

EXEGETICAL NOTES ON THE EPISTLE OF  
ST. JAMES.

ST. JAMES ii. 1. *μὴ ἐν προσωπολημψίαις ἔχετε τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης.* This is translated in R.V., "Hold not the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, *the Lord* of glory, with respect of persons"; but the margin follows Westcott and Hort in making it a question, "Do ye, in accepting persons, hold the faith?" etc. The interrogative rendering is also preferred by Stier, Schneckenburger, Kern, Gebser, Pott, and other commentators. I think it is simpler and more natural to take *ἔχετε* as imperative, especially as it is the commencement of a new section of the epistle, and it is the manner of the writer to begin by putting each topic forward clearly and explicitly, and afterwards to enforce and illustrate it in a variety of forms. It certainly cannot be said that, taken interrogatively, the sentence gives a clear, unmistakable meaning. At first sight it would seem to suggest that those addressed are not guilty of respect of persons. And the following *γάρ*, which, if we take *ἔχετε* as imperative, gives a reason for the warning against respect of persons, because it is shown by an example to involve worldly-mindedness and unrighteous judgment, is hard to explain if we take *ἔχετε* as a question.

The chief difficulty however of the verse lies in the construction of the genitive *τῆς δόξης*, which has been variously interpreted as having an objective, a subjective, or a qualitative force, and been connected in turn by different commentators with every substantive in the sentence: with *προσωπολημψίαις* (1) by Erasmus, Calvin, Heisen, Michaelis; with *πίστιν* (2) by the Peshitto, Grotius, Cornelius à Lapide, Hammond, and Hofmann; with the whole or a portion of the phrase *τοῦ Κυρίου . . . Χριστοῦ* (3) by the majority of commentators.

1. Erasmus translates, "Cum partium studio quo ex

sua quisque opinione quemlibet æstimat"; Calvin, "Ne in acceptionibus personarum fidem habeatis . . . ex opinione," which he explains, "Nam dum opum vel honorum opinio nostros oculos perstringit, veritas supprimitur." Both interpretations would make δόξης a subjective genitive, denoting the cause or source of *προσωποληψία*. Michaelis, on the other hand, gives it an objective force, translating, "Admiratio hominum secundum externum splendorem"; and much in the same way, Heisen. It is now generally recognised that the order of the words renders this explanation of the construction impossible.

2. The Peshitto, followed by Grotius, Hammond, Hofmann, etc., translates "faith of (in) the glory of Christ" (objective genitive). Huther, "Christ-given faith in the glory to be revealed"; Getcker, followed by Hottoman, "the glorious faith in Christ" (qualitative genitive). Though the interval between the two words πίστιν and δόξης in my opinion entirely precludes any qualitative connexion, it is perhaps not so decisive against Grotius' interpretation. To a certain extent we may find a parallel in i. 2: τὸ δοκίμιον ὑμῶν τῆς πίστεως, "the proof of your faith," is not unlike τὴν πίστιν . . . Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τῆς δόξης, "the faith in Christ's glory"; but of course the harshness becomes greater with every additional word which separates them, and with the greater importance of those words.

3. It remains to consider the interpretations which make τῆς δόξης depend upon the whole, or a part of, the phrase preceding. These may be classified as follows: (a) δόξης depending on Χριστοῦ only; (b) depending on Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ; (c) on τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν; (d) on τοῦ Κυρίου understood; (e) on the whole phrase τ. Κ. ἡ. Ι. Χ.

(a) "The Messiah of glory": so Laurentius, Schulthess, Lange, Bouman. The objection to this is, that it is impossible thus to separate Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, and that in any case it would require the article before Χριστοῦ.

(b) So Ewald: "Den Glauben unsers Herrn, Jesus Christus der Herrlichkeit." This seems to make an arbitrary division of the words, and is also liable to the same objections as (e). Moreover, do we ever find a proper name used with the genitive of quality?

(c) "Our Lord of glory, Jesus Christ." So Schneckenburger, De Wette, Wiesinger. If this were the writer's meaning, why did he not place the words τῆς δόξης after ἡμῶν?

(d) "Our Lord Jesus Christ (the Lord) of glory." So Baumgarten, Senler, and others; but it is without parallel, and is not supported by any of the later commentators.

