THE IDEA OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL AND THE THEOLOGY OF NATURE.

(John i. 18; xiv. 8, 9.)

The texts we interpreted in the previous number have raised certain questions which we must now attempt to discuss. What value and validity for man have the ideas as to the invisible God who has become visible in the Son? Can he and they be said to correspond? Can they be described as ideas that, although not products of his reason, yet appeal to it and satisfy it? And have they any light to shed on the general problem of the relation of revelation to nature and mind?

I.

1. Of the texts which started our discussion the one stated an incapacity of nature in the form of a fact of experience: “no man hath seen God at any time”; the other expressed a need of nature which the incapacity made only the more urgent and acute: “Shew us the Father.” These are what we may call the antinomies of nature and experience, laws which may seem to be opposed, but which can neither invalidate nor annul each other. Man’s need for God is too strong to be satisfied by the plea of a natural incapacity, his desire to find Him is too invincible to be silent at the bidding of an impotent experience. The saying of Augustine is familiar to us all: “Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they rest in Thee.” Now the inquietude of the heart is but its need of God expressed in dumb desire. Man was made by God for God, and he cannot do without the God who made him. Atheism is a thing of art, not of nature; an individual may train or persuade himself to believe it, but it has never been the spontaneous belief of any tribe
or age, the collective need of any century or country. At most it is but a negation, and a negation is without the secret of life; it may have power to destroy, but it has none to construct. It is only a belief that another belief is false; it is not a belief that a given truth is so real that the universe has been built on it, and that what bears up the universe may well support our lives. And this is what faith in God means to the soul, and why the soul feels so insatiable a need for the faith.

It is now a generation since the autobiography of John Stuart Mill was published, but it is full of lessons that can never grow old. In it he told us that his father thought dualism more reasonable than monotheism and agnosticism more reasonable than either, for he had come to the conclusion that concerning the origin of things nothing whatever could be known; that he himself was one of the really few who had been brought up outside the Christian religion, who had never believed or practised it, and who as socially and intellectually independent of it was able to think of it justly and judge it impartially. But in so writing he forgot several things he ought to have remembered: (i.) While his father came to think in the way just stated he did not begin by so thinking. He was trained for the Christian ministry; was a candidate for the ministerial office, and would have been a minister if he had been accepted by a congregation. (ii.) The position he reached he reached by reaction against his own understanding of the theology in which he had been educated. The God he rejected was not "the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ," but a perfectly impossible deity, an almighty maker of hell for men and men for hell. If James Mill had but thought more consistently he would have seen that to deny this God was to become not an atheist but rather a more perfect theist. (iii.) His son showed how little he understood
either himself or his day or the Christian religion when he spoke of having been brought up outside it or in independence of it. That was impossible in his age and place; what fills the air a man breathes, what penetrates the language he speaks, what pervades the literature he reads, what leavens the thought of his people, is embodied in their institutions, and is the mother of all their philanthropies as well as the spirit which qualitatively distinguishes their modern from the ancient world, is a thing from which the man cannot escape, especially if he be a man as susceptible and assimilative as was John Stuart Mill. (iv.) As he misconceived the religion, he never judged it impartially, nor could he. He thought he was neutral when he was not; and where he failed to appreciate he was quite unable to criticize. (v.) Yet he, perhaps more than any man of his day, witnessed to the veracity and vitality of man's need for God, which persists in spite of the incapacity to see Him. He confessed that he did not believe that the universe had an author and governor infinite in goodness and power, yet his whole being confessed that he was bound to regulate and direct his life towards the highest good. But a single life cannot be detached from the whole; if there is a good for one there must be a good for all, and if obligation is to govern an individual it must have its sanction in the system men call the universe. Now, under what form did Mill conceive this directive power? "The ideal of a perfect Being to whom he could habitually refer as the guide of conscience"; but what did this mean save that the man who had got rid of God as an idea had to enthrone an ideal to do His work? In other words, by denying God he was obliged to invent a substitute for Him; and what sort of substitute did he invent? He loved; and though I may have my own strong convictions as to the moral character of the process which turned his love into a passion and broke up a house-
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hold that but for him might have continued one and happy, —yet I note only the fact that he loved and lost, and the woman he lost became, the further he retreated from her living presence, a memory that ruled his life. And he loved to think the thoughts that would have pleased her, to do the things she would have approved, till his attitude became a kind of worship and her memory "a sort of religion." And has not this tale a moral as true as it is pathetic? The man who could not believe in a God of "perfect goodness" found a substitute for Him in the apotheosis of a woman who owed her perfection and function as an ideal to the imagination of the man who mourned her, and who could not bear to lose her influence from his life. If the logic of incapacity had never a more illustrious victim than John Stuart Mill, man's need for God had never a more veracious witness than the tragic sequel to his disappointed love.

