CRITICAL REMARKS ON THE TRANSLATION OF THE REVISED VERSION.

If the reader of the first Article on this subject has appreciated the distinction made in the Revised Version between ἔχεισε with the Infinitive and ἔχεισε with the Indicative or between εἰςπερ and εἶγε, he will be better prepared to set its true value upon the diagnosis exhibited in the treatment of participial tenses. In considering this important branch of Greek scholarship, it may be well in the outset to state briefly a certain law of language, apparently not yet formulated into a rule of grammar. After verbs of perception, whether of hearing or seeing or of mental apprehension, three participial tenses are used, and used with very marked differences, the Aorist and the Perfect and the Imperfect. This last tense is generally termed the Present; but it would be more correct and much more convenient to call it the Imperfect. Why so? Because the action, expressed by the participle, is regarded as imperfect or unfinished. But, it may be asked, what has the action to do with the tense? Answer, everything: for tense means time, and an action can no more take place without time to move in than a horse can gallop without ground to go upon. If therefore an action is unfinished, the time, which is inseparable from its process, is unfinished too; for the time of an action is of necessity commensurate with the action itself. But unfinished time, or what now appears to be much the same thing "unfinished action," is in grammar designated the Imperfect Tense. Wherefore in the sentence "I saw the man running a race" (εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα διαθέοντα), let the

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participial tense be called *Imperfect*, because the man had not finished the race when my eyes fell upon him as he ran. When I first saw him, he was beginning to run or was in the full swing of running, but had not yet done running. Certainly, in whatever stage of the race he happened to catch my sight, the action of the runner was still proceeding and not yet completed. This imperfection of the action is expressed in the imperfection of the tense in διαθέωντα. The sentence must therefore be rendered "I saw the man *running* a race:" not "*run* a race." Wherefore quite correct is the new translation of Revelation xiii. 1, "And I saw a beast *coming up* (άναβαίνον) out of the sea, having ten horns and seven heads:" where the imperfect tense of the participle expresses the gradual emersion of the beast from the sea, and serves to make more vivid the appearance first of the horns and after them of the heads.

But what is the Greek for "I saw the man *run* the race"? Clearly εἶδον τὸν ἄνδρα δραμόντα τὸν ἀγώνα: here in the participle the Aorist supplants the Imperfect. Why so? Because the writer or speaker wishes to bring to view the man beginning to run, continuing to run, and ceasing to run. He employs the Aorist to denote the process of the race from first to last, so that the time or action of seeing may be coincident with the time or action of running. The race may have lasted five minutes or five hours, but the Aorist does not at all trouble itself about that: it is profoundly indifferent to duration of time, and measures a long or a short space with a corresponsive elasticity. It contracts or expands according to outward pressure. Hence it appears that the so-called "momentary or transitory use of the Aorist" (Jelf, Gr. Gr., § 401, and sometimes Stallbaum) is a conception neither logical nor accurate. The nature of the case or the circumstances alone determine the character of an action, whether it be long or short, quick or slow. The Aorist simply discharges its proper function
when it defines an action from first to last and circumscribes it within the assigned limits. If the action is long, the time also is long; if short, short: for instance ἐβασίλευσεν means he reigned: what does the Aorist care whether μίαν ὥραν or πεντήκοντα ἔτη be appended thereunto? Not a whit: the Tense of Definition is purely unaffected by the duration of any reign. Or does it swerve from its line of duty, if it allows ἐβασίλευσεν to be rendered he became king? Not a hair's breadth: to its own function of circumscription it is faithful as ever; the Aorist is Aorist still. To be sure there appear to be sundry modifications to the above rule, when, for instance, in certain combinations the completion of an action is made more illustrious than its commencement, as in ἐπείδη ἐβασίλευσεν.

Having thus determined the distinct participial uses of the Imperfect and of the Aorist, we now proceed to the equally distinct use of the Perfect. What is the Greek for "I saw him when he had run the race?" Clearly εἶδον διαδεδραμμένα. Whether I saw him immediately after the race or some time or how long after, let the context decide. There is no difficulty about the participial Perfect.

