CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW TESTAMENT GREEK.

VIII.

THIS not being a formal treatise, demanding completeness, we may now leave the Article and pass on to the Pronouns in general. A very short excursion among the Personal Pronouns brings us up against another untrustworthy evidence of "the dependence of the language on Semitic speech," in the "extraordinary frequency of the oblique cases of the personal pronouns used without emphasis" (Blass, p. 164). The phenomenon is only another feature of popular Greek, and can be matched from papyri in which no Semite had a hand. Cf. *Ox. Pap.* 299 (1st cent.), *Λάμπωνι μυοθηρευτῇ ἔδωκα αὐτῷ . . . δραχμὰς η.* Cf. also Kälker, *Quaestiones de elocutione Polybiana*, p. 274, where *διὸ καὶ πάλιν ἐπερρώσθησαν διὰ ταῦτα* and similar redundancies are cited from Polybius. I return to this matter shortly, remarking only that dependence on Semitic would need to be very strongly evidenced from other phenomena before we could accept such an account of a feature affecting the whole fabric of every-day speech.

The *Reflexive* pronouns have developed some unclassical uses, notably that in the plural they are all fused into the forms originally appropriated to the third person. The presence or absence of this confusion in the singular is a nice test of the degree of culture in a writer of Common Greek. In the papyri there are a few examples of it in very illiterate documents,[1] while in the plural the use is general, beginning to appear even in classical times.[2] This answers to what we find in the New Testament, where some seventy cases of the plural occur without a single genuine example of the singular;[3] late scribes, reflecting

[1] See *Cl. Rev.* xv. 441, xviii. 154. I find it rather hard to believe that Lucian's text is sound where he is recorded as using this eminently illiterate idiom.

[2] Polybius always uses *αὐτῶν* (Kälker, *Quaestiones*, p. 277).

[3] In 1 Cor. x. 29 *ἑαυτοῦ*="one's."

the developments of their own time, have introduced it into John xviii. 34 and Romans xiii. 9 (Gal. v. 14). As in the papyri, ἑαυτούς sometimes stands for ἀλλήλους, and sometimes is itself replaced by the personal pronoun. In one class of phrases we find ἑαυτοῦ used rather lightly, on sepulchral inscriptions especially. A son will describe his father as ὁ πατήρ, ὁ ἴδιος πατήρ, or ὁ ἑαυτοῦ πατήρ, and the difference between the three is not very easily discernible. In a number of these inscriptions contained in the third volume of the *Inscr. Maris Aegaei* I count twenty-one examples with ἴδιος, ten with ἑαυτοῦ, and sixteen with neither. The papyrus formula, used in all legal documents where a woman is the principal, μετὰ κυρίου τοῦ ἑαυτῆς ἀνδρός (ἀδελφοῦ, etc.), gives a parallel for this rather faded use of the reflexive. It starts the more serious question whether ἴδιος is to be supposed similarly weakened in Hellenistic. This is often affirmed, and is vouched for by no less an authority than Deissmann (*B.S.* 123 f.). He calls special attention to passages in the LXX. like Job xxiv. 12 (οἴκων ἰδίων), Proverbs xxvii. 15 (τοῦ ἰδίου οἴκου), ix. 12 (τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ἀμπελῶνος . . . τοῦ ἰδίου γεωργίου), xxii. 7 (ἰδίοις δεσπόταις), in which the pronoun has nothing whatever answering to it in the original. He reminds us that the "exhausted ἴδιος" occurs in writers of the literary *Κοινή*, and that in Josephus even οἰκεῖος comes to share this weakening: a few Attic inscriptions from the 1st cent. B.C. (Meisterhans,[3] p. 235) show ἴδιος with the like attenuated content. Our inference must be that in Acts xxiv. 24 St. Luke is not ironically suggesting the poverty of Felix's title, and in Matthew xxii. 5 there is no stress on the disloyal guest's busying himself with his own farm instead of someone else's. I venture, however, to think that this doctrine of exhausted ἴδιος is in some danger of being worked too hard. In *Cl. Rev.* xv. 440 f. I have put down all the occurrences of ἴδιος in the first two volumes of the Berlin Papyri, which