(e) "Of our glorious Lord Jesus Christ." So Kern, Alford, Beyschlag, Erdmann, Schegg, and the great majority of modern commentators. We may allow that St. James makes frequent use of the genitive of quality, as in i. 25: ἀκροατῆς ἐπιλησμονῆς; ii. 4, κραταὶ διαλογισμῶν πονηρῶν, etc.: but it is very improbable that such a genitive would be appended to a phrase which is already complete in itself; and we may safely say, that no one would have thought of such a construction for this passage, if the other suggested interpretations had not involved equal or even greater harshness.

There is however a perfectly natural and easy construction, suggested by Bengel, which has been set aside by later commentators on what seem to me very inadequate grounds. His note is: "τῆς δόξης; est appositio, ut ipse Christus dicatur ἡ δόξα . . . Christus gloria; hinc fideles gloriosi. Hanc fidelium gloriam nullus mundi honos æquat, nemo personarum acceptor agnoscit." The objection made to it is, that the abstract term δόξα, by itself, is too indefinite to bear this weight of meaning. But other abstractions are used of Christ. He calls Himself the Truth, the Life; He is called the Word, why not the Glory? If we had before us such a sentence as μὴ ἔχετε ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ τὴν πίστιν τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ,

τοῦ λόγου, we should have no scruple in translating it, "Do not hold in folly the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the Word," any more than we have in translating 1 Timothy i. 1, *κατ' ἐπιταγὴν Κυρίου Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ τῆς ἐλπίδος ἡμῶν*, "According to the command of Christ Jesus, who is our hope." Why should we object to the similar translation here, "the faith of our Lord Jesus Christ, who is the glory"? The only question is, whether the abstract *δόξα* is thus used of a person. Bengel cited Luke ii. 32, *τὸ σωτήριον, ὃ ἠτοίμασας . . . δόξαν λαοῦ σου Ἰσραὴλ*; Ephesians i. 17, *ὁ Θεὸς τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὁ Πατὴρ τῆς δόξης*; 1 Peter iv. 14, *εἰ ὀνειδίξεσθε ἐν ὀνόματι Χριστοῦ, μακάριοι, ὅτι τὸ τῆς δόξης καὶ τὸ τοῦ Θεοῦ Πνεῦμα ἐφ' ὑμᾶς ἀναπαύεται* (where he takes *δόξης* as an appellation of Christ). Perhaps more striking parallels are 2 Peter i. 17, *φωνῆς ἐνεχθείσης τοιαύτης ὑπὸ τῆς μεγαλοπρεποῦς δόξης* ("The words seem a periphrasis for God Himself," *Alford*); Colossians i. 27, *τί τὸ πλοῦτος τῆς δόξης τοῦ μυστηρίου τούτου, ὃ ἐστὶν Χριστὸς ἐν ἡμῖν, ἡ ἐλπίς τῆς δόξης*; Romans ix. 4, where it stands for the Shechinah; John xvii. 22, *ἐγὼ τὴν δόξαν ἣν δέδωκάς μοι δέδωκα αὐτοῖς*; *ibid.* i. 14, *ἔθεασάμεθα τὴν δόξαν αὐτοῦ, δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ Πατρός*, of which Westcott says, p. xlvi, "Christ the Light of the world is seen by the believer to be the manifested glory of God." Similarly *μεγαλωσύνη* is used Hebrews i. 3, and *δύναμις*, Matthew xxvi. 64. We may suppose that the reason why the word *δόξα* stands here alone, without *ἡμῶν* or *τοῦ Πατρός*, is in order that it may be understood in its fullest and widest sense of Him who alone comprises all glory in Himself.

According to the view which I have taken of the verse which has just been discussed, we must no longer cite *δόξης* as an instance of the genitive of quality. There are however two other verses in which I am inclined to give this force to genitives, which have been differently understood

