

THE MEANING OF ΤΟΥΤΟ ΠΟΙΕΙΤΕ.

PROFESSOR T. K. Abbott's essay on *τὸυτο ποιεῖτε*, in his essays on Old and New Testament questions, reprinted 1898 as a separate pamphlet ("Do this in Remembrance of Me, —should it be *Offer this?*") is the fullest answer that has been offered to the upholders of a sacrificial meaning of *ποιεῖν* in the narrative of the Institution. Others may be found in an article by Dr. Plummer in the *EXPOSITOR* of June 1888 (referred to below as *Expos.*), and in his commentary on St. Luke, *ad loc.* Prof. Abbott's essay is evidently meant to be exhaustive and final; and though he thought worth while to supplement it by another pamphlet, *A Reply to Mr. Supple's and other Criticisms*, it remains the principal argument on that side, and is from time to time referred to as such. I venture however to call attention to some points in it which are not satisfactory and to commend a form of the sacrificial theory suggested by Scudamore's *Not. Euchar.* ed. ii., not as certain, but as being in a difficult case more probable than the traditional.

There is a want of clearness and consistency in Prof. Abbott's paper which makes it not always easy to grasp his exact meaning, but his contention in the main appears to be:—(i.) that *ποιεῖν* nowhere has a sacrificial meaning of its own; in its general sense it may be applied to sacrificial as to other action, that is all; (ii.) that the common rendering of *τὸυτο ποιεῖτε*, "Perform this action" is perfectly obvious, simple and devoid of difficulty; (iii.) that no authority ancient or modern is on the side of the new rendering, Justin no more than any other.

I wish to show, perhaps with some rearrangement of familiar arguments, (1) that within narrow limits yet clearly and unmistakably, *ποιεῖν* is found with a sacrificial

meaning. As to this it is possible that on reconsideration Prof. Abbott, while denying the relevance, will allow that he has overstated the matter; others, who agree with his main conclusion, are not at one with him here, e.g. Bishop Ellicott, approved apparently by Dr. Plummer, *Expos.* p. 441; (2) that the common rendering is not free from difficulty; (3) that Justin Martyr, though perhaps he alone directly, is on the side of the new rendering; (4) that in view of unsolved difficulties on both sides what may perhaps be called Scudamore's theory has considerable probability.

1. "The general conclusion so far is (1) That in the LXX ποιεῖν never means offer" (*Do this*, p. 26). Abbott points out a large number of LXX cases in which the use of ποιεῖν has been no doubt improperly claimed as supporting the sacrificial sense, though some of these would admit it were such a sense otherwise made out. But there remain those in which it stands for עשה used in a sacrificial sense. That עשה has a technical sacrificial sense is not a novel theory of High Churchmen, but is, I understand, accepted by Hebrew scholars, e.g. Gesenius, "9. to offer, present, as in Greek, *πέζειν ἔρδειν*." The new Lexicon: "II₄ make offerings [instances given of עשה with concrete object זבח, עולה, etc.]; also with accusative of thing sacrificed (perhaps originally, prepare, divide) . . . abs. = offer sacrifice Ex. 10₂₅ . . . 2 Kings 17₃₂." Why the suggestion "(perhaps, etc.)," if it was a simple application of the verb's general meaning *make* or *do*? So Delitzsch on Ps. 66₁₅, "עשה used directly (like the Aramaic and Phœnician עבר) in the signification to *sacrifice* (Exod. 29₃₆₋₄₁ and frequently) alternates with הֶעֱלָה the synonym of הִקְטִיר." If ποιεῖν is used to render עשה in these cases, the presumption is that it follows the meaning of עשה whether by so doing it is used classically or not. And this seems to be the Professor's view (*Do this*, p. 4).

