

remain. No doubt the Exile added greatly to the scientific lore of the Hebrews. At the same time there is no nation, however limited its outlook, which is not vitally interested in the weather, and interest in the weather means to those who live out of doors a working knowledge of the sky. The mere naming, therefore, of stars or constellations in a Hebrew work is scarcely a proof of post-exilic date, especially if the stars named are those which were held to be connected with the wet and dry seasons. I am not here concerned to defend the loose syntax of Amos v. 8 (which I suppose is best taken as a long *nominativus pendens* resumed at י'דעתי' in v. 12), but I do suggest that the language used is not inappropriate to Amos and his times.

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JÜLICHER ON THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE PARABLES.

JÜLICHER proceeds to draw out further the difference between simile and metaphor in a series of suggestive antitheses. Metaphor admits of interpretation; in simile, interpretation is wholly out of the question, as every word is to be taken literally. Simile is instructive; metaphor, interesting. Simile, the reader takes as it is given him; metaphor, he makes something for himself. Simile makes the understanding of the subject easier; metaphor, we might almost say, more difficult, or at any rate presupposes some understanding on the part of the reader. Simile explains; metaphor hints. Simile, increases the light; metaphor diminishes it. Simile, reveals; metaphor encourages the reader to learn for himself. Simile descends to the level of his understanding; metaphor raises him up to its own. A good simile admits of no further question; a good metaphor is intended to call forth the question, τί ἐστὶ τοῦτο;

What holds of simile and metaphor holds also of their higher forms, parable and allegory; for the parable is an expanded simile, the allegory, an expanded metaphor. To take the latter first, an allegory is really a series of metaphors. All the main terms introduced are metaphors which require to be replaced by other terms to which they correspond before the meaning is clear. But the metaphors thus introduced are all drawn from the same sphere, and have a connexion among themselves. Apart from the hidden meaning beneath it, that is to say, the allegory must present some intelligible sense. A single metaphor is a point corresponding to another point in a different plane; an allegory, a line running parallel to another, to which it corresponds at every point. As an example, we might take the *למשל* in Ezekiel xvii. There we have a connected narrative about a vine and two eagles. But beneath the story there runs a hidden meaning, a line running parallel to the line of the narrative. In *v. 12*, the prophet asks, *οὐκ ἐπίστασθε τί ἦν ταῦτα*; and then goes over the narrative again, only substituting now the proper conceptions for the metaphorical ones which took their place before, *βασιλεὺς Βαβυλῶνος* for *ἀετὸς ὁ μέγας*, *ἔλθη ἐπὶ Ἱερουσαλήμ* for *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὸν Λίβανον*, and so on. Now if we regard the interpretation of the parables of the sower and the tares in the Gospels as authentic, then these parables are nothing more or less than allegories. But, in spite of the high authority upon which this view of the parables rests, Jülicher is strongly of opinion that it is false, and for the following reasons:—

1. In the first place, we understand the parables of Jesus without *ἐπίλυσις*. Now the view of the Synoptists is that Jesus's parables are speeches which mean something different from what the words say. What they do mean the disciples themselves do not know. They need to ask Jesus, and He interprets (*ἐπιλύει*) for them. But, with two

exceptions, these (*ἐπιλύσεις*) are all lost. The only conclusion is that, with these two exceptions, the parables are unintelligible to us. Upon these lines we land in the following dilemma: *Either*, the parables as allegories require an *ἐπίλυσις*, and, as that given by Jesus has not been handed down, they must be unintelligible; *or*, we understand them without any interpretation handed down to us, in which case such interpretation could never have been necessary, *i.e.*, they are not allegories. The attempt to escape this dilemma, on the ground that Matthew xiii. 18-23, 37-43 gives the key to the interpretation of all the parables, is futile. The only key which that passage gives is the general principle that the main conceptions introduced in the parables of Jesus are to be understood in a sense different from the literal one. But that does not advance us any further, any more than to know that a riddle is a riddle gives the answer to it.