by the commentators. These are i. 17, *παρ' ᾧ οὐκ ἐνὶ παραλλαγῇ ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα*; and iii. 6, *καὶ ἡ γλῶσσα πῦρ, ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας ἢ γλῶσσα καθίσταται ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν ἡμῶν*. The former is thus given in R. V., "With whom can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning," making *τροπῆς* a subjective genitive. The old way of taking it, which we find in the Greek commentators and lexicographers, was to give to *ἀποσκίασμα* the meaning of "trace," "hint of," "approach to," implied by the A. V. "shadow of turning," old Latin *modicum obumbrationis*. The simple noun *σκιά* is often used in this way, as in Dem. *Mid.*, p. 552: *ἀρ' ἂν, εἴγ' εἶχε στιγμὴν ἢ σκιὰν τούτων ὧν κατεσκευάζε κατ' ἐμοῦ, ταῦτ' ἂν εἴσεν*; and in Philo, *Mut. Nom.*, p. i., 606 M.: *πεπιστευκῶς ἔχρος ἢ σκιὰν ἢ ὄραν ἀπιστίας δέχεται τὸ παράπαν*; but it is impossible that the extremely rare compound *ἀποσκίασμα* could have acquired any such colloquial force. It was however so understood by Wolf, Morus, Rosenmüller, Hensler, and even by Ewald. Grotius supposed the words *παραλλαγή* and *τροπῆς* to be used in a technical astronomical sense; but Gebser showed that *παραλλαγή* never had any other than the general sense "variation," even in the writings of the astronomers, and the special meaning of *τροπή* in reference to the sun's solstices is evidently inapplicable. The majority of commentators understand it of the apparent revolution of the sun, and give to the genitive a subjective force, "a shadow caused by the movement of the sun, or other heavenly body." So Gebser, "Der aus der Sonnenwende entstehende schattung"; Beyschlag, "Das Beschattetwerden des Gestirns das durch die wechselnde stellung derselben bewirkt wird"; Erdmann, "Er redet nach der beim Anblick der Gestirne sich aufdrängenden Wahrnehmung der Veränderung, die sich in ihrer Bewegung zeigt, und der Beschattung derselben wie sie erfahrungsmässig durch den Wechsel in ihrer Stellung verursacht wird." The actual

phenomena referred to will then be the alteration of position and the varying colour or brightness of the sun, moon, etc., and the overshadowing of a portion or of the whole of their disk, as in an eclipse. But what a very singular way of describing the latter to say that it is an overshadowing which comes from turning or change of position! "Overshadowing of one another," ἀλλήλων ἀποσκίασμα, would be what we should have expected. Accordingly De Wette (Brückner) and Schneckenburger have rightly felt that τροπή must be taken here in another and far more usual sense, that of "change" in general, since, as the former says, "schwierig ist damit (*i.e.* with the idea of revolution) ἀποσκίασμα in Verbindung zu bringen." Schneckenburger refers to Philo's frequent use of τροπή in order to contrast the mutability of nature with the immutability of God, as in *Alleg.* ii. 9, p. 72 M, πᾶν τὸ γεννητὸν ἀναγκαῖον τρέπεσθαι· ἴδιον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο αὐτοῦ, ὥσπερ θεοῦ τὸ ἀτρέπτον εἶναι; and just above, ἀντιφιλονεικεῖ μοι ἡ τροπή, καὶ πολλάκις βουλόμενος καθήκον τι νοῆσαι ἐπαντλοῦμαι ταῖς παρὰ τὸ καθήκον ἐπιρροίαις; and translates, *obumbratio quæ oritur ex inconstantia naturæ*. I should prefer to interpret as Stolz does after Luther, "Keine abwechselnde Verdunkelung." Beyschlag thinks this would require τροπή ἀποσκιάσματος; but why may not "overshadowing of change" serve to express "changing shadow," just as well as "a hearer of forgetfulness" to express "a forgetful hearer"?

I proceed to iii. 6, which is thus translated in the text of the R.V.: "And the tongue is a fire: the world of iniquity among our members is the tongue, which defileth the whole body," etc. In the margin we have two other interpretations: (1) "The tongue is a fire, that world of iniquity: the tongue is among our members that which," etc.; (2) "The tongue is a fire: that world of iniquity, the tongue, is among our members," etc.