“The Hebrew verb, which corresponds generally in its range of application with ποιεῖν including the signification of ‘do,’ ‘make,’ ‘cause,’ etc., is פָּשַׁע, which occurs about 2,500 times. Hence, as was inevitable, the Greek translators almost always rendered it by ποιεῖν. It follows that in the LXX we find ποιεῖν used not only in its classical senses but in others.” One would think from this that he allowed what is all I am maintaining, that in these passages ποιεῖν was used in the exact sense of פָּשַׁע, not derived from or testifying to any previous Greek use of the word, but simply by a Hebraism of translation, the mere transference of a Hebrew word into Greek by its ordinary but not idiomatic equivalent, such as is the case in other LXX renderings. It must be then that in denying a sacrificial sense of ποιεῖν in the LXX he would deny a sacrificial sense of פָּשַׁע as well, though there is nothing in his argument to show that he is opposing a received view. In his first paper, *Do this*, he takes no notice at all directly of this question of פָּשַׁע; in his second, *A Reply*, he throws in (p. 11) a remark, “As regards the use of the Hebrew word itself, I must now add that in the judgement of Hebrew scholars it was not properly used of ‘offering’ but of preparing and slaying the victim,” a footnote being added, “Cp. Wünsche or Keil on Hosea ii. 8” (Hebr. verse 10).

These scholars then go beyond Abbott in holding that פָּשַׁע was properly used in a special meaning, for they plainly are not speaking merely of an application of the general meaning; no one could deny what Prof. Abbott emphasizes, that פָּשַׁע could be applied generally to the action of offering. But moreover they can hardly mean to confine the technical application of פָּשַׁע to preparing and slaying; that was exactly what did not take place “upon the altar” (Exod. 29₃₈). Evidently by “properly” is meant “originally,” i.e. with a relative originality; and

it is very pertinent to point out that where the object is *gold* the sacrificial use of ΠΣΥ is inappropriate with its associations of food and culinary preparation.

A prominent feature of Professor Abbott's paper is the pointing out that uses of words (ποιεῖν in particular) which are adduced as special are really general; and he illustrates from other languages, English in particular. Up to a certain point it is necessary to go with him; but as there seems on both sides a want of distinctness here, it is necessary, even more for a later part of the argument than for this, to dwell on the matter at the risk of seeming to waste words on a minor point. When we claim a distinct sacrificial meaning for ποιεῖν, or for the matter of that for ΠΣΥ, we mean a distinct meaning in the full sense, as *horse* has a distinct meaning from *animal*. One of the most common processes of change of meaning is through words of a general meaning assuming a specific. Where that is a gradual process there may often be a doubt whether there is to be considered a specific meaning or not, whether the point has been reached at which a new meaning is definitely formed, e.g. in English *do* for *cook*; and this uncertainty is one of the reasons why lexicographers group uses under a number of specific heads which often at first sight seem merely applications of a general sense. Abbott indeed says (*Reply*, p. 14), "Are we getting back to the days of the lexicographers who reckoned more than 40 'special meanings' of ποιεῖν in the N. T. and twenty of λαμβάνειν?" But allowing for exaggeration, it will be clear from Murray's *New Dictionary* that we are getting, rather have got, back to those days, if indeed they were ever left.

In the specialising of the meaning of a word the general meaning may be entirely lost, as in *Queen*, *starve*, *undertaker*. Or it may continue to live by the side of the special, as in *property*, *animal*, *cultivate*; and then the context has

