that he is repeating a statement of some good authority. This statement differs widely in tone from the sentences preceding, which were based on Tacitus; and I have tried to show that it is quite inconsistent with him (p. 244).

It appears to me that the really weighty evidence in this case is the striking agreement between the detailed and carefully weighed account given by Tacitus and the evidence of those Christian documents which have the best claim to be dated between A.D. 64 and 80, especially the Pastoral Epistles. Their authority agrees, and it far outweighs everything else in my estimation. And to this critical point I shall address myself, in the belief that, if it can be clearly proved, it will be considered by Dr. Sanday to justify and reward our friendly controversy.

W. M. Ramsay.

(To be continued.)

ST. PAUL'S CONCEPTION OF CHRISTIANITY.

VII. THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

The topical consideration of Paulinism on which we now enter may fitly begin with St. Paul's negative doctrine concerning justification, viz., that it is not attainable by the method of legalism. The proof of this position resolves itself practically into the Pauline doctrine of sin, which embraces four particulars. These are (1) the statement concerning the general prevalence of sin in the "sin section" of the Epistle to the Romans; (2) the statement respecting the effect of the first man's sin in Romans v. 12-21; (3) the statement concerning the sinful proclivity of the flesh in Romans vii.; (4) the statement concerning the action of the law on the sinful proclivity of the flesh in the same chapter. From all these taken together it follows that salvation by the works of the law is absolutely impossible.¹

¹ Ménéguez truly remarks that to understand St. Paul's notion of sin we must
1. The apostle's first argument in support of his doctrine of justification on its negative side is that as a matter of fact and observation sin, even in intense virulence, is widely prevalent in the world, both among Pagans and among Jews. It may be called the popular argument, and its use is to produce a *prima facie* impression or presumption in favour of the doctrine in connection with which the appeal to experience is made. It cannot be regarded as a strict proof that justification by works is impossible; at most it amounts to a proof that salvation by that method is very unlikely. To that it certainly does amount, very conspicuously in the case of the Jews. If, as is alleged, the people to whom had been given the law were as sinful as the rest of the world, the obvious inference is that the legal dispensation, viewed as a means of attaining unto righteousness, had proved a signal failure. And in view of the dark picture of the world generally, without distinction of Jew and Gentile, it is clear that, whatever might be possible for the exceptional few, the way of legal righteousness could never be the way of salvation for the million. But the empirical argument does not exclude the possibility of that way being open for the few; for though gross sin be very generally prevalent, it does not follow that such sin, or even sin in any degree, is absolutely universal. There may be some exceptionally good men capable of perfectly satisfying the law's requirements. The apostle makes it quite evident that he does not believe in any exceptions, for he winds up the account of the moral condition of the world in the early chapters of *Romans* with the unqualified statement: "therefore by the works of the law shall no flesh be justified." ¹ But that he does not rest the inference solely on the fore-

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¹ *Rom. iii. 20.*
going statement concerning the extensive prevalence of sin appears from the appended remark: "for by the law is the knowledge of sin," which is a new reason for the assertion just made. It may be doubted whether the apostle rests his doctrine as to the absolute universality of sin even on the texts of Scripture he has previously cited, which on the surface seem to teach the doctrine, though as they stand in the Old Testament they are not intended to state an abstract doctrine concerning human depravity, but simply characterise in strong terms the moral pravity of a particular generation of men. That he put on these texts a universal construction is not questioned, but he may have done so not so much as a mere interpreter of Scripture, but rather as one who believed in the universal diffusion of sin on other grounds. That the possibility of exceptions was present to his thoughts is evident from his reference to the case of Abraham. We may expect therefore to find that he has in reserve some deeper, more cogent reasons for his thesis than either an appeal to observation or citations from the Hebrew Psalter.

