spiritual achievement. But also, no one knew better than he, in consistency with all this, that sin and death are needed for the interpretation of each other, and that fundamentally, in the experience of the race, they constitute one whole. Even when he cried, "O death, where is thy sting?" he was conscious that "the sting of death is sin." Each, so to speak, had its reality in the other. No one could vanquish death who had not vanquished sin. No one could know what sin meant without tasting death. These were not mythological fancies in St. Paul's mind, but the conviction in which the Christian conscience experimentally lived, and moved, and had its being. And these convictions, I repeat, furnish the point of view from which we must appreciate the Atonement, i.e. the truth that forgiveness, as Christianity preaches it, is specifically mediated through Christ's death.

JAMES DENNEY.

THE VALUE-JUDGEMENTS OF RELIGION.

II.

EXPOSITORY AND HISTORICAL (continued).

II. Otto Ritschl, Reischle and Scheibe on Value-Judgements.

(1) Otto Ritschl, the son of the founder of the school, claims that in his pamphlet Concerning Value-judgements, he stands for the position held by his father, which he, "although in a still in some measure undeveloped form, rather assumed than illumined and made distinct on its varied sides." (a) He begins with a historical survey, in which he traces the idea of value-judgements to Luther, but the name to Kant. In Luther's view what distinguished religious from all other knowledge was the incomparable
interest of the objects of faith for the religious subject. "It is not enough," says Luther, "that a man believes that God is, that Christ suffered, and suchlike; but he must steadfastly believe that God is God for His blessedness, that Christ suffered for him, died, was crucified, rose again, that He bore his sins for him." Kant made a distinction between "relative value, that is, a price" and "inner value, that is, worthiness." In comparison with talent which has a commercial, and temperament which has an emotional price, character has "an inner worth, and is raised above all price," for "any man calls agreeable what delights him; beautiful what simply pleases him; good what is esteemed, approved, that is, in which he places an objective value." On account of his insistence on the simplicity of the psychological process of moral judgement, his refusal to recognize any admixture of feeling in it, he was prevented using the term value-judgement, although he brought into use one very similar to it, namely, taste-judgement. Herbart contrasted "theoretical representations, the subject of which is regarded as an indifferent one," and "aesthetic judgements," which express a "spontaneous involuntary preference or rejection," and affirm that the subject "is to be preferred or rejected." He, too, insisted that to be morally effective religion must make an aesthetic as well as a moral impression. De Wette, in developing the ideas of Kant, recognized this process of valuation as a motive to action, distinguished different stages of it from the sensuous to the spiritual, and, practically, identified religious faith with "the highest and purest feeling of value." But even he, although coming so near, does not yet hit on the term value-judgements. Lotze has rendered the greatest service in the development of the theory. He affirms that the value or valuelessness cannot belong to things in themselves, but exists only in the form of a feeling of pleasure or pain, experienced by a spirit
capable of feeling; that in this capacity of valuation by the feelings of the subject has "as authoritative a revelation of the purpose of the world," as the laws of reasoning afford an indispensable instrument of experience; that the world of forms is to be distinguished from the world of values, which may be identified with the world of ends. The use made of these ideas and even the term value-judgements in more recent philosophical literature has affected theological thought so slightly, if at all, that Otto Ritschl does not deem it necessary to pursue the historical inquiry further, but proceeds to discuss his father's, Herrmann's and Kaftan's views, a discussion into which we need not follow him, but may at once deal with his own contribution to the subject.

