

large measure at all events, in the right: but it is a very great thing that any candid and intelligent man who will patiently study the English New Testament for himself may now find in it a God whom he can honour and love as the very Incarnation and Ideal of all justice and all charity; a God who will by no means spare the guilty indeed, but who will punish them justly and not unjustly, and who will at the same time temper judgment with mercy, nay, cause mercy to rejoice over judgment.

If the New Version had no other claim upon us, it has this supreme claim; that, with all its defects, it brings us, on all grave doctrinal questions, nearer to "the mind of the Spirit."

S. Cox.

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SOME CRITICISMS ON THE TRANSLATION OF  
THE REVISED VERSION.

THE more closely we look into the Revised Version, the more apparent is the lack, in numerous instances, of fine scholarship. Certainly, no fixed principles seem to have guided the learned translators in their dealings with ὄσπε, as was shewn in the first Article. The three Participial Tenses also have bitterly complained, apparently with justice, of unworkmanlike treatment. This was discussed in Article II., wherein a certain law or rule was formulated, bearing upon the distinct uses of the three participial tenses. It may now be added that this law, which I then framed, I have tested for many years; and (unless I am mistaken) have verified it by instances so numerous, that it seems to be a *rule* with few exceptions. It was shewn in that Article that, if the rule therein formulated be

correct, some grave errors have been committed in constructions of participial tenses with verbs of *seeing*; errors always impairing, sometimes destroying, the true idea which the Greek writer intended to place before the reader. It is to be regretted that a similar inattention to close scholarship appears now and then in the method of dealing with other verbs of perception in the like construction. It is true that in the text 2 Peter i. 18, τὴν φωνὴν ἠκούσαμεν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ ἐνεχθείσαν the learned Revisers have duly respected the participial aorist in the rendering "this voice we heard *come* out of heaven:" where the variant in the margin for *come* is *brought*: this alternative rendering also is good as being aoristic: nevertheless, it seems to me that better than either *come* or *brought* would have been "*borne* out of heaven." But if the *aorist* was here recognised in ἐνεχθείσης, why was the *imperfect* ignored in λαλοῦντος, John i. 37? Why was ἠκουσαν αὐτοῦ λαλοῦντος rendered, just as if λαλοῦντος were identical with λέξαντος or εἰπόντος, "they heard him *speak*?" Surely the rendering "they heard him speaking" or "talking," or "they heard him as he spake" or "talked," would have been not only more correct in itself, but probably more in keeping with the context. For the preceding context presents to us a picture of John *standing still* and of Jesus *walking about*. The Baptist, we read, εἰστήκει—"was standing;" the coming Teacher, as was the way with the teachers of those days, περιεπάτει—"was pacing about." As the latter slowly paced to and fro, the former would more than once utter in tones audible to the bystanders "Behold the Lamb of God!" But be this as it may, it would have been better and more true to the Greek to recognise the imperfect in λαλοῦντος by some such rendering as "heard him talking" or "heard him as he spake." Out of very many parallel passages in Greek tending to verify the above propounded theory of participial tenses constructed with verbs of *seeing*

and of *hearing* let two suffice as samples. Cassandra says (Agamemnon 1258),

εἶδον Ἰλίου πόλιν  
πράξασαν ὡς ἔπραξεν,

*i.e.* "I saw Ilium's city *fare* as it did *fare*," "treated in what way it was treated," from first to last. Again in *Œdipus Colon.* 1645 we find

τοσαῦτα φωνήσαντος εἰς ἠκούσαμεν,

"all this we heard him *speak* aloud."

We now proceed to discuss the treatment of *ἵνα* in the Revised Version. Upon the uses of *ἵνα* much has been written, but little hitherto that presents a distinct view of them. *Grimm* has done good service in classifying parallel texts, but he does not seem to have evolved any clear theory. *Winer's* views on this particle are perplexing in the extreme, a labyrinth without a clue. The inexorable *Meyer* clings with a strange pertinacity to the *telic* or *final* use of *ἵνα*: to this one use he makes all contexts bend alike. Nevertheless *Meyer's* scrupulous and rigorous scholarship seems to have found *large* favour with some eminent commentators among ourselves. For instance, *Alford* and *Ellicott* have drafted into their notes much of what he has written about *ἵνα*. No doubt, *Meyer* has made a mark on English exegesis. He seems to have bewitched some of our ablest expositors. Who can tell how far the learned Revisers themselves may have been *bemeyered*? Was it his potent spell of the *telic* use that charmed them away from their better judgment, when they changed "*should* fall" into "*might* fall" (Rom. xi. 11)? or when they changed "be" into "*may* be" (1 Cor. vii. 29)? or "that they be with me" into "that they *may* be with me" (John xvii. 24)? or when they failed to change "that I *may*" into "that I *should*" (1 Cor. ix. 18)? But no wonder if they were now and then beguiled; for *ἵνα* is a difficult particle. And yet