2. The necessary supplement to the popular argument is to be found in the famous passage concerning Adam and Christ, and in the not less notable statement concerning the sinful proclivity of the flesh. As to the former I remark that this section of Romans (v. 12-21) contains much more than a contribution to the Pauline doctrine of sin, or to the proof of the negative doctrine of justification. It serves the comprehensive purpose of vindicating the Apostle's whole doctrine of justification, both on its negative and on its positive side, by fitting it into a grand philosophic generalisation respecting the religious history of the world. That history is there summed up under two representative men, the first man and the second, Adam and Christ. Between these two men St. Paul draws a parallel in so far as both

\[ \text{iii. 10-18.} \]

\[ \text{iv. 1.} \]
by their action influenced their whole race. But beginning with a parallel, he forthwith glides into a contrast. Apology passes over into eulogy. For the writer, at the commencement of the chapter, has been extolling the benefits connected with the era of grace, and he is in the mood to continue in the same strain, and so having once suggested the thought: Adam and Christ like each other as both representative men to opposite effects, he introduces the new theme: "but not as the offence is the free gift; sin abounds, but grace superabounds." ¹

What we are now concerned with, however, is the bearing of this passage on the doctrine of sin, and so on the negative side of the doctrine of justification. That it was meant to have a bearing on these topics we need not doubt, though the direct purpose in view is more general and comprehensive. It may be said that the apostle here supplies a supplementary proof of the impossibility of attaining unto salvation by personal righteousness, a proof which converts his first statement concerning the general prevalence of sin into an absolutely universal doctrine as to the sinfulness of man.

And what then is the new proof? It starts from the universal prevalence of death. Indubitably death reigns over all. But death, it is assumed, is the wages of sin: there had been no death among men had there been no sin; therefore all must be in some sense and to some extent sinners simply because all die. Not improbably this was the original germ of the train of thought contained in the Adam-Christ section. But this germinal thought would inevitably suggest others. It would in the first place start a difficulty to be overcome, in grappling with which the apostle at last reached the magnificent generalisation contained in the antithesis between the two representative men. Death has swept away all the generations of man-

