

ON THE GOD-MAN.

III. THE INCARNATION AND THE UNITY OF CHRIST'S PERSON.

WE have considered the incarnation in relation, first, to the Trinity; and, second, to human nature. We must, lastly, enquire what relation the different states of the Logos will sustain to one another. He is the second person in the Godhead, and, as such, he is the Archetype of man. The Archetype of man becomes actual Man, the God-Man. What is the relation between the Trinitarian Logos and the Logos incarnate? What relation does the Logos incarnate bear to the humanity which He assumed? Has His mode of existence as a divine Person been affected or not? In other words, did He suffer *kenosis* or empty Himself in any way of a Divine attribute? Lastly, is His humanity in any sense personal, or altogether impersonal? If it is personal, does the personality consist in the Divine or the human hypostasis?

1. While we must maintain that the Logos "came out from God," we are compelled to believe also that the Logos ever retains His eternal position within the Godhead. He fills two distinct spheres of action, the one as second Person in the Trinity, without beginning and without end, without humiliation and without subsequent exaltation; the other as Logos incarnate or God-Man, which mode of existence He assumed at the incarnation, but will continue to have for ever; and it is the same divine Person that occupies both positions. The whole personality of the Son became incarnate, and, at the same

time, the whole personality of the Son continued to exist and act without incarnation, as sustainer of the universe. "And no man hath ascended into heaven, but he that descended out of heaven, even the Son of man, which is in heaven,"¹ and Christ clearly taught "that He came forth and is come from God."²

So Athanasius³ says: "The Logos, while present in the human body and Himself quickening it, was, without inconsistency, quickening the universe as well and was in every process of nature"; and Calvin⁴ to a similar purport: "The Son of God descended in a wonderful manner from heaven, but so that He did not leave heaven." As God is all everywhere, not part here and part there, so the Logos is all within the Trinity and all within humanity, but His mode of existence, of thought, and of action differs. In the New Testament an act done in one state is ascribed to the Logos, who exists, at the same time, in the other state.

The famous patristic phrase, *communicatio idiomatum*⁵

¹ John iii. 13. Westcott and Hort omit the words "which is in heaven" from their Edition of the Greek Test.; but Tregelles and Tischendorf insert them in their texts. They are also inserted in the Revised Version, but a marginal note apprises the reader of their "omission by many ancient authorities."

² John viii. 42.

³ *De Incarn.*, § 17, οὐ γὰρ δὴ περικεκλεισμένος ἦν ἐν τῷ σώματι οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι μὲν ἦν, ἀλλαχόσε δὲ οὐκ ἦν. οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ἐκίνει, τὰ ὅλα δὲ τῆς τούτου ἐνεργείας καὶ προνοίας κεκένωτό· ἀλλὰ τὸ παραδοξότατον, Λόγος ὢν, οὐ συνεχέτο μὲν ὑπὸ τινος, συνείχε δὲ τὰ πάντα μάλλον αὐτός καὶ ὡς περ ἐν πάσῃ τῇ κτίσει ὢν, ἐκτὸς μὲν ἔστι τοῦ πάντος κατ' οὐσίαν, ἐν πᾶσι δὲ ἔστι ταῖς ἐαυτοῦ δυνάμεσι, τὰ πάντα διακοσμῶν, καὶ εἰς πάντα ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐαυτοῦ πρόνοιαν ἐφαπλῶν, καὶ ἕκαστον καὶ πάντα ὁμοῦ ζωοποιῶν, περιέχων τὰ ὅλα καὶ μὴ περιεχόμενος, ἀλλ' ἐν μόνῳ τῷ ἐαυτοῦ Πατρὶ ὅλος ὢν κατὰ πάντα· οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ σώματι ὢν, καὶ αὐτὸς ζωοποιῶν, ἐκθῶς ἐζωοποιεῖ καὶ τὰ ὅλα, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πᾶσιν ἐγένετο, καὶ ἐξω τῶν ὄλων ἦν.

⁴ *Inst.*, II. xiii. 4, "Mirabiliter enim e coelo descendit Filius Dei, ut coelum tamen non relinqueret."

⁵ Ἀντίδοσις τῶν ἰδιωμάτων. Cf. Athan., *Or. IV. c. Arian.*, § 6; for the Lutheran view cf. *Die Dogmatik, etc.*, von H. Schmid, p. 256 sqq. The true meaning is given by John Damascene, *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III. 3, οἰκειοῦται δὲ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ὁ Λόγος· αὐτοῦ γὰρ ἔστι τὰ τῆς ἁγίας αὐτοῦ σαρκὸς ὄντα καὶ μεταδίδωσθε τῇ σαρκὶ τῶν ἰδίων κατὰ τὸν ἀντιδόσεως τρόπον, διὰ τὴν εἰς ἄλλα τῶν μέρων περιχώρησιν, καὶ τὴν καθ' ὑπόστασιν ἔνωσιν, καὶ ὅτι εἰς ἦν καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ὁ καὶ θεὸς καὶ