But in order to deepen the impression of the broad difference between the three tenses in their uses, one more illustration may be serviceable. Take the sentence, "I beheld a woman putting on the sun," εἶδον γυναῖκα ἐνδυσαμένην τοῦ ἥλιον. What is the true idea? This: my eye lighted upon a woman as she was engaged in the process of solar investiture; whether she was in the first, or second, or third stage of the process, the Imperfect Tense does not decide, the circumstances of the case decide. Again the sentence, "I saw a woman put on the sun," εἶδον γυναῖκα ἐνδυσαμένην τοῦ ἥλιον, implies that I beheld the process of solar investiture from first to last. And of course "I saw a woman clothed with the sun," would be expressed in Greek by ἐνδεδυμένην or περιβεβλημένην, the participial
Perfect denoting the complete state of solar equipment. How long time the woman had put on the sun, when I beheld her clothed with it, is a question lying outside the Perfect, one in which the tense itself is neither interested nor concerned.

From the above positions, being true, it follows that the Greek for "I saw a star falling," is *eidoν áστέρα πίπτοντα*, meaning that I gazed upon it during some part or other of its descent; and for "I saw a star fall," *eidoν πεσόντα*, my eye following it in its lapse from sky to earth; and for "I saw a star fallen," *eidoν πεπτωκότα*; but how long fallen after its lighting upon the earth, depends upon circumstances.

Upon what principle therefore were the learned Revisers led to alter the A. V. rendering of Luke x. 18, and retranslate it, "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven," ὡς áστραπῆν πεσόντα? Did they hazily confound πεσόντα with πεπτωκότα? the process with the state resulting therefrom? And that too when the faultless rendering of the A. V. lay before them? a rendering not only faultless but vivid in its order of the words, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven." But what makes more conspicuous still this alteration for the worse of a rendering absolutely perfect is that it flatly contradicts the Revisers' alteration for the better of Revelation ix. 1, *eidoν áστέρα πεπτωκότα*, which they have properly retranslated, "I saw a star fallen." This latter correction is a silent correction of the former, and a standing protest against it. But even supposing that in the text Luke x. 18, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from heaven," the substitution of fallen for fall could be desperately defended by some crooked parallel or other, could be crazily buttressed by some weird structure of a passage in which not the whole of the action denoted by the participial Aorist came to view, but only the last stage or fag end thereof, it might still be asked,
what sense does the new rendering yield? None whatsoever. The proposition, "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning from heaven," is an absurdity. The altered translation is as logically untenable, as it is grammatically indefensible. This will appear from a brief consideration. For there is a simile in this text; a comparison between Satan and lightning. In a comparison there is always a congruity between the thing compared and that to which it is compared. What we may predicate of the one, we may predicate of the other. If it is correct to say "I saw Satan fall like lightning," it must also be correct to say "I saw lightning fall." By parity of reasoning, if it is correct to say, "I beheld Satan fallen as lightning," it must also be correct to say, "I saw lightning fallen." But it is not correct to say so, for we cannot see lightning fallen; we can see it fall, shoot, dart from point to point, from sky to earth; but fallen we cannot behold it; when it has fallen, we may only discern its effects, say, in a blasted oak or a calcined ox.

