Josephus, in an interesting passage at the close of his *Antiquities*, after boasting with characteristic self-complacency of his unequalled attainments in all Jewish learning, adds that he had also taken great pains to acquire the learning of the Greeks, and a grammatical mastery of the Greek language. He admits, however, that long familiarity with his native Aramaic had prevented him from gaining an accurate pronunciation of Greek, and tells us, by way of excuse, that his nation generally discouraged the acquisition of many languages, or the attempt to adorn their discourses with smooth periods — accomplishments which they disdained to share with slaves and freedmen.

But the position of St. Paul was very different from that of Josephus. The astute Jewish politician had been trained from early childhood up to the age of twenty-six in Palestine, and mainly in Jerusalem; and it is evident from his silence that he had not, during that time, been a pupil of Gamaliel, the only Rabbi who was sufficiently liberal to encourage, or even to tolerate, "the wisdom of Javan." He therefore grew up in the very head-quarters of the Aramaic dialect; and

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1 Josephus, *Antiq. xx. 11, 2.*
although Palestine was at that period sufficiently bi-
lingual to furnish plenty of opportunities for learning
Greek as a spoken language, it could never have been
to Josephus quite so familiar as his native tongue.
With St. Paul these conditions were reversed. By
birth a Hebrew of the Hebrews, he was by training
a Hellenist. He had grown up, certainly until boy-
hood, in one of the most famous of pagan cities, where
he would only hear Aramaic in the synagogue, and
perhaps sometimes in the family circle, but where he
would hear Greek spoken on every side directly he
stepped into the street. He must have learnt the lan-
guage without any conscious labour, and almost as his
mother-tongue. And when he went to Jerusalem, he
became a member of the school of Gamaliel, which
permitted the study of Greek authors, in order to unite
—at least ideally—the tallith of Shem with the pallium
of Japhet. St. Paul’s Greek is less strictly accurate and
more provincial than that of his famous contemporary,
but it is incomparably more forcible, and probably it
was used with far greater ease. And there was this
further difference between their styles: that while St.
Paul cared very much for what he had to say, he cared
to a much lower degree than Josephus about the man­ner of saying it.¹

The notion, so often repeated, that St. Paul was a
classical scholar, profoundly versed in heathen authors,
is, as I shall prove elsewhere, a complete delusion.
His quotations from Menander, Aratus, and Epime-
nides, are mere stock quotations, of which the two first
occur in more than one writer, and the third is a fami-
liar national proverb. They do not furnish the smallest

¹ 1 Cor. i. 17; ii. 4. οὐκ ἐν πεισεὶς ἀνθρωπίνης σοφίας λόγους.
evidence of an advanced classic culture, the existence of which is decisively disproved both by the omission of all direct references in the Apostle's writings, even where we should naturally look for them, and by the total absence of any traceable impress left by the Greek authors on the most susceptible of intellects. It is, I think, certain that with the great masterpieces of ancient literature—with Homer, with Sophocles, with Plato, with Aristotle—Paul was absolutely unacquainted. There is, indeed, a close resemblance in form between him and one eminent Greek, the historian Thucydides; and a book was written in the last century, by Bauer, called Philologia Thucydideopolina (1773), to shew how closely the two writers resembled each other in their syntaxis ornata, or "figures of speech." And yet no scholar has ever seriously maintained that St. Paul had read Thucydides. The narrative, so full of immortal interest to us, would probably have had little or no interest for a Jew, who, like all the rest of his nation, felt an almost entire indifference for secular history. The resemblances between the banished general and the hunted missionary are due to psychological causes. Both suffered from lifelong and virulent opposition; both stood in a relation of antagonism to the main current of feeling in their nation; both were men whose thoughts were of a nature to strain to the utmost the capacities of language; both, in the endeavour to obtain a direct grasp of conceptions in all their bearings, display "a love of antithesis and contrast, rising, not unfrequently, to paradox;" both were accustomed to let the syllogism of grammar yield to the syllogism of emotion; both,