2. If now man's incapacity to see God, so far from suppressing his need of Him, only renders it the more active and acute, are there any means or standards by which we can define the kind of God he needs? Well, then, it is evident that God must represent his highest idea and that this idea will reflect and articulate what is best and most essential in himself. Now we may describe the self of man as constituted by reason, conscience, and heart; or thought, moral judgment, and a free and motived will; and the elements necessary to him must be repeated in his highest idea, the God who is the impersonated ideal that governs his life.

(i.) Man is by pre-eminence the thinker; thought is his very essence, and the more and better he thinks the higher and the nobler grows his manhood. When he explains nature he interprets himself, for it is only in the degree that he perceives it to be reasonable that he becomes rational. But thought is a thing of spirit, not of matter: it is with-
out form or figure, is neither ponderable nor divisible, may be spoken or written, communicated or evolved, but can neither be measured nor handled. There have, indeed, been men who have described thought as a product of organization and a function of brain. "Ohne phosphor kein Gedanke," without phosphorus no thought, said one who imagined that to coin a graphic phrase was to solve a serious problem. But how out of phosphorus as a mere special kind of matter can you educe immaterial thought? by what alchemy can the ponderable be changed into the imponderable? by what art or craft can the atom which gravitation rules become the mind which speculates concerning the law that governs the universe of atoms but does not control thought? Things so incommensurable and so separated by the whole diameter of being cannot by experiment be converted into each other, or by analysis resolved into the products of a common factor. It is a very easy thing, indeed, to correlate organization and consciousness, but how does that prove organization to be the cause of thought, or thought a product of the organized brain? A very distinguished German biologist, who loves to gird at benighted theologians and to carry what he conceives to be the war into what he imagines to be their camp, has proposed what he considered to be here a grand test of truth. "Just take," he says, "the brain of a man, with all its grey matter, its lobes and wonderful convolutions, and put it in a casket, and put in a second casket beside it the brain of a well developed anthropoid ape; then submit the two to a competent arbiter, say, the inhabitant of some distant planet, that he may tell us whether there is any insurmountable difference or impassable gulf between them." Now there are decided controversial advantages in this sort of reference. For one thing the man who makes it determines the terms of the problem, and to be able to do this is to make sure of the
solution that will be offered. For another thing the arbiter, though he is supposed to come from another planet, is only another form of the man who appeals to him; and so is certain to return a verdict in terms agreeable to the appellant. And thus the imaginative act is but a legal fiction by means of which the brains can be judicially declared not indeed to be identical, but to be capable of becoming so nearly alike as to be indistinguishable, so much so that each may be equal to performing the functions of the other. But let us ask our visitor to pause; we, too, have a problem for him, though it somewhat differs from the one so lightly put and so easily solved. Bring other two caskets and place them alongside those already there. Into the one which stands beside the ape's brain let us put the history of his race, if history it may be said to have, telling how they have lived in the forest, climbed trees, cracked nuts, courted, fought, hungered and fed, without change or variation from the earliest moment of observation to our own day. Into the casket which stands beside the brain of man place the history of his civilization, if not as written yet as transacted and realized, the story of the arts he has invented and the art he has cultivated; of the empires he has founded, the governments he has established, the states and the cities he has built; of the literatures he has written, the music he has created, the religions he has professed; of the tragedies which have made his life stern and the comedies which have filled it with mirth and humour; of the beliefs he has lived by, the ideals he has pursued, the hopes that have cheered his desolation, and the loves that have out of his very weakness made him strong. And then, when our two supplemental caskets have been filled, let us turn to our judicial visitor and say: "We pray you, as one who knows how serious a thing life is and how much they who would live it honestly need truth as their guide, help us to solve this problem; whether we may regard these two
