ON COLOSSIANS II. 22, 23.

The exegetical difficulties of "this profound and difficult Epistle" are at their greatest, both in number and degree, in the Second Chapter, and culminate in its last verse. They arise partly from the phraseology of the Epistle and the number of rare and obscure words it contains, partly from its extreme abruptness and "want of finish," and the neglect by the Writer of those conjunctive and modal particles in which the Greek language is so incomparably rich, and which form the connective tissue of its sentences. The controversial purport of the Letter, with the crude and novel, as well as subtle and many-sided character of the form of error that it has to deal with, go far to account for these peculiarities. Some of the more crucial difficulties of this Second Chapter may be due, as I have tried to shew in a former Paper on Verse 18, to the allusions the Apostle has occasion to make to the tenets and phrases of the party he is attacking. Indeed, it would be strange if we did not meet with passages extremely obscure and perplexing in a controversy so far personal and local, at least in the immediate occasion of it, as was that between St. Paul and the false teachers of Colossæ, and one about which we know so little beyond what can be gathered from the pages of the Epistle itself, where it is dealt with in such brief and summary fashion. And the more swift and telling are the sharp home-thrusts of the Apostle's mighty dialectic, the more likely are they to baffle the eye of the distant observer in attempting to follow them.

Out of the thirty-three Hapax legomena of the
Epistle, three belong to this verse alone—the words ἑθελοθρησκεῖα, ἀφελεία, and πλησμονή. The first of these three appears to be an inspired coinage of the Apostle’s own. It only occurs besides, and that very rarely, in later ecclesiastical writings. Two distinct shades of meaning have been assigned to it. The sense of ἀφελεία, on the other hand, is unmistakably definite; but that of πλησμονή has been grave matter of dispute. If, with most modern interpreters, we blend λόγον ... ἐχοντα (our having a show) into a single phrase, then we have a fourth expression (given by Alford in his list of Hapax legomena) peculiar to this passage, and which affords a choice of various renderings. Add to this that τιμή may mean honour or value, and the preposition πρὸς (before πλησμονήν) as readily against as for; and as to σάρξ, the last word of the verse, every one knows how naturally it will lend itself to different interpretations. So much for the lexical conditions of the problem.

Its syntactical difficulties will be appreciated when it is observed that the relative ἄτιμα (such as), forming the subject of the sentence, may be fairly referred to either of two quite different antecedents; and that the predicate is made up of one participial followed by three prepositional phrases—with the addition of a dependent dative without preposition thrown in amongst them, if we follow a somewhat probable correction of the Received Text—and these strung together without a single particle to help us to adjust them, except a “solitary μεν” bereft of its corresponding δέ. In fact, the verse at first sight looks like nothing so much as a series of rough notes or memoranda, hastily jotted down for one’s own private use, to be enlarged upon
and worked up afterwards, but which, as they stand, must be little more than a riddle to every one except the Writer himself. And such an enigma the sentence appears to have proved. It would be no very great exaggeration to say that every combination of its details arithmetically possible has been tried by one interpreter or another; and indeed such an estimate would not include all the views proposed, Alford, for instance, connecting the last phrase, πρὸς πλησμονὴν κ.τ.λ., with δογματίζοντες of Verse 20. Thanks to the labours of recent Commentators, the ground is now, however, considerably cleared, and the points at issue have been reduced to a comparatively narrow compass. But I venture to doubt whether, after all, the position of the Verse as forming the conclusion of the Apostle’s polemic has been sufficiently considered, and whether due weight has been given to the indications it contains of backward reference, both as explaining its summary character, and as elucidating what is otherwise doubtful in its meaning and connection of thought.

Another consideration determining the line of exposition adopted here is this: that when a number of phrases follow each other asyndetically, without conjunctive or modulating particles, the presumption is that their order gives their connection, and that they appear on the page just as they issued from the Writer’s mind. In such a case link-words can be dispensed with where the desire for brief and energetic expression dictates their absence, for the sentence holds together by the mere position of its different parts. Directly we abandon this principle, and are tempted to take the words otherwise than as they stand, we are landed in
the arbitrary and uncertain, and, in fact, turn the verse into a sort of elaborate amphibology, as the history of its exegesis too plainly shews.