I do not propose to consider any other difficulties of this passage except those connected with the words *ὁ κόσμος τῆς ἀδικίας ἢ γλώσσα καθίσταται*, and I shall follow the punctuation in the text of the R.V. Isidore of Pelusium (fl. 400 A.D.), followed by the Greek commentators, mentions two meanings of the word *κόσμος*. (1) "ornament," *ἐγκαλλώπισμα δοκεῖ τῆς ἀδικίας*, because the tongue *κοσμεῖ τὴν ἀδικίαν διὰ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων εὐγλώττου δεινότητος*: so Wetstein, Semler, Storr, Ewald, and others; (2) "the wicked world": at least this seems to be intended by the somewhat obscure expressions, *πῦρ ἐστὶ, πλήθος ἀδικῶς κατακαίουσα*, and *κόσμος ἐστὶ τῆς ἀδικίας, οἰονεὶ πρὸς τὸν συρφετώδη ὄχλον καὶ δημῶδη ἐκφερομένη καὶ βλέπουσα*, with which apparently should be connected the sentence just below, *ταυτῆ γάρ ἀλλήλοις κοινωνοῦμεν τῶν ἑαυτῶν νοημάτων*. The majority however of modern commentators follow the Vulgate, "*universitas iniquitatis*" (3); thus explained by Bede, "*Quia cuncta fere facinora per eam aut concinnantur . . . aut patrantur . . . aut defenduntur.*" So Erasmus, Calvin, Corn. à Lapide, Schneckenburger, Kern, De Wette, Wiesinger, Alford, Beyschlag, Erdmann. The objection to (3) is, that St. James elsewhere only uses the word *κόσμος* in a bad sense (i. 27, *ἄσπιλον ἑαυτὸν τηρεῖν τοῦ κόσμου*, ii. 5, iv. 4, *ἡ φιλία τοῦ κόσμου ἔχθρα τοῦ Θεοῦ ἐστίν*); that only one example in all Greek literature is adduced for the meaning "totality," *viz.* Proverbs xvii. 6, *τοῦ πιστοῦ ὄλος ὁ κόσμος τῶν χρημάτων, τοῦ δὲ ἀπίστου οὐδὲ ὀβολός*, if indeed this should not be rather understood more literally, of the inanimate world, as consisting of things which can be used and enjoyed. Lastly, the article seems scarcely consistent with this interpretation. "A world of cares" is a natural expression for many cares; but if we say "the world of care," we are understood to predicate something about the world itself. Schegg's interpretation, "the sphere or domain of iniquity," is, I think, an improvement on (3) as far as sense

goes, but it is not the natural meaning of *κόσμος*. The objections stated above are also applicable in part to (1). It is moreover a very harsh expression to call the tongue "the ornament of injustice" because it is capable of being used to give a colour to injustice; and it falls flatly after the stronger word "fire." Putting aside the commentators, if we read the words simply, we can hardly fail to be reminded of the similar expressions in Luke xvi. 8, 9, *τὸν οἰκονόμον τῆς ἀδικίας, τοῦ μαμωνᾶ τῆς ἀδικίας*, where *τῆς ἀδικίας* is qualitative, as is shown by the parallel expression in ver. 11, *τῷ ἀδίκῳ μαμωνᾷ*. The meaning of the phrase will then be, "in our microcosm the tongue represents or constitutes the world." In the same way it might be said, *ἡ ἐπιθυμία τῆς σαρκὸς ὁ γαστήρ καθίσταται ἐν τοῖς μέλεσιν*. The tongue represents the world, because it is that member by which we are brought into communication with other men; it is the organ of society, the chief channel of temptation from man to man. Here it is described as *ἡ σπίλουσα τὸ σῶμα*, but in i. 27 this is said to be the effect of the world; true religion is shown by keeping oneself *ἄσπιλον ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου*. Olshausen, Stier, and Lange give this meaning to the passage, and I think it is hinted at by the Greek commentators. One word on *καθίσταται*, which really means "is set," "is constituted."<sup>1</sup> It is opposed to *ὑπάρχω*, because it implies a sort of adaptation or development as contrasted with the natural or original state; to *γίνομαι*, because it implies something of fixity. So in iv. 4, *ὃς ἐὰν βουληθῆ φίλος εἶναι τοῦ κόσμου, ἐχθρὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ καθίσταται*, "Whoever will be a friend of the world thereby becomes (is constituted) an enemy of God."

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<sup>1</sup> That it is passive and not middle may be inferred from the fact that out of the twenty-two instances in Bruder, while sixteen belong to the active voice and two are 1st aor. pass., there are only four examples of the ambiguous form *καθίσταται*, two of which are those cited above from this epistle, and the other two Heb. v. 1, viii. 3) are undoubtedly passive.