brains, which differ so slightly in matter, weight and organization, as the cause of the acts which represent the immense differences between their respective races and their contrasted achievements. We are not greatly concerned as to their cranial resemblances, or as to whether the lower brain is capable of becoming even as the higher; but we do strongly desire to discover whether in their structural or material differences the causes of the histories distinctive of the separate owners is to be found." Our urgency might disturb the celestial calm of the judge to whom our terrestrial controversies may well seem trivial; but if his heavenly pity were to overcome his natural irritation we may conceive him replying somewhat thus: "The problems move in very different regions; the brain is a question in the history of nature, civilization a question in the history of mind; and effects which so differ can hardly be conceived as having like or equal causes." "True," we make reply, "but the essential nature of the ape is unfolded in his history, the essential nature of man unfolded in his civilization; and do you find the natures which have been thus unfolded stored in the brains you have been invited to examine?" And he answers: "How can I? Man's civilization is the creation of reason, thought, mind; without these it could not have been, and these no brain made nor is there in its mechanism anything to show how they came to be. Man is mind, and though mind may need an organ for its material expression it cannot be conceived as dependent for its very existence on the organ it uses." "How then do you explain the being of mind?" "It is older than man, for it is the Father of all things; it took shape in him because it is increate and eternal; the Reason that is God brought nature into being and made man become. The root of the creation blossoms into its finest fruit; the Architect of the universe could realize His universe only by means of beings who were spirits like Him-
(ii.) But man is conscience as well as thought. Paul tells us that the heathen who have no written law, yet do by nature the things it enjoins; that they are a law to themselves, and have its commands written on the tables of the heart; and that the existence of this inner law is proved by two concordant witnesses, the voice of conscience and the moral judgments of men, whether condemnatory or approbatory, which they pass upon both each other and themselves.\(^1\) He also tells us that while by nature the knowledge of God is manifest in them\(^2\) yet it has seemed good to many not to retain this knowledge;\(^3\) that He made them to obey the truth but they have obeyed unrighteousness;\(^4\) and that to those who seek by obedience to attain eternal life He will award glory, honour and immortality, but upon those who are disobedient He will visit wrath and indignation.\(^5\) From these positions three notable things follow: (a) there is in man a conscience on which the finger of God has written the duty required of him; (β) he is able to obey or disobey this duty; and (γ) God will exact from every man an account as to how he has dealt with this law and how he has used this freedom. These are in an equal measure truths of nature and of revelation; it is because the one knows that the other can speak of them and so enhance their authority. It is because of the law within that no virtue of the heathen can ever be a splendid vice; that nature is ever on the side of virtue; that by following it man can at once transcend and realize himself, for he carries within a standard which changes him from a mortal individual into a vehicle of the eternal and universal; and that he is able, while doing what it most becomes himself to do, to do also what most serves man—found states, frame codes of duty, speak a common ethical language, recognize and fulfil com-