1 See some excellent remarks in Baur, Patres, ii. 281 (Eng. trans.).
though capable of the most powerful eloquence, display
a certain disdain for literary polish, because, while they
cared much for ideas, they cared little for the form in
which they were expressed. The resemblances would
have been nearly as striking if they had written in
two different languages. It is, no doubt, a curious psy­
chological fact, illustrative alike of St. Paul's peculi­
arities and of his complex training, that “it is in the
dialectical skill of Aristotle, the impassioned appeals
of Demosthenes, the complicated sentences of Thucy­
dides, far more than in the language of Moses or
Solomon, or Isaiah, that the form and structure of his
arguments finds its natural parallel;”—yet at the same
time it is all but certain that with the writings of those
philosophers, orators, and historians, he was very little
or not at all acquainted.

But if Paul be so careless of style as these remarks
would seem to imply, some may feel inclined to ask
whether it is not a misnomer to talk of his rhetoric?
Now as to this I would observe that it is only true to
say that he is careless of style when by style we mean
something polished and artificial. A style may be
faulty, may be liable to a thousand criticisms, may be
too rough or too ornate, or too indifferent to rhythm, or
too neglectful of grammar, and yet may be incom­
parably the best style which a particular man could
have used, because it sprang naturally from his cha­
racter and education, and is therefore most exactly ex­
pressive of himself;—of himself as the complex total
result of his original temperament, and of the modifi­
cations which it has undergone from the myriads of
influences for which he has shewn the greatest affinity.
The best style a man can have is “the style of his
thought.” The style of Æschylus is turgid, that of Aristotle dry, that of Virgil elaborate; yet who would wish to alter a word or line that they have written? We should do wrong to make models of Milton’s impassioned rhapsodies, or Sir Thomas Browne’s quaint Latinisms, or Butler’s emotionless aridity; but should we not have been the losers if they had written otherwise? Of modern writers, Macaulay is antithetic, Ruskin florid, Carlyle almost grotesque; yet we do not wish their style changed, because in each instance the style has “the defects of its qualities,” and is most expressive of the individuality of those great writers. It is not true that Buffon said, “Le style c’est l’homme;” but it is true that he said, “Le style c’est de l’homme;” and, as Grimm remarked about Montesquieu, it is “better to have the style of genius than to have the genius of style.”

Now, if there had been reviewers in the days of St. Paul, they might have passed upon him censures without end. How careless are those unfinished sentences! What ungraceful and tedious repetitions of the same word again and again! What extraordinary confusions of metaphors! What a barbarous cliche! What a vulgar expression! What an obscure sentence! What a violent paradox! What a bitter taunt! If some friendly Atticist or Tarsian professor had got hold of one of the Epistles, to prepare it for publication, he would have made great havoc of it. We should have had whole sentences underscored, and softened down, and squared, and elaborated; graceful variations of the same term; phrases suited to the politest society; all

1 Since writing this sentence I find that “Le style c’est l’homme même” is found in the earliest editions of Buffon, though the de is inserted (perhaps by error) in the later ones.
provincialisms and irregularities removed. So the Epistles of St. Paul might have been made as correct as those of Philostratus; but although it would have been impossible to reduce them to the vapid inanity of the immoral pagan sophist, it would have been but too possible to rob them of their characteristic life. Paul’s arguments would no longer have been thunders; he would no longer have spoken “mere flames;” his phrases would no longer have been half battles; his words would no longer have been “like living creatures, with hands and feet.”