(b) First of all he gives us a psychological analysis of value-judgement generally, in which he calls attention to the following facts:—(1) The soul is one, and, therefore, none of its functions of thinking, feeling or willing is exercised apart from the others. (2) Few men are fitted for purely intellectual pursuits, that is, the exercise of thought without emotion or volition. (3) The judgements of childhood express, to begin with, pleasure or pain, that is, the value of objects to the feeling self. (4) As we become more familiar with objects, our feelings regarding them become less lively, and customary judgements take the place of value-judgements. (5) A further process of abstraction, in which the other functions are suppressed as far as possible in order that the powers of the mind may be exercised on the object without distraction from them, results in theoretical judgements, in which we are concerned about the nature, cause and relations of the object, irrespective of its effect on ourselves. (6) The emotional loss in this process is compensated for by a moral gain, as we learn self-control as well as acquire knowledge. (c) The results of this psychological inquiry are next applied to the treatment of
the nature of religious knowledge. Briefly, to state his conclusions: we exercise faith in God because we expect help from God, and we value our faith because by it we gain this confidence that God can and will help us. All further developments of the religious life have this confidence in God as their basis, and, therefore, in the last resort are dependent on the value to us of our faith. As in childhood, the capacity for forming value-judgements is greatest, and lessens as the power of abstract thinking is developed, the childlike spirit is characteristic of religion, and religious impressions are less easily received if the intellectual faculties have been developed at the expense of the emotional and the volitional. It is natural, therefore that religious knowledge should assume the form of value-judgements, as religion is so closely related to the emotional and volitional functions of human personality, and so adversely affected by the exclusive exercise of the intellect.

(d) A common objection needs to be met. To affirm that religious knowledge consists of value-judgments seems to some equivalent to denying them all objective validity. Otto Ritschl boldly meets this objection. "To set in opposition to one another value-judgements and so-called 'existence-judgements,' and then to identify the theoretical judgements with the so-called 'existence-judgements,' as if the value-judgements expressed a non-existence, is a quite senseless misrepresentation of the mental process which really takes place," for "all human beings regard as also genuine and real the objects they perceive, which they in fact first recognized in value-judgements," inasmuch as these objects meet all the practical tests of reality. In value-judgements we assume the reality of the subjects to which we assign predicates as much as in theoretical judgements; they are both existence-judgements, only in the one case the predicates express the relation of the subject to ourselves as realized in our feelings, and in the other case their
nature as discovered by observation. What gives us pleasure or pain is as real to us as what we know. The exercise of religious faith, and the accompanying affirmation of the reality of its objects is a necessity for man, and science is quite incapable of denying that reality, for these objects as supersensuous lie altogether beyond its proper province. Faith does not need any demonstration of that reality, such as science offers of the objects which it deals with; for in Christian experience the evidence of that reality, expressed in value-judgements, is being ever verified and vitalized. For this reason Otto Ritschl refuses to separate, as Kaftan proposes, the contents of religious knowledge as expressed in theoretical propositions, from its evidences, as given in value-judgements, as it is in the one contact with supersensuous reality that we recognize the contents and receive the evidences of our religious knowledge. Our religious knowledge not only begins, but also continues, as personal conviction, in our being personally affected in our emotions by the objects of our faith. Accordingly he admits that religious knowledge cannot claim the universal validity of scientific knowledge, because only those who feel the value can also believe in the reality of these objects, while all that science deals with can be known by all whose perceptive and reasoning powers are sound. But as there are certain religious values given in history, we may by means of them get a step nearer to the objectivity we seek. (e) The testimony of history is that the highest spiritual value attaches to religion, and that that religion will assert its supremacy, in which "the objects of faith will of necessity prove themselves as the only genuine and real ones." Christians anticipate that triumph for their faith not only because in their experience it has proved its power and truth, but also because the hope of its victory is essential to it. It is in the Christian life as displayed in human history that the proof of the truth of
Christianity lies, and if that proof were more convincing there would be less demand for any theoretical proof. (f) A second objection to the theory of value-judgements is dealt with in the last section of the pamphlet. It has been urged that this distinction of theoretical and value-judgements involves a double truth. The answer is this. If science, which is expressed in theoretical judgements, and religion, the knowledge of which consists of value-judgements, confine themselves to their respective spheres they cannot come into conflict. Different religions may be competing rivals, but not science and religion, which, on the contrary, may be helpful allies, as religion may inspire the moral qualities which the pursuit of science demands, and science may furnish that knowledge and skill which a man needs to fulfil his vocation.