¹ v. 15.
THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

kind, therefore all men in all generations have sinned. But
if so, men must have sinned before the giving of the law.
But how could that be if where there is no law there is no
transgression, and if by the law comes the knowledge of sin?
This difficulty might be met by saying there was a law be­
fore the lawgiving, a law written on the hearts or con­
sciences of men, and sufficiently known to make them
responsible. But that is not the way in which the apostle
meets the difficulty, though, as we know from other places
in his epistles, such a line of thought was familiar to him.
He is willing to make the concession that there was no law
before the Sinaitic lawgiving, and that therefore men could
not legally be treated as sinners, could not have sin imputed
to them as a ground of condemnation and infliction of
penalty, because he has in view another way of showing
that in all the ages men were under the reign of sin, and
therefore subject to death. That way he finds in the great
principle of solidarity, or the moral unity of mankind. The
first man sinned, and that is enough. By one man sin
entered into the world, and death followed in its track
legitimately, righteously, because when the one man sinned
all sinned. Such I take to be the meaning of the famous
text Romans v. 12, and in particular of the last clause :
εψ’ φαντες ημαρτων. The rendering of the Vulgate, in quo
omnes peccaverunt, is grammatically wrong, for εψ’ φα
does not mean " in whom," but " because," yet essentially right.
It requires some courage to express this opinion, or indeed
any opinion, when one thinks of the interminable contro­
versies to which these four Greek words have given rise,
and considers how much depends on the interpretation we
adopt. The sense of responsibility would be altogether
crushing if the matter in dispute, instead of being a state­
ment connected with a theological theorem, were a vital
article of the Christian faith. Of the possible meanings of
the words in question, the one for which I, with something
like fear and trembling, give my vote, is, it must be ad-
mittted, *a priori* the least likely. Who would ever think of
saying himself, or expect another to say, that when Adam
sinned all mankind sinned? But we know that St. Paul is
in the habit of saying startling things, the sinless One made
sin, *e.g.*, and therefore we cannot make it a rule of inter-
pretation, in dealing with his writings, that the most obvious
and ordinary meaning is to be preferred. Of course the
most obvious meaning of the second half of *Romans* v. 12 is
that death passed upon all men because all men *personally*
sinned, which accordingly is the interpretation favoured by
an imposing array of modern expositors. Among the objec-
tions that might be stated to this view, not the least
weighty is this, that it makes St. Paul say what is not true
to the fact. If he really meant to say that all died because
all personally sinned, he must have forgotten the very large
number of human beings who die in infancy, an act of for-
getfulness very unlikely in so humane a man and so con-
siderate a theologian. The infants would not be left out of
account if we adopted the interpretation which has on its
side the great name of Calvin: all died, because all, even
the infants, inherited a depraved nature, and so were tainted
with the vice of original sin, if not guilty of actual transgres-
sion. But this is not exegesis, but rather reading into the
word ἡμαρτον a theological hypothesis. We seem, therefore,
to be thrown back, in spite of ourselves, on the thought,
however strange it may seem, that when Adam sinned all
mankind sinned, as that which the apostle really intended
to utter. The aorist, ἡμαρτον, as pointing to a single act
performed at a definite time, fits into, if it do not compel,
this interpretation. Writing some years ago, one would
have been able to cite in support of it the authority of
Pfleiderer. In the first edition of his great work on
Paulinism he remarks that in *Romans* v. 12 two different
reasons seem to be given for the entrance of death—Adam’s
sin and men's own sin, and it may seem strange that no attempt should be made to reconcile the two. But he goes on to say: "just in this hard and completely unreconciled juxtaposition of the two reasons lies without doubt the hint that in the apostle's view they are not two, but one, that therefore the sinful deed of Adam is at the same time and as such the sinful deed of all." "This," he continues, "naturally must mean that in the deed of Adam, as the representative head of the race, the race in virtue of a certain moral or mystic identity took part." ¹ But in the second edition of this work, published in 1890, the author has, with an implicit faith which is almost pathetic, adopted as his guide in the interpretation of Paulinism Weber's account of the theology of the Talmud. In doing so he makes two great assumptions: that the theological opinions of the Jews in the time of St. Paul were the same as in the period, centuries later, when the Talmud was compiled, and that St. Paul's theology was to a large extent simply a reflection of that of the Jewish synagogue. Both assumptions seem to me very hazardous. It stands to reason that Jewish theological thought underwent development in the centuries that elapsed between the apostolic age and the Talmudic era. And it is by no means a matter of course that every theological theorem current in the synagogue, and as such familiar to Saul the Pharisee, was adopted into his system of Christian thought by Paul the Apostle. That Rabbinism exercised a certain influence on his mind need not be questioned. The influence is traceable in his method of interpreting Scripture and in his style of argumentation, and it is not at all unlikely that it may here and there be discernible also in the thought-forms and phraseology of his Christian theology.² But of one thing we may be sure, viz., that St. Paul was not the slave of Rabbinical theology,

¹ Der Paulinismus, pp. 39, 40.
² Lipsius (Hand-commentar in Rom. v. 12) points out that the idea of death
and that he would never allow it to dominate over his mind to the prejudice of his Christianity. He might use it as far as it served his purpose, but beyond that he would not suffer it to go. The view he expresses in Romans iv. 1–3 in reference to Abraham, as no exception to the thesis that men cannot be justified by works, illustrates the freedom of his attitude towards Jewish opinion.¹

The servile use of Talmudic theology as a key to the interpretation of Paulinism, which makes the new edition of Pfleiderer's work in many respects the reverse of an improvement on the first, suggests another reflection which may here find a place. It is a mistake to be constantly on the outlook for sources of Pauline thought in previous or contemporary literature. Pfleiderer is a great offender here. According to him one part of St. Paul's theology comes from Alexandria, and the other from the Jewish synagogue, and the original element, if it exist at all, is reduced to a minimum. He cannot even credit the apostle with the power to describe the vices of Paganism as he does in Romans i. without borrowing from the Book of Wisdom.²

I may find another opportunity of expressing an opinion as to the alleged Hellenism; meantime I content myself with cordially endorsing a sentiment occurring in a book by a young German theologian, of whom Pfleiderer speaks in most appreciative terms. It is that "the theology of the great apostle is the expression of his experience, not of his reading."³ The remark applies even to the Old Testament, much more to the Apocrypha, or to the works of Philo, or to the dreary lucubrations of the scribes.

entering into the world through the sin of the first man was generally current among the Jews before and during Paul's time, citing in proof Sirach xxv. 24, Wisdom of Solomon ii. 23, and iv. Esdras vii. 18–20. What Paul did was not to invent the idea, but to apply it in exposition and defense of the Christian faith.