But it is a mistake to imagine that, under these circumstances, we cannot talk of the Apostle’s rhetoric. That word is so ignorantly misused by writers who pour forth their judgments on all conceivable subjects, that it is now understood to be a condemnation to call a writer “rhetorical.” By that expression it is meant to be understood that he is artificially elaborate, that he is insincerely eloquent, that he goes out of his way to find ornamentation, that he only cares for what is called fine writing. It has become a sort of reproach, which might be levelled equally at the μυροβραχεῖς cícinni of Mæcenas and “the sevenfold chorus of hallelujahs and harping symphonies” of Milton’s prose. But what is rhetoric? It is nothing more or less than the art of expression; and that art may be inspired by genuine emotion, and come in the form of perfectly natural and spontaneous utterance. The style of a writer who is powerfully swayed by his feelings often seems to be modelled into conformity with certain artificial figures of speech, only because those very figures of speech—as is proved by their existing in all languages—are the immediate result of psychological in-
fluences. If rhetoric in general were my subject, it
would be easy to shew that there is not a figure of
speech which does not exist in the literature of every
civilized language, whether Aryan or Semitic, and which
is not found in the earliest recorded specimens of those
literatures. I have in part shewn this in my Chapters
on Language; and in the Brief Greek Syntax I have
quoted numerous instances to shew that many of the
figures of Greek rhetoricians were equally familiar
to Hebrew prophets. But, setting figures of speech
aside for the moment, a passage is rhetorical when
it expresses what it has to express in such a manner
as to bring it home with the utmost vigour to the
mind of the hearer or reader. It is rhetorical when the
thought owes something of its power of appeal to the
form in which it is expressed no less than to its intrin­
sic force. In this sense St. Paul, like all the
greatest writers in the world, is at times over­whelm­
ingly rhetorical—rhetorical with the rhetoric of a deep
emotion and an intense individuality.

Take, as a remarkable instance, the passage (Rom.
ii. 17-23) on which I touched in a former paper, and
which, following the correct reading, and bringing out
the force of the words, may be rendered as follows:—
"But if thou bearest the proud name of Jew, and re­
posest on the law, and boastest in God, and dost
recognize the Will, and discriminatest things trans­
cendent, and art confident that thyself art a leader of
blind men, a light of them in darkness, an instructor of
fools, a teacher of babes, having a form of knowledge
and of truth in the law—thou, then, that teachest
another, dost thou not teach thyself? Preacher against
theft, art thou a thief? Forbidden of adultery, art thou
an adulterer? Loather of idols, dost thou rob temples?” Now, it would have been perfectly easy to express every thought in this passage in an entirely unrhetorical manner. The rhetoric consists, first, in the consummate irony of the apparently respectful picture of a Pharisee in all the full-blown prestige of sanctimonious dignity—and then the aposiopesis by which the sentence is broken off, the hypothesis unfinished, the construction changed, and, with a most unexpected apostrophe, the interlocutor is suddenly overwhelmed with a series of crushing questions. The very splendour and force of the passage lie in that element which we should characterize, and rightly characterize, as powerfully rhetorical.

Take another celebrated passage—the sixth Chapter of the Second Epistle to the Corinthians. As he dictates that passage to his amanuensis, St. Paul seems to be struck with the spontaneous outburst of his own inspired eloquence, and pauses in the midst of it to say to the Corinthians, “Corinthians! our mouth has been opened to you, and our heart has been broadened,” in order that he may found on this open-hearted passion of words the appeal: “Ye are not being straitened in us”—there is no compression, no limitation, in my love for you—“but ye are being straitened in your own feelings”—the coldness, the want of effusive sympathy, is with you. “I speak to you, then, as to children. Pay me back in kind: be ye, too, broadened in sympathy to me.” But wherein consists the eloquence and rhetoric of the previous passage, in which he feels that he has poured out his very heart? St. Paul might have given, in the most specific and unrhetorical way, a catalogue of his persecutions and sufferings;
but in this Chapter the power of his description of what a Christian missionary should be, lies almost entirely in its rhetorical features—in its copia verborum, in its balanced rhythm, its varied use of the same preposition (ἐν), its sudden change (Verse 7) to another preposition (διὰ), and then in the sudden outburst of striking antitheses:

“As deceivers and true; as being ignored yet fully recognized; as dying, and behold we live! as being chastened, and not being slain; as grieving, yet ever rejoicing; as paupers, yet enriching many; as having (ἔχοντες) nothing, and having all things to the full (κατέχοντες).”—Here we have not only antithesis and striking paradox, and the picturesque working out of a conception (ἐπεξεργασία), but also that equality of clauses and assimilation of endings which was known to Greek rhetoric as parisonis and paromoiosis,\(^1\) and which would come all the more naturally to St. Paul from his familiarity with the antithetic parallelisms of Hebrew poetry. Not only in this Chapter, but throughout this impassioned latter section of the Epistle (which some have regarded as a separate letter), St. Paul is evidently in what is called a rhetorical mood, which is merely equivalent to saying that he is writing with deep emotion. And it is remarkable that the same features of style invariably appear when he is referring to that “Iliad of woes” his missionary life. In 1 Corinthians iv. 8-11 we find it mixed with a most biting irony. In 2 Corinthians xi. 26 the colour of the picture is heightened by the repetition of the words