Should these two principles coincide in the result to which they point us, we may feel tolerably sure of being in the right direction, and by the aid of such light as we can gather from the general analogy of Pauline modes of thought and expression elsewhere, may, perhaps, even hope to reach some definite and well-established conclusion as to the sense of this most vexed of all vexed passages.

1. We must, therefore, refer such as, the all important subject of the Verse, with Alford, Ellicott, Hofmann, Meyer, to the immediately antecedent *commandments and teachings of men*. The first glance at the contents of Verse 23 shews that they have a far wider reference than simply to the "decrees" of Verses 20, 21. And this wider reference is already implied in "the commandments and teachings of men," as constituting the system "according to" which these special prohibitions (*handle not,* &c.) were enacted and enforced. Comparison of Verse 22 with the similar words of Verse 8, and with the striking parallel in Ephesians iv. 14, will shew that it is a clause of most significant and fundamental import in its bearing on the Colossian heresy. That the saying was borrowed from Old Testament Scripture, and was also one of the (probably) well-known phrases of Christ Himself, would lend to it a peculiarly solemn judicial emphasis.¹ *Its ἐντάλματα* gives a wider extension to the δόγματα of the two preceding verses, and the διασκαλίας τ. ἀνθρώπων links them

¹ See Isaiah xxix. 13 (LXX.); Matthew xv. 6-9; Mark vii. 6-13; also Titus i. 14.
on to the general body of doctrine to which they belonged. And so, by a bold and easy transition, the Apostle passes from the particular warnings and denunciations of the previous verses to the general survey and review of the whole Colossian error that we find condensed into the brief and pregnant words of Verse 23. And it is just the note of solemn repetition struck in the 22nd Verse that prepares us for this final summing up.

2. If in the commandments and teachings of men in Verse 22 the tradition of men of Verse 8 is repeated and amplified, the loudly sounded warning against philosophy and empty deceit contained in that former verse is echoed no less distinctly in the λόγον μὴν ἐχοντα σοφίας of Verse 23. And with this reference in our minds, and remembering the standing proverbial antithesis between λόγος and ἔργον, δύναμις, and the like (word and work, &c.),¹ this latter phrase becomes sufficiently complete in itself. "Having word (or form, show) indeed of wisdom" clearly means "having that and nothing more—no inner truth, no pith and substance of wisdom"—λόγον, οὐ πράγματα, μᾶλλον δὲ πιθανολογίας λόγον ψίλον (mere words, nothing but words), as Οἰκουμενιος puts it. So already Chrysostom—Δόγμαν, οὐκ ἀληθείαν, οὐδὲ δύναμιν. Here we have exactly the conditions under which the classical μὴν solitariwm appears, "where a sentence or word with δὲ can easily be supplied in thought;"² and the search for the missing half of the antithesis in the latter part of the

¹ Compare, for St. Paul, Col. iii. 17; Rom. xv. 18; 1 Cor. iv. 19, 20; 2 Cor. x. 11; 1 Thess. i. 5; 2 Thess. ii. 17; also 1 John iii. 18; James i. 23–25. And, for classical usage, see, e.g., Thuc. i. 22; Eurip. Heracl. 5; Aristotle, Polit. iii. 9. 8; and the saying of Democritus, λόγοι ἔργοι σοια.

² Matthiä, Gr. Grammatik, 622. 6. 'Ως μὴν λέγοντων (as indeed they say), Eurip. Orestes, 8, is a fair example of the idiom.
verse becomes as needless as it has proved precarious. This view of the force of μὲν has in its favour the suffrages of Erasmus, Winer, A. Buttmann, Meyer, amongst others.