¹ Vide on this Expositor for June, p. 423.
² Der Paulinismus, 2te Aufl., pp. 83, 84.
³ Gunkel, Die Wirkungen des heiligen Geistes, p. 86 (1888).
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The doctrine of the Talmud on the connection between sin and death, as stated by Weber, is to this effect. Adam's sin is his own, not the sin of the race. Every man dies for his own sin. Yet the death of all men has its last ground in the sin of Adam, partly because the death sentence was pronounced on the race in connection with Adam's sin, partly because through Adam's sin the evil proclivity latent in the flesh not only first found expression, but was started on a sinister career of increasingly corrupt influence. Assuming that the apostle meant to echo the Talmudic theory in the text under consideration, the resulting interpretation would be something like a combination of two of the three interpretations which divide the suffrages of Christian commentators.

In the famous comparison between Adam and Christ the terms ἁμαρτία and δικαιοσύνη appear both to be used objectively. Sin and righteousness are conceived of as two great antagonistic forces fighting against each other, not so much in man as over him, each striving for supremacy; the one manifesting its malign sway in death, the other in the life communicated to those who believe in Jesus. The one power began its reign with the sin of Adam. From the day that Adam sinned ἁμαρτία had dominion over the human race, and showed the reality of its power by the death which overtook successive generations of mankind. The existence of this objective sin necessitated the coming into existence of an objective righteousness as the only means by which the reign of sin and death could be brought to an end. The existence of an Adam through whom the race was brought into a state of condemnation, made it necessary that there should appear a second Adam in whom the race might make a new beginning, and in whose righteousness it might be righteous. As by the disobedience of the one man the many were constituted (κατεστάθησαν, v. 19) sinners, so also it was necessary that by the obedience of the
One the many should be constituted righteous. Such seems to be the Apostle’s view. It may raise scruples in the modern mind on various grounds. Some may think that St. Paul has read far more theology into the story of the fall than can be taken out of it by legitimate exegesis. The idea of objective sin may appear objectionable on ethical grounds; for what, it may be asked, can be more unjust or unreasonable than that one man should suffer for another man’s sins? Yet, modern science will teach even the freest theological thinker to be cautious in pressing this objection; for by its doctrine of heredity it has made it more manifest than ever that the solidarity of mankind is a great fact and not merely a theological theory, and that the only question is as to the best way of stating it so as to conserve all moral interests. It may readily be admitted that a better statement is conceivable than that furnished by Augustinian theology. The question may very legitimately be raised: to what extent does objective sin reign; in other words, what is meant by death in this connection? When St. Paul says, “so death passed upon all men,” does he allude to the familiar fact of physical dissolution, or is death to be taken comprehensively as including at once temporal, spiritual, and eternal consequences? If my conjecture as to the genesis of the Adam-Christ train of thought be correct, we must understand θάνατος in the restricted sense. In any case there is no ground for ascribing to St. Paul the dogma that the eternal destiny of men depends on the sin of the race apart from personal transgression. That

1 Lipsius in Hand-commentar zum N. T. maintains that θάνατος nowhere in St. Paul’s writings means spiritual death, but physical death without hope of resurrection. Vide his notes on Romans v. 12 and vii. 10. Similarly Kabisch, Die Eschatologie des Paulus (1893). The views of Ménégoz will be stated in next article.