\(^1\) Aristotle, Rhet. iii. 9, 9, of which 2 Cor. vi. affords abundant illustrations e.g., “As dying, and, behold, we live” (general antithesis, ἀντικειμένη); ὡς λυτοθυμοῦντες οἷον εἰς χαίροντες, &c. (parisonis of periods); παιδευόμενοι καὶ μὴ βαθαντικῶς (paromoiosis of final syllables); to say nothing of the paronomasia of ἔχοντες and ἀνέχοντες.
"in perils" eight times in one verse, which, except for the purpose of rhetoric, is entirely needless, but was known to the ancient rhetoricians as *epanaphora*. It is a figure by no means infrequent in the writings of St. Paul. There is a fine instance of it in Philippians iv. 8: "Finally, brethren, whatsoever things are real, whatsoever things are venerable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovable, whatsoever things are of good report; if there be any virtue, if there be any praise, think on these things." And again in Philippians ii. 1: "If then there be any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any participation of the Spirit, if any emotions and compassions, fulfil my joy." Another striking instance of this figure may be found in 2 Corinthians vii. 11:

Ancient grammarians held it sufficient to divide all figures of speech into *figures of language* (*figurae verborum, elocutionis, λέξεως*) and *figures of thought* (*sententiae, διανοιας*). Aquila, a grammarian of the age of the Antonines, follows Cicero and other ancient authorities when he draws this distinction between them, that *figures of speech* disappear if you alter the words or their order, whereas *figures of thought* remain unimpaired by such a process. But this classification is obviously superficial and unsatisfactory, and the distinction is only one of the roughest kind. It is a somewhat better arrangement to distinguish figures as falling under the heads of—

1. *Figures of colour, i.e.,* those which are due to the imagination, such as personification, simile, metaphor, allegory, metonymy, catachresis, &c.

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2. **Figures of form**, whether due to passion or to conscious art,—which range over an immense field from the natural expressions of emotion to the merest elegances of verbal ornament; from the animation of irony and aposiopesis to such mere variations of style as zeugma, or of order, as *hysteron proteron* and *chiasmus*.

3. Figures depending mainly on the analogies of words, on unconscious association of ideas, on resemblances of sound, such as *alliteration, parasisos, homoeteleuton, parechasis, paronomasia*, and plays on names.

Now I do not at all intend to enter into an exhaustive discussion of the nature and origin of figures of speech, which would require a volume; or to furnish a complete and careful list of St. Paul's figures of speech, which would require more time than I can at present devote to the subject. But while I think it possible that the youthful Saul may have attended classes in the schools of Tarsus, in which he learnt the rudiments of Stoicism—an interesting question which I cannot now pursue—it seems to me not only possible, but extremely probable, that he had attended classes of Greek rhetoric, and gained a tincture of that then-prevalent training. That this was the case will, I think, hardly fail to be the inference of all who consider merely so much evidence as I shall furnish in this paper.

On **figures of colour** I shall not touch. The Dean of Chester has published a little book on the metaphors of St. Paul, which deals to a certain extent with that branch of the subject. I will merely mention, in passing, the obvious circumstance that nearly all St. Paul's metaphors are social, agonistic, or military; and that.
through all his Epistles, almost the only metaphor which he derives from natural objects is that of the grafting of the wild olive branch into the fruitful stock, which, singularly enough, is founded on a method of grafting either non-existent or extremely rare.

But coming to the second head, figures of form, the instances are not only numerous, but are as varied as are the currents of human passion. Of these I will furnish a few specimens.

(1) *Chiæmus* is a name derived from the Greek letter *Chi* (χ), because in it words are arranged crosswise. It is extremely common in Latin. Thus in such a sentence as, "Ratio consentit, oratio repugnat," which would be the natural order of the words, a Latin writer, influenced partly by the parechysis, or resemblance of sounds, would be almost certain to write, as Cicero does—

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Ratio consentit,} \\
\times \\
\text{Repugnat oratio.} \\
\end{align*}
\]

placing the two substantives last, and the two verbs in the middle, as in the sentence—

He hath filled the hungry with good things;
The rich he hath sent empty away;

or in Milton's lines—

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Reason'd high} \\
\text{Of freedom and foreknowledge, will and fate,} \\
\text{Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute.}
\end{align*}
\]

There is a striking instance of this figure in the arrangement of the clauses in Romans ii. 6, 10, where the results of good and evil actions are stated twice over, but the glory and honour which shall follow

\[\text{Cicero, De Fin. iii. 3.}\]
patient well-doing are put at the beginning and end, as though to leave the first and last, and therefore the strongest impression, while the punishments of evil-doing are put twice over in the interspace. Bengel has called frequent attention to the use of this figure, which is, however, more common in the Epistle to the Hebrews than in the Epistles of St. Paul. It will be found in nearly every instance that even such changes of order have their own significance. How far more forcible, for instance, than the English is the Greek of 1 Corinthians iii. 17: \(\text{Εἴ τοὺς τῶν ναῶν τοῦ Θεοῦ φθείρει, φθείρει τοῦτον ὁ Θεός.}\)

(2) **Euphemism** is the employment of pleasant or harmless words for unpleasant things. It may arise from many different feelings. Among the Greeks it mainly originated in the dread of evil omens, which they carried to such an extent that *euphemein* and *favere linguis*, which originally meant "to speak words of good omen," came to mean "to be silent," because if, during a sacrifice or any solemn event, any words were used at all, some ill-omened word might slip out among them, and vitiate the entire ceremony. Hence they called the Furies the "gentle ones;" they spoke of a prison as "a house;" of an executioner as "a public officer;" of dying as "something happening;" &c. That "beautiful bright people," as Faber says,

\[
\text{Hesitated still} \\
\text{To offend the blessed presences} \\
\text{Which earth and ocean fill;} \\
\text{Their tongues, elsewhere so eloquent,} \\
\text{Stammer'd at words of ill.}
\]

Now, of this kind of euphemism there is naturally little or no trace in St. Paul, because he had none of the superstition in which it had its root; nor has he any of
that glozing hypokorisma, which puts a varnish upon deeds which men are not ashamed to do, but which their tongues hold it vile to name. To St. Paul death is death, infamy is infamy, and a lie a lie. But we do find in him the honourable euphemism which refrains from needlessly using coarse expressions. His language never wounds the most delicate sense of modesty. When duty requires, he can tear very rudely open the veil of Cotytto; yet when there is no such necessity, he not only adopts the most refined language, as in 1 Corinthians v. 1, 2 (ἐχεώ . . . ὁ τὸ ἐργον τοῦτο ποιήσας) and 2 Corinthians vii. 11 (ἐν τῷ πράγματι), but even does so to an extent which, in some instances (e.g., in 1 Thess. iv. 6), entirely and happily obliterates for modern readers the dark and terrible sense which his words had for the early Greek Fathers, as well as for his pagan contemporaries. It would have been better for the Church had all her writers imitated herein his modest reserve and "chaste bashfulness" of language. It is often a duty and a necessity to speak of sin. It can be rarely right to speak of it with wounding and brutal plainness. Language fails of its purpose, warning loses its power, if it is easy to miss its real meaning; but language, in order to be intelligible, does not need to become vile and coarse.

(3) Analogous in some respects to euphemism is litotes. The word properly means "smoothness," but it is a technical expression for meiosis, or "lessening." It consists of the intentional use of an expression much less strong than the one which is intended and required. It is, in fact, the suggestion of a strong notion by the employment of an over-weak form of speech. The mental correction supplied by the reader
comes with all the more force because of its artistic suppression by the writer. Thus, if in speaking of the cannibal tyrant of Egypt, Virgil calls him "the unpraised Busiris," the reader instantly supplies with more indignation the thought, "unpraised? nay, execrable." And when Pope writes—

Narcissa's nature, tolerably mild,  
To make a wash would hardly stew a child;

he conveys more strongly by his litotes the intended impression of the cruel recklessness of womanly vanity. This is a figure which, by a Hebrew idiom, runs through the Hellenistic Greek of the New Testament, as far as the use of the negative is concerned, as in οὐ δικαωθήσεται πᾶσα σὰρξ—"all flesh shall not be justified," for "no flesh shall be justified." But St. Paul makes deliberate use of it in such passages as 1 Corinthians xi. 22: "What am I to say to you? shall I praise you in this? I praise you not;" Romans i. 28: "God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do the things which are not convenient;" Ephesians v. 4: "Neither filthiness, nor foolish talking, nor jesting, which are not convenient;" 1 Corinthians v. 6: "The subject of your boasting is not good." In Philemon 18 he uses of the theft of Onesimus the euphemism of charity when he says, "If he hath wronged thee, or oweth thee ought;" and he again employs litotes when of this once untrustworthy fugitive he writes, "which in time past was to thee"—he will not write "injurious," but—"unprofitable."

(4) Proparaitesis, or "previous deprecation," and protherapeia, which the Latins called captatio benevolentiae, is the very common rhetorical method by which
a speaker or writer feels his way before making a difficult or offensive statement, or tries to conciliate beforehand the kindly feeling of his hearers or readers. We have very different instances of it in the false and fulsome flattery of Tertullus to Felix, compared with the perfectly true yet dignified and respectful address of Paul to this Procurator and afterwards to Agrippa. We have a marked instance of it in the solemn and pathetic attestation with which he prefaces the stern conclusion of the ninth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. We have specimens of it in the prefatory thanksgiving of every general Epistle, with the single exception of that to the Galatians. He had to speak to the Corinthians many bitter truths, yet he begins his letter even to the Corinthians with thanks to God for the gifts and graces which He had bestowed upon them.

(5) Paraleipsis, or praeteritio (also called occupatio),1 is an ingenious method of saying something which the writer says he will pass over, but to which nevertheless he wishes to allude. We have marked instances of it in Philemon 19: “I will repay thee—not to say to thee that thou owest to me even thyself besides.” 1 Thessalonians v. 1: “Of the times and seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you.” The same convenient form occurs in 1 Thessalonians iv. 9, and in 2 Corinthians ix. 1.

(6) Zeugma is a figure by which, often out of mere carelessness, one verb is attached to two nouns of which it only suits the meaning of one, but naturally suggests a verb which is suitable for the other. It is a rare figure in English and in modern languages, partly perhaps because it requires in the reader a quicker

1 Auct. ad Herenn. iv. 27.
THE RHETORIC OF ST. PAUL.

apprehension than modern authors can rely on, and partly because the immense multiplication of modern literature has rendered it necessary that every sentence, so far as its form is concerned, should be comprehensible at a glance to readers whose time is limited. There is a figure akin to it called syllepsis, which, though often confounded with zeugma, is different from it. In syllepsis the same verb applies equally to two different nouns, but in a different sense. In English there is scarcely an instance of this which is not intentionally comic, as in Pope's remark about Prince Eugene, "This general is a great taker of snuff as well as of cities." Except occasionally in poetry, it always produces a comic effect, even when seriously intended, as when Lord Carlisle, in his Sieges of Vienna, said of Sobieski, that "he flung his powerful frame into the saddle, and his great soul into the cause." We are not surprised that there is no marked instance of syllepsis in the epistles of St. Paul, because it is for the most part a very technical and poetic figure. The nearest approach to it (I think) is in Galatians i. 10: "Am I now carrying favour with (πελθω) men, or (conciliating) God?" But he has at least two striking examples of zeugma: one in 1 Corinthians iii. 2: "I gave you (to drink) milk, not meat;" the other in 1 Timothy iv. 3: "hindering to marry" [commanding, understand κελευόντων out of κωλυόντων], "to abstain from meats." To these expressions there is a remarkable parallel in St. Chrysostom, who says: "This I say, not as hindering you from forming connections, but" (bidding you) "to do this with moderation."
OXYMORON ("sharply-foolish") is the paradoxical juxtaposition of opposite words, and we should naturally expect instances of it in any writer whose thoughts are often clothed in antithetic forms. It is, in fact, antithesis of the strongest kind reduced to the briefest compass, and sometimes existing in a single word, like *bittersweet*, γλυκύπικρος, θρασύδειλος, &c. It is found in Hebrew in such phrases as "drunken, but not with wine," and is frequent both in our poets and prose-writers, as in Shakespeare's—

Dove-feather'd raven, fiend angelical;
Beautiful tyrant, wolfish-ravening lamb;

or Spenser's—

Glad of such luck, the *luckless lucky* maid
Did her content to please their feeble eyes;

or in Tennyson's—

His honour rooted in dishonour stood,
And faith unfaithful kept him falsely true.

But it is specially prevalent in Greek and Latin, as in such well-known phrases as γάμος ἄγαμος, impietate pia est, &c.; St. Paul's oxymoron, "Dying, and, behold, we live;" ¹ and, "She that liveth in pleasure is dead while she liveth" (ζωὰ τῆς ηῆκεν),² is a favourite one. We have, for instance, such lines as—

τις οἶδεν εἰ τὸ ζῆν μὲν ἵστη καθαναίν,
τὸ καθαναῖν δὲ ζῆν;
(Who knows if life be death, and death be life?)

which struck the ancients as so startling a paradox; and Dryden's—

The dead shall live, the living die,
And music shall untune the sky.

The Apostle uses this figure in Romans i. 20: τὰ . . .

¹ 2 Cor. vi. 9.
² 1 Tim. v. 6.
His unseen things are clearly seen."

Romans xii. 11: τῇ σπουδῇ μὴ ὁκνηρόι—"In haste, not sluggish."

3 Thessalonians iv. 11: φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ἡσυχίαν—"To be ambitious to be quiet." (Comp. Acts v. 41, "They were deemed worthy to suffer shame.")

1 Corinthians viii. 10: οἰκοδομηθῆσαι εἰς τὸ τὰ εἰδωλόθυτα ἐσθῆναι—"Shall be built up into eating idol-offerings:" "ruinous edification." (Comp. Tertullian's aedificari in ruinam, Praescr. 3.)

Romans i. 22: φάσκοντες εἰναι σοφοὶ ἐμφράνθησαν—"Alleging themselves to be wise, they were befooled." This phrase will remind the reader of the insaniens sapientia of Horace,—the term which he applied to his false philosophy.

In Ephesians vi. 15, as part of the panoply of war, we have the preparedness (ἐτοιμασία) of the gospel of peace.

2 Corinthians viii. 2: "Their deep poverty abounded to the wealth of their liberality. (Comp. the word πτω-χοπλούσιος.)

2 Corinthians vii. 10: (μετάνοιαν ... ἀμεταμέλητων) "Repentance not to be repented of." Here the oxymoron is stronger in the English than in the Greek.

We come now to the third division of figures. Some instances of oxymoron also fall under the head of PARONOMASIA (the Latin annominatio), a figure of which St. Paul is peculiarly fond. There are two kinds of paronomasia. One is a change of meaning in a word caused by the alteration of a single letter;¹

¹ "Parva verbi immutatio in litterâ posita." Cicero, De Orat. ii. 63; Auct. ad Herenn. iv. 21; Quint. ix. 3, 66, &c.
the other is, more generally, a play upon words which have some kind of resemblance, either in sound only or also in meaning. The first class of paronomasias may be illustrated by Shelley’s line—

And like a cloud dyed in the dying day;

the second, by Sheridan’s correction of his remark about Gibbon: “Luminous, did I say? I meant voluminous.” An instance of this kind is found in James i. 6: “He that wavereth is like a wave of the sea,” where it does not occur in the original; and one of the former kind in the Prayer-book: “Among all the changes and chances of this mortal life.” Both classes of paronomasia are found in St. Paul. Of the first we have no less than three instances in the first chapter of the Romans.

Romans i. 29: πορνεία, πονηρία, . . . φθόνον, φόνον. Romans i. 31: ἀσυνέτος, ἀσυνιθέτος. Again we find it in Romans xi. 17: τινες τῶν κλάδων ἐξεκλάσθησαν. And in Hebrews v. 8 we have the common instance, ἐμαθεν ἄφ' ὄν ἐπαθεν, which is found in the proverb παθήματα μάθημα, nocumenta documenta.¹

(1) The other form of paronomasia, a play on words of similar sound, is perhaps the most frequent of all St. Paul’s rhetorical figures. It often consists in the change of preposition in a compound verb, as in 2 Corinthians iii. 2: “Ye are our epistle, known and read (γνωσκομένη καὶ ἀναγνωσκομένη) of all men.” This particular play of words is found in the well-known

¹ Alliteration (1 Cor. ii. 13; 2 Cor. v. 22; ix. 8, &c.) sometimes almost amounts to paronomasia. St. Paul is so fond of this figure, that it even leads him to the use of most unusual words, as παθηματική, in Gal. v. 8. Comp. Rom. iii. 3; xvi. 2 (παραστήτης . . . προστάτης); Ephes. i. 23; iii. 19; Gal. iv. 17; 1 Tim. i. 8.
story of Julian returning the New Testament to St. Basil, with the untranslatable
paronomasias, 'Ἀνέγραψεν ἐγών κατέγραψεν' to which the Saint replied, Ἀνέγραψεν οὐκ ἐγών ἐὰν κατέγραψεν ('You read it, but understood not; for, had you understood, you would not have condemned.' Compare Acts viii. 30.

Other instances are—

(2) Philippians iii. 2, 3: the famous contrast of genuine spiritual circumcision (περιτομή) and the mere physical mutilation of concision (κατατομή).

(3) Romans i. 28: "And as they refused (οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν) to have God in knowledge, God gave them up to a refuse (ἀδόκιμον) mind." Here the force of the words is remarkable. It shews that the punishment was in kind: sin was the punishment of sin.

(4) Romans ii. 1: "For wherein thou judgest (κρίνεις) another thou condemnest (κατακρίνεις) thyself." Similarly, in 1 Corinthians xi. 29–31, the play on the words "judgment," "discernment," "condemnation" (κρίνειν, διακρίνειν, κατακρίνειν), which derives such force from the paronomasia, is lost in the English. Not only do we miss the lesson that if discernment (διάκρισις) be neglected, the retribution comes as a judgment (κρίμα), which is intended only as a Divine education (παιδευ-όμεθα), but which, if ineffectual, leads to condemnation (κατάκριμα), but we also lose inevitably the force and beauty of the figure in the original Greek.

(5) Romans xii. 3: "Not to be highminded (ὑπερφρο-νεῖν) above what he ought to be minded (φρονεῖν), but to be minded to be soberminded (σωφρονεῖν)." This elaborate paronomasia resembles the famous οὐ φρονίματι μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ καταφρόνηματι of Thucydides ii. 62.

(6) 1 Corinthians viii. 31: "Using (χρώμενοι) this world,
as not using it to the full” (καταχρώμενοι). Compare 
πρα on 2 Corinthians vi. 10 (ἐχοντες ... κατέχοντες), 
and 2 Corinthians v. 4 (ἐκδύσασθαι ... ἐπενδύσασθαι).

(7) 2 Corinthians iv. 8: “Perplexed (ἀπορούμενοι), but 
not in despair” (ἐξαπορούμενοι). Comp. 2 Corinthians 
v. 4.

(8) 2 Timothy iii. 4: “Lovers of pleasure (φιλήδονοι) 
more than lovers of God” (φιλόθεοι).

(9) 2 Thessalonians iii. 11: “Not busy, but busybodies” 
(μηδὲν ἐργαζόμενος ἀλλὰ περιεργαζόμενος). This keen 
paronomