and firm in their attitude, and others were full of change. Hills, mountains, and stars were fixed, and continued to maintain their immoveable attitude, while the regular return of night and day, of summer and winter, of seedtime and harvest, gave him the consciousness of permanence. Slowly the thought of order would arise in his mind, and the belief that things might be permanent might find a place among his beliefs. But so long as he believed in the view that each thing had a life and action proper to itself, he would find it difficult to reach the conception of order in the world outside himself. Certain aspects of the world tended towards such a belief, but certain other aspects tended the other way. For there were many objects around him, and each had its own way. He had to adjust his conduct to the separate ways of each.

Many of these objects were greater, stronger, more powerful than himself, and his attitude towards them was one of awe and fear. They might help him, or they might injure
him, and it was needful that he should gain their help or avert their hostility. It is not necessary to trace the process by which their primitive beliefs grew till they became the complicated systems which we read of in the religions of the world. What we are concerned with here is to note how primitive Animism grew into Polytheism, and how, with the necessity under which the human spirit ever lies of reaching some form of unity, Polytheism developed into Pantheism. Pantheism is the form which Polytheism takes as it strives to find a unity for itself. It may be safely said that the unity which appears in the religions of the world, in all the religions we know, is a pantheistic unity. It is so in the religion of Egypt, it is so in China and in India, it is so in Greece and in Rome. In fact, there have been only three monotheistic religions in the history of man, and these are closely connected with one another: the religion of the Hebrews, the religion of Christianity, and the religion of Mohammed.

All objects in the world were to the early man living things with a life and action of their own. What the particular form of that life was, was determined for early man by its particular action. Each thing had its own characteristics, and each had to be dealt with separately. And the particular strength, power, and action of the thing indicated the amount of respect to be paid to it. Into this attitude was gathered the full stream of the growing experiences of the generations, and each experience helped to raise to a higher level the estimate in which particular powers of nature were held. The respect and reverence which early men paid to the powers of nature were blended with the respect which they felt for the men among themselves who had manifested special power, had unusual gifts of strength, cunning or power. Ancestor worship blended with the reverence for natural objects, and all
experience flowed together to enhance the practice of Polytheism.

But here came the parting of the ways, which led, on the one hand, to the materialistic Monism of the present time, and, on the other hand, to the objective idealism which obtains so widely to-day. These have their roots deep down in the primitive Animism, which took the experience, unreflective experience no doubt, but still a real experience, as the type of the experience of the universe. But there are two elements in experience. There is the objective element and the subjective. There is the world of objects and there is the inner life to which they appear. Both elements are together, and they can never be separated, except in abstraction. But they have been separated, and one or other of them has thrust the other into the background. In the one result you have a material world, with its appearance in time and space, with its own laws of causality, and its own ongoing, and the world of mind is simply an unexplained accompaniment, only with that significance which the ticking of the clock has to its action. Thus there may be a materialistic Pantheism, a Pantheism which is the negation of spirit, a Monism which makes mind secondary, derivative, simply an element in experience which is without significance.

But this mode of explanation appeared early in the history of human thought. How it arose is easily understood. Early man, living in a world of objects, dealing with them in daily intercourse, apprehended them in their apparent objectivity, and was oppressed by their constant presence. He looked out at them, and never looked within. Each object, too, had its own peculiar nature, but they had this in common, that they were all outside, and all were always there. There was a certain permanence attaching to them all, and all of them could be seen,
some of them could be touched: may there not be some quality which they all had in common? They had this at least, that they were all of them in a world external to the individual, and appeared to be independent of him. The first questions asked by man, when he began to ask questions at all, was as to the whence and the how of the actual world around him. Whence was it and what has been its becoming? Answers to these questions arose, and are recorded in the systems of the world. In some cases the questioner neglected the inner factor, and laid stress on what seemed external. The material world was everywhere present, and seemed to go a way of its own.