(2) Max Reischle has been led by the theological controversies which have raged in Germany around this subject to make the attempt by a more thorough investigation to lay the storm, and bring a calm. (a) Without here considering the review of this controversy with which he begins his book, we may at once address ourselves to the subject of his second chapter, an Analysis of the Conceptions "Value" and "Value-judgement" in their simplest Application. "I assign value," he says, "to an object of which, on reflection, I am sure that its reality affords, or would afford, satisfaction to my whole self, and indeed a higher satisfaction than its non-existence. . . . The feeling of value becomes clearer, surer, and steadier when it rests on a fixed value-judgement, which is "a judgement in which to any object a predicate of value is assigned." As we may be in error regarding ourselves or the object, or both, these judgements may be false; if our knowledge is accurate they are likely to be true. (b) There are several classes of these value-judgements, and they may be so arranged as to form an order, approaching more closely to
universal validity. The lowest class is the *hedonistic,* "which are grounded on man's natural capacity for pleasure, and grow out of it under natural conditions by natural necessity." These may be *individual,* or *collective,* where a number of persons share common interests; or *general,* where, with or without qualifications, we have a right to assume common susceptibilities. To all these judgements we have experience only to justify our assigning a wider or narrower universality. Only when a norm or standard is recognized as authoritative for all, can we affirm universal validity. That is, can we say, not only that these objects have value, but also that they ought to have value for all. We then pass from *hedonistic* to *ideal* value-judgements, which are *aesthetic,* concerned with beauty, or *intellectual,* affirming the worth of truth to man; or *ethical,* recognizing an unconditional ought for conduct and character; or *religious,* which as *legislative* define what is, or is not piety, and as *applied* express approval or condemnation of religions or persons. "The ideal value-judgements," he says, "are the expression of a personal deed, the inner recognition of the ideas of beauty, truth, morality, religion, in the last resort, of freedom"; and "we must recognize these ideas if we do not want to renounce our personal rational existence," to which we must assign an unconditional value. To these two classes there may be added a third—*legal* value-judgements, the norm of which is law or custom, and these are intermediate between the other classes. (c) Value-judgements may be determined as such from several points of view. "If a relation of value is assigned to an object as a predicate," we have a value-judgement from the *verbal* standpoint. When a judgement is due to, or results in, a personal valuation, the *psychological* is the standpoint. When, not the compulsion of perception and reasoning, but the attitude of the personal subject to the object is determina-
tive in a judgement, then we have a value-judgement from the epistemological standpoint. Whether these latter judgements have universal validity or not depends on "the teleological necessity" of the relation of the subject to the object; what is essential to man's personal existence has this warrant. (d) Among these classes of value-judgements, from these different standpoints, it is necessary to assign to the propositions of faith their proper place. It is seldom that they are merely value-judgements from the verbal standpoint. They often affirm a fact, and not only assert a worth, yet it would be a mistake to call them existence-judgements or theoretical judgements on the basis of value-judgements, for this would breed confusion with regard to the origin of the two kinds of judgement. In so far as the propositions imply personal conviction, that is, are held with more or less feeling, they are value-judgements from the psychological standpoint. Epistemologically they are value-judgements, or, as Reischle proposes to call value-judgements from the epistemological standpoint, thymetic judgements of an "ideal, personal, morally conditioned religious" kind. But they are not postulates assuming the existence of their objects simply on the ground of the value of these to the religious subject, but they are "judgements of trust directed to the normative divine revelation." (e) The last question in relation to value-judgements dealt with is that of their universal validity. Reischle denies the charge made by some of the opponents of the Ritschlian school, that the theory of value-judgements is intended to be a pretext for evading the problem altogether. "None of the more distinguished followers of Ritschl," he declares, "has fallen into this delusion; but they have occupied themselves in the most lively way with the problem whether and how the truth of the Christian faith can be proved." He holds that such a proof must be attempted, if "Christianity is not to renounce the claim to be the
absolute religion, and if the power of Christian missions is not to be broken. Although the theoretical reason cannot prove either the truth or falsehood of the propositions of faith, yet a proof for their truth can be drawn from the practical considerations that the only sufficient help in man’s moral conflict is found in Christianity, and that the faith which accepts Christ as a divine revelation finds its own justification. There is not, however, any dualism in knowledge, because the theoretical and practical reason belong to the same personality, the activity of each is the complement of the other; and, as by the growing accord of the one with the other the unity of the spiritual life is attained, the Christian gains the assurance that what has worth for him will prove itself truth to all, and that among all his spiritual activities religion claims the sovereignty.

