before him, that St. Paul nowhere calls Christ God. On this point I have said enough. It is quite true that (although even Socinus was compelled to admit that the clause which we are discussing refers to Christ) this and the other passage in which Christ is distinctly called God (as Tit. ii. 13; Acts xxi. 28) are grammatically or critically disputable, nor would any one readily quote them in the controversy with Unitarians, because

\[\text{Nil agit exemplum quod litem lite resolvit.}\]

But, while declining here to discuss that question, I simply refer to the passages which I quoted in my last paper, and once more answer Dr. V. Smith that our faith in the Divinity of the Eternal Son by no means rests on two or three isolated texts, but on the witness of History to the truth of all that is written of Christ Jesus, from the beginning to the end of the New Testament. Dr. Smith says that St. Paul "does not appear to have held the Logos doctrine." It would be truer to say that, for sufficient reasons, St. Paul does not use the word Logos. How any one can read the Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians (to say nothing of the Pastoral Epistles) without seeing that St. Paul believed in the essential Divinity of Christ is more than I can pretend to understand.

6. In his last paragraph Dr. Smith tries to shake my subordinate argument about the abruptness of a doxology in Romans ix. 5 by the exceedingly weak analogy of Romans i. 25. This latter Verse is not a doxology at all, and any one who will thoughtfully compare the two passages will see how totally they differ. I refrain from any reiteration of those strong arguments in favour of our Authorized rendering, which Dr. Smith has not so much as touched; and if any one will again read what has been said on both sides, I shall be surprised if he considers that Dr. Smith, with all his learning, has rendered any appreciable assistance to the view which he maintains.

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given. To a book like this the want of the author's eye and hand is an almost absolute loss, even when, as here, the editor has been almost too scrupulously faithful to the \textit{litera scripta} of his author. Yet, as it stands, the book is a legacy to be received with gratitude and regret—gratitude that so much has been given, regret that the hand that gave it can give no more. Indeed, the reader seems ever to sit in the shadow cast by Mr. Herbert's untimely death, the book has lost so much by it, and the cause the book represents. We never knew him, but to know his book is to know that he must have been a man of fine simplicity of spirit, transparent, single-minded, a vigorous and independent thinker, strenuous in his love of truth and in his search after it. To feel that death has deprived us of such a man is to feel how much we have lost.

The strength of the book lies in its criticism; in construction it is much less successful. The author had carefully and exhaustively elaborated his philosophy in its polemical aspects; but as regards its constructive parts, he had manifestly laboured less at either the foundation or superstructure. In his positive sections he says, indeed, much that is true, reasons subtly, speculates ingeniously and boldly; but he does not lay with sufficient breadth his philosophical principles, or handle with sufficient knowledge his philosophical terms and ideas. We do not feel free in the sad circumstances in which the book has appeared to be critical of its terminology and structure, especially as these leave its substantial merits unimpaired. Taken simply as a criticism of what it terms "the Realistic Assumptions of Modern Science," it is altogether worthy of praise. It is directed against the new metaphysic that has appeared disguised as physics. Professor Herbert saw with admirable clearness that certain recent scientific speculations were really metaphysical, though proceeding with the most happy unconsciousness of their own nature; and he directed his criticism to show that the metaphysics and physics are in radical antagonism, that the metaphysical doctrines either disprove or invalidate the physical conclusions. And in this work he is most entirely successful. His very limitations become here excellences. He confines himself to "modern science;" touches philosophy, strictly so called, only where it touches and supports scientific speculation. Hence there is a point in his criticism that comes of their strict relevancy to to-day. He often reasons against our scientific Materialism as we can imagine Bishop Berkeley might have done. It is metaphysically an empirical Idealism, but constructively, a "cosmotheretic Realism." On the psychological or
subjective side it reasons as if empirical Idealism were true, and explains mental processes and phenomena by its principles; on the ontological or objective side it reasons as if Realism were true, and advances its explanation of the universe in harmony with this assumption, yet is meekly unconscious of making it. But the two positions exclude and annihilate each other. If empirical Idealism is true, objective science, or a science of objective things, is, in any real sense, impossible; man can never transcend appearances, or attain the knowledge of truth, as, indeed, there can be no truth for him to know. Hume was the most consistent of modern empiricists, and in his Scepticism Empiricism found its happiest and most logical result. Indeed, it has never got beyond him, or has done so only by doing violence to his first principles. The significance of Hume for our living speculation is just beginning to be understood, and the interesting monograph on him by our most distinguished English physico-philosopher is a happy sign of recognition and appreciation.

It is not necessary to follow in detail the argument by which Mr. Herbert seeks to make good his thesis. To do so would lead us, both in the way of exposition and criticism, far beyond our limits. It may be enough to say, that any criticism we would be inclined to make would leave the substantial value of his argument, so far as critical, untouched. He does most conclusively prove that science cannot explain the connection between brain changes and thought, or combine movements and thoughts in one scheme. Materialism suffers from two radical abilities—the inability to discover any real or causal relation between the physical organism and mental processes, and the inability so to know what is as to construct a science of it. By virtue of the one inability it cannot explain the real phenomena of mind; by virtue of the other it can never reach a science of the universe, must end all its struggles after knowledge by a confession of blank ignorance, by the paralysis of reason, and the negation of morality. This radical incompetence of Materialism is a truth this age needs to be made to recognize, the more that it is so disinclined to recognize it. Physical science has infinite promise in its own sphere, but beyond it its promises are all illusive, can only bewilder and deceive. He who can make this apparent to our age will help it in its search after truth as in its rational and religious faith. And this is the work Mr. Herbert aimed at doing, and what he aimed at doing he has in a greater degree than is granted to many actually done.

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