But, as Æcumenius has already indicated, this clause reminds us of Verse 4 almost as forcibly as of Verse 8. "This I say lest any one should be deceiving you (playing off fallacies upon you) in persuasive speech"—such were the Apostle's first words of warning to his readers. And now he comes round to the same point again when he writes in the language of this concluding verse, "having speech indeed of wisdom." The force of the double verbal association (παραλογίζεται ἐν πιθανολογίᾳ... λόγον μὲν ἔχοντα) it is impossible to reproduce in English, because we have no word to unite the ideas of reasoning and speech under one concept, as the Greeks have done in their marvellous λόγος. It is precisely the same style of expression and the same association of ideas that we meet in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, when the Apostle acknowledges word of wisdom (λόγος σοφίας) as one form of "the manifestation of the Spirit," but repudiates for himself wisdom of word (much the same as "word indeed of wisdom") and persuasive words of wisdom. Indeed, the whole of 1 Corinthians i. 17—ii. 16 is a most profound and eloquent inspired play upon the notions of word and wisdom, which binds them together.

1 Hofmann (apparently) finds it in ἐν θελοθρησκείᾳ τ.λ.; Peirce, Bengel, and Eadie in πρὸς πληρωμὴν; Ellicott (apparently) and Lightfoot in οὐκ ἐν τιμὴν.
2 Grammar, p. 719, E.T.
4 1. Cor. xii. 8. Compare Ibid. i. 5.
5 Ibid. i. 17; ii. 1.
6 Ibid. ii. 4, 13. The language of these two verses combines and blends completely the phrases we have attempted to link together in Col. ii. 4, 8, and 23.
inseparably in the mind of every reader of St. Paul. This parallelism of expression is the more certain and decisive because it appears to be due to the common "philosophical" character of the errors the Apostle is dealing with in each case.¹

We have no need, then, to search amongst the various uses of λόγον ἕχω for that most fitting here. The sense of the grammatically inseparable λόγον σοφίας is defined by Pauline usage, and of λόγον μὲν σοφίας by the previous context. And "Having word indeed of wisdom" describes sufficiently the sophistical nature of the Colossian heresy, the show of logical method, and of philosophical breadth and thoroughness of treatment, which naturally made it so attractive to half-educated minds, to men perhaps of a speculative and mystical bent, but whose intellectual grasp of the Christian system was as yet but partial and imperfect.²

3. While the external form and garb of the new doctrine are described in the participial clause λόγον μὲν ἕχουσα σοφίας, its content as a system of religion and morals is indicated in the prepositional adjuncts that follow. For beyond a doubt ἐν ἑθελοθρησκείᾳ κ. ταπεινοφροσύνη is a repetition from Verse 18, while ἀφελεία σώματος points hardly less distinctly to the ascetic regulations of Verse 21.

Ἑθελοθρησκεία seems to be not merely connected with, but even etymologically derived from, the θέλων ἐν . . . θρησκεία τῶν ἀγγέλων of Verse 18. It is a word which St. Paul himself compounds to set forth

¹ See also a previous Paper on Col. ii. 18, in Vol. xi. pp. 388-397. The bitter word of condemnation, φυσιούμενος, is used by St. Paul only in these two Epistles.
² See Col. i. 9 ; ii. 2. It is for this Church alone that the Apostle asks the gift of συνεσθέν (intellectual comprehension, the power to put things together). Comp. Eph. iii. 4 ; Luke ii. 47.
the characteristic quality and temper of the man who has been spoken of just before as "Delighting in worshipping of the angels." Its appearance here, in conjunction with ταπεινοφροσύνη, cannot be accounted for in any other way. Its meaning, therefore, must correspond with this derivation. Examination of the parallel compounds of ἐθέλω confirms this presumption; for this prefix (nearly synonymous with φιλο-) usually denotes addiction to, or delight in, the state, or quality, or practice signified by the other half of the word. In fact, ἐθέλο- appears to connote willingness rather than wilfulness. No better example could be found than the ἐθελοπερισσοθρησκεία (zeal for excess of ritual) quoted by several commentators from Epiphanius, as attributed to the Pharisees. And therefore, as Hofmann puts it, "if θρησκεία is not in itself anything evil, so neither is ἐθελοθρησκεία;" so neither, indeed, is ταπεινοφροσύνη, nor ἀφειδεία σώματος, nor λόγος σοφίας (without..."
the μέν). Δεσιδαιμονία (religiousness) is the equivalent given for ἐθελοθρησκεία by the modern Greek scholar Byzantios. At the same time θρησκεία, as denoting worship as matter of ritual and outward form, is, like Δεσιδαιμονία in another way, always ready to assume an unfavourable sense, and such a sense has here been stamped upon it already by Verse 18.