Thus we find systems which explained the whence and the how of things from the ongoing of the world of nature. It was first, and man was only a product of it. Early in the history we find this naturalism, and in the systems of Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus it lies before us in full development. Its mystic and poetic side appears in the wondrous poem of Lucretius. And more recently it appears in the modern systems of materialist unity, from the Système de la nature, to the Monism of Haeckel. The watchwords of this type of monistic thought are of this kind, “everything happens by natural means,” “nature is all-sufficient,” “there can be no intervening influence from without or beyond nature.” “There is no purpose, events happen, they are never meant.” One would expect that a naturalism of this kind would have felt bound to think out what it meant by Nature. But it is an attitude of mind which has not anything to do with concrete and exact knowledge of nature. It has quite a number of ideas which are not in any true sense scientific. Though opposed instinctively to any conception of interference from without nature, yet nature itself may, and often does,
take on a mystic shape, and teams with mysterious agencies. Nature may become the Alma Mater, and the attitude towards nature may be that of reverence and worship. The outcome is not a denial of the divine, but an ascription of divinity to nature itself. It is not Atheism, it is Pantheism. Everything happens naturally, but nature itself is instinct with divine life. It is the all-living which, without haste and without rest, pours forth its inexhaustible fulness into the finite forms of being. Nature itself is cause, principle, and unity; she is the fruitful mother of all things; she is the *natura naturans*, and the *natura naturata*. If it retains the name of God, it means only the Logos of Heracleitus and the Stoics, the *Anima Mundi*, the meaning and reason of all-living nature. It delights to dwell on the Immanence of God, and is concerned to deny a God who is something for Himself. Its God must dwell only in the world, and is never to be thought of as having any meaning purpose or action save within the universe.

Along this tendency of thought, which appears from age to age, there is another tendency equally conspicuous and equally constant. It does not dwell on the external world, its order, its causality, and its steadfastness. It is occupied with the world within. The spirit of man has somehow become aware of itself, conscious of its own activity, of its own meaning as a factor in its own experience. It feels that it is something, it can stand over against the world, and distinguish itself from the world. May not the self be the only permanent thing among the constant becoming, and changing flux of things? The self remains, conscious somehow of its own unity and persistency: may not the external world be only a seeming world, and the self the only—the final—reality? The most complete expression of this tendency is found in the Upanishads, set forth thus by Dr. Deussen, who is in entire sympathy with the
philosophy of the Upanishads. He speaks of the great "Intellectual truth that this entire universe, with its relations in space, its consequent manifoldness, and dependence upon the mind that apprehends, rests solely upon an illusion (‘Mâyâ’) natural to us owing to the limitations of our intellect; and that there is in truth one Being alone, eternal, exalted above space and time, multiplicity and change, self-revealing in all the forms of nature, and by me, who myself also am one and undivided, discovered and realized within as my very Self, as the Ātman." (The Upanishads, Deussen, English Translation, pp. 48-9.) It may be well to quote another paragraph: "There have been three occasions, as far as we know, on which philosophy has advanced to a clearer comprehension of its recurring task and of the solution demanded; first in India in the Upanishads, again in Greece in the philosophy of Parmenides and Plato, and finally, at a more recent time, in the philosophy of Kant and Schopenhauer. In a later word we shall have to show how Greek philosophy reached its climax in the teaching of Parmenides and Plato, that this entire universe of change is, as Parmenides describes it, merely phenomenal, or, in Plato's words, a world of shadows, and how philosophers endeavoured through it to grasp the essential reality, τὸ ὅν, τὸ ὅντως, ὅν, that which Plato, in an expression that recalls the doctrine of the Upanishads no less than the phraseology of Kant, describes as the αὐτό (ātman) καθ' αὑτό (an sich). We shall see how this same thought, obscured for a time under the influence of Aristotle and throughout the Middle Ages, was taken up again in quite a different way, and shone forth more clearly than ever in the philosophy of Kant, adopted and perfected by his great successor, Schopenhauer. Here we have to do with the Upanishads, and the world-wide significance of these documents cannot,
in our judgment, be more clearly indicated than by showing how the deep fundamental conception of Plato and Kant was precisely that which formed the basis of Upanishad teaching.” (Op. cit. pp 41-2.)