\(^{1}\) Rom. ii. 14, 15. \(^{2}\) i. 19. \(^{3}\) i. 28. \(^{4}\) i. 19, 21. \(^{5}\) ii. 7, 8.
mon obligations. It is because he is free that he can do the thing he ought; that, since he is able to create fresh good his obligation to do it is absolute; and that he is not so fettered by the inheritance of an ignoble past as to be absolved from the duty of introducing a more gracious future. And it is because God is above and over us all that actions done in time yet range towards eternity; that our temporal is the germ of an immortal being; that while we are, singly, but units, yet we do not constitute a universe of atoms, but a co-ordinated unity, created by a law which the individual can obey, but the whole alone can realize. Hence comes our conclusion:—Conscience in man demands righteousness in God; a moral Deity is involved in a moral mankind; unless God be absolutely holy and pure man will not be able to do Him reverence. The law implanted in us requires that the highest idea, if it be so articulated as to be an object of worship, shall be one that while evoking adoration yet awes and uplifts the adorer.

(iii.) The man who is reason and conscience is also heart. It can be as truly said of man as of God, he is love; where it is not there is no humanity. "Intellect without affection" defines neither man nor God, but only the devil. Invest Satan with all the power of the Almighty, yet leave him in every other respect unchanged, and he would not thereby become like God, but only a thousandfold more the child of hell than before. For what makes a person a devil and his environment a hell save the want of love? For where there is no love there is simply an insatiable selfishness, guarded by a suspicion that can never trust and a fear that cannot rest. The loveless man loves his own happiness but that of no other being. Around him are multitudes who desire happiness, some asking it from him or seeking to attain it with him and through him; but he, as void of love, desires happiness for himself alone and sacrifices theirs to his, though he soon discovers that selfish
happiness is but the lust that begets misery and turns into despair. And a loveless man who despairs of pleasure is indeed a terrible being. More ruthless than any beast of prey, he can spoil innocence and glory in its shame; he can rejoice in the pallor that steals upon the cheek once ruddy with health; the cry of the orphan comes to sound like music in his ear; the ravages of disease and crime and death wake in him no pity, though they may stir the horror that fears for himself. And there is no misery like the misery of him in whom fear for self has taken the place of love for others, who reads danger in every human face, sees an enemy in every living form, who hears disaster murmured in every breeze, disease blown about on every wind, or death threatened by every exhalation. He who fears for himself alone, will find suspicion of others so grow on him that carefulness on their part will seem but a new monition of danger and a cause of deeper fear; and in his dreaded yet desired isolation he will come to feel as if all the agony of earth were impersonated in his single breast. It is this that makes the loveless a Satanic state; for hell is created by the hate which begets suspicion and solitude. Where no being loves and every being fears, where no eye can close, for every other eye watches for the opportunity of gratifying jealousy or envy, of indulging malice or the revenge that lusts to murder,—there is hell and the men who make their home in it are devils. But if love be so necessary to man, what must it be to God? The loveless Maker of a universe were a being we could neither revere nor adore. Yet is not this very inability a witness to the moral character of our Creator? He so made us that we could not worship an Almighty devil, who were a being a coward might flatter, but no man could praise. We can love only the lovable, and only where love is can there be the will to do good and the power to accomplish it. To be without heart is to be able to seduce innocence without remorse; and not even the
seduced can love the remorseless seducer. Man may yield to the devil's temptation, but it does not follow that he on that account loves the devil; nay, he may hate him all the more that he has not tempted in vain. God, then, to be a Being man can worship must be the impersonated goodness he can admire and adore, reasonable in all His acts, righteous in all His works, gracious in all His ways. Were He less than this our souls could not be persuaded to the obedience which is realized love.

II.

1. So much for the God needed to satisfy the higher and better nature in man. But that nature has this curious quality,—the higher and better it becomes it is the less easily satisfied, especially in those things it does or produces for its own delectation. And it is not surprising that refined nature should be most justly dissatisfied with the work of its barbarous state in the highest region of thought, and more especially with the sort of gods it then made and bade man worship. It is out of this inability of nature to satisfy nature in the matter of religion that the need for revelation has come; for revelation means that unless God makes Himself known man will never really know Him, or, in other words, can never realize the perfect religion. And the higher our idea of God rises the less can we deny to Him the power and the right of speech. The race that could not speak would not be rational, for what were reason without the gift of expression? A dumb race—i.e. one without the power to make and to use language—would be a race without intelligence. The thought that cannot be uttered is thought that does not live. And so God in the very degree that He is reason will speak; that He is righteous, will act and govern; that He is love, will show Himself gracious. And how can He speak unless He addresses those who hear? How can He
govern unless He reigns over those who are able to obey? And how can He be gracious unless He declare Himself to those who stand in need of His love? But these are all personal acts, not possible of expression save in personal forms, not capable of apprehension save by persons. And this signifies that if God is to be revealed it must be on the one hand by His own spontaneous action, and, on the other, by the use of a medium which we may conceive as an objective personality to Him, and which is essentially such to us. There is a familiar tale of the Italian boy who became the most famed of sculptors, sitting long and pensively before the supreme work of his master, wondering, admiring, judging as only an artist can. The master watched the boy, and read in the eager yet shadowed face the verdict of posterity. Suddenly the lad rose and turned sadly away, murmuring to himself: "It needs but one thing to be perfect." Much did the master marvel at the boy's speech, and one day, seeking knowledge that he might die in peace, he asked his pupil: "Michael, what did that statue of mine need to be perfect?" "Need, Master? it needed speech." It had received from its creator's genius everything but life; and without that what was it but a dead and graven image? And what is nature but a dumb creation with man sitting before her open-eyed and wondering, asking whence she has come and he with her? Whither he and she are together going? She silent and sphinx-like answers only by her sculptured face and couchant figure, leaving the imagination of man to reply to the questions which his reason has asked. But God could not leave man to such a dumb instructrix; the creature He had made that He might love appealed too strongly to His heart. "The only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He declared Him." The men who see the Son, see the Father; and from Him who has ever lived in God, they learn to know what God is.