Ἐθελοθρησκεία, then, appears to be the general characteristic and governing religious principle of the ἰδίων ἐν θρησκείᾳ τῶν ἀγγέλων, whose love of worship for mere worship's sake prompts him at once to accumulate and elaborate its forms, and to multiply its objects. Such an one, for whom the act and outward exercise of worship is the chief part of religion, and the recognition of its true object but a secondary matter, is ready to pay his adoration to angel, or saint, or Virgin mother, metaphysical abstractions, forces of nature, or grand être de l'humanité—anything that his superstitious fancy, or philosophic theory, or the fashion of the hour may present to his religious instinct.

This kind of zeal for worship, especially in the form of angel-worship, naturally has about it a plausible air of "humility;" it appears to manifest a becoming

1 In his Lexicon. Athens, 1839.
2 See Trench's Synonyms of N. T., s.v. θρῆνος. Trench furnishes a reference to "a very instructive passage on the merely external character of θρησκεία" occurring in Philo (Quod Det. Pot. Insid. 7), in which, refusing the character of "devout" to those who seek it by divers washings, sacrifices, temple-building, &c., he speaks of them as making outward worship a substitute for piety (θρησκείαν ἀντὶ διαόνησις ἰγνώρισε). One cannot help noticing that it is only in the Ephesian Epistle (Chap. iv. 24) that St. Paul uses διαόνυς, the other of these two contrasted words, in express distinction, one might suppose, from the θρησκεία which so troubled him at Colossae. Θρησκεία is only used here in St. Paul's Epistles; but see Acts xxvi. 5; James i. 26, 27.
3 Col. ii. 16.
4 Compare Gal. iv. 9, 10, where the knowledge of God is appealed to as that which should have rendered a return to petty ceremonialism impossible.
reverence for the great powers above us, and a proper sense of our "low estate" as compared with them. But the Apostle has already shewn what pride and falsehood lay hid under this specious garb of piety. He has no need to repeat what his readers have only just learned from him a few verses back (in Verse 18). He has said enough in these two words (ἐν ἑθελοθρησκείᾳ κ. ταπεινοφροσύνη) to serve his purpose here, and to explain the religious fascination, as the previous clause, in the light of earlier warnings, explains the intellectual attractiveness of the Colossian heresy.

4. In discussing the last clause of the verse, it may be convenient to begin with πληρομονή, the meaning of which, unless we are to set aside all lexical usage, is repletion, surfeiting, and nothing else. Granting this, then, the meaning of σάρκι is determined on the one hand, for it is only the flesh, as the sensual in man, that is capable of such indulgence; and the force of προς is fixed on the other hand, as denoting against. No one would suppose the Apostle to charge the errorists with laying down ascetic rules "for (in order to promote) surfeiting of the flesh;" "such language would defeat its own object by its extravagance." And to describe them as "not . . . for surfeiting of the flesh" would be altogether pointless, as it would also be to speak of them as actually "against surfeiting of the flesh." Evidently, then, προς πληρομονή τ. σαρκός is a

1 For proof of this see Lightfoot's Note on the verse; also Stephens's Thesaurus, s. v. πληρομονή. At the same time it must be allowed that "the majority of the Fathers, Greek and Latin," read the word in a milder sense, as though it might denote legitimate and natural gratification. So Luther, very decidedly.