to show which meaning is taken just as much as in *It rained, he reigned, the Lord Mayor, the grey mare*. But effects of context have to be distinguished. Dr. Kay, in a poetical mood (I have not been able to recover the place), compares this ποιεῖτε in its sacrificial context to a diamond looking red by the side of a rose; but in no individual passage can context convey meaning into a word, though a repeated habitual context can, as in *Queen*, etc. In the case of a word of general meaning, as genus can only actually exist in species, context may show the species; just as in *grey horse* the meaning of horse is not affected by the adjective, so in οὕτως ποιεῖτε, τοῦτο ποιεῖτε, though the first word stand for sacrificial action the ποιεῖτε is still merely general. But in the case of a word of several meanings the context has not to assist in creating a meaning, but to select the ready-made meaning intended: *A property of matter, this watch is my property, the property market, man is an animal, animals have not the power of speech, this powder is harmless to animals but fatal to insects*; or to take a technical term—*such a farmer is cultivating to-day*, where the hearer, even if ignorant, would probably be able to see that a special process was meant; he would not be able to guess from the words the special process of land-cleaning by steam, but were the thing indicated a familiar one, would very likely infer it from the context. Or still nearer the point, *He did me over the bargain* (not mere modern slang, *v. Murray*). The context here says nothing of cheating or overreaching, and so cannot convey that meaning into the verb; but it drives us to select that meaning of *do* which implies overreaching. This is what it seems to me the context may do in the case of τοῦτο ποιεῖτε. It may show the ordinary general meaning unsuitable, and a sacrificial meaning, if such exist, suitable, and therefore eligible.

Without then claiming to settle the question altogether,

I maintain that we can rely on ample authority in giving to וַשָּׁע a special sacrificial meaning distinct from the general.

Another point is that, viewed from the Greek side, there are many places in which ποιεῖν , standing for the sacrificial וַשָּׁע , cannot be construed by ordinary Greek idiom.¹ By an ordinary Greek idiom, most familiar perhaps in εὖ ποιεῖν τινα , ποιεῖν with adverbial expression of treatment governs an accusative of the thing affected; and this idiom is freely employed in the LXX. even where the Greek accusative corresponds to a Hebrew dative (ל). But this usage does not cover ποιεῖν without expression of treatment, as Prof. Abbott's argument would require. And yet I might speak with more reserve in view of his authority were it not that he himself can be quoted against it. He groups indeed under the one head of ποιεῖν , as a substitute for a more special verb to avoid repetition (*Do this*, p. 3), both the Greek $\text{ταῦτα ἐποίησαν τοὺς ταῖς βώλοις βάλλοντας}$ and the English *If you correct this sheet and verify the references, I will do the other; when I have painted and varnished this panel, I will do that one*; but on the other hand he is apparently pointing to ποιεῖν and accusative without words of treatment when he concludes (*Do this*, p. 26), "So far as this usage of the LXX goes beyond that of classical writers it is not an Hellenistic idiom, but a Hebraism due to literalness of translation." Again he says (p. 9), "The last class of passages consists of those in which ποιεῖν is used in the familiar way to avoid the repetition of a specific word or complex description contained in the preceding context. . . . For example, in Exodus 29₃₉, $\text{τὸν ἀμνὸν τὸν ἕνα ποιήσεις τὸ πρῶν κ.τ.λ.}$, the sort of ποιεῖν is specified in the preceding verse, $\text{ποιήσεις ἐπὶ τοῦ θυσιαστηρίου}$,

¹ There are also cases where, though the Greek considered alone will construe as Greek, the Hebrew verb is unambiguously sacrificial as Leviticus 9₁₆.

and by a well understood idiom ποιήσεις carries on this specification. This is what is known as 'brachylogy' or brevity of expression. . . . Indeed even ποιήσεις itself might have been omitted had not the Greek idiom permitted this brachylogy. . . . Psalm 65₁₂ is similar: ὀλοκαυτώματα . . . [sic] ἀνοίσω σοι μετὰ θυμιάματος . . . [sic] ποιήσω σοι βόας μετὰ χιμάρων. The poetical parallelism here makes the brevity of expression less harsh in Hebrew. In Greek it would not be possible, except in a very literal translation, and that even in a translation it was felt to be scarcely tolerable appears from the fact that about a hundred MSS. substitute ἀνοίσω." It is perplexing to be told that Greek idiom permits what is harsh, except in a very literal translation impossible, and even there scarcely tolerable.

I claim then that the sacrificial meaning of ποιεῖν is so far tenable that ΠΣΥ has a sacrificial meaning, and is able conceivably to give birth to a sacrificial meaning of ποιεῖν as a Hebraism for it has done so in the LXX.