2. If the revelation of God must be through a person,
then where in all history can we find so suitable a personal medium as Jesus Christ, one whose manhood is so calculated to make our conception of God more sublime and gracious? The character of the interpreter adds its finest qualities to His interpretation. We believe that He lived in God and we seek God through Him; the affinity of His manhood with God brings Deity near us, while the affinity of our manhood with His lifts us nearer to Deity. As the medium of revelation He is like the great aërial ocean which floats round and enfolds our earth; without it gravitation could not exercise its mystic power, binding mass to mass, planet to sun and system to system, and making of immensity a shoreless sea in which worlds sail more noiselessly and sure than were they guided by rudder and compass; without it the light and heat which the sun flings from his burning face would never visit us and change our cold earth from a dwelling of death into the home of rational life. Why He is qualified to be so lucid a medium is expressed in His very name; He is "the Son," or, as the Te Deum has it, "the everlasting Son of the Father." The two notions are inseparable; where the Father is the Son must be; if we had no "everlasting Son" we could have no essential or eternal Father. And each is as the other is. The machine witnesses to the skill of the mechanic; the pupil to the learning or genius of the master; the son to the character and qualities of the father. The gentleness, the grace, the sternness, the patience, the inflexible integrity towards men which marked the One distinguishes also the Other. There were men who were wont to argue as if God's Fatherhood signified mere indulgent good nature, as if His goodness prevented Him from being a cause of suffering and would not even allow Him to see a creature suffer; and they forgot that Jesus could be fierce as well as gentle, angry as well as gracious, and that man could by his sin not indeed punish God, yet inflict upon Him the
sorest suffering. Then there were other men who, on the contrary, argued as if God were so severe and austere that while the insult of the sinner's sin moved Him to anger, the misery of the sinner's state did not touch Him with pity. Thus a distinguished and subtle divine defined Sovereignty and Fatherhood, when predicated of Deity, as, respectively, titles of nature and of grace; God as Sovereign having over against all men rights He must enforce, but as Father duties of tenderness and care which were proper only to His own; and one who heard Him discourse on this distinction said "that man would take from God all that makes Him divine and gracious." But there could not be a more unreal antithesis, for the father who is not a sovereign and never enforces his authority and rights, is but the shiftless head of a shiftless family. There is indeed nothing so mischievous in public politics or in private morals as the easy good nature which fears the giving of pain too much to be able to punish wrong. And the sovereign who is not the conscious father of his people is no just king, but is an owner and a disposer of chattels rather than a ruler of men. In God these two constitute a noble unity, all His paternal acts are regal, all His regal functions are paternal. An emasculated Deity, incapable of the anger that burns like a consuming fire against iniquity and oppression, were no Deity fit to hold the reins of a wicked and guilty world; and a pitiless God who never saw the pathos of the sinner's lot, whether he sins against his will or in the flowing tide of irresistible inclination, is not equal to the sovereignty of a fallen race. The two functions need then to be sublimed into a fine and balanced harmony that God may reign in love and yet man be saved from his sin.