2 The "excess of riot" described in 1 Peter iv. 3 is an exhibition of πληρομονή τ. σαρκός. Philo uses the word of Noah's drunkenness, in De Sobriet. 1. The Greek proverb, ἔν πληρομονῇ Κύπρος, sufficiently indicates the current associations of the term.
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part of the negative phrase following ἀφείδεια σώματος, and the Apostle is denying to these practices a merit which they claimed or might seem to possess (that of being directed against sensuality), not charging them with a new demerit. But πρὸς πλησμονήν κ. τ. λ. is connected with οὐκ through ἐν τιμῇ τινι, and in his treatment of τιμῇ Lightfoot is not at all so convincing as in regard to πλησμονή. He renders it value, i.e., value in use, utility, efficiency. It is hard to see how his examples justify putting this sense on τιμῇ. Value in the sense of price it often means, of course; but that usage is obviously inapplicable here.¹ 1 Thessalonians iv. 4 gives the only Pauline parallel to ἐν τιμῇ: “That each of you should know how to gain possession of his own vessel (i.e., his body)² in sanctification and honour.” The more closely the two passages are compared, the more one is persuaded, with Alford and Wordsworth, that the use of ἐν τιμῇ is identical in the two cases,³ and expresses a principle of the most vital importance as a part of St. Paul’s moral teaching. The word sanctification in the Thessalonian passage points us again to 1 Corinthians vi. 13–20, where we learn what it is that gives the human body its dignity and sacredness and its imperishable worth, and what it is that most deeply wounds and shamefully tarnishes its honour.⁴ How naturally the idea of honour occurs to St. Paul’s mind

¹ Τιμῇ is price in 1 Cor. vi. 20; vii. 23: elsewhere in St. Paul always honour. Comp. Matt. xxvii. 6; Acts v. 2.
² See Wordsworth’s full and very valuable Note on this passage, as against Alford and Ellicott.
³ This limits the reference of οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ to ἀφείδεια σώματος. Meyer opposes it to ἐν ἱδελθρησκείᾳ κ. τ. λ. as well, on account of the repeated ἐν; but this consideration of itself is of no decisive weight.
⁴ We speak, in common parlance, of a man’s “honour” as consisting in his truthfulness, and a woman’s in her chastity. When shall we be Christians enough to recognize that the one sex is as much dishonoured by impurity as the other?
in connection with the body we see again in 1 Corinthians xii. 22-27. Twice over in the fearful denunciation of Romans i. 18-32 does he speak of dishonour as that which was so deeply branded on the body by the dark and nameless pollutions to which it was subjected in a Paganism where idolatry and unbelief had worked out their last results. To him, therefore, the ascetic rules of these new teachers were sure to present themselves from this point of view; and it particularly concerned him to state whether or not he allowed to their “hard treatment of the body” the honour which it seemed to have, or was perhaps represented to have, as a means of “escaping the corruption that was in the world through lust.” Especially was he bound to be explicit here, and to distinguish between the true and the false asceticism, since there were decided ascetic leanings in his own moral teaching, and certain phrases on record, such as Romans viii. 13; xiii. 14; 1 Corinthians vii. 1; ix. 27, which might easily be made to lend a colour to the Colossian rigorism. Ἀφεῖτελα σώματος he neither could nor did condemn absolutely and in every sense. The language of Philippians iii. 19 (whose god is their belly, and their glory is in their shame) gives us a hint as to the connection of τιμὴ with πρὸς πληθυμονὴν τ. σαρκός, sensual indulgence being there identified with open (shameless) shame, and therefore implicitly opposed to the honour of a man’s person. In the Septuagint, Habakkuk ii. 16 (the Chapter from which, by the way, comes St. Paul’s cardinal quotation, The just shall live by faith), we have an instance of the use of πληθυμονή that may possibly throw some further light on this connection. “Surfeiting of dishonour (πληθυμονὴν ἀτιμίας) from glory drink thou also,” is the
rendering of the LXX. The picture drawn by the prophet is repulsive in the extreme; surfeiting and dishonour appear together at their worst, and are blended in one of those bold expressions which print themselves indelibly on a reader’s memory and are likely to reappear in other forms. As sensual excess brings dishonour, so a right Christian estimate of the dignity of the body is its surest preventive, and St. Paul’s τιμή πρὸς πλησμονήν κ. τ. λ. is (to use a logical phrase) the contrapositive of Habakkuk’s (LXX.) πλησμονή ατιμίας. What prepares us for the hostile sense implied in πρὸς, and in virtue of which it links πλησμονή to τιμή, is that αφειδεία already connotes hostility to something; the Apostle complains that it is the body as such that is the object of this severity, and that it is not, in a way of true honour to the body, directed against indulgence of the flesh. So we may do justice to the sharp antithesis so well insisted on by Meyer between αφειδεία σώματος and πλησμονή τ. σαρκὸς, and yet give οὐκ ἐν τιμῇ τῷ its due place between them, the whole clause being thus drawn together into the closest and most compact unity.