It is not our purpose to trace the history of the striving after unity or the search after some fundamental conception which might express the reality of the universe, while it would also set forth the reality of every particular being. Briefly the fundamental conception was expressed either in terms of the objective world or in terms of the perceiving and thinking mind. In both cases there were fringes attached to the main conception by means of which they sought to conserve what the main conception almost in terms denied. Naturalism, in opposition to its own principles, spoke in poetic and in religious tones of the spirit of Nature, of the mystic glow which in times of emotion it saw shining over the world, or issuing forth from it, while on the other hand the advocates of the supremacy of the universal self allowed some show of reality to the finite experience of finite selves. To trace these tendencies in Greek philosophy, in Oriental speculation, or in the scholasticism of the Middle Ages, would far exceed our limits. Nor is it necessary to do so, for they reappear in our modern philosophy enriched by the experience of mankind, and specially by the mastery of the world attained by modern science. That form of Pantheism which Greek materialism elaborated appears to-day in the evolutionary Pantheism of Spencer and Haeckel, while the Pantheism of the Upanishads appears in absolute idealism, which regards the universe as the experience of a single life, or the expression of an Absolute Self-consciousness. While the modern forms gather up in themselves the historic gains of former explorations, they owe their precise shape mainly to the influence of Kant. All modern problems of philosophy date from him.
To him may be traced the current forms of Agnosticism and also the apotheosis of the single absolute experience, and of absolute self-consciousness. No doubt the advocates of both delight to read the history of philosophy and gather from it illustrations and adumbrations of their own solution, but it is still true that they follow in the footsteps of Kant, and deal with their problem under conditions set by him. To the man of science, who regards all inquiries into ultimate reality as vain, and who steadily opposes a "We do not know" to all questions beyond phenomena and their interconnexions, Kant is the great exemplar, for did he not limit inquiry to the realm of possible experience? Besides, Kant was himself a man of science, who had mastered the science of his time and had indeed extended its boundaries. He accepted the order of nature, and also the phenomena of duty, and had asked the question of their possibility and validity. This had led him into an inquiry as to the nature and validity of human knowledge. Not to dwell on his view of perceptions and conceptions, or on the synthetic unity of Apperception and its significance, it is sufficient to say here that his restriction of knowledge to phenomena, and his recognition of things in themselves as lying beyond knowledge, laid the foundation on which the structure of Agnosticism has been built up.