(3) Max Scheibe, in his pamphlet on the Significance of the Value-judgements for Religious Knowledge, also begins with a brief historical introduction, and next discusses at some length the views of Ritschl, Herrmann, and Kaftan. Against their statements of the theory he mentions two objections which enjoy general currency. From the side of religion it is objected that although all the theologians of this school intend to assert the reality of the objects of faith, that is, the truth of religious knowledge, yet they give no adequate justification of this assertion, and even themselves cast doubt on it by denying that the objects of faith are accessible to theoretical knowledge, or at least by Herrmann’s talk about two kinds of reality and truth, or Kaftan’s claim that purpose is the highest category even for science. In the interests of science it is objected that by this theory religious knowledge is relieved of all obligation to be intelligible or rational. (a) Before dealing with the subject of religious knowledge with reference to these objections, Scheibe offers some remarks on the meaning of “value” and “value-judgements.” Value-judgements are
those in which an object is measured by a standard. This standard does not lie in the object, but in ourselves, who have the faculty of setting up norms, not as beings who simply know, but as beings who feel pleasure or pain. Value-judgements do not express what the object is in itself, but what it is for us who have such standards by our faculty of feeling bound up with our personality. These judgements are of three kinds—hedonistic, aesthetic, and moral. Even the moral judgements are determined by norms which lie in our feelings, for moral distinctions, independent as they are of our own wishes, rise in our consciousness as feelings of approval or detestation. The moral values are not determined by individual wilfulness, but are expressions of "the universal spirit in us, the will of God." Although it is by our individual feelings, yet it is an universal necessity that we become aware of in our moral value-judgements. The aesthetic as well as the moral judgements are easily obscured by individual inclinations, and no rational demonstration can secure the recognition of these values, but they must be personally experienced, that is, the certainty of their truth is more closely bound up with the personality than is logical necessity, although that, too, is an inner experience. (b) According to Scheibe religion is "the consciousness of humble dependence on God, and of loving communion with Him." Religious knowledge is concerned with the means and the ways of meeting this need of God. (i.) The object to which religious knowledge is directed is not the states of the religious subject, but "an existence which is for consciousness transcendent." The religious judgements do not affirm merely certain effects within us, but also the causes of these without us, the qualities in the divine action which explain our experiences. As the religious judgements affirm transcendent reality, they appear as theoretical or existence-judgements. Ritschl's statement that "religious knowledge
consists of value-judgements is, therefore, misleading and inappropriate," although he means only to affirm that the contents of religious knowledge have the highest value for man, and by no means to deny that these objects really exist. Although we cannot know God in Himself apart from the effects of His action in us, yet "the proper object of faith is not the operation we experience, but the cause in the self-existent nature of God, which we must assume to be assured of the truth of this operation." What is religiously valuable would at once lose its value if it were assumed not to exist really. We must believe that God really helps those who trust Him, if our confidence in His help is to have any value for us. Both kinds of judgement affirm reality: their difference lies in their mode of origin.