It is remarkable that the Revisers seem to have rendered correctly enough the participial tenses in the Book of Revelation. Why were they less discreet elsewhere? Why did they fail to render aright εἶδον περιλάμψαν με φῶς in Acts of the Apostles xxvi. 13? Just as εἶδον αὐτὸν ἐνυσσάμενον, δραμόντα, πεσόντα must be rendered, "I saw him put on, run, fall," so precisely εἶδον περιλάμψαν με φῶς must be rendered, "I saw a light shine round about me." Grammar demands this rendering, and logic appends its seal to the postulate of grammar. For what is the drift of the sacred record? This: at the hour of noon St. Paul was approaching Damascus. As he journeyed, what he saw shining around him was the light of the midday sun. Then in a moment another and unearthly light "above the brightness of the sun" shone round about him. He saw the strange light shine, and outshine the shining sun, for it
came upon his eyes sudden, intense, dazzling, even blinding. This bewildering *surprise* and overmastering *afflux* of supersolar splendour, radiating from the glorified Presence of the audible Saviour, is declared, as far as it can be declared, by the participial Aorist *περιλάμψαν*. If the Apostle had employed the Imperfect *περιλάμπτων*, he would have described the unearthly light either as *shining* around him already, before his eye was arrested and dazzled by it, or else as *proceeding to shine* round about him. But that idea was not in his mind: quite the reverse: he therefore employed the participial Aorist. To make this correct view of the text more certain still, we find the same sudden blaze of a divine light, shaming the sunshine, indicated by the Infinitive Aorist *περιαστράφαι* in Acts xxii. 6. In Jelf's Grammar this would be called probably the *instantaneous* or even *subitaneous* use of the Aorist; but that would not be strictly correct, as the Aorist shakes its definitive head at all such foreign titles and alien appellations, content to rule within its own proper domain of determining actions and leaving their times of duration to circumstances lying beyond its own control.

But now that we are become more familiar with these three tenses in their several and distinct uses, what shall we say to the translation of *πώς εἶδε τὸν ἄγγελον ἐν τῷ οίκῳ αὐτοῦ ἑταβήνα καὶ εἶπόντα*, "how he had seen the angel standing in his house and saying" (Acts xi. 13)? Just as if the angel were standing in the house already, and waiting to catch the eye of Cornelius! The facts narrated in this text are *alia omnia*, precisely the reverse. Cornelius being in his house saw the angel, who was gliding swift towards him, *stand and say*; that is, saw him stop in his advance (*ἑταβήνα*) and heard him say his say—from first to last (*εἶπόντα*). Clearly the order of the words is "he saw the angel in his house"—saw him then and there do what? *stand and say*: these two verbs should not be put asunder,
but allowed to run together in quick sequence. Ponderous exceedingly is the received translation "standing in the house and saying": for, not to mention that ἐστώτα ἐν τῷ οίκῳ καὶ λέγοντα would be the Greek purely necessary to express this idea, surely the light approach to earth of a herald from heaven, speeding through the air and checking his flight till he came to a halt in the presence of a Peter or a Cornelius and straightway delivered his message, might have been truly pictured by the learned Revisers in this text, if only the transitional Aorist (σταθέντα) had received honour due and not been heavily identified with the sluggish and ponded Perfect—a tense denoting not a change but a state. An angel’s visit was a bright surprise, an apparition with a radiation; at any rate such an angel’s visit as we find recorded in Acts xii. 7, a text in which the correct and even graphic or sprightly rendering in the A. V. “an angel of the Lord came upon him” has been altered in the R. V. to the crass and massive and misleading stood by him. Where is the Greek for by in ἐπέστη? Stood before him might have been better, or even visited him: but no doubt the true idea is that of the A. V., came upon or surprised him.

But—πήμα πήματος πλέον—more ponderous than ever, even elephantine in its tardiness of tread is the drowsy diction which, again putting a slight on the mercurial Aorist and delighting to honour the phlegmatic Imperfect, is employed to describe an angel’s quick approach and brief address, or rather nuncupation uttered once and no more. We read according to the R.V. in Acts x. 3 that Cornelius “saw an angel of God coming in unto him and saying to him, Cornelius.” Here coming in and saying profess to represent not εἰσερχόμενον and λέγοντα, but εἰσελθόντα and εἰπόντα. Equal in accuracy and alacrity would be the rendering of the line

εἶδον διστεύοντα καὶ ὀφθαλμοῖο τυχόντα,
"I saw him letting fly an arrow and hitting the bull's eye."

The very phrase "saying, Cornelius," amounts to a contradiction in terms: for the whole speech of the angel in this text consists of a single word, and is itself as circumscribed and constricted as the Greek tense is circumscriptive and constringent. A speech of one word, which Cornelius is, excludes the very idea of unfinished utterance, repudiates therefore a participial usher in the dull uniform of an imperfect tense saying, and demands to be announced by the bright and brisk Aorist say; to which it is exactly fitted, even as a sword to its scabbard: for εἰπόντα or say is the sheath that utters the blade Cornelius. We must not however conclude that an Aorist cannot announce a speech of many words: we have had an instance of this already in Acts xi. 13: but in these instances the many-worded speech must be regarded as one whole or a single message.