In dealing with the moral and practical side of the Colossian heresy, the Apostle does not therefore simply repeat by way of conclusion, and in a more general manner, what he had said before, but adds a new element of essential moment to his counter argument. He had condemned the moral code of the errorists in Verses 20–22, on the ground of its arbitrariness and pettiness, and the intrinsically trivial and
perishing nature of the objects with which it mainly dealt. Now he lays hold of the inner principle of their entire scheme of morality, its hostility to the body as a physical organism, and a part of material nature. Such treatment, he declares, robs it of its honour and sacredness, and is not directed against that feeding of the flesh in which lies our real peril and dishonour in relation to this "vessel" of our earthly life. St. Paul has, perhaps, reserved this objection to the last in order to give him a suitable starting-point for the exhortations of the next Chapter, where (in Verses 1–4) he shews the only sure way to be delivered from sensual sin, by "seeking and minding the things above, where Christ is," and sets forth the true Christian asceticism (ἀθεωσία τῆς σαρκός indeed) as a "making dead the members that are upon the earth"—that belong to the earthly body of "the old man that is under corruption according to the lusts of deceit."

On its ethical side, therefore, the system of the Colossian heresiarch (the founder and father, shall we say, of Gnosticism?) held out the charm of a lofty and severe morality attainable by simple and plain rules of life and a strict external regimen, but based unhappily on a false and fatal principle—a principle the deadly mischief of which the history of the Church since the time of the Pastoral Epistles has hardly ever ceased to illustrate. It taught men to hate the body and the

1 For we may safely follow Meyer, Ellicott, Lightfoot, Wordsworth, Eadie, &c., in finding in 1 Cor. vi. 13, Matt. xv. 17, the true explanation of Verse 21.
3 In Section 7 of Philo's Quod. Det. Pot. Insid., previously referred to in illustration of ἑρημοκεία, there is also an instructive account of modes then in use of ἀθεωσία σώματος. Those who practise them, Philo says, are to be shewn "the true way of temperance."
4 See again Phil. iii. 19, 20.
natural world instead of hating "the flesh which is not subject to the law of God."

A word or two further is necessary on the connection of the clauses of the 23rd Verse, and then our task is completed. With Lachmann, Lightfoot, and other eminent critics, we may suppose it probable that the καὶ before ἀφειδεῖα should be deleted. And, indeed, that word is not exactly on the same footing as the two previous nouns governed by ἐν. And, in regard to the ἐν which attaches ἐθελοθησκεῖα κ. ταπεινοφροσύνη to λόγον ὥσ ποντὰ σοφίας, we may adopt Ellicott's excellent remark that it points "not to the instrument by which, but, as usual, to the ethical domain in which the λόγος σοφίας was acquired." It was in its mode of developing, combining, and applying its theological and ethical principles that this system exhibited so much "word (and logical form) of wisdom," and assumed the character indeed of a Theosophy.

Gathering up the results of the previous discussion, we may venture to translate as follows: "According to the commandments and teachings of men,—such as have word indeed of wisdom, in zeal for worship and humility, with hard treatment of (the) body—not in any honour (as) against surfeiting of the flesh."

I have already described the incipient Gnosticism of Colossæ as a "compound of intellectual pride, visionary pseudo-mystic spiritualism, and ritualistic fervour," with (may now be added) a harsh and misguided asceticism that, in seeking to reduce the body, succeeded only in debasing and enfeebling the soul.

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