2. There are in the context difficulties of applying the ordinary meaning of τοῦτο ποιεῖν, these difficulties arising from the word τοῦτο. It may be quite true (excluding the passages in question) that, as Abbott claims, the phrase τοῦτο ποιεῖν "recurs frequently in classical Greek and always='do this'; frequently in the LXX and always in this sense; frequently in the New Testament (about twenty times), and everywhere in the same sense." But context has to be regarded. (a) τοῦτό μου ἔστιν τὸ σῶμα τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν, τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν. Two clauses, short and mysterious (at least the first of them) side by side beginning with the same word, as it would seem, with intentional emphasis. One must feel what a congruous element of dignity it would be that the two τοῦτο have the same meaning, and how strange the collocation otherwise. Abbott indeed says, "Had it been intended

to express *Do this*, no other words than *τούτο ποιείτε* could have been used." Why not *οὕτως ποιείτε, ταῦτα ποιείτε*, or even *ποιείτε τούτο*, to say nothing of the more probable employment of a longer and more explicit phrase, such as *ὡς ἐγὼ ἐποίησα καὶ ὑμεῖς ποιήσετε*. It is use which has habituated us, as it did the Greek Fathers, to sever *τούτο* from *τούτο* without feeling of strangeness. If then the second *τούτο* is the same as the first, it points to a concrete object and not a verbal action, and the common rendering of *ποιείτε* will not stand. (β) *τούτο ποιείτε ὁσάκις ἂν πίνητε εἰς τὴν ἐμὴν ἀνάμνησιν*. It is argued by the sacrificialists that *πίνητε* can only find an object in the previous *τούτο*, which therefore must = *τὸ ποτήριον* (in the sense of *τὸ ἐν τῷ ποτ.*).¹ Abbott replies (*Do this*, p. viii.): "It is said further that as there is no word in the Greek corresponding to the 'it' inserted in the E.V. it is natural to suppose that *ποιείτε* and *πίνητε* have the same object. On the other hand if *αὐτό* had been expressed, it might have been said that it is awkward to overleap *τούτο* in order to find the antecedent of *αὐτό*. Compare in fact

τούτο ἐστι . . . τούτο προσφέρετε
ὁσάκις ἂν πίνητε αὐτό
 with *τούτο ἐστι . . . τούτο προσφέρετε*
ὁσάκις ἂν πίνητε

[I copy the accentuation.]

In the former case one is almost compelled to refer the three pronouns to the same antecedent; in the latter there is more freedom. In the passage in question I think no Greek reader or listener would miss *αὐτό* or think necessary to supply an object to *πίνητε*. If he thought of supplying anything, it might quite as well be 'thus' as 'it.' And the proof is that no Greek ever did feel such a

¹ Cf. Hort's note on *τῷ λόγῳ* 1 Peter 2, even though the position spoken of is not the same, "The position rather suggests that it belongs to both by a natural and common Greek usage too much ignored by commentators."

difficulty." But whether *αὐτό* has to go looking for an antecedent or *πίνητε* for an object the difficulty of over-leaping an obvious one at hand is the same. Still one cannot help saying that some of Prof. Abbott's sensitiveness as to an awkward reference might have been applied to the repeated *τούτο*. That it has not been shows how easily the mind accommodates itself to a received interpretation. There is an obvious rendering of *ὁσάκις ἐὰν πίνητε* (grammatically possible, v. 1 Cor. 10₃₁) which has been taken up by Dean Stanley and others: "Do this whenever you satisfy your thirst. Turn every meal into a reminder of Christ." This seems to be purely modern. The Greek Fathers (if what Prof. Abbott says is correct) were too entirely limited by the traditional rendering to think of it. And the same limitations made them simply acquiesce in the omission of *αὐτό*. It is too much to say that no Greek felt any difficulty or at least awkwardness in it. Probably in every page of the New Testament they were as sensible of a difference of style from their own day as we are with the A.V., and this would go with the rest. After all that has been written in recent years, and though a translation can be tested by the original, there are, I believe, hundreds of educated people who take "I know nothing by myself" in the modern sense. If Stanley's rendering is to be rejected (as I doubt not), it seems to me that some special point has to be looked for in the omission of *αὐτό* for the Biblical style is not chary of pronouns, and that that may be found in the intention pointedly to contrast *ποιεῖτε* and *πίνητε*. Commentaries do not much help to the reason of inserting *ὁσ. ἐ. πίν.* May it be "You are quite aware the Eucharist is a joint religious meal (*πίνητε*); mind then it is also a sacred service offered to God (*ποιεῖτε*)." In this way it will be the *τ.π.* clauses which contain the main point of the argument, and do most to explain the *γὰρ* of v. 23.