contain nearly 700 documents of very various antiquity. It is certainly remarkable that in all these passages there is not one which goes to swell Deissmann's list. Not even in the Byzantine papyri have we a single case where ἴδιος has to be left out, where the English *own* does not exactly represent it. In a papyrus as early as the Ptolemaic period we find the possessive pronoun added—ὄντα ἡμῶν ἴδιον, which is exactly like "our own." (Cf. 2 Pet. iii. 16; Tit. i. 12; Acts ii. 8.) This use became normal in the Byzantine age, in which ἴδιος still had force enough to make such phrases as ἰδίαν καὶ νομίμην γυναῖκα. Now in the face of the literary examples I cannot venture to deny *in toto* the weakening of ἴδιος, still less the practical equivalence of ἴδιος and ἑαυτοῦ, which is evident from the sepulchral inscriptions just cited, as well as from such passages as Proverbs ix. 12 and 1 Corinthians vii. 2. But the strong signs of life in the word throughout the papyri have to be allowed for. In correlating these rather perplexing phenomena we may bring in the following considerations. (1) The fact that Josephus similarly weakens οἰκεῖος seems to show that the question turns on thought rather than on words. (2) It is possible, as our own language shows, for a word to be simultaneously in possession of a full and an attenuated meaning. People who say "It's an awful nuisance" will without any sense of incongruity say "How awful!" when they read of some great catastrophe in the newspaper. Of course the habitual light use of such words does tend in time to attenuate their content, but even this rule is not universal. "To annoy" is in Hellenistic σκύλλειν,[1] and in modern French *gêner*. There was a time when the Greek in thus speaking compared his trouble to the pains of flaying alive, and the Frenchman recalled the thought of *Gehenna*, but the original full sense was wholly unknown to the speaker of a later day. Sometimes,

[1] See EXPOSITOR, VI. iii. 273 f.

however, the full sense lives on, and even succeeds in ousting the lighter sense, as in our word *vast*, the adverb of which is no longer available as a mere synonym of *very*. (3) The use of the English *own* will help us somewhat. "Let each man be fully assured in his own mind" (Rom. xiv. 5) has the double advantage of being the English of our daily speech and of representing literally the original *ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ νοΐ*. What function has the adjective there? It is not, as normally, an emphatic assertion of property: I am in no danger of being assured in someone else's mind. It is simply a method of laying stress on the personal pronoun, a fact which shows at once how the equivalence of *ἴδιος* and *ἑαυτοῦ* in certain locutions comes in. Now when we look at the examples of "exhausted *ἴδιος*" we find that they very largely are attached to words of relationship or the like. Husband and wife account for seven examples in the New Testament, and other relationships, including that of master and slave, for a good many more. A large number come under the category of the mind, thoughts and passions, and parts of the body. House, estate, riding-animal, country or language, and similar very intimate possessions receive the epithet. If occasionally this sense of property is expressed where we should not express it, this need not compromise the assertion that the word itself was always as strong as our English word *own*. There are very many places in the New Testament, as in the papyri, where its emphasis is undeniable: *e.g.* Matthew ix. 1, Luke vi. 41, John i. 42 (note its position), v. 18, etc., Acts i. 25, 1 Corinthians iii. 8, Galatians vi. 5, Hebrews vii. 27, and many others quite as decisive. I feel therefore quite justified in repeating the argument that in John i. 42 *τὸν ἀδελφὸν τὸν ἴδιον* is meant to hint that the unnamed companion of Andrew, presumably John, fetched *his* brother. What to do in such cases as Acts xxiv. 24 and Matthew xxii. 5 is not easy to say. The Revisers insert *own* in the

latter place, and it is fair to argue that the word suggests the strength of the counter-attraction, which is more fully expressed in the companion parable, Luke xiv. 18. Drusilla is less easily dealt with. It is hardly enough to plead that the epithet is customarily attached to the relationship, for (with the Revisers) we instinctively feel that *own* is appropriate in 1 Peter iii. 1, and similar passages, but inappropriate here. It is the only New Testament passage where I feel any real difficulty; and since B stands almost alone in reading ἰδίᾳ the temptation to side for once with ℵ is very strong[1]—if indeed the "Western" text is not to be followed.