2 To understand Paulinism we must carefully note the distinction between άμαρτία and παράβασις. άμαρτία is objective and common; παράβασις is subjective and personal. άμαρτία entails some evil effects, but παράβασις is necessary to guilt and final condemnation.
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through the sin of Adam eternal perdition overtakes children dying in infancy (unless averted by baptism!) formed no part of his theology. The idea is utterly irreconcilable with his optimistic doctrine of superabounding grace. It is excluded by his conception of objective sin and objective righteousness as forming two aspects of one system. He did not think of the former as reigning unconditionally. He thought rather of the fall and its consequences as counterworked from the first by the reign of grace, Adam nowhere where Christ was not also in more or less potency. This covers infant salvation; for if infants perish, the common sin reigns unchecked and the common righteousness is convicted of impotence.

3. Something more than the theorem of objective sin in the sense explained is needed to produce the conviction that sin is a universal reality. It must be shown that sin is a power at work in man as well as above him, influencing his character as well as his destiny. Till this is shown men may remain unpersuaded that righteousness is unattainable by the way of legalism, deeming objective sin either an unreality or at most something external affecting man's physical life, but not his moral being or his standing before God. To shut men up to the way of faith there is needed a demonstration of the inherent sinfulness of human nature. This demonstration the apostle supplies in his statement as to the sinful proclivity of the flesh. The relative section of the Epistle to the Romans is not indeed a formal contribution to the doctrine as to the universality of sin; it rather deals with the flesh as a hindrance to Christian holiness, under which aspect it will fall to be

1 Vide on this Christ in Modern Theology, by Principal Fairbairn, pp. 460-2; also Godet, who on Rom. v. 12 remarks: there is no question here about the eternal lot of individuals. Paul is speaking here above all of physical death. Nothing of all that passes in the domain in which we have Adam for our father can be decisive for our eternal lot. The solidarity of individuals with the head of the first humanity does not extend beyond the domain of natural life.
considered hereafter. It may seem unsatisfactory that so important a part of the doctrine of sin should be brought in as a sort of afterthought. But we must once for all reconcile ourselves to the fact that St. Paul is not a scholastic theologian, and be content to take his teaching as he chooses to give it.

The demonstration takes the form of a personal confession. In the first part of his doctrine of sin the apostle has described in dark colours the sins of other men; in this part he details his own experience in most graphic terms. "I am carnal, sold under sin, for what I do I know not; for not what I wish do I, but what I hate, this do I." And he assumes that in this respect he is not exceptional. Personal in form, the confession is really the confession of humanity, of every man who is σαρκινος, living in the flesh. The ego that speaks is not the individual ego of St. Paul, but the ego of the human race. It is idle therefore to inquire whether he refers to the period antecedent to his conversion or to the post-conversion period. The question proceeds upon a too literal and prosaic view of the passage, as if it were a piece of exact biography instead of being a highly idealised representation of human weakness in the moral sphere. In so far as the artist draws from his own experience the reference must be held to be chiefly to the preconversion period, for it is clear from the next chapter that the apostle is far from regarding the moral condition of the Christian as one of weakness and misery like that depicted in chapter vii.; though it need not therefore be denied that the conflict between flesh and spirit may reappear even in the life of one who walks in the Spirit. But we miss the didactic significance of this passage if we take it as merely biographical instead of viewing it as typical and representative. That it is meant to be typical is manifest from the abstract

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1 This is the approved reading. Adjectives terminating in νος indicate the material of which anything is made. Vide 2 Cor. iii. 3, καρδιας σαρκινος.
manner in which the flesh is spoken of. It is not St. Paul’s flesh that is at fault, it is the flesh, the flesh which all men wear, the flesh in which dwells sin.\footnote{Rom. vii. 25; viii. 3.} What precisely the apostle means by \( \sigma \dot{\iota} \rho \xi \) is a question for future consideration; meantime the point to be noted is that the word does not denote something merely personal. It represents an abstract idea. The term may not signify the mere physical organisation, but we may safely assume that it has some reference thereto, and so find in this notable passage the doctrine that in man’s material part resides a bias to sin which causes much trouble to the spirit, and prevents those who with their mind approve the law of God from actually complying with its behests. This doctrine St. Paul proclaims in the pathetic confession: “I know that in me, that is in my flesh, dwelleth not good.”\footnote{vii. 18.} What dwells in the flesh is not good but sin.\footnote{vii. 20.} “I know,” says the apostle, expecting every man who has any sympathy with good to echo the acknowledgment. If he be right in this expectation, then it is all over with the hope of attaining to righteousness by personal effort. The appropriate sequel of such a confession is the groan of despair: “Wretched human being, who shall deliver me.”\footnote{vii. 24.} If there be any hope for us, it must be in Another; our standing-ground must be grace, not law. “But,” it may be said, “Paul may be wrong in his judgment; he may be taking too morbid a view of the moral disability of man.” Well, it is a jury question; but, inspiration apart, I had rather take the testimony of St. Paul on this question than that of a morally commonplace, self-complacent person like the Pharisee of our Lord’s parable. It is a fact that the noblest men in all ages have accepted his verdict, and this consensus of those most capable of judging must be held to settle the matter.