2. But, further, it is in the highest degree unlikely that Jesus made such general use of allegory; for allegory is the most artificial among the figures of speech. Metaphors flow from the lips of the speaker, particularly the Oriental, spontaneously; but allegory demands careful preparation. To carry it through with success is a work of much difficulty. It smells of the lamp, and, unless we think of Jesus preparing His addresses carefully beforehand, is the very last form of instruction to which we should expect Him to resort.

3. But the parables of Jesus positively forbid identification with allegories. They begin usually with the formula "The kingdom of heaven is like" so and so. They invite the reader to compare two different things, and note their resemblance. No allegory begins thus, for the purpose of allegory is quite different. It requires us, not to put two things side by side and compare them, but to substitute one for the other. Its object is gained if, in reading of the one,

we think of the other ; in reading of the vine and the eagles in Ezekiel xvii., for instance, we understand Israel, and Babylon, and Egypt. The interpretation of the allegory never runs thus, "this is *like* this," "the eagle is *like* the king of Babylon," but "this *is* that," "the eagle *is* the king of Babylon." To identify the parables of the Gospels with allegories is simply to ignore the difference between "being like" and "standing in place of," between comparison and substitution.

4. Every allegory bears infallible witness to its character in the fact that its literal sense is unsatisfactory. To regard a saying as an allegory, merely because we think it may be made to bear an allegorical interpretation, is pure caprice. Only when such interpretation is forced upon us by the unsatisfactory meaning of the saying in its literal sense, are we justified in resorting to it. The simple metaphor makes us feel that it must not be taken literally. We understand at once, from the connexion in which it occurs, that the word ζύμη, in Mark viii. 15, must be understood in another than the ordinary sense. Much more do we feel the same thing with allegory. Nobody can read Ezekiel xvii. without feeling that this is no story about a real vine and real eagles. No doubt the aim of the allegorist is to make the story, beneath which his meaning is concealed, run as smoothly and with as little breach of probability as possible. But he can never succeed entirely. There are no two objects in the world that are exactly alike. The more complex their character, the less is such likeness possible. The conditions and laws of the spiritual sphere, with which allegory for the most part deals, in spite of a certain resemblance, are yet widely different from those of the natural. How, then, is it possible to construct a story which, while apparently narrating some occurrence in the natural sphere, shall accurately describe some spiritual experience, without in some measure violating the law

of probability? The resemblance between the symbol and the reality is only superficial. As soon as we go into detail, the wide difference between the two makes itself felt. The parallelism can be preserved only at the expense of one or other of the sides; and, as it is the spiritual meaning that is the matter of importance, naturally it is the other side which suffers. Thus every allegory, no matter how carefully constructed, lacks, to a certain extent, inner necessity. Pure impossibilities, open contradictions are, indeed, avoided, but it aims at nothing more than mere possibility. There is always a certain air of unreality, of unsatisfactoriness, about it, which impels us to seek for a meaning underlying the story. But we feel nothing of the kind with the parables of Christ. The characters we meet in them are all taken from real life. They act exactly in the way we should expect them to act. Never for a moment do we feel that the story has been "cooked" to serve a hidden purpose. Not a hint is there to suggest that it is merely the worthless husk, within which the precious kernel is concealed.

These considerations justify us, Jülicher thinks, in rejecting the Evangelists' view of parables. We cannot but admit that they may have allowed the prejudices of their own circles to affect the account they give of the parables of Jesus. They sometimes put into His mouth sayings which He certainly did not utter. When they begin to reflect, as in Mark iv., Matthew xiii., Luke viii., there they are least of all to be relied on. We appeal from the Evangelists to the parables themselves; we examine them free from all prejudice inspired by the evangelical theory, treating them as though the Evangelists had never said a word as to their nature, had never given a hint as to their interpretation. At once all difficulties disappear, and the parables of Jesus range themselves alongside of the ordinary figures of speech which we meet with in the case of every

great orator. The following are the conclusions Jülicher arrives at on such an unprejudiced investigation of the subject:—