(γ) Another point may be worth mentioning. *Τούτο ποιεῖτε*

in its ordinary rendering is as general and undescriptive as possible: its natural position would be once at the end of the whole; for the rite is everywhere regarded as one whole with two parts. But that is not the use of τ.π. in the accounts of the institution. In both accounts¹ it applies to the half rite, not to the whole. If the τούτο has a concrete reference, this will be natural, for a single τούτο could not include both Bread and Cup; and the sacred dealings with the two are quite separate acts.

(δ) Prof. Abbott insists that “τούτο ποιεῖν has a well established meaning which is invariable”; but neither he nor any one applies that here. Without answering that no parallel whatever can be found to the common rendering, there is, so far as I can see, none in the New Testament. Some may perhaps so take St. John 5₁₉, “*ἃ γὰρ ἂν ἐκεῖνος ποιῆ ταῦτα καὶ ὁ υἱὸς ὁμοίως ποιεῖ.*” But it can hardly be questioned that Westcott is right in identifying the works of the dependent clause with those of the principal. Not that the Father does some work and the Son imitates in others, but that their working is coincident.²

What does the common rendering make the antecedent of τούτο? In all three cases (St. Luke 22₁₉₋₂₀, 1 Cor. 11₂₄₋₂₅), in WH, in two of the three in TR (which has λάβετε φάγετε 1 Cor. 11₂₄) nothing has been said to which τούτο can refer, though the mention in narrative easily disguises the fact from the reader. The τούτο must refer

¹ The T. R. of St. Luke 22₁₉₋₂₀ is assumed without judging anything respecting the autograph of the Evangelist as being allowed, I believe very generally, a sufficiently early date to make its testimony of value for the present purpose.

² Of passages bearing on this apart from τούτο, ταῦτα would not St. John 14₁₂ (τὰ ἔργα ἃ ἐγὼ ποιῶ κάκεινος ποιήσει) be parallel to 5₁₉? Not “He shall do works like those of healing, etc., which I am now doing,” but “He shall share in my operation as I share in the Father’s.” ποιῶ not ποιήσω, because our Lord is regarding his operation present and future as one whole.

Passages on the other side are St. John 15₂₄, εἰ τὰ ἔργα μὴ ἐποίησα . . . ἃ οὐδεὶς ἄλλος ἐποίησεν where the negative οὐδεὶς eases the expression, and Rev. 2₅ τὰ πρῶτα ἔργα ποιήσων.

to the action of our Blessed Lord (including benediction, thanksgiving and the responsive action of the disciples); but that was a series of individual acts which can no more be repeated than a man can be doubled. The common rendering takes *τούτο* as = *τοιούτο*. This is not impossible, but so far as at present appears is unexampled. But in a command to imitate certain actions, the natural form would be far more explicit. Cf. St. John 13₁₄₋₁₅, where the fact that the command was not understood literally will hardly make the difference. Compare also Judges 7₁₇₋₁₈, 9₄₈. And remember that according to the common rendering this unusual form is chosen where, through the neighbourhood of another *τούτο*, it occasions a special confusion. In the new rendering, on the other hand, the *τούτο* is justified by the mystical identification with *τὸ σῶμά μου*.