Granting the matter of fact to be as asserted, \textit{viz.}, that there is in the flesh a bias towards evil, what is its cause?

\footnote{\textit{VOL. VIII.}}
Is the bias inherent in the flesh, inseparable from the nature of a material organism, or is it a vice which has been accidentally introduced into it, say, by the sin of Adam? On this speculative problem St. Paul has nowhere in his epistles pronounced a definite opinion. He declares the fact of an antagonism between flesh and spirit, but he gives no account of its origin. It may indeed seem possible to arrive at a solution of the problem which may reasonably be held to be Pauline by combining the statement in the Adam-Christ section with that of the section concerning the flesh, and drawing the inference that human nature, and in particular the bodily organism, underwent a change for the worse in consequence of the sin of the first man. This is the church doctrine of original sin. A question has been raised as to the legitimacy of the combination on which this doctrine rests.¹ This question very naturally leads up to another: does the combination go to the root of the matter? From the sin of the first man came the corruption of human nature, but whence came his sin? Was his flesh entirely free from evil bias, morally neutral, and containing no elements of danger to the spirit? Or had it too that in it—desire, passion—which might very readily tempt to transgression? If the Pauline literature contains any hints of an answer to this question, they are to be found in the terms in which in 1 Corinthians xv. the first man is described as in contrast to the second, only a living soul, psychical as distinct from spiritual, and of the

¹In the first edition of Der Paulinismus Pfleiderer pronounced the combination inadmissible, and maintained that Paul gives two wholly different accounts of the origin of moral evil in Rom. v. and vii., that in the latter chapter being that sin has its origin in a flesh conceived to be inherently evil. Vide p. 62. In the second edition he regards it as possible that the Augustinian theory that the sinful bias of the flesh originated in Adam's fall was held by Paul, but thinks it more likely that he accepted the view of the Jewish schools, viz., that the evil bias was there from the first, and was only provoked and increased through the temptation to sin. Vide p. 71; and for the Jewish view, Weber, §§ 46, 48.
These expressions seem to point in the direction of a nature not very different from our own, and altogether suggest an idea of the primitive state of man not quite answering to the theological conception of original righteousness. The same remark applies to the account of that state in the book of Genesis, wherein the first man appears in such a condition of unstable moral equilibrium as to fall before the slightest temptation, more like an innocent inexperienced child than a full-grown man, Godlike in "righteousness and true holiness." Should a revision of the church's doctrine concerning the initial moral condition of man be necessitated by the progress of modern science, it may be found that it is not the sacred historian or the Christian apostle that is at fault, but the dogmatically-biassed exegesis of the system builders.

4. The last particular in the Pauline doctrine of sin is the statement concerning the effect of the law's action on the sinful proclivity of the flesh. On this point the apostle teaches that in consequence of the evil bias of the flesh the law, so far from being the way to righteousness, is rather simply a source of the knowledge of sin and an irritant to sin. The topic is handled chiefly in Romans vii. It is introduced at verse 7 by the question: "What shall we say, then? Is the law sin? God forbid"; which is followed up by the explanatory statement that the law, though not sin, is the source of the knowledge of sin. This is explained in turn by the doctrine of the sinful bias of the flesh in consequence of which it comes to pass that the law in commanding the good, as it always does, being itself holy, simply comes into collision with contrary inclination.