(ii.) Scientific knowledge is gained by observation, and by reasoning on the observed facts. It demands the exclusion as far as possible of all personal interests which might prevent impartial observation and reasoning. The value of the object known to the subject knowing is to be rigorously excluded from all scientific judgements. But with religious knowledge it is entirely different. Man gets his religious knowledge as he gets his religion. The practical need to affirm his personality with its ideals drives him to religion—leads him, therefore, to recognize the existence of God. "Religion demands with confidence the existence of God, because it needs Him, and as it needs Him." Not only the evidence for God's existence is thus practically conditioned, but even the contents of the conception. While in science personal interest disturbs knowledge, "in religion it is essential to knowledge." Faith is a confidence that that is which ought to "be to meet man's religious needs." "The judgement 'God is love' is not a value-judgement, but it is based on the value-judgement and the religious value-judgement, 'The love of God is religiously valuable.'" "The judgements of religious
knowledge are not value-judgements, but they are postulates on the basis of value-judgements." But these postulates are not individual wishes, they are universal necessities. (iii.) As the origin of the two kinds of judgements is different, so is their certainty. While in both cases the certainty is subjective, in scientific knowledge the certainty has nothing to do with our personal condition, our feelings of pleasure or pain, our sense of weal or woe, but is altogether determined by the necessity of the case, the nature of the object; but in religious knowledge the certainty depends on our personal choice and experience. Christian truths are not understood by every man who thinks, their meaning is disclosed only to him who has a sense of their worth to himself personally and individually in relation to his own salvation. (iv.) Nevertheless the objects of religious faith are not imaginations, inventions, illusions, but realities; and accordingly, "however different the origin and the certainty" of religious and scientific knowledge, "they both belong to the same province." The possibility of conflict must be recognized, and, therefore, the necessity of a reconciliation and harmony of both must be asserted. Herrmann's solution of the problem that in each case reality and truth have another meaning cannot be accepted, as reality can never mean anything else than actual existence irrespective of our ideas or desires, and truth than the correspondence of our knowledge with this reality. "There are not two realities and two truths, but only two ways to the knowledge of the one reality and the one truth." Are the results of both methods of knowing capable of a combination? Ritschl declares that the results of metaphysics and of the Christian world-view mutually exclude each other, because metaphysics is indifferent to the contrast of nature and spirit; while for religion the recognition of the difference is essential. But it is only a materialistic metaphysics which denies the
difference and seeks to explain the spiritual by the physical, and that can be disproved as a metaphysics. So, too, the metaphysical conception of the absolute is not, as Ritschl holds, irreconcilable with the Christian idea of God, but is even necessary to it. The causal and teleological interpretations of the world, when they recognize their respective limits, do not contradict one another. The causal interpretation cannot yield a complete world-view, for it cannot do justice to the aesthetic, moral, and religious consciousness; it must be supplemented by a teleological, in which these elements of the total reality to be interpreted can alone come to their own. In the teleological interpretation, even the distinctively religious, the categories of the causal must be employed, such as substance, cause, mutual action, change, time, and space. "As for the representation of our religious knowledge, we employ the same categories as in our theoretical thought, all our religious judgements, although practically conditioned, are also theoretical judgements." Theology must accordingly take into account the meaning which metaphysics assigns to the categories employed in giving to the objects of faith an intelligible form, and on this side religious knowledge cannot claim to be independent of theoretical knowledge. For instance, theoretical knowledge has a right to investigate the conception of the physical filial relation of Jesus to God as regards its intelligibility, but on his worth for religion as the source of new spiritual life it can pronounce no judgement. "A scientific proof for the truth of religious knowledge there is not, and cannot be." Its truth can be proved only as its worth is experienced. All science can do for religion is to show that there is no necessary conflict between them, and that "a particular religion is best suited to fill up the gaps left by science, and thus also to satisfy the demands of the understanding, which it cannot meet by its own means and powers."

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