He was successful in his attempt to vindicate the possibility of experience, and the possibility of science. That is, he succeeded in showing that experience is a connected whole, that the categories were immanently at work in all experience. The fact of succession was possible because the notion of permanence and change, the notion of causality, are involved in the apprehension of succession, and without these connecting links succession could not be apprehended. But while these categories are there and are at
work, they have their sphere of operation and their validity only in relation to the experience they set in order. The orderly arrangement of experience suggests a perfect system. It is possible to define the ideas and ideals through which such a perfect system might be realized. As, however, these are not indispensable to experience Kant denies reality to them. It can only remain an ideal which regulates only that part of it which may fall within the range of my experience, or, in moral experience, it may become an absolute postulate and an object of faith. Kant’s philosophy is altogether a critical philosophy, a study of the terms and relations of human knowledge. Beyond this realm these terms and relations have no validity. There remained in his philosophy the abstract opposition between the subject in itself and the object in itself. The object remained inaccessible to the subject, or there were aspects of the object which refused to submit to the categories, and these were outside the bounds of human knowledge. The result thus attained was accepted by many. It fell in with the tendency to circumscribe human knowledge, and to limit it to the phenomenal world, or the world suggested to us by sense-experience. Comte, perhaps not directly influenced by Kant, but breathing the same atmosphere, limited knowledge to the immediate and autocratic evidence of sensible experience. In effect he said, Let all theological and metaphysical entities be banished for evermore, for they are all like the product of illusion, abstraction, and conjecture. Organize life without reference to any ultimate reality. In a consistent way he wrought his system, though in the end he brought back an abstraction, called it Humanity, and enthroned it in the vacant place. In the interest, too, of theistic faith Agnosticism was cultivated, and in the hands of Sir William Hamilton and Dean Mansel gave rise to the philosophy of the Unconditioned. We do not dwell on
this save to say that the argumentation of Hamilton and Mansel supplied Spencer with the basis of his doctrine of the Unknowable. To do Spencer justice he endeavoured to avoid the negative conclusions of Hamilton and Mansel, and allowed a vague consciousness of an Ultimate reality, but of such a sort as remained beyond the bounds of positive knowledge. Spencer appeared at an appropriate time. Science had greatly advanced, evolution was in the air, and to Spencer appeared the vision of cosmic evolution. An immanent movement, not the Dialectic movement of Hegel, but a movement within the field of reality, was the means by which evolution was to be accomplished. The great thought dawned on his mind, and he set himself to work it out. Speedily he was strengthened in an unexpected manner by the appearance of Darwin's work. Spencer endeavoured to work out his thesis, and sought to set forth a system of philosophy in which the interests reflected in the Agnosticism of Hamilton and Mansel, the Positivism of Comte, the generalizations of science, and even the interests of religion might be reconciled in the higher synthesis of the synthetic philosophy. It must be admitted that the Unknowable appeared to be far from home in his positive synthetic procedure. As soon as he obtains his postulate, the persistence of force, the Unknowable ceased to be an active partner in the business, it served only to provide a safe receptacle for the shelving of unanswerable questions. In the end his philosophy ceases to be agnostic and becomes a Pantheism largely dominated by material interests. To prove this thesis it is only necessary to quote two passages from his Principles of Sociology. "The internal energy which in the experiences of the primitive man was always the immediate antecedent of changes wrought by him—that energy which, when interpreting external changes, he thought of along with those attributes
of a human personality connected with it in himself; it is the same energy which, freed from anthropomorphic accompaniments, is now figured as the cause of all external phenomena. The last stage reached is recognition of the truth that force as it exists beyond consciousness cannot be like what we know within consciousness; and, that yet, as either is capable of generating the other, they must be different modes of the same. Consequently the final outcome of the speculation commenced by the primitive man is that the Power manifested throughout the Universe distinguished as material is the same Power which in ourselves wells up under the form of consciousness. (Principles of Sociology, p. 839.) "One truth must ever grow clearer—the truth that there is an Inscrutable Existence everywhere manifested, to which he can neither find nor conceive either beginning or end. Amid the mysteries which become the more mysterious the more they are thought about there will remain the one absolute certainty that he is ever in presence of an Infinite and Eternal Energy, from which all things proceed" (p. 843).

Not to dwell on the fact that these passages follow, not from the agnostic element of Spencer's system, but from the positive constructive part, we note that those who had praised the agnostic statement in the First Principles, and called them the final word of human reason on these questions, protested that Spencer was untrue to his own philosophy, and had brought back again the metaphysical and theological ghosts which they thought had been banished for ever. There were many protests, but Spencer persisted in his affirmation of the Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. If these results be the final outcome, and the conclusions of Haeckel are not very different from them, then the result is a materialistic Monism, which is a Pantheism with special emphasis laid on the materialistic aspect of
the universe. Agnostic immanence is the outcome of the system. Spencer tried to conciliate all interests in his solution. Knowledge is not of the Ultimate Reality, but only of phenomena, that is of things as they appear in conscious experience, limited as this is by correlation with a specific nervous organism. He thought that he conserved the truth of the various systems of religion and philosophy when he conceded to the Agnostic that the Ultimate Reality was unknowable, while to the Theist and the religious instinct generally, he gave the assurance of an Infinite and Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. The demands of the religious consciousness were met by the presentation not of an anthropomorphic God transcendent of the world, but by an immanent God whose presence in the world might still nourish all the religious feelings, and feed the feelings of reverence, awe, and devotion, formerly evoked by belief in a personal God. How far agnostic Immanence can satisfy the religious need of man, we shall inquire presently. At present we take Spencer as the latest exponent of that type of pantheistic thought, which merges God in the world, and leaves no room for any proper life in the Eternal Energy from which all things proceed. The Energy has no meaning apart from its manifestations of itself within space and time. God is identified with the world, and has no meaning apart from the world.

JAMES IVERACH.

THE DESOLATION OF THE CROSS.

(1) The holiest spot for the Christian Church is Calvary; the most sacred symbol is the Cross; when in its most solemn ordinance it remembers its Founder, it is as dying. Immediately after the Resurrection the sacrifice of Christ