if we glance through all that Grimm and Winer and Meyer and some others have written about it, we shall find that what is difficult in itself has been made more difficult still by a lack of simplicity in their method of analysis. The above named scholars, whenever they meditated upon the particle in question, seemed utterly unable to get out of their heads the haunting notion, that the idea of *design* or *purpose* is an inalienable attribute of *iva*; that, be the surroundings what they may, let the context frown or protest never so much, nevertheless some little measure of purpose, an ounce of intent, or a dram of design is a necessary ingredient in the composition of *iva*'s use.

From this rooted opinion, coming often into contact with a context that contradicted it flat, was engendered that hybrid curiosity in modern scholarship, that veritable minotaur of philology, which is called sometimes "a combination of *purpose* and *consequence*," and sometimes "a combination of *purpose* and *purport*." In these two appellations, frequently used, it is evident that the idea of *purpose* is a constant quantity, that it belongs to the fixed opinion about *iva*'s essential sense or use; while the ideas of *consequence* and of *purport* as clearly belong to the contexts which may happen to surround *iva*. Alford seems to have felt this strongly when he wrote on 1 Corinthians xiv. 13 "the idea of *purpose* is inseparably bound up with this particle, and can be traced wherever it is used." He then goes on to say that in the phrase *to pray that* "the *purport* and *purpose* become compounded in the expression." To shew further how stereotyped in thoughtful minds this opinion is, or was some years ago, I well remember once asking a distinguished scholar "How do you explain the *iva* in the text 'command *that* these stones be made bread'" (Matt. iv. 3)? He answered me promptly and without a moment's hesitation, "Simple enough the principle: it is a combination of two ideas—thus, Command

these stones to become loaves in order that they may become so." This explanation, not being simple, was not convincing; for it is obvious that grammatical duplicity is as unsatisfactory in its way as moral duplicity is. The truth is, language is simple: one idea is quite enough for one clause to carry at a time, whether it be an *iva* clause or any other. If therefore we would try and solve the riddle of *iva*, we must first clear the course by removing the obstacle that has so long beset the path, even by exterminating this modern monster of two heads, this double-walking amphisbæna which guards the approach, I mean the so-called combination of two ideas in one clause, the combination whether of purpose and result or of purpose and purport. But, this obstruction being swept away, it is not easy to propound a lucid theory, that shall explain all the difficulties. Nevertheless I venture to lay before the reader one that was formulated by me some twenty years ago; one that I have found useful, and in most instances satisfactory to myself. It is a theory that receives support from its being flexible alike to *iva* in Greek, and to *ut* in Latin, and to *that* in English.

There are, it appears, three uses of *iva*: the first may be called the *definitive* use, when *iva* ushers in a clause simply explanatory of something, whether that something be the subject of the verb, as in English *It is a pity that he should go so soon*, or the object of the verb as in the clause *I advise that he go at once*. The second use is the well-known *telic* or *final* use, the admiration of Meyer, implying intention or design or purpose, as in English, "I will order the carriage *that we may start*." But besides these two uses, the *definitive* and the *final* or *telic*, which are not difficult, there is a third, which is difficult. I have accustomed myself to call it, for lack of a better term, the *subjectively ecclastic* use, or the use of *contemplated result*: in which the *iva* clause denotes a result not *actual* (this is the province of an ὄσπε

clause with the *indicative* mood), but contemplated or viewed by some person or other as an effect possible or probable or reasonable. One instance of this use in English is, "Have they stumbled *that* they *should* fall?" (Rom. xi. 11) where the Greek *ἵνα πέσωσιν* is admirably rendered in the Vulgate *sic ut caderent*, less admirably rendered "that they *might* fall" by the learned Revisers, who in this instance preferred the *telic* to the *ecbatic*, and the view of Meyer and Alford to that of Origen and Chrysostom.