3. But though these functions constitute a unity, they express also a difference. God is one, but He has an infinity of attributes, every attribute denoting a distinct
quality in the Divine character, or a special aspect in the Divine relations. And so here the sovereign is concerned with authority and law, but the father with the child and his obedience. The first thought of the purely legal monarch is order, and how to maintain it; the first thought of the regal parent is the family and how to preserve it. The relations and acts of the sovereign are impersonal and juridical, but those of the father are personal and ethical. The former enforces law that he may vindicate justice and uphold order; the latter maintains authority that he may discipline and benefit his children. The sovereign honours the law by punishing the transgressors, and in order to this he builds a prison that so far from reforming may only further corrupt and deprave the wrong-doer; but the father vindicates authority by chastisement, which is distinguished from penalty by seeking not so much to create fear of law and of its majesty as to reclaim the disobedient and uplift the fallen. The one regards the whole, the other the persons who compose it. The sovereign says: "I impersonate the law without which there would be no society and no state, no justice between man and man, no fear of wrong and unfaithfulness, no security for property and no guardianship of rights." But the father says: "I am the embodied providence of the family, toil for it, spin for it, think of all its members, help all and love all, especially the helpless, the unloved and the unlovable." But the very difference in the functions makes their unity and concurrence in God the more needful to the seemliness of His action. It would not be God-like to save by being unjust to law, any more than it would be to think of His majesty to the neglect of His grace. We can as little imagine that it would become God to save the guilty by doing indignity to justice, violating order or tarnishing right as to conceive that it would be agreeable to Him to think that He magnified justice by forgetting mercy and dealing pitilessly by
the miserable mortals who could not choose but sin. Sovereignty is as normal as fatherhood; fatherhood is as normal as sovereignty; and it is by showing their complete and indefeasible unity that the Christian redemption so glorifies God. If He had not been Sovereign, man would never have needed reconciliation to Him; If He had not been Father, the means of reconciliation never could have been found. The sovereignty which loves law, upholds justice, and institutes order, could not have winked at sin or benignly smiled on the transgressor; the fatherhood which has a heart for men and pity for the forlorn could not have allowed red-handed vengeance to work its will upon a fallen race. But if without the sovereignty there would have been no need for a Redeemer, yet if there had been nothing else, He would not have been possible. For law has power to punish but none to save; justice has the will to vindicate the denied authority, but not to deliver the denier; and so the God who has only regal rights and legal instruments could never have permitted the guilty to escape, let alone have provided the means for its attainment. But with the Fatherhood there could not but be a Redeemer, and redemption by suffering; for the sin of the child is the sorrow of the parent. And is there anything so absolutely irrepressible as the grief that would die to save the son who has been its cause?

4. The positions thus reached are fundamental, and ought to supply us with standards for the appraisement of cardinal evangelical doctrines. (i.) The Father and the Son cannot be placed in opposition; they agree in will, though they differ in function. The Son is not the rival, but the agent of the Father; He does not cancel but fulfils the purposes of the Sovereign. (ii.) The work which expresses the common will is as much the Father's as the Son's. His blood does not purchase the Divine love, for the love that could be bought by blood were not divine; but it expresses the
sorrow of Him who gave, the suffering of Him who was given, and the sacrifice which was made by both. (iii.) The sovereign, though he may will the good of the law-breaker, yet cannot save him by breaking the law himself, for that would be to gratify pity at the expense of order and all it stands for; the father, though he may feel hindered by authority and may hate the shame of penalty, yet must regard their rights, for to do otherwise would be to make himself the slave of the wrong-doer and the approver of the wrong he did. The common suffering of Father and Son is a joint homage to the sovereignty; their union in sacrifice is the witness to the fatherhood. (iv.) The eternal and essential unity expressed in "the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father" is fulfilled and realized under historical conditions when Christ so did the Father's will as, on the one hand, to reconcile man to God, and on the other hand to incline and qualify man to do what is well pleasing in His sight. (v.) As the son became the standard regulative of Christian conduct, He also becomes the principle regulative of Christian thought. That principle is to the Greek the orthodoxy of the Church; to the Roman its infallibility as embodied in the Pope and articulated by him; to the Lutheran justification by faith, which, as it is accepted or denied, decides whether a Church shall stand or fall; to the Reformed, who was here the more radical and so nearer the truth, it was the gracious will and character of God. The grace of the reformed divine was indeed not always gracious, but he did right in beginning not with any special Church or any personal doctrine, but with the God who was the source of all religion and the matter of all thought. There, too, we would begin, not indeed with the God of a nature "red in tooth and claw," or with the absolute and the abstract, which is the Deity of philosophy, but with the God the Son declared. Where He placed us there we stand, and look at God
through His eyes, and at man with a vision He has clarified and enlarged; and we come to understand how it is that when man sinned God could not but suffer, and how His suffering became a sacrifice which reconciles the guilty to the All-Good. And so we come to see how profoundly true is the word of Paul, "Christ Jesus is made unto us of God, wisdom and righteousness and sanctification and redemption, that it may be according as it is written, He that glorieth, let him glory in the Lord."

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