1 Cor. xv. 46, 47.

F. W. Robertson says that popular ideas of the paradise state are without the warrant of one syllable of Scripture. Vide Lectures on the Epistles to the Corinthians in loco 1 Cor. xv. 46, 47. Godet also on the same text remarks that Paul does not share the traditional orthodox idea of the primitive state as one of moral and physical perfection.
and so awakes the consciousness of a law in the members warring against the law in the mind. So by the law I simply know myself to be a sinner, to be morally impotent, to be a slave. To make one righteous is because of the flesh impossible for the law, a truth which the apostle states very forcibly in Romans viii. 3, where he represents the fulfilment of the righteousness of the law in men as the impossible for the law in consequence of its weakness by reason of the flesh. Such being the fact, made known to him by bitter experience, he argued that the law could never have been intended to make men righteous. It could not have been instituted to accomplish the impossible. It must have been instituted with reference to an ulterior system which should be able to realise the legally impossible; a means to an end destined to be superseded when it had served its ancillary purpose; a preparation for the advent of God's Son, who, coming in the likeness of sinful flesh, and with reference to sin, should condemn sin in the flesh, and help believers in Him to be indeed sons of God, walking not after the flesh but after the Spirit. We have seen with what fertile ingenuity the apostle describes the preparatory function of the law in the Epistle to the Galatians, and we shall have a future opportunity of considering his whole doctrine as to the legal economy from an apologetic point of view. Meantime what we have to note is the sombre aspect under which that doctrine presents the sinfulness of man. Human sinfulness is such as to make the question not an impertinence whether the very law of God which reveals it and provokes it into activity be not itself sinful. Yet there is a bright side to the picture. The law does more than bring to consciousness human depravity. In doing that it at the same time makes man aware that there is more in him than sin: a mind in sympathy with the moral ideal embodied in the law, an inner man in a state of protest against the deeds of the
outer man. The action of the law on the flesh on the one hand and on the conscience on the other makes me feel that I am two, not one, and this duality is at once my misery and my hope: my misery, for it is wretched to be drawn two ways; my hope, for I ever feel that my flesh and my sin though mine are not myself. This feeling all may share. On the bright hopeful side as well as on the darker St. Paul is the spokesman for the race. His \( \tau\alpha\lambda\alpha\iota\pi\sigma\rho\alpha\rho\sigma\ \dot{\varepsilon}\gamma\omega\ \dot{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\tau\sigma\varsigma \) voices not only the universal need but the universal desire for redemption. It is the \( \textit{de profundis} \) of sin-oppressed humanity. The apostle's doctrine of sin is not flattering, but neither is it indiscriminate. It is not a doctrine of total unrelieved depravity. It recognises a good element in average human nature. As described that element appears weak and ineffectual. But the important thing to note is that it is there.

A. B. Bruce.

\textit{ABELARD'S DOCTRINE OF THE ATONEMENT:}

\textit{A UNIVERSITY SERMON.}

"Even as the Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give his life a ransom for many."—\textit{Matthew} xx. 28.

Among all the passages of the New Testament in which our Lord is said to have died \textit{for} men, this is the only one in which the preposition \textit{about} is employed.\textsuperscript{1} The usual preposition is \( \dot{\upsilon}\tau\varepsilon\rho \); and, where that is the case, I need hardly say that the attempt to read into the text the meaning "instead of," "as a substitute for," or the like, is wholly gratuitous. To suffer death, vicariously as a substitute for others would no doubt be to suffer \( \dot{\upsilon}\tau\varepsilon\rho\),\textsuperscript{2} on behalf of, for

\textsuperscript{1} With the parallel, Mark x. 45. It is possible that Luke xxii. 27 may be nearer to the original form of our Lord's saying. But even if a touch of theological reflection has been imparted to this record of our Lord's words, the tradition is clearly a very ancient one.

\textsuperscript{2} Cf. the late Prof. Evans' note on \( \dot{\upsilon}\tau\varepsilon\rho \) in the \textit{Speaker's Commentary, N.T.}, vol. iii. p. 371.