(i.) One group of the *παραβολαί* he regards as SIMILITUDES (Gleichnisse), attaching to the word the sense which Aristotle (Rhet. ii. 20) assigns to *παραβολή*. The similitude is a higher stage of the simile. The simile compares two conceptions, *e.g.*, “Herod” and “fox”; the similitude, two propositions, *i.e.*, two relations of conceptions. We might represent simile in mathematical form, thus, $a = a$; similitude, on the other hand, thus, $a : b = a : \beta$. Now the proportion $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{a}{\beta}$ holds good, even if a be not equal to a and b to β ; and this is the case with similitude. To construct a simile there must be some resemblance between the two objects compared; but in a similitude such resemblance need not exist, for it is not the objects that are compared, but the relations between them. So in a similitude, although there are many terms introduced, we speak of a *tertium comparationis*, but not of several *tertia*. As the simile compares one *word* with another, so the similitude illustrates one *thought* by another. Hence the similitude consists necessarily of two members—the thought which the author desires to illustrate, and the illustration which he brings forward to cast light on it. It is a common practice to apply the name *παραβολή* only to the latter member, the illustration, a practice which has proved a fruitful source of error. We might distinguish these two members as *fact* (Sache) and *illustration* (Bild). Aristotle gives a typical *παραβολή* in the chapter already referred to: οὐ δεῖ κληρωτοὺς ἄρχειν (fact), ὅμοιον γὰρ ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τοὺς ἀθλητὰς κληροίη, μὴ οἷ ἂν δύνωνται ἀγωνίζεσθαι ἀλλ’ οἷ ἂν λάχωσιν, ἢ τῶν πλωτήρων ὅν τινα δεῖ κυβερνᾶν κληρώσειεν ὡς δέον τὸν λαχόντα ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν ἐπιστάμενον (illustrations). Of course it is not to be expected that every similitude

will be constructed strictly on this model. We meet with countless varieties. The illustration sometimes comes first; or the two propositions may be placed alongside of one another without any comparative particle; or one or other of them may be only partially expressed; or the "fact" omitted altogether. These are mere external variations which do not affect the essential character of the similitude.

In the above example from Aristotle, observe, there is no question of comparing *ἄρχειν* with *ἀγωνίζεσθαι* or *κυβερνᾶν*. All that is asserted is, that it is as unreasonable to elect rulers by lot as it would be to choose athletes or steersmen on the same principle. It is not the ruler that is compared to the athlete or the steersman, but the principle in the one case that is compared with the principle in the others. The three cases are all instances of a general law. One might have appealed to the general law in support of the proposition. That were the more logical procedure. But the most logical is not the most effective method in popular argument. The concrete is much more convincing than the abstract. There is nothing like a *demonstratio ad oculos*. Hence the power of similitude. It is an argument from the admitted to the doubtful, from an indisputable fact to a parallel case, where for some reason or other—want of understanding, it may be, or the existence of prejudice, or the presence of passion—the action of the law in question is not recognised.

Jülicher would define similitude thus:—Similitude is that figure of speech in which the operation (Wirkung) of a proposition is secured by placing alongside of it a similar proposition, taken from another sphere, the operation of which is assured.

We have but to compare with this the definition of allegory, to realize how complete is the difference between them. Allegory he defines thus:—Allegory is that figure of speech in which one connected series of conceptions is

represented by another connected series of similar conceptions borrowed from another sphere. What a vast difference there is between these two must be evident at a glance. In the allegory all the main terms must be understood in a sense different from the literal one; in the similitude every word in the illustration must be taken exactly as it stands. Fancy taking the *κυβερνᾶν* of Aristotle's example in a metaphorical sense! There could not be a greater offence against the aim of the figure. The reason why the speaker introduces it is that it is a thing with which every one is familiar, and yet we are to believe that when he speaks about steering, he means not steering but something quite different! Allegory requires interpretation before its meaning becomes clear. But the purpose of similitude is to illustrate, to make clear, and in order to do so it must be perfectly clear itself. An obscure similitude is worse than none. To interpret a similitude is like taking a lamp to show the lamp that is placed to give us light.