But if we would be clear upon this point, we must first banish clean from our thoughts this modern theory of "purpose and purport," or two distinct ideas embodied in one clause; and in order that we may destroy and decapitate this irrepressible double-headed monster, *ἵνα τήνδ' ἀμφίκρανον καὶ παλιμβλαστῆ κύνα πρόριζον ἐκτρίψωμεν* as Euripides would say, it is necessary that we discharge many missiles—*ἵνα πολλὰ τοξέσωμεν*. These missiles will be passages illustrating the *definitive* use of *that* or *ut* or *ἵνα*, the definitive use pure and simple, without any admixture or alloy of *intent* or *design*. First we will quote a few passages in English, where the *that* clause simply defines the subject to the verb.

*It is impossible that I should die.*

*It seems to me most strange that men should fear.*

And 'tis great pity *that* the noble Moor

*Should hazard* such a place.

Is *it* meet *that* we *should* be an ass?

The above lines from Shakespeare may be matched by such texts as "*It is expedient for you that* 'one man *should die* for the people;" or (with the *should* omitted), "*It is expedient for you that* I go away" (*συμφέρει ἵνα ἀπέλθω*). What is expedient? *It is expedient*. What does *it* mean? The explanation of *it* is a thought or idea or proposition contained in the *definitive clause* "*that* I go away," or

“that one should die for the people.” In other words “it,” namely, “that I go away” or “that one should die for the people,” is the subject of the sentence, of which “expedient” is the predicate. So in Latin: Proximum est *ut doceam*, “the next step is that I teach,” or “should teach;” where *ut doceam* simply defines the subject in a sentence in which *proximum* is the predicate. Again, Cicero has *Accidit ut in urbe essem*. Twins apparently in construction, are *Mos est hominum ut nolint eundem pluribus rebus excellere* (Cic. Brut., 21), and *ἔστιν συνήθεια ὑμῶν ἵνα ἀπολύσω* (John xviii. 39), well rendered in both the Versions, “Ye have a custom that I *should* release,” not “that I release,” but “that I *should* release”; and yet the two passages above cited are not twins really, but really dissimilar; for *ut nolint* is a *definitive* clause, and *ἵνα ἀπολύσω* a *subjectively ecbatic*, for the meaning clearly is, “There is a custom among you (requiring) that I should release”; albeit in the very next sentence, “Will ye therefore that I release,” curiously enough the same *ἵνα ἀπολύσω* is a *definitive* clause. But we may rightly compare, “Whence is *this* that the mother of my Lord *should* come unto me,” where “whence” is the predicate (*τοῦτο ἵνα ἔλθῃ*, Luke i. 43) with Horace’s

Omnibus *hoc* vitium est cantoribus, inter amicos  
*Ut* nunquam *inducant* animum cantare rogati;

where the demonstratives *this* and *τοῦτο* and *hoc* are simply defined by the clauses ushered in by *that* and *ἵνα* and *ut*. It may be noted that in John iv. 34, “My meat is *to do* the will of him that sent me,” the construction is, “that I should do the will” (*ἵνα ποιήσω*) defines the subject, and “my meat” (*ἐμὸν βρῶμα*) is the predicate.

Furthermore, it should be well noted that the particles *ἵνα* and *ut* and *that*, are used to usher in clauses that define the *object* of the verb, as well as the subject of the verb.

After verbs of *willing, commanding, praying, desiring, exhorting, asking, expecting*, the object clause appears to be (with few exceptions) purely definitive, without any alloy or admixture of intent or design or purpose. In Shakespeare we find,—

All do *expect that* you *should* rouse yourself.

Admonishing,

*That* we *should* dress us fairly for our end.

He *wills that* you *divest* yourself.

Go *bid* thy mistress when my drink is ready

She *strike* upon the bell.

In this last cited passage, if any one supposes the construction to be “bid thy mistress to strike upon the bell, that she *may* strike thereupon,” let him also suppose the construction of Matthew iv. 3 to be, “command these stones to become bread, that they *may* become such.” At all events, this double dealing theory will hardly fit the following line from Henry V., Act 4, Sc. 1,—

I do not *desire* he *should* answer for me.

A thousand modern instances of this use might be quoted: let one suffice: “I had no *desire that* the contents of that telegram *should be* communicated to M. Le Fevre” (*St. James's Gazette*, March 29, 1882).