Before leaving ἴδιος something should be said about the use of ὁ ἴδιος without a noun expressed. We have this in John i. 11, xiii. 1, Acts iv. 23, xxiv. 23. In the papyri we find the singular used thus as a term of endearment to near relations, thus: ὁ δεῖνα τᾷ ἰδίῳ χαίρειν. In the EXPOSITOR for 1901 (VI. iii. 277) I ventured to cite this as a possible encouragement to those (including Weiss) who would translate Acts xx. 28 "the blood of One who was His own." Matthew xxvii. 24, according to the text of ℵL and the later authorities, will supply a parallel for the grammatical ambiguity: there as here we have to decide whether the second genitive is an adjective qualifying the first or a noun dependent on it.

We pass on to the Relatives. The limiting of ὅστις is a very apparent feature in the vernacular, where the nominative (and the neuter accusative) covers very nearly all the occurrences of the pronoun. The phrase ἕως ὅτου is the only exception in New Testament Greek. The obsolescence of the distinction between ὅς and ὅστις is asserted by Blass for Luke, but not for Paul. A type like Luke ii. 4, εἰς πόλιν Δαυεὶδ ἥτις καλεῖται Βηθλεέμ, may be exactly paralleled from Herodotus (see Blass, p. 173) and from papyri: so in

[1] I suggest that the error arose simply from the commonness of the combination ἡ ἰδία γυνή, which was here transferred to a context in which it was not at home.

an invitation form *αὔριον ἥτις ἐστὶν ιε̄*, "to-morrow, which is the 15th." Cf. Matthew xxvii. 62. Hort, in his note on 1 Peter ii. 11 (p. 133), allows that "there are some places in the New Testament in which *ὅστις* cannot be distinguished from *ὅς*." "In most places, however, of the New Testament," he proceeds, "*ὅστις* apparently retains its strict classical force, either generic, 'which, as other like things,' or essential, 'which by its very nature.'" A large number of the exceptions, especially in Lucan writings, seem to me, whether agreeing or disagreeing with classical use, by no means cases of *equivalence* between *ὅς* and *ὅστις*. Some of them would have been expressed with *ὅσπερ* in Attic: thus in Acts xi. 28 we seem to expect *ἥπερ ἐγένετο*. Others show a subtle stress on the relative, which can be brought out by various paraphrases, as Luke i. 20, "which for all that." Or *ὅστις* represents what in English would be expressed with a demonstrative and a conjunction, as Luke x. 42, "and it shall not be taken away." In Matthew we find *ὅστις* used four times at the beginning of a parable, where though the principal figure is formally described as an individual he is really a *type*, and *ὅστις* is therefore appropriate. I may refer to Blass, p. 173, for examples of *ὅς* used for *ὅστις*, with indefinite reference. The large number of places in which *ὅστις* is obviously right according to classical use may fairly stand as proof that the distinction is not yet dead. I must not stay to trace the distinction further here, but may venture on the assertion that the two relatives are never absolutely convertible, however blurred may be the outlines of the classical use in Luke, and possibly in sporadic passages outside his writings. I should mention that Kälker asserts for Polybius (*Quaest. de eloc. Polyb.* 245 f.) that *ὅστις* is used for *ὅς* before words beginning with a vowel for no more serious reason than the avoidance of hiatus; and I must add that among twenty-three more or less unclassical examples in the Lucan books fourteen do happen to achieve this result. I chronicle this

fact as in duty bound, but without suggesting any inclination to regard it as a key to our problem. If Kälker is right for Polybius—and there certainly seems weight in his remark that this substitution occurs just where the forms of ὅς end in a vowel—we may have to admit that the distinction was throughout the *Κοινή* period rather fine. It would be like the distinction between our relatives *who* and *that*, which in a considerable proportion of sentences are sufficiently convertible to be selected mostly according to our sense of rhythm or euphony: this, however, does not in the least imply that the distinction between them is even blurred, much less lost.