Here then are reasons drawn from the New Testament texts for holding that the antecedent of the *τούτο* is a concrete object and not a verbal action or group of verbal actions; and if it is so, there is no meaning which, according to Greek idiom, can be attached to *ποιεῖτε*; but if there existed a sacrificial meaning of *ποιεῖν* parallel to that of *Πῶγ*, the context, as indicating the prominent use of a material object in the worship of God, would easily suggest that as the meaning to be selected here.

3. The argument from Justin Martyr is that he has a concrete thing for the object of a *ποιεῖν* identical with the verb of *τούτο ποιεῖτε*, and that therefore (as just stated) in view of the context none but a sacrificial meaning of *ποιεῖν* is possible.

(i.) *Apology*, i. 66: οἱ γὰρ ἀπόστολοι οὕτως παρέδωκαν ἐντετάλλθαι αὐτοῖς τὸν Ἰησοῦν λαβόντα ἄρτον εὐχαριστήσαντα εἰπεῖν, Τοῦτο ποιεῖτε εἰς τὴν ἀνάμνησιν μου, τοῦτ' ἔστι τὸ σῶμά μου κ.τ.λ.

The inversion makes the strangeness of severing the one

τούτο from the other still more perceptible; the narrative helping it less, as the second has to pass the first in looking back for a reference.

(ii.) Trypho 41 : τοῦ ἄρτου τῆς εὐχαριστίας ὃν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ πάθους οὐ ἔπαθεν ὑπὲρ τῶν καθαιρομένων τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπὸ πάσης πονηρίας ἀνθρώπων Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν παρέδωκε ποιεῖν.

(iii.) *Ibid.* 70 : περὶ τοῦ ἄρτου ὃν παρέδωκεν ἡμῖν ὁ ἡμέτερος Χριστὸς ποιεῖν εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ σεσώματος ποιῆσθαι αὐτὸν διὰ τοὺς πιστεύοντας εἰς αὐτὸν δι' οὗ καὶ παθητὸς γέγονε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ποτηρίου ὃ εἰς ἀνάμνησιν τοῦ αἵματος αὐτοῦ παρέδωκεν εὐχαριστοῦντας ποιεῖν.

In these two passages the ποιεῖν of 1 Corinthians 11. occurs three times governing twice ὃν, i.e. τὸν ἄρτον, and once δ, i.e. τὸ ποτήριον, itself being the object of παρέδωκε in each case; or even if we took the ὃν, ὃ as directly objects of παρέδωκε, they would have to be understood again after the infinitive (cf. Acts 12₄, 16₄). In two of these cases ποιεῖν stands in a very emphatic position, making a slipshod clumsy sentence unless capable of corresponding emphasis. Professor Abbott and Dr. Plummer have two main methods of disposing of Justin's witness. For one, Abbott says, "As to ποιεῖν I think we must conclude that he simply introduces the words by way of quotation without intending to give an interpretation" (*Do this*, p. 36), and Plummer (*Expos.* p. 445), "The words εἰς ἀνάμνησιν are an intentional quotation of the words of institution, and they naturally draw after them the verb with which they are joined, viz. ποιεῖν"; i.e. both writers say there is an irregularity of construction from the confusion of a quotation. It is not sticking to the order that confuses it, nor confining himself to the thoughts or words of the Scripture passage, and it is on the face of it unnatural that an irregularity should be repeated three times. The other reply attempts no justification of Justin. It is simply

that no other Father takes it so, and therefore Justin must be either wrong or misunderstood. But Justin's is genuine evidence which must constitute a difficulty until it is explained or accepted; evidence moreover to which time and place give a value of its own. A writer in the *Church Quarterly*, vol. 22, p. 329, says, reasonably, "It is not the exigencies of controversy which drive him to give the word this meaning. He does not defend it as if it was a novelty or an explanation needing to be justified; it is evidently to him the natural way of taking the word, and no other interpretation seems to occur to him." Dr. Plummer says some of the Fathers must have noticed it had Justin intended a sacrificial sense; but even if they read him carefully enough to notice an irregularity, would they be likely to spend time on discovering its significance? As to the practical fact they were at one with Justin, and the question would have been as purely philological as the way of construing *μίαν ἄραν ἐποίησαν* in S. Matthew 20₁₂.