How often in Latin also does an objective *ut* clause define and specify the contents of the verb's general idea. For example, *suadeam tibi ut hoc agas*, sine te *exorem ut adsis*, *velitis jubeatis* Quirites *uti* prætor rem ad senatum *referat*. And precisely as is the construction of an objective definitive *that* clause in English, and of a similar *ut* clause in Latin, such is the construction of a like *iva* clause in Greek; not only in Hellenistic, but in *Attic* Greek also, albeit this last statement is questioned or denied by Winer and Meyer and others. It is true that in these instances from classical Greek the *iva* is generally omitted,

just as *that* is omitted in the passage of Macbeth, "Go bid thy mistress (that) she strike upon the bell"; but the principle is in no wise affected thereby. Let two instances suffice: βούλει φράσω (Aristoph., Equit., 36) and θέλετε θηρασώμεθα (Eur., Bacchæ, 719).

The principle above formulated being true, it is not easy to see upon what grounds the learned Revisers in John xvii. 24 inserted *may* in their new rendering "I will that, where I am, they also *may* be with me." This *may*, which is significantly and properly omitted in the Authorised Version, is neither more nor less than an impertinent intrusion; after the words *I will that* it is precisely not wanted; for, in an alien construction, it is a word savouring of *intent*: its very presence banishes simplicity and encourages duplicity, making room for the reappearance of that monstrous construction, the combination of purport and purpose, namely "I wish them *to be* with me *that* they *may be* with me." Besides, what makes the false rendering more strange, is the fact that it contradicts the true renderings given by the Revisers themselves in numerous other texts, in which *to will that* occurs; for instance John xviii. 39, "*Will ye that I release* unto you?" not "that I *may release*" but that I *release*." Moreover this inaccuracy tends to create ambiguity and to breed confusion in the whole sentence, which now runs thus: "I will *that they may* be with me, *that they may* behold my glory": for who can tell from this sentence, as it is, whether the second *that they may* clause is or is not intended to be an added improvement or corrective explanation of the first *that they may* clause? On the other hand, nothing can be clearer than the meaning of the old rendering "I will that they be with me, that (being with me) they may behold my glory;" the first clause *that they be* being *definitive* and specifying the contents of the Lord's will, the second *that they may behold* being *final*

or *telic* and denoting the objective end of the specified contents.

Again this modern amphibæna seems to erect its double crest in the new rendering "Let us therefore give diligence to enter that rest, that no man fall" (Heb. iv. 11). This ambiguous rendering appears to postulate the following construction, "give diligence to enter into that rest—give diligence that no one fall;" for the omission of *may* before *fall* declares the *that* clause to be a definitive clause specifying the contents of the verb *give diligence*, and that too when the contents of this verb have already been specified in the words *to enter into that rest*. Probably this text in the Greek is a sentence in which the second clause contains the final cause of the first, and should be rendered "that no one may fall"; which indeed seems to be the meaning of the A. V. rendering "lest any man fall." It is a pity that in John viii. 56, "Abraham rejoiced to see my day" the obviously correct rendering *that he should see* was not transferred from the margin into the text: *to see* is a rendering not true to the true idea; for the phrase "I was delighted to see you" is very different in meaning to the phrase "I was delighted that I should see you," *i.e.* delighted at the idea or prospect of seeing you.

As the second use of *iva*, called the *telic* or *final*, is well known, we now proceed to the third, which I have termed the *subjectively ecbatic* use or use of *contemplated result*. This last, as compared with the other two, is difficult. The learned Revisers seem to have erred still more in the ecbatic than in the definitive, apparently drawn away from their finer judgment by the powerful magnet of the inexorable Meyer. The difficulty in this use lies mainly in the context of the *iva* clause. The character of the context determines the particular line of the subjectivity, and sometimes this particular line is not easy to trace;

even as it sometimes happens in the case of ὥστε with the infinitive; for example in ὥστε ἀκοῦσαι (Acts xix. 10), "And they continued for the space of two years, *for* all them which dwelt in Asia *to hear* the word," who can tell whether "for them to hear" was intended by the writer to mean "allowing them to hear" or "time enough for them to hear" or "with a view to their hearing"? Certainly the sacred historian never intended to state as a fact, what the Revised Version has made him state, namely "that *all they* which dwelt in Asia *heard* the word." And precisely as with ὥστε and the infinitive, so with ἵνα and its subjectively ecbatic use; the difficulty is to determine the direction of the subjectivity and its whereabouts, in *what mind* the conception resides; whether, for instance, the contemplated result is contemplated as such by one who is moving in the action or by others outside the action. This ambiguity may be removed to the reader by the translator supplying a link of connexion in the form of a brief phrase inserted between the context and the ἵνα clause; such a link as *a fact requiring* or *giving occasion* or *making it possible* or *desirable* or *reasonable* that. But in a rigorous translation like that of a Version such ellipses can hardly be inserted. To be sure, in the Latin Vulgate we find a clever instance of a curt *sic* inserted in Romans xi. 11, where ἵνα πέσωσι is lucidly rendered *sic ut caderent*, "that they should fall" or "in such wise as to fall."