The *attraction* of the relative—which, of course, does not involve ὅστις—is a construction at least as popular in late as in classical Greek. It appears abundantly in the papyri, even in the most illiterate of them; and in legal documents we have the principle stretched further in formulae such as *ἀρουρῶν δέκα δύο ἢ ὅσων ἐὰν ὦσιν οὐσῶν*. There are exceptions to the general rule of attraction, on which see Blass, p. 173.

Confusion of relative and indirect interrogative is not uncommon. "*Ὅσος, οἷος, ὁποῖος, ἡλίκος* occur in the New Testament as indirect interrogatives, and also—with the exception of *ἡλίκος*—as relatives," Dr. Moulton observes (WM. 210, note); and in the papyri even ὅς can be used in an indirect question. A good example is found in the Revenue Law of Ptolemy Philadelphus (3rd cent. B.C.), *φράζοντες [τό τε] αὐτῶν ὄνομα καὶ ἐν ᾗι κώμηι οἰκοῦσιν καὶ π[όσου τιμῶν]ται*. So already in Sophocles, *Ant.* 542, *Oed. T.* 1068, with Jebb's notes; and in prose Plato, *Euthyphro*, xviii., *ἃ μὲν γὰρ διδόασιν, παντὶ δῆλον*. It is superfluous to say that this cannot possibly be reversed, so as to justify the A.V. in Matthew xxvi. 50. The more illiterate papyri and inscriptions show *τίς* for relative *ὅστις* not infrequently, as *εὗρον γεοργὸν τίς αὐτὰ ἑλκύσῃ—τίνος ἐὰν χρίαν ἔχῃς—τίς ἂν κακῶς ποιήσει*, etc. Jebb on Soph.

Oed. T. 1141 remarks that while "τίς in classical Greek can replace ὅστις only where there is an indirect question . . . Hellenistic Greek did not always observe this rule: Mark xiv. 36." I do not think there is adequate reason for punctuating James iii. 13 or Acts xiii. 25 so as to bring in this misuse of τίς, but Luke xvii. 8 is essentially like it.[1] The New Testament use of ὅτι for τί in a direct question is a curious example of the confusion between the two categories, a confusion much further developed in our own language.

Modern Greek developments are instructive when we are examining the relatives and interrogatives. The normal relative is ποῦ, followed by the proper case of the demonstrative, as ὁ γιατρὸς ποῦ τὸν ἔστειλα, "the doctor whom I sent for." The difference between ποῦ and אֲשֶׁר in their original functions is small enough to give the Hebraists sufficiently plausible grounds for assigning the modern idiom to Semitic influence, as Jannaris (*Hist. Gram.* § 1439) does in the case of ἧς τὸ θυγάτριον αὐτῆς and the like. (Blass thinks this last is "specially suggested by Semitic usage," though he cites an example from Hypereides: as we have seen, it appears in the papyri.) The interrogative now is mostly ποιός, for τίς has practically come down to the indeclinable τί, just as our *what* (historically identical with the Latin *quod*) has become indifferent in gender. The New Testament decidedly shows the early stages of this use of ποῖος. It will not do for us to refine very much on the distinction between the two pronouns. The weakening of the special sense of ποῖος called into being a new pronoun to express the sense *qualis*, viz. ποταπός, which was the old ποδαπός, "of what country?" modified by popular etymology to suggest πότε, and thus denuded of its meaning-association with ἡμεδαπός and ὑμεδαπός.

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[1] I must retract the denial I gave in *Cl Rev.* xv. 441.