But enough and more than enough of these Participial Tenses: already the reader exclaims ἅλις λέλεκται τῶν ὄριστικῶν χρόνων. Nevertheless, even after a surfeit of Aorists overlooked or extinguished in Participles, one may be tempted to examine the rare curiosity of an Aorist actually buried alive in a Perfect. In the verb ἐσχηκα (formed from ἐσχον, not from ἔχω) two tenses are in copartnership: theirs is a divisum imperium; of these two joint rulers, the Aorist and the Perfect, one has been hurled from his throne by the learned Revisers, the other exalted to reign alone. The banished partner is the ill-starred Aorist. The Tense of circumscription has fled before the Tense of uncircumscription. The Perfect has been allowed to triumph over the contemned Aorist, as in πεσόντα rendered fallen, so in ἐσχήκαμεν rendered we have had: just as the Imperfect has been permitted to usurp supreme dominion in σταθεύτα rendered standing, in εἰπόντα rendered saying, in εἰσελθόντα rendered coming in: and in every instance with results disastrous to the true idea.
In the important text Romans v. 2, the new reading ἐσχήκαμεν for ἔχομεν has been followed by the new rendering “through whom also we have had our access by faith into this grace wherein we stand.” Is we have had right grammatically? How can it be, when the Aorist ἔχω = I got or I found has been forcibly expelled from ἐσχήκαμεν? If, however, we render afresh we have got, then the Aorist got is reinstated in its proper position by the side of the Perfect have. Again is the new rendering we have had right logically also? How can it be, when the phrase we have had so often implies that we have no more—the very contrary of what the Apostle here means to declare; certainly what we have no more, that we have had. With good reason therefore St. Paul employs the Aorist-Perfect of ἔχω and not the other, and with equally good reason he placed τῇ πίστει immediately after ἐσχήκαμεν and not after προσαγωγὴν or access, as some readers might infer that he did from the order of words in the Revised Version translation.

Perhaps both grammar and logic will run in perfect harmony together, if we render, “through whom we have by faith got or obtained our access into this grace wherein we stand.” This rendering will bring to view two causes of getting the access or obtaining the introduction into the state of grace; one cause objective, Christ: the other subjective, faith; Christ the door, faith the hand that moves the door to open and to admit.

The last passage for discussion under this head of Participial Tenses is one of much moment and interest. The text 2 Corinthians v. 2, 3. ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποδοῦντες, εἰ γε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα is rendered in the Revised Version as follows, “longing to be clothed upon with our habitation which is from heaven: if so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked.” The English of this rendering is rather obscure, and not true to the
Greek; for if *to be clothed upon* is intended to denote a swift process, the Greek for that would be ἐπενδυθῆναι, and if *being clothed* is intended to denote a lasting state, the Greek for that would be ἐνδεδυμένοι. But if in this rendering Tense is not confounded with Tense, Voice is with Voice; and that with results disastrous to the true idea. For here the Passive is boldly substituted for the Middle, the objective for the subjective. This winnowing away of the dynamic Voice scatters to the winds the free will of the agent, the correlation between part and counterpart, between divine power and human capacity, between God's gift to men of the habitation from heaven and man's moral meetness for the same. For surely the Middle Voice implies *consciousness* in him who superindues the spiritual tenement; and this consciousness might have been easily expressed in English by rendering ἐπενδύσασθαι simply and correctly to put on over, i.e., to put on over it, the material body, the immaterial.