The above rule, examples of which may be found (in spite of what Winer and Meyer and others have said) in classical Greek, may aid us in testing some dubious renderings in the Revised Version. The last cited text shall come first in order. The question here is whether the ἵνα πέσωσι comes under the *telic* use and means "in order that they might fall." If this view be correct, the idea of design or purpose must reside in some mind or

other. Does it reside in the mind of the Jew who stumbled? Clearly not: for as he did not stumble of choice, neither did he stumble on purpose that he might fall. Was then his future fall a final cause of his stumbling in the *divine mind*? Incredible; for how could St. Paul moot the idea of a divine purpose in one sentence, and pray for the thwarting of that purpose in the next? How could he append to such an idea, *God forbid* or *far be it*? We must therefore recall and reinstate the A. V. rendering "Did they stumble (so) that they should fall?" in other words, Did the Jew when he stumbled overhang the perpendicular so many degrees as to make it probable that he should finally fall flat? Let us rather believe that, arrested halfway and stereotyped aslant, he is to remain suspended between the vertical and the horizontal, say at an angle of 30 or 45 degrees, until in the lapse of centuries he regain his original upright position.

Neither is the rendering correct of *ὅνα μή τις εἴπη* (1 Cor. i. 15) "lest any man should say," *i.e.* if this English means "in order that no man may say." The modern interpretation of this text seems to be, "I am thankful to God who, in order to prevent any one from asserting that in my name ye had been baptized, designedly brought about the fact of my having baptized very few in Corinth." This view, held by many moderns, cannot be right; it is out of all keeping with the line of argument. The truth is, this Verse 15 is in a serious *reductio ad absurdum* argument intended to refute an inference drawn from an inference. This might be shewn at length, did space permit. It is quite clear from the preceding context that the whole paragraph means *I am thankful to God* for the fact that *no one did I baptize save Crispus and Gaius* (a fact requiring) *that no one should say that in my own name ye were baptized.*" The *ὅνα* or *that* here denotes, not purpose or design on the part of God, but a result contemplated as

necessary or possible by St. Paul. This is a clear instance of the *subjectively ecbatic* use of *ἵνα*. On the other hand, the Revised Version rendering "lest any man should say" seems to me an instance of the *telic* use, which precisely breaks the logic here. It may be remarked that in the rendering "so that no one should say" the *should* has much the sense of *must*; and this *must* serves well enough to render the subjunctive sometimes, e.g., in *τί εἶπω* "what must I say." If this be true, the Authorised Version rendering "how that he *must* suffer many things" (Mark ix. 12) might well have been allowed to remain. It may be asked, by the way, why in 1 Corinthians i. 15 was "any one" of the Authorised Version exchanged into "any man?" Surely "one" is truer to the Greek, and a term more comprehensive; who knows but St. Paul alluded to other creatures besides human?

Neither is the rendering correct "that ye *may* marvel" (John v. 20): for it is quite clear that "their marvelling" was not viewed as the final cause of the "greater works," but rather a contemplated result, the sense of the *ἵνα θαυμάσητε* being obviously, "enough to make you wonder," precisely the *ὥστε θαυμάσαι* of Attic Greek. Neither is the alteration an improvement but rather the reverse in 1 Corinthians i. 27, "God chose the foolish things *that* he *might* put to shame them that are wise" (rather feeble and verbose "them that are wise"; why not "wise men," or if "the" must be retained before "foolish things" "the wise men"?): for nothing can be clearer than this, that *ἵνα* here does not denote *design* on God's part in putting to shame the wise men, but a contemplated necessary and negative result of the design itself, which design was the selection of the fittest for the kingdom, and the fittest would be mostly found among such as were not pre-occupied by the world's wisdom. We must therefore recall and reinstate the Authorised Version's "to confound" or

rather "to put to shame," unless we substitute "so as to put to shame."

Neither in 1 Corinthians iv. 21, is the rendering to be admired of *τί θέλετε; ἐν ῥάβδῳ ἔλθω ἢ ἐν ἀγάπῃ*; "What will ye? shall I come with a rod or in love?" Manifestly a more correct translation would be "*Which* do ye choose? With a rod must I come or in love?" or "with a rod that I come:" where *ἵνα* must be supplied before *ἔλθω*, just as *that* must be before *she strike* in "Go bid thy mistress she strike upon the bell." Compare also Luke ix. 54, *θέλεις εἰπῶμεν* well rendered in the Revised Version "wilt thou that we bid." It is obvious that in 1 Corinthians iv. 21 *τί=πότερον*, just as in verse 7 of the same chapter *τίς=πότερος*, "which" of us two.

Neither is the strange rendering in 1 Corinthians vii. 29, "that henceforth *those* that have wives may be as though they had none," one that can stand the test. In the first place, why has the demonstrative *those* been allowed to displace the correct *they* of the Authorised Version? There is no *οὗτοι* in the Greek text. Why the final *may* has been permitted to usurp the seat of the consequential *should*, is easily explained; for it is clear that the learned Revisers have again preferred the *telic* use to the *ecbatic*, steering steadily in the wake of the indomitable Meyer and of other equally rigorous expositors. Nearly all recent commentators seem to see the "divine counsel" in this *ἵνα* clause, which in fact has nothing at all to do with the divine counsel—quite the other way—but simply denotes a natural result or effect of an antecedent cause, contemplated as such by St. Paul and intended by him to be contemplated as such by his Corinthian readers,—an *inference*, in fact, that may be fairly deduced from the *premiss* "the time is straitened." It matters little with which clause we take *τὸ λοιπόν*, which means "in what remains" or "in what is left"; for whether we take it with the

protatic clause and render "that *henceforth*," or with the apodotic and render "the time is straitened in what remains" of it, in neither case can *iva* possibly signify, as so many expositors insist, *in order that*, denoting (to quote from one of them) "the divine counsel in shortening the time." For is it probable that a state of sitting loose to worldly interests should be described as the aim or purpose of God in curtailing the season of the great tribulation? This might be a divine motive for the terrors and portents of the last time being lengthened, hardly for the last time itself being shortened. Again is it probable that St. Paul should assign such a motive for the curtailment, when evidently he is here giving merely *an opinion of his own*, not recording a divine inspiration? That he does state merely a view of his own, is clear from the first words of this text, "but this I affirm, brethren." No doubt in this clause *iva* has precisely the same use as in 1 Corinthians i. 15, and the ellipse or missing link to be supplied is "(a fact requiring) that": this ellipse (to take a leaf from the Latin Vulgate) may be condensed into *so*, and the sentence rendered "the time is straitened in what is left, so that they who have wives should be as men having none."

"Once more and yet once more" the *telic* is permitted to eclipse the *ecbatic* in 1 Corinthians ix. 18, "What then is my reward? That, when I preach the gospel, I *may* make the gospel without charge." What is the meaning of the expression "my reward is that I *may* make the gospel without charge"? Is *reward* identical with *object* or *design*? This central text is an important one; it may be termed the eye of the chapter, the pivot on which the whole argument turns; but it seems to have been simply misunderstood and mistranslated in both Versions. It would take too much space now to state in full what appears to me the only right rendering of this curious text, involving a construction easy enough to unlock, if we apply

the key of the subjectively ecclastic use. A new translation, one that shall not identify *reward* with *object*, will be set before the reader in another Article; in which the treatment in the Revised Version of nouns in *μα* and of the middle voice and of some hard texts will come under review.

T. S. EVANS.

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### THE SELF-STANDARD DECEPTIVE.

#### 2 CORINTHIANS x. 12.

THE Jewish members of the primitive Church, even though they were sincerely converted to Christ, could not throw off the habits of a lifetime or the hereditary tendencies of their race. At no time indeed, no, not even when a new life had been quickened within them, do Pharisees find it easy to shed either their ecclesiastical habits or their theological opinions. Could they have had their way, Christianity would have been but a reformed or fulfilled Judaism, looking back on a Messiah who had come instead of looking forward to a Messiah who was to come, and provided with an additional rite—Baptism, and an additional feast—the Lord's Supper. Naturally, therefore, the broad and catholic spirit of St. Paul was an offence to them. *They* still plumed themselves on the superiority of the Jew over the Gentile, while *he* refused to see any vital difference between Gentile and Jew, but counted all "one in Christ Jesus." To them Religion was still mainly a thing of rites and precepts, while to him circumcision was nothing and the law was dead, and charity, or love, was at once the end and the fulfilling of the commandments. The gulf between them and him was as deep, the opposition as sharp, as that which obtains between the modern Sacerdotalist and