4. While then it may be granted that the other Greek Fathers show no knowledge of any but the common use of *ποιεῖτε*, Justin's language will not admit of the common use, but points to a sacrificial. Justin and the other Fathers do not agree; one or other must be wrong, but there is no need to exaggerate the difference. It is wrong to say with Abbott (*Do this*, p. v.), "The two renderings are entirely different and incompatible"; and again, p. 1, "If [the special sacrificial meaning] is correct, the words ought to be so translated, for in that case 'do this' is wholly wrong and misleading." Were it indeed so, there would be no doubt that the Liturgies and Fathers accepted the new rendering, for they speak and act on the strength of its being practically true. Prof. Abbott would no doubt agree in referring the prayer "Summe Sacerdos et vere Pontifex" of the Missal to a period when the new rendering was unknown. It has the words, "Accedo ad altare tuum licet

peccator ut offeram de donis tuis sacrificium quod tu instituisti et offerri tuæ Majestati præcepisti in commemorationem tuam et pro nostra salute." Would that have struck any of the older Fathers as less exact¹ than our "Did institute and in His holy Gospel command us to continue a perpetual memory of that His precious Death until His coming again?" The Liturgies at least, if they ignore the new rendering as a rendering, practically accept it as a gloss upon the traditional. Scudamore, holding Justin to be right, offers briefly (*Notit. Euchar.* 2nd edition, p. 625) an hypothesis to explain why the rest of the Greek Fathers are wrong. It has no direct evidence to demonstrate it, but seems to offer an explanation of facts hard to reconcile. He is (as I understand) ready to agree with Prof. Abbott that the Greek Fathers knew no sacrificial meaning of ποιέιν because there was none to know in genuine Greek; but thinks that a sacrificial use of עָשָׂה, or of the corresponding word in another language, may have continued attached to the Mosaic rites till it passed out of sight and knowledge of Christians some time after the destruction of the Temple, and so may in time have been forgotten, but that Justin was familiar with it possibly even more than foreign-born Christians. The striking character of Justin's meaning must not be exaggerated. The existence of schools denying or belittling the sacrificial character of the Eucharist has brought out the contrast of the two renderings. But when all the valley is flooded one may fail to mark the stream so clearly. When the sacrificial character of the rite was neither questioned nor analyzed Justin's use, even if already obsolescent, might escape critical notice.

With regard to the received rendering it is said that no Greek writer finds any difficulty in it. This is explained first by the unquestioned fact that it is a possible rendering,

¹ Unless in the words "tuæ Majestatis," omitted by the Roman Missal. The quotation is made from the Burntisland edition of the Sarum.

and then by what is here allowed that the Fathers knew no other, not recognizing the relevance of the few Old Testament passages. When once then a meaning was established it became a law to itself, bearing down the difficulties of context, the more so from the familiarity and constant repetition of the words. There was, I believe, a long period during which the meaning of *allto* in Judges 9₅₃, was widely unknown, and consequently in spite of the spelling *brake* and the unusual form of sentence people were driven to understand it, "She did all for the purpose of breaking his skull."

The Liturgies, amid a general ignoring of the new rendering, have some evidence the other way. In spite of Dr. Plummer's argument (*Expos.*, p. 446)? I think most people will think that *οὖν, τοίνον, igitur*, following the institution, sound somewhat inexact without a previous command of oblation. In the Clementine also he has failed to notice the words *κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ διάταξιν (προσφερόμεν σοι τῆ βασιλεῖ καὶ θεῷ κ.τ. αὐ. δ. τὸν ἄρτον τοῦτον καὶ τὸ ποτήριον τοῦτο)*. I would however allow that these, the *therefore* and the *κ.τ. αὐ. δ.*, have persisted into an age when their purport was no longer exactly understood. But while they lose (as we are inclined to think) the old meaning of *τ.π.*, the greater number of them (i.e. of Hammond's) including the Clementine, St. James, St. Mark, the Roman,¹ at the same time change its use.