But meanwhile what of our client, the participle ἐνδυσάμενοι and its tense and its voice? Can the rendering *being clothed* stand at all? Not at all; for if the ambiguous English of this phrase was designed by the learned Revisers to denote a permanent state reached, ἐνδεδυμένοι would be required for that, and if it is intended to represent a process continuing and unfinished, ἐνδυόμενοι would be required for that. But ἐνδυσάμενοι, the Aorist, insists upon its circumscripptive rights. How then *salvo jure* is it to be translated? Clearly the consciousness and volition of the Voice must be preserved; the subjective Middle expressive of action from within must not be ousted and replaced by the objective Passive expressive of action from without. That will never do. Suppose then we render ἐνδυσάμενοι here in *putting on*, or *when we put on*, or (to bring out the force of the καὶ) *when we do put on*. Certainly of a construction nearly parallel (Acts x. 33) καὶδὲς ἐποίησας παραγενόμενος
the rendering in the Revised Version *thou hast done well in that thou hast come*, though somewhat wordy, is correct enough; for by the *in* therein is indicated the coincidence in time between the moral *doing well* and the material *coming*. Nevertheless this text, like the half line of Euripides, εἰ δ' ἐποίησας μολὼν, might be rendered with equal propriety and more tersely *thou didst well in coming*. For *coming* in this new rendering is just as much a participial Aorist, as *thou didst well* is a verbal. “But,” some one will say, “surely *coming* is a participial Imperfect!” Answer: it may be so elsewhere, but not here; here the context *thou didst well* commands it to be Aorist. The truth is, the meagre staff of participial forms in English makes it necessary that such words as *coming*, *entering*, *putting on* should do duty sometimes as Aorist, sometimes as Imperfect, according to the colour of surrounding circumstances. Instances of this double use abound in “Tales of my Grandfather.” But in Greek it is otherwise; the English *entering* is pressed to translate alike εἰσελθὼν and εἰσερχόμενος; for instance, of the sentence εἰσελθὼν ἔμαρατε με τῆς χειρός, the translation, “entering the room he grasped me by the hand,” is more graphic and less ponderous than, if *having entered* or *he entered and grasped* were used; it is also more correct. Yet the same word *entering*, and no other, suits the Greek Imperfect in εἶδον εἰσερχόμενον, just as *enter* and nothing but *enter or come in* suits the Greek Aorist in εἶδεν εἰσελθόντα, Acts x. 3.

“But,” some one will object, “what is the Greek for *In putting on* his cloak he slipped?” Answer; ἐνδυόμενος τὴν χλαίναν ὄλισθε: the participial Imperfect here, because it is obvious from the circumstances of the case that the man had not completed the process of cloaking when he stumbled. But, it may be asked in reply, what is the Greek for *Putting on* his cloak he left the house? Clearly ἐνδυσάμενος ἔξηκε; because the circumstances are changed,
and therefore *putting on* from an Imperfect becomes an Aorist in English, defining the process of cloaking from first to last, from commencement to completion.

"But, sir," again says the objector, "this process of putting on, mentioned by St. Paul, will be an instantaneous act, quick as lightning: you can hardly call it a process beginning and continuing till it is ended." Answer: why not? Surely an instantaneous act may be also an instantaneous process with a first and a middle and a last. Not that this is a sample of the momentary or subitaneous use of the Aorist, but rather we gather from the extraordinary nature of the case as revealed elsewhere (1 Corinthians xv.) that the transfiguration of the saints will be an instantaneous process, swift as a flash. It is true that in ordinary human apparelling the process has stages and takes time: but this superinvestment will be superhuman and all but timeless, for we read that therein "we shall be changed (ἀλλὰ γυμνῶμεθα, Aorist Future) in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye." Wherefore it appears that a process which measures the twinkling of an eye, will be so instantaneous, that the first of it will be the last of it, the commencement the completion. But in this mighty transformation there will be a process still, just as there is a process in a flash of lightning that lasts a second. And the whole of this process is denoted in our text by the Participial Aorist, which in itself is profoundly indifferent whether the process it denotes last a second or a minute. This explanation seems to remove the objections made so far to the rendering "if in putting on" or "when we do put on we shall be found not naked."