has been applied to the relation of the Person of the Logos incarnate to the human nature which He assumed. But it may with equal reason be applied to the different states of the Logos, His Trinitarian and His incarnate conditions. For, rightly interpreted, the phrase means that actions done in both states are actions of the same person, whether the person has changed the condition only or assumed another nature as well. As the Logos incarnate is real Son of God, and not another person, any change in the mode of His existence consequent upon His incarnation will not affect the mode of existence of the other two Persons in the Trinity. The Father did not become incarnate. The *perichoresis* within the Trinity does not touch the Logos so far as He is incarnate; and, on the other hand, the *communicatio idiomatum* will become the *perichoresis* of the Logos incarnate, as Damascene says, but will not touch the other Persons of the Trinity. On the other hand, the phrase "community of properties," if incorrectly interpreted, is a mere figment;¹ for an action done in one state or in one nature must not be attributed to the other state or nature. Such expressions as "the Lamb that created the world," "the Son of God shed His blood," are much deprecated and condemned by some writers, while others are fond of using them. They colour the piety of Roman Catholic composers of hymns, such as F. W. Faber, and they tinge the devotion of a very different school of theology, which has been influenced by Zinzendorf and the Methodist revival. They are theologically correct, and, within the bounds of good

τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἐνεργῶν ἐν ἑκατέρᾳ μορφῇ μετὰ τῆς θατέρου κοινωνίας. διὸ δὴ καὶ ὁ κύριος τῆς δόξης ἐσταυρώσθαι λέγεται, καίτοι τῆς θέας αὐτοῦ μὴ παθούσης φύσεως, καὶ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, πρὸ τοῦ πάθους ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἶναι ὡμολόγηται, ὡς αὐτὸς ὁ κύριος ἔφησεν.

¹ Cf. Hodge, *Syst. Theol.*, II. p. 392: "By this is not meant (as some Lutherans said) that one nature participates in the attributes of the other, but simply that the person is the *κοινωνός*, or partaker of the attributes of both natures."

taste, they are to be commended as the vehicle, and only vehicle, of true feelings; for they emphasize the identity of the Logos in all states.

2. In reference to the second question, the relation of the human nature of Christ to His person, the right understanding of the *communicatio idiomatum* will help us here also. For instance, the term θεοτόκος, *Deipara*, or, as it has been usually rendered, "Mother of God,"¹ is rightly vindicated by Dr. Charles Hodge.² For, though Mary was not the bearer of the Godhead of the Logos, either in His Trinitarian mode of existence or even as incarnate Logos; she was bearer of the Logos as to His human nature. If it is correct to say that the Logos was incarnate, it is correct to say that He was "made of a woman."³ He who was made under the law is the person who was made of a woman. He was made under the law through incarnation, continuing to be the same Person that He had ever been, Son of God, and He was made of a woman, in virtue of the humanity that He assumed. Similarly, if it is correct to say that the Son of God became Man, it is correct to say that the Son of God suffered, that the Son of God shed His blood, that the Son of God died. "Though it would be an error to say that the Godhead was born or died, it is absolutely necessary to say that He who was God was born and died." Yet even this, however true, is not enough. Ordinary men are passive in these circumstances; but they became personal acts on the part of Christ. Men are born into the world and pass out of life. The former is never in the case of other men a moral act; the latter only in the case of some men. The Son of God came

¹ Luke i. 43, "the mother of my Lord," where "Lord" must mean "Jehovah."

² *Syst. Theol.*, II. p. 393. He also cites Turretin.

³ *Gal.* iv. 4.

into the world, by means of birth, from a previous state of existence, and, by means of death, ascended up where He was before. Each was a personal state that began in a personal act, into which the Son of God threw the energy of a Divine power, and made it, by so doing, redemptive.¹ It is right, again, to worship Christ in His human nature, though the doctrine ascribed to Apollinarius must be rejected; for it would be idolatry to worship the human nature of Christ in and by itself.²

But so strong is the tendency to what is known as Nestorianism, that theologians are, in every age, more or less under its fascination. Even Athanasius himself could not altogether escape. For instance, he frequently speaks about the Logos assuming flesh as a garment (*ἐφόρεσεν*), the very word of Nestorius.³ When, again, Athanasius discusses the human limits of our Lord's knowledge, he admits that it was a real, not a pretended, ignorance. But when he says "that the flesh of Christ was ignorant, though the Logos Himself, as such, knew everything before it came to pass," he calls it an economy. But it is an economy that is really based on the duality of Christ's Person, and he is very often hard put to vindicate the morality of it. Is it not the same thing as saying that the ignorance of our Lord's human nature was fictitiously assumed? Can it be thus restricted to the human side of His personality? When He asked where the body of Lazarus was laid, can we conceive that as Logos He knew where it lay and as a Man did not know? Can we sup-

¹ Cf. *The Doctrine of the Atonement*, by the late Dr. Lewis Edwards, p. 123 (E.T.).

² Cf. Jackson, *Works*, B. XI. ch. 3, "The glory of the Godhead, which dwelleth bodily in Christ, is infinite. But it is not communicated to Christ's human body according to His infinity; the communication of it, or the glory communicated is created and, therefore, finite."

³ Cf. Schaff, *History of the Church, Nicene and Post-Nicene Christianity*, p. 718, "This garment which he used I honour on account of the God which was covered therein, etc."

pose the plea of "economic ignorance" would be accepted in the court of conscience among men? ¹ Again, Athanasius denied that the Logos personally either feared death or wept. It was His humanity that feared death and wept. "Is it not extravagant," he asks, "to admire the courage of the servants of the Logos [the martyrs], yet to say that the Logos Himself was in terror, through whom [rather, for whose sake] they despised death."² Still more strange, Athanasius, from dread of admitting the *kenosis*, or self-emptying of the Logos, is in some passages led to deny His personal exaltation: "It is no absurdity then, if, as for our sakes He humbled Himself, so also for our sakes He is said to be highly exalted. So 'He gave to Him,' that is, to us for His sake: and 'He highly exalted Him,' that is, us in Him."³ "When our Lord as Man," he says elsewhere, "was washed in Jordan, it was we who were washed in Him and by Him." In the same spirit Cyril of Jerusalem⁴ virtually denies the humiliation of the Logos: "Christ sits on the right hand of God, not as a reward of patient endurance, but as His eternal right and in consequence of His eternal generation." And Athanasius, who, as we have seen, makes the distinction between the Logos in the Trinity and the Logos incarnate, ignores the glorification, like Cyril, though in

¹ *Or. III. c. Arian.*, § 38, οὐ γὰρ χρεῖαν ἔχων, ἕως αὐτὸς ὡς εἰληφὼς λέγεται ἄπερ ἐλάμβανεν ἀνθρωπίνως κ.τ.λ., *ib.* § 48, οὐτε ἐψεύσατο τοῦτο εἰρηκῶς (ἀνθρωπίνως γὰρ εἶπεν, ὡς ἄνθρωπος, Οὐκ οἶδα). Cf. Cyril Alex., *Ep.* XLV. p. 137, ὡς ἄνθρωπος οἰκονομικῶς καὶ ἀνθρωπίνως διαλέγεται. Hilary, *De Trin.*, IX. 62, "Ignoratio ejus, secundum quod omnes thesauri in eo scientiæ latent, dispensatio potius quam ignoratio est."

² *Or. III. c. Arian.*, § 57: πῶς οὖν οὐκ ἄτοπον τῶν μὲν θεραπόντων τοῦ Λόγου θαυμάζειν τὴν ἀνδρείαν, αὐτὸν δὲ τὸν Λόγον λέγειν δειλιᾶν, δι' ἃν κάκεινον τοῦ θανάτου κατεφρόνησαν.

³ *Or. IV. c. Arian.*, § 7, οὐδὲν οὖν ἄτοπον εἶ, ὡς περ δι' ἡμᾶς ἐταπεινώσεν ἑαυτὸν, καὶ δι' ἡμᾶς λέγεται ὑπερυψῶσθαι. ἐχαρίσατο οὖν αὐτῷ, ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμῖν δι' αὐτὸν, καὶ ὑπερύψωσεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡμᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ.

⁴ *Cat. IV. vii.*, οὐ γὰρ, ὡς τινες ἐνόμισαν, μετὰ τὸ πάθος στεφανωθεὶς, ὡς περ ὑπὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ διὰ τὴν ὑπομονὴν ἔλαβε τὸν ἐν δεξιᾷ θρόνον· ἀλλ' ἀφ' οὐπὲρ ἐστίν, [ἔστι δὲ γεννηθεὶς ἐκ πατρὸς αἰεί] ἔχει τὸ βασιλικὸν ἀξίωμα.

another way. He denies the exaltation of the person and ventures to assert the deification of the human nature: *ὑψωσις δὲ ἦν θεοποιεῖσθαι αὐτόν.*¹ We find Augustine also speaking to the same effect, when he says "that the whole human nature [of our Lord] was elevated by its union with Him without His being lowered in any degree";² and Leo maintains that our Lord did not lay aside the form of God.³ "Remaining what He was and putting on what He was not," is the remark of Dr. Owen.⁴ We meet with the same unwillingness to break with Nestorianizing tendencies in Eustathius, as cited by Theodoret:⁵ "Not indeed that the Logos was subject to the law, as our calumnious opponents suppose we say, being Himself the law." This, though the Apostle says that the *Son* of God⁶ "was made under the law." The only way out of these apparent denials of the incarnation is to suppose that the great writers we have cited admit, but not consistently, the distinction made already between the Trinitarian Logos and the Logos incarnate.

But even this admission is not an adequate solution of

¹ In *Or. III. c. Arian.*, § 48, Athanasius regards the deification of the human nature of our Lord as taking place at His exaltation: *λοιπόν γὰρ ἦν ἡ σὰρξ ἀναστᾶσα καὶ ἀποθεμένη τὴν νέκρωσιν καὶ θεοποιηθεῖσα.* But elsewhere he seems to connect it with the incarnation, *ib.* § 38, *ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον θεὸς ὢν, προσελάμβανε τὴν σάρκα, καὶ ἐν σαρκὶ ὢν ἐθεοποίησε τὴν σάρκα.* But this may refer to the exaltation.

² Tract. LXXVIII. in Joann., "Forma quippa servi accessit, non forma Dei recessit: haec est assumpta, non illa consumpta."

³ *Ep. XI.*, Ad Flav., "Salva igitur proprietate utriusque naturae et substantiae, et in unum coeunte personam, suscepta est a maiestate humilitas, a virtute infirmitas, ab aeternitate mortalitas. . . . In integra ergo veri hominis perfectaque natura verus natus est Deus, totus in suis, totus in nostris. . . . Proinde qui manens in forma Dei fecit hominem, idem in forma servi factus est homo. . . . Sicut formam servi Dei forma non adimit, ita formam Dei servi forma non minuit."

⁴ *Vindiciae Evangelicae*, chap. xiii. (Vol. XII. p. 287, Goold's Ed.) Dr. Owen's argument is that the form of God means the Divine nature.

⁵ *Dial.*, II. p. 186, *ὅτε δὲ ὁ Λόγος ὑπέκειτο τῷ νόμῳ, καθάπερ οἱ συκοφάνται δοξάζουσιν, αὐτὸς ὢν ὁ νόμος, ὅτε ὁ θεὸς ἐδεῖτο θυμάτων καθαρῶν, ἀθρῶα ῥητῆ καθαρίζων ἅπαντα, καὶ ἀγιάζων κ.τ.λ.*

⁶ Gal. iv. 4, *ἐξαπέστειλεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν υἱὸν αὐτοῦ.*

the difficulties unless we add the theory of the *kenosis*,¹ or self-emptying of the Logos, in His state of incarnation, in some form or other. Athanasius, as we have seen, admits the former, and stoutly denies the latter. He declares his belief in the distinction between the mode of existence of the Logos in the Trinity and His mode of existence in virtue of the incarnation ; and discovers the outlet from the labyrinth in unduly exalting the humanity of Christ, so much so that he falls on occasion into what afterwards developed into Nestorianism. And, at first, it might appear that if we admit the distinction now mentioned, we might avoid Nestorianism by a careful judgment as to the length we are prepared to go in the direction of Nestorianism. For why should Athanasius have admitted the distinction between the Trinitarian and the incarnate Logos at all? Because he saw the necessity of maintaining the identity of the Logos in every state. He distinguishes his modes of existence that he may not sacrifice that identity. But, for the same reason, he feared to go *too far* in making distinctions. For instance, he feared to admit fully the humiliation of the Logos so as to ascribe limitation of knowledge to the Logos, and he preferred deifying the human nature of the Logos to using expressions which the sacred writers frankly and unhesitatingly employ. But, as the fulness and glory of the incarnation lies in the true, Divine personality of the Logos, so also the self-sacrifice which the incarnation implies is the act of the same Logos. The initiative in the incarnation must be ascribed to the Logos ; that initiative is an ethical act, a " becoming poor,"² based

¹ Cf. Meyer on Rom. viii. 3 and Phil. ii. 6 ; Arndt, *True Christianity*, Pt. II., Bk. II., ch. i. § 7, Eng. trans., pub. 1744, " For when the faithful soul, that is conscious of her own vileness, reflects upon the humiliation of the Son of God, and beholds Him humbling Himself after such a manner, as not only to put off the form of God, that He might appear in that of man, but even to suffer the greatest evils too in this vile form, . . . there springeth up a most noble flame of Divine charity."

² 2 Cor. viii. 9. This verse explains Phil. ii. 6.

upon a change of metaphysical condition. The Apostle calls it a self-emptying, which is a word so extreme and emphatic that we must beware of making the fact that it is unique a reason for refining it away.

It was not in dying on the Cross that the Son of God began to sacrifice Himself, but in assuming human nature into union with His Divine Person; not as if the assumption of itself involved humiliation, for then the humiliation of our Lord would continue for ever. But His incarnation involved His divesting Himself for a time of the form of God and taking upon Him instead of the form of God the form of a servant. It is true that He had already obeyed His Father's command by incarnating Himself; and, even previously to the act of incarnation, he was already from eternity ideally, though not actually, a servant, when He was king. But now He took the form and position of a servant, in which form it was not competent for Him to assume the kingship without dying to regain it.

The doctrine of the self-emptying of the Logos is found in Origen, among the Fathers.¹ But it was not favoured in the early Church, owing to the influence of Athanasius, and to the extreme and confessedly heretical form in which it was thought² to be presented by Apollinarius. He explained the words *ὡς ἄνθρωπος* in Philippians ii. 7 as meaning simply that the humanity of the Logos was, not real Man, but like man. The fact is, the doctrine of the kenosis would preserve us from this erroneous interpretation. The words "in the likeness of men" are significant. But they refer to the humiliation of the Logos incarnate. In the Trinity the Second Person is, in idea, human; but

¹ *Hom. in Jer.*, I. 7, Ἰησοῦς οὐκ ἀνὴρ γενόμενος, ἀλλ' ἔτι παιδίον ὢν, ἐπεὶ ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν, προέκοπτεν . . . εἰ γὰρ ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν, ἐλάβανε πάλιν ταῦτα ἀφ' ὧν ἐκένωσεν ἑαυτὸν, ἐκὼν κενώσας ἑαυτὸν, τί ἄπορον αὐτὸν καὶ προκεκεφέναι σοφία καὶ ἡλικία καὶ χάριτι παρὰ Θεῷ καὶ ἀνθρώποις.

² Successful attempts have of late been made to vindicate the orthodoxy of Apollinarius.

through incarnation He assumed actually the *humanlike* condition, though He continued to be God.

In this century we are indebted to Thomasius¹ for the first elucidation of the kenotic theory. Dr. Bruce has subjected² it to very clear and most powerful, but to my mind not convincing, criticism. In the first place, he says that, according to the Thomasian doctrine, the incarnation involves at once an act of assumption and an act of self-limitation, the former an exercise of omnipotence, the latter the loss of omnipotence, and asks, Are such contrary effects of one act of will compatible? But there is no contradiction here. In the creation of the world God passes from a state of quiescence to a state of activity. Ambrose, as Dr. Bruce points out,³ explains the incarnation as the opposite movement—a Divine Person withdrawing Himself from activity that He might be subject to infirmity. In the second place, Dr. Bruce acutely observes that the depotentiated Logos seems superfluous, because it implies that He has been reduced to a state of helpless passivity or impotence. But the *kenosis* consists of two successive steps. The first step was the laying aside the form of God, and this act the Apostle dates back in the pre-incarnate state of the Logos. It was an infinite act of self-denial, than which a lesser would have been impossible to him, as well as incapable of being revealed as an ethical example to men. Then, when He had divested Himself of His metaphysical omnipotence as Son of God, and was “found in fashion as a man,” He humbled Himself—an expression properly applicable only to a man or the Logos as man⁴—and He humbled Himself more than would have been possible to any mere man or angel, however perfect, and however

¹ *Christi Person und Werk*, 2 vols., 1886.

² *Humiliation of Christ*, Lect. IV.

³ *Ib.*, p. 217.

⁴ Dr. Bruce applies it, in his *Apologetics*, to God.

much aided by the Spirit of God. For our Lord's moral omnipotence still remained to Him, and the help of the Spirit was added, which enabled Him to become obedient unto death, yea the death of the cross, and constituted His obedience redemptive—priestly and sacrificial. The contrast between the form of God and the obedience unto death, even the death of the cross, is infinite, for redemptive reasons. Further, the moral height of perfection, obtained through the human discipline of His life, was greater than human. All this will, I think, answer also Dr. Bruce's fourth objection, that the Logos incarnate is to all intents and purposes a human soul, and therefore a superfluous dualism ensues. I admit the dualism, and think it necessary for the reasons now mentioned. In the third place, Dr. Bruce objects that the kenotic theory introduces a break in the consciousness of the Logos as God. This holds good especially of Martensen's form of the doctrine,¹ and we must confess Martensen's position "that the Son of God was in the womb, not as a self-conscious Divine Ego, but as an unripe, unborn child," and "whilst advancing in years and becoming more and more conscious of itself as a human Ego, became also in the same measure conscious of its Deity," is unthinkable. But this is unessential to the doctrine. Quiescence does not mean annihilation. With Dr. Bruce's criticism of Gess's extreme form of the theory we fully agree.² Gess introduced the unnecessary and inconsistent supposition that the Logos divested Himself of all Divine attributes. Among English theologians who accept the doctrine of the *kenosis* are Canon Gore³ and Principal Fairbairn.⁴

All that is essential is that the Logos did not in any way

¹ *Christian Dogmatics*, Sect. 132, E. T.

² *Christi Person und Werk*, 2 vols., 1870. An abridged translation by Dr. Reubelt of an earlier edition (1856) appeared in America in 1876.

³ *Bampton Lectures* for 1891, Lect. vi., p. 158.

⁴ *Christ in Modern Theology*, p. 476.

or measure hamper the free activity of the humanity. An omniscient or omnipotent man, not in need of the unction and power of the Spirit, is inconceivable, but a perfectly just and loving man, having the Spirit, is not. If the Divine side of the complex personality of Christ is the initiatory and productive element, the human side is the regulative. So much on the kenosis.¹

As the Logos emptied Himself of the form of God by becoming incarnate, it is equally true that the God-Man became gradually more full in the content of His human nature, and consequently more full, because of the communion of properties, in the endowments of His Divine Person as well. If He became poor for our sake, for our sake He became also more rich. If He surrendered much, He received as much in gifts and graces. In the Gospel of John He prays that He may receive as a reward the glory which He had with the Father before the world was.² In the epistles we are told that His prayer was fully heard. Corresponding to the kenosis of Philippians ii. 6, we have in Ephesians v. 9-13 mention of what we may call the anaplerosis of Christ. When He ascended at His exaltation, He received gifts, and not only received, but (as the Apostle interprets the Old Testament prophecy) "*gave* gifts unto men." Now this ascension corresponds to a previous descent, and is its result, for it is the ascension of one who had been in the form of God, and had emptied Himself. It is the very Person who had descended that ascended afterwards, that He might fill the whole universe with His efficacious presence. In verse 13 the words "fulness of Christ" are found, the fulness with which Christ is filled,

¹ It may be thought that the expression, "emptied Himself" is too strong to convey the idea of simple quiescence of certain powers. But it should be remembered that the emphasis lies on its being Christ's own act. It is this that conferred an ethical character on it, and its ethical character gave it power as an example to men.

² John xvii. 5.

and which has come as His reward for the previous self-emptying.¹ The Apostle expresses the thought allegorically. The incarnation, an ethical act of self-sacrifice, he likens to a descent of Christ into regions lower than earth, that is, to the fact of the descent of Christ's soul into Hades, and the corresponding anaplerosis of Christ, another ethical act, but on the part of God, He represents as Christ's ascent above all heavens. But the fulness of Christ is as much a manifestation of Divine love as His self-sacrifice. For Christ's fulness is not simply His own reward, but the means of bestowing on Him power, in the language of the allegory, "to fill" all creation, from the regions above the heavens to the regions lower than the earth, with His personal activity. To His Church on earth He has given gifts, which consist of apostles, prophets, evangelists, and teachers who are pastors, for the proximate purpose (*εἰς*) of the ministry and the building up thereby of the body of Christ, but for the ultimate purpose (*πρός*) of perfecting the saints, their corresponding fulness, until all attain to complete oneness of faith in, and knowledge of, the Son of God. Their previous imperfect graces differ from each other, not only in character, which is their excellence, but also because of their very fragmentariness, which is a defect. But as the entire Church is one organic whole, fitly framed and solidly compacted, so every member of it will grow from childhood to maturity; and the standard according to which, as well as the vital principle from which, the development of the body and of every member takes place, is the fulness of Christ, here called the "stature" or full age of Christ's development. Christ is no more in the "days of His flesh." He is Spirit,² and where the Lord the Spirit is, there is liberty, growth, ex-

¹ Cf. Cremer, *Lex.*, s.v. *πλήρωμα*, and especially Lightfoot, *Epistle to the Colossians*, p. 257 sqq.

² 2 Cor. iii. 17.

pansion. If we have known Christ according to the flesh, yet now we know Him no more; and for this reason (οὖν) if any one is in Christ, he is a new creation.¹ We all, therefore, with uncovered face, looking at the glory of the Lord as in a mirror, are transfigured from His glory unto our corresponding glory, as by the power of the Lord, who has been Himself transfigured into Spirit.² For His human nature is human nature at its best and highest; and He Himself, once self-emptied, now God-Man replenished, is become what He was not before, Saviour of all, and defined Son of God in power according to the spirit of holiness, His ethical Divine personality and presence, in consequence of His resurrection from the dead.³ To this also refer the words, "For it was the good pleasure of the Father that in Him," fully after His resurrection, and through His ascension, "should all the fulness dwell," He who emptied Himself has the fulness or form of God restored to Him,⁴ as "a wealth of glory"⁵ for His Church.

It was not in self-sacrifice alone that He gave us an example that we should follow His steps, but in the possession and use of every endowment. He is the ideal Man, the highest specimen of humanity, moral and spiritual, yea, Divine humanity, that the world will ever behold. His incarnation and humiliation was "becoming" (ἐπρεπε) to him, and the crowning Him with glory and honour and universal sway on the throne of God equally becomes Him. The expression, "a genius was born in Bethlehem," is only incorrect because it is so utterly inadequate and one-sided, when applied to Him who has realized the grand possibilities of humanity beyond the imagination of any poet or the hope of any saint.

¹ 2 Cor. v. 17.

² 2 Cor. iii. 18.

³ Rom. i. 4.

⁴ Col. ii. 19.

⁵ Col. i. 27, τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης. It is difficult not to recognise an allusion to 2 Cor. viii. 9, ἐπτώχευσεν πλούσιος ὢν, ἵνα ὑμεῖς τῇ ἐκείνου πτωχείᾳ πλουτήσητε, which is synonymous with ἐαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν of Phil. ii. 7.

In this connection we heartily approve and welcome the new phase which Apologetics exhibits in our time. Formerly the defence of Christianity started from the same principles as the Deists assume, that is to say, God was regarded as a mechanician, and the universe as governed by Him through "secondary causes."¹ For this reason our reliance always rested on miracles, and we were in the same stage of spiritual knowledge as Nicodemus, who said, "No man can do these signs that Thou doest, except God be with him." But things have changed, if Luther's saying be true, that the finite has the power of receiving the infinite into itself; and if, which is the same thing, the essential greatness of Christ is moral, and the incarnation is first of all a manifestation of infinite love within the limits of human action. Miracles come in the wake of Christ at the bidding of His compassion. The supernatural is to Him natural. The evidences of Christianity will, therefore, no longer consist in the "miracles which He did," but in Himself as He is manifested in His humanity. As His Divine life on earth did not transcend the human or become monstrous, His influence on others must be ethical. He will be God-Man, if He is infinite love. He will be the manifestation of infinite love if He can forgive sins, redeem and sanctify mankind.

3. We have spoken of our Lord's self-emptying and subsequent fulness, and have seen how the former was necessary to enable His humanity to act freely. Another—and our last—question is whether His incarnation involves any kind of *kenosis* in the human nature, to allow freedom of action on the part of His Divine Person. The earth attracts the sun, as the sun attracts the earth. This question refers to the hypostatic character of our Lord's human nature.

¹ Cf. the excellent remarks of the late Mr. Aubrey Moore in *Lux Mundi* p. 99.

The patristic theory was that the humanity of Christ was impersonal. This was defended by the late Canon Liddon on the plea "that to deny it is to assert that there are two Persons in Christ";¹ and again, "to speak of Christ as *a* Man may lead to a serious misconception; He is *the*² Man, or rather He is Man." We subscribe fully to Liddon's objection to Nestorianism. But all the writers of the New Testament represent Jesus Christ as *a* man, an individual man, as well as *the* Man, as truly a man as Paul or Peter. They all start with the humanity of Christ, and from it slowly pass to the belief in His Divinity. Personal acts are ascribed to His humanity, such as prayer, which can belong only to a creature, not to the Logos, except, indeed, ideally;³ and the temptations of Christ to sin are possible only to a human person. In a word, a human nature without personality of some sort would seem impossible and inconceivable. It is like assuming all the separate elements of humanity without that *suppositum* which gives them personal identity and continuance.

On the other hand, the prevailing view among the Re-

¹ *Bampton Lectures*, Lect. I., p. 35, footnote, and Lect. V., p. 387. Ed. of 1867.

² The use of the article in the A.V. in Tim. ii. 5 implies the very opposite of what Liddon seems to infer: "For there is one God, and one Mediator also between God and men, *the* Man Christ Jesus." In the Greek the article is omitted, and the R.V. has attempted to show the significance of the omission: "For there is one God, and one Mediator also between God and men, *Himself* Man, Christ Jesus." *All* men have but *one* God. But that *one* God desires *all*, without any difference arising from Himself, to be saved, and then if they are not all saved, the difference is in themselves. The one God has constituted Him Mediator, who partakes of the *oneness* of God, and is at the same time Himself *a man* (*ἄνθρωπος*) like other men—One among many brethren. Christ is not here the ideal Man, but, as in Rom. v. 15, He is "the one individual Man," as individual as Adam, through whom the many individual men died. The verse in Timothy really takes for granted that Christ is God, because He has the Divine oneness, as well that He is a Man, because He partakes of human individuality.

³ Heb. v. 7: *ἐν ἡμέραις τῆς σαρκὸς αὐτοῦ κτλ.*

formers, received from John Damascene,¹ was that in itself the human nature of Christ was impersonal (*ἀνυπόστατος*) but became personal (*ἐνυπόστατος*) through the incarnation of the Divine Person, they rightly maintaining that the human nature never subsisted separately from His divinity. But the definition of person which was formerly accepted, "an exclusive whole,"² seems again to render it impossible to humanize the Divine personality in Christ. If so, we gain nothing by supposing the humanity to have the Divine hypostasis as its own hypostasis. Scripture, for instance, plainly teaches that Christ had two wills, a human as distinct from the Divine will; and that is the doctrine of the Church. But what becomes of the human will if we mean by it only the will of a Divine hypostasis? We desiderate something more; and we find it in Luther's conception of the human in Christ being united, after a completely unutterable manner, with the Deity so as to form one indivisible person.³ This is contained in His maxim already cited, "*finitum capax infiniti.*" The infinite Person is capable of assuming a human personality. He does not cancel or absorb it, but permits it to live on after a human fashion, even when it has been personally united with the Divine, as a man can live either in his rational or in his physical state. Dorner himself, who has ably elucidated this conception of personality, accepts it.⁴ Illingworth,⁵ too, says that, "while all around us is rigorously finite, personality alone suggests infinitude of life": personality is not a fixed, exclusive *totum quiddam*, but "a seed, a germ, a potency," which we can imagine almost infinitely magnified in capacity, character, intensity, scope.

¹ *De Fide Orthodoxa*, III. viii., *προσκυνεῖται γὰρ [ἡ σὰρξ] ἐν τῇ μᾶ τοῦ Λόγου ὑποστάσει ἢ τῆς αὐτῆς ὑποστάσεως γέγονεν.*

² Cf. Schaff, *History of the Church*, Nicene and post-Nicene, vol. ii., p. 751, "*persona rationabilis naturæ individua subsistentia.*"

³ Cf. Dorner, *Person of Christ*, Div. ii., vol. ii., p. 81 foll.

⁴ Cf. *System of Christian Doctrine*, vol. iii., p. 309.

⁵ *Bampton Lectures for 1894*, "Personality, Human and Divine."

An able American writer, Du Bose,¹ has a similar remark: "It is one thing to say that the Divine Logos united Himself with a human person whom He made to manifest Him, and it is another thing to say that He became and manifested Himself as a human Person. If He, being a Person, in any real and perfect sense, became human, then He became a human Person. . . . It is true that He is the Divine Logos realized in humanity—and between the *He* and the *We* there is all the difference between God and Man." Shedd² objects that Dorner is making an approach to Nestorianism. I confess it seems to me this doctrine is far removed from Nestorianism, inasmuch as it retains the unity of the Person. And how does it differ from Shedd's own doctrine that we must distinguish between the consciousness and the self-consciousness of Christ? "If the important distinction between consciousness and self-consciousness had been perceived and employed, the conscious experience of the person at a particular moment . . . would not have been mistaken for the permanent and immutable ego whose self-consciousness lies under all this stream of consciousness or experiences, and combines them into the unity of a person." As Professor Orr³ says: "There is a human side in the Logos, as there is a Divine side in man. . . . We do not deny in the doctrine of the incarnation, a true human personality in Christ; and that the personality of the Divine Son becomes also in the incarnate condition a truly human one."

Perhaps we may sum up the doctrine in the statement that the God-Man was a Divine Person who had a human as well as Divine personality. A writer in the *Guardian* of

¹ *The Soteriology of the New Testament*, chap. x.

² *Dogmatic Theology*, vol. iii., p. 391, where he criticises the Apollinarian theory and wrongly, it seems to the present writer, identifies it with "the whole kenotic controversy."

³ *Christian View of God and the World*, p. 284 foll.

July 17, 1895, has the following suggestive remarks: "It is common to speak of the limitation of personality, as though limitation were the most distinctive feature of personal life. This is virtually Mr. Balfour's view of human personality. As a matter of fact, we are on very safe ground in saying that nothing in experience is so unlimited as personality. . . . Personality is not *a* person. What is characteristic of personality is that it is not realised except in a close intercommunion and interpenetration of persons. . . . It is, in fact, the final characteristic and true definition of personality that it is the capacity for love, not for self-consciousness, but for self-sacrifice, for life in other persons." The human personality of the Incarnate Logos supplied what would otherwise have been lacking to the Son of God during the days of His flesh. The Apostle seems to represent the form of a servant as the necessary substitute for the form of God and the possession of that divine glory with His Father of which He had voluntarily divested Himself by His incarnation. How this will affect our conception of His exaltation we do not know, whether we suppose that the human personality will be swallowed up in the divine, as a ray in the light, or that it will have its distinctive function in the endless mediatorial kingdom. The cognate question, also, of the relation of the human nature of Christ to the mystical union between Christ and the Church we must leave untouched.

In conclusion, it is certainly worthy of consideration whether Luther's insight has not put us in a position to answer in the affirmative the question concerning the peccability of our Lord's humanity. But we seem still to be where we were before. The undoubted difficulty that one who could be tempted to sin was yet incapable of sinning remains unsolved. For He is still the same Person, and to sin is a personal act. The denial of this would be Nestorian. The incarnation gave to a Divine

Person a human personality ; but He has not ceased to be a Divine Person. It is only a change of condition. As the Logos does not cease to exist in the Trinity by becoming Logos incarnate, so He does not cease to be Logos incarnate by becoming Man. All the actions of the Man are the actions of the Logos incarnate, and the actions of the Logos incarnate are the actions of the Second Person in the Trinity. The patristic supposition that the humanity of Christ is impersonal implies that it is a mere thing, as incapable of goodness as of sin. The new definition of Person, makes no difference in Christ's ethical condition. The kenosis will not affect it any more than it affects the ethical condition of the Logos in the Trinity. Christ is truly subject to temptation, and requires the help of the Spirit of God, as every other man does, in order to conquer. Though this is true, His Divine personality is always in reserve, if we can suppose Christ being ever in danger of defeat in the temptation. But this supposition, notwithstanding the intensity of His agony, it is unnecessary to make. Apart from the form of God, of which He had divested Himself, and the Divine personality, which He still retained, the human moral power of Christ, with the gracious aid of the Spirit, was enough to bear Him victoriously through every conflict. His moral omnipotence was required not for the conquest of evil but for the accomplishment of the work of His life and death in obedience and redemption. If it be objected that His having laid aside His metaphysical omnipotence implies the weakening of His moral omnipotence, we have to bear in mind that the kenosis was itself an act of moral omnipotence, done in a manner wholly incomprehensible to us, and that the indwelling of the Spirit was enough to enable Christ to overcome any such possible weakening effects of His self-emptying. It was this—the fact that the kenosis did not leave Him morally weaker as Man, and did not

ethically depotentiate His Divine Person—that enabled Him to become an example and a redemption, not the one without the other, through His life and in His death.

Our argument ends where it began. If an ideal humanity existed necessarily and eternally in God, it became an actual humanity at the incarnation. The God-Man is not, as Hegel said, a monstrosity. A complex personality like Christ's is possible. If it be asked whether He is God or Man, the answer must be Both in One. He was in idea from eternity God-Man. He is and will be to eternity actual God-Man.

T. C. EDWARDS.

ST. PAUL IN ATHENS.

II.

IT is the merit of Prof. E. Curtius first to have caught the right tone of this scene, and to have restored it to its true surroundings amid the active bustling life of the Athenian Agora, where alone it is in its element. While in part the view taken in this paper differs from Curtius's exposition, yet all I have to say starts from his exquisite essay, "Paulus in Athens." It was he who showed me the spirit and the suitability of a scene which I had previously misunderstood and mistrusted. I regret to find that I have made an error on this point on p. 218, trusting too much to memory and conversation with a friend; and I beg to remodel the sentence, ll. 8-12, thus: "He touched on the subject first in his *Stadtgeschichte von Athen*, and afterwards in the fascinating paper, 'Paulus in Athens,' defining the situation as being rather a preliminary examination," etc. My friend considers that in his essay Curtius draws back from the view that the scene was a *προδικασία*, and