Placing it once at the end of the whole institution, and evidently referring it to the rite as a whole, they give evidence of a deflexion from the original meaning of the words. But we may fairly claim the testimony of the whole body of Liturgies down to 1552 in another way. We have in the Anglican Communion Service of that year

¹ Of the rest of Hammond's, the Coptic and Mozarabic follow 1 Cor. 11. in the double mention, St. Chrysostom (as also Serapion) omits altogether; the Nestorian has lost the Institution. Of variations in wording the one bearing most on the present point is the *Haec* of Roman and Ambrosian.

and its derivatives a liturgy drawn up on purely Scriptural lines as then understood. In it the sacrificial character, which is evident in Scripture apart from the τ.π., is acknowledged, but how different the result! In the old Liturgies the sacrificial character supplies the system of the service and the Communion follows as an essential and sacrificial feature. In the Anglican the sacrificial character is obscured in the greater part of the service. Understand the words "Sacrifice of Praise and Thanksgiving" in the most Zwinglian sense, and the form of our office does not suggest it. The mind prepared by the opening of the Anaphora is thrown off the lines by the Prayer of Humble Access. It is not simply a question of High doctrine. Our service does fit in with High doctrine of the Real Presence better than with any other. A sacrificial character might, as was said, consist with very low doctrine. But our service makes it hard to bear in mind any sacrificial character, though in the last prayer asserting one. Whence then did the ancient Liturgies draw this most conspicuous and paramount feature that the sacrificial character should govern the form of the rite? Apostolic tradition would be sufficient, as with the Lord's Day. Yet in a matter of such extreme importance, and in a service where so much is made of Scripture, basing itself by explicit declaration on the Scriptural account of the institution, we should expect here also an original belief in the explicit support of Scripture; and if so, this is the only point at which it can be found. Without going so far as the words to which Dr. Plummer objects that "no other explanation of the sacrificial view of the Eucharist is forthcoming," we may still say that no other Scriptural explanation is forthcoming of its dominating to such an extent the form of the service. And so when Dr. Plummer asks, "Is it likely that a tradition of such moment would have left no impression on any of the Greek Fathers?" we can answer,

It has made the very greatest impression, living, lasting, clearly marked. The seal may have been, so to say, mislaid, or its writing obliterated by the cataclysm of Jewish apostasy, as Scudamore holds, but not before it had impressed the Church ineffaceably.

For the new theory has been adduced not only the LXX ποιεῖν, but the Homeric ἔρδειν and ῥέζειν and the Latin *facere* and *operari*, to which Prof. Abbott adds a later Greek use of ποιεῖν absolute (*ιερά* understood) with dative of the deity.¹ These are, as he points out, various, both in origin and in construction; they are historically independent. But can it be quite fortuitous that thus again and again we find the vague word of used *doing* technically of sacrifice. The very point of sacrifice is that it has a mystical side, that something meets the eye, but something not less important and characteristic evades exact description. Hence the resort to a vague expression, the vagueness of reverence, and it is evident how appropriate it is to this holy mystery.

The evidences for a sacrificial sense in τοῦτο ποιεῖτε may not justify an actual demand for its acceptance. But those who have felt it a reasonable and probable view may, I think, properly wait for a clearer refutation than is found in Prof. Abbott's articles, trenchant rather than consistent, ἵνα ἐν ᾧ καυχῶνται εὐρεθῶσι καθὼς καὶ ἡμεῖς.

¹ *Do this*, pp. 3, 39. In view of the fact that Liddell and Scott give no instance of this use (Hdt. 2. 49 is hardly an exception), it would have been convenient had Prof. Abbott given some unambiguous references.