So widely different are allegory and similitude that not only can there be no question of identification of the two, but there can be none even of combination. An allegorical similitude is a monstrosity. How were it possible to combine things so utterly different in nature? We understand what an allegory is, and know that its terms are to be understood in a metaphorical sense. We understand what a similitude is, and know that its terms are to be understood in a literal sense. But what an allegorical similitude can be, with its terms to be understood at once in a literal and a metaphorical sense, we cannot imagine. One might as well speak of a black white, or a light darkness. Even the attempt to compare the various items in the illustration half of the similitude with those in the other half is unjustifiable. It is a milder species of "interpretation" derived from allegory, which is not permissible in similitude.

For, as we have seen, the proportion $\frac{a}{b} = \frac{a}{\beta}$ holds good, though a be wholly different from a , b from β . The resemblance between the proposition to be illustrated and the illustration, in similitude, depends, not on the resemblance of the various terms in each to one another, but on the resemblance between the relations in the two cases. When I apply the homely proverb about the pot calling the kettle black to the conduct of one person towards another, surely I do not compare the one to a pot and the other to a kettle!

Similitudes such as we have described are frequent among the sayings of Jesus. Such, for instance, are Mark xiii. 28 sq., iii. 23 sqq.; Luke v. 36-39, iv. 23, xii. 39, 40, xiv. 28-33; Matthew vii. 9-11, 24-27. Let us glance at one of the examples, the first in the above list. Here are two sentences placed side by side, the one dealing with the Parousia, the other with the fig tree. Is this an allegory or a similitude such as we have described? Let us see how it lends itself to allegorical interpretation. What do "the fig tree," "the branch," "being tender," "putting forth leaves," etc., mean? These are questions to which we are supposed to find answers in verse 29. But verse 29 is very far from professing to give anything of the kind. It begins with *οὕτως καὶ*, which is surely in itself a proof that it contains something different from interpretative repetition. *Οὕτως καὶ* is not identical with *id est*; it adds something new to what has gone before, and does not simply repeat it in another form. As an allegory the figure were of the poorest. How forced the resemblance between summer and the Son of man! Or, again, could a more unfortunate comparison be made than that between the genial evidences of spring in the bursting forth of the fig tree, and the terrible events described in vv. 14-23? But, further, the opening words expressly forbid anything

in the nature of allegorical interpretation. Ἀπὸ τῆς συκῆς μάθετε τὴν παραβολήν, it begins; and if we are to learn anything from the fig tree, surely we must look at the fig tree itself, and not take it as a metaphor for something else. Plainly this is no allegory that we have before us. But take it as a similitude, such as we have described above, and all these difficulties disappear. Jesus has been describing the terrible events that will precede the Parousia (vv. 14-23). When these things come to pass, He tells His disciples, they may know that the Parousia is at hand, just as surely as they know, when they see the fig tree putting forth her leaves, that summer is near. The resemblance between the two cases lies in the fact that they are both instances of the general law, that when once a thing begins to work, then it is not far off—the general law to which the summer and the Parousia and a thousand other things are subject. That the disciples are to learn anything more from the fig tree, that they are to take the tenderness of its branches, or the putting forth of its leaves, as counterparts to any of the signs which announce the advent of the Parousia, we are not justified in inferring from the text. The parable does not profess to teach anything regarding the *nature* of the Parousia. All that it deals with is the question of the “*when*.” Every word is to be taken literally. The fig tree, of which Jesus bids His disciples learn the parable, is a fig tree such as every inhabitant of Palestine was familiar with. The fact stated in verse 28 was a fact which Jesus’s hearers had observed scores of times. Only on the supposition that Jesus is referring to a well-known fact, does the similitude convey any instruction.

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(To be concluded.)