"But," some one not yet satisfied asks, "how must the time of ἐνδυσάμενοι be fitted to the time of εὑρεθηγομέθα? Here is the difficulty: it seems to me, sir, that the Revised Version takes a very sensible view of this passage when it renders, If so be that being clothed we shall not be found naked: which I for my part make to signify, when we are
completely clothed (or as you, sir, would render it when we have put on), we shall then not be found naked. Why, of course we shall not be: this is an evident truth well drawn out in the rendering of the Revised Version. For this use of the English Perfect being clothed let me quote from Shakespear—

My story being done,
She gave me for my pains a world of sighs:

where Desdemona heaves her world of sighs when Othello has finished his story.” Answer: even supposing the received translation being clothed to be correct (which is most improbable, if not quite impossible) and your own interpretation of it to be correct also (which is quite possible and very probable), what sense does it make? What you call “an evident truth” I should term a self-evident truism, a proposition indeed so evident that to state it is unnecessary, even superfluous. But to this proposition, self-evident as it is from one point of view, there is from another aspect a fatal objection, which is that γυμνος here means stript or unclad not of the heavenly but of the earthly body. This is clear from all the antecedent context. And now to answer your first question about the two times, how they must be fitted to each other. Consider: there are not two times nor two moments, but one moment and two actions or two sides of the same event or process. These two sides or halves or tallies or, if you please, part and counterpart, are described as coincident in the same second of time. They are as consentaneous as they are instantaneous. The instantaneous process of putting on completely is an act simultaneous with the state of being found not naked: for so, perhaps, it should be translated and not as in the Revised Version, inasmuch as the οὐ is restricted to γυμνος, not extending to εὑρεθησόμεθα. This more correct rendering, which limits the negative to naked, brings ἐνδυσάμενοι
face to face with εὐρεθησόμεθα ou γυμνόν, positive with positive, Aorist with Aorist, each tense with its own distinct action filling the same all but spaceless space of timeless time; while again the Middle confronts the Passive, the subjective Voice the objective, both of them complementary each to each and tallying with a mutual correspondency. For it is obvious that εὐρεθησόμεθα, now disencumbered of the negative, being Passive points to objective agents in this mystery, who shall find the saints of the last time not-naked. It is likewise all but certain that these not-naked or still body-clad saints, who shall superinde, were intended by St. Paul here to be in silent contrast with others who being naked or disembodied shall only indue or put on, not put on over. For the naked indue, the not-naked superinde. But when the not-naked do put on over, in that same moment they will be found not naked by whom? Who are these visitors that shall find them still clad? If they are the good angels, who day and night minister unto God for the heirs of salvation, this will be on earth their last office of love to the saints. What will be? The finding them? Both the finding which comes of seeking and the clothing which comes of finding. If this be true, the ministering angels, commissioned by God, shall just then prove ἐνδύσαντες, just when the expectant saints, meet for the embracing gift, shall prove ἐνδυσάμενοι to themselves. As the angelic agents rehabilitate the human recipients, these also shall rehabilitate themselves, with the new tenement furnished from heaven. Or to make the idea still clearer, after the final transfiguration of all the saints, one of them, looking back upon the stupendous event, looking back upon the instantaneous process of two sides or acts, one subjective on man's part, the other objective from the angelic side—such a one might thus fairly describe it in Greek οἱ μὲν ἄγγελοι ἐπιστάντες ἐνέδυσαν, οἱ δὲ ἄγιοι ἐνδυ­θέντες καὶ ἐνεδύσαντο.
Quae cum ita sint or rather si ita sunt, suppose we render longing to put on over, that is if in the moment of putting on we shall be found not naked. Has the critic any objection to this, grammatical or logical? Voice of critic: "Well, I now begin to realize the idea of simultaneousness in the putting on and in the being found clad. No doubt, the Greek will allow two Aorists, one participial, the other verbal, to connote the same action from its two sides, as in εὐ ἐποίησας μολὼν, where, as you say, sir, the moral is coincident with the physical, the doing well with the coming. And certainly, now I think of it, one could hardly render κτείνωμεν σφάξαντες (Eur., Orest., 1105) 'let us kill her, when we have cut her throat' but rather 'let us kill her—cutting her throat' or by cutting. In fact we find it thus in English, for I saw to-day in the Newcastle Journal, 'The Dean took the oath kissing the book,' which, probably you, sir, would render καταφιλήσας τὸ βιβλίον. And for my part I should do the same, for I cannot suppose that the Dean is described as kissing the book before he took the oath. In fact, the sealing kiss followed so close upon the so help me God, that the two acts were all but simultaneous. So that my difficulty is grammatical, no more; but is there not a logical difficulty here? According to your explanation should not St. Paul have written ἐνδυσάμενοι 'in the moment of putting on over?'" Answer: That is precisely what the Apostle would not have written; for, consider, he is here describing two states, one alternative to the other, namely the state of being found in the body, and that of being found stript of the body. He therefore prefers ἐνδυσάμενοι as being a term common to both these states, for whoso puts on over also puts on. Have you any more objections? One other objection is heard: "Well, sir, yet somehow after all I cannot but think that notwithstanding the flashing speed of the timeless time, as you unmathematically call it, one might have rather expected ἐνδυόμενοι
than ἐνδυσάμενοι, to suit your view. For will not the being found in the embodied state take place a moment before or at least in the first moment of the superinvestment?" Answer: Better say at once in the first half of the moment which is to measure the whole time of the superinvestment. This quick process, however, is a mystery simply beyond our comprehension. But even supposing that the being surprised in the body would possibly precede the superinduement by half a second or by the tenth of a tick, how could the Apostle, whose whole soul was penetrated with the instantaneousness of that mighty transfiguration, who wrote in future Aorists, We shall not all sleep but we shall all be changed in a moment, have here employed the tardy Imperfect instead of the vivid Aorist? Impossible: the act and the fact occupy side by side one and the same flash of time. Nay, so incalculably swift may be the absorption of the corruptible into the incorruptible, that the being caught in the mortal body may be realized only in the first moment of immortality.

Has my critic any other objection? Voice of critic: "Yes, I have, sir, and a grave one; a missing link, sir, a missing link! Notwithstanding all these brainspun fineries about voices subjective and objective, about participial imperfects (I was taught at school to say the Present Participle and shall continue to do so), and notwithstanding all these wiredrawn distinctions between saying and say, shining and shine, standing and stand, falling and fall, hitting the bull's eye and hit it; after all these brilliant meteors and delicate gossamers of superfine scholarship, you have ignored, sir, in this passage, the existence of the particle γε! I see that εἰ γε in the Revised Version is rendered if so be that. To this I hope you object. I do. I was always taught to translate εἰ γε if indeed or if in fact: and now my sole doubt is whether γε means indeed or in fact. Pray, sir, can γε in any combination be rendered so be that? Can it in εὔωγε?
or in κατά γε τούτο? or in κατιδανύξω γε πρός? What is to become of this and of other like texts, if so be that γε nowhere signifies so be that?" Answer: the particle γε here signifies neither so be that, as you rightly remark, nor indeed, as you wrongly assume. It means at least or of course; and being a volatile and flickering particle, it is sometimes not easy to see what word or words it influences. Here it has nothing to do with the ei which precedes it, and little to do with any word that follows it. It exerts no direct influence upon its own clause, in whole or in part. "You amaze me: what use then does it serve?" It serves or tends to reflect a strong light upon the apodosis taken in strict connexion with the protasis. "You astonish me: how in particular?" Its particular mission here is to intensify one word in the major clause, which is in affinity with another word in the minor. "You bewilder me: what next?" Its peculiar function in this passage is to illuminate the fingerpost ἐπενδύσασθαι, while this index points forward to its correlate ἐνδυσάμενοι. Is this lucid? The construction is ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες—ἐπενδύσασθαι γε—ei καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι κ.τ.λ. The conditional clause contains a necessary limitation to the idea of putting on over. The particle γε intensifies and makes brilliant ἐπενδύσασθαι as restricted by the conditioning clause. Clearly the meaning is Longing to put on over—to put on over, of course, if, when we do put on, we shall be found not naked: for otherwise, if in the instant of that induement, we shall be found divested of the terrestrial body, how shall we be able to superindue the celestial body over the terrestrial? It matters not whether we render of course if or if, of course: or at least if or if, at least: for at least and of course are no more fixtures in a sentence, with one place always assigned them, than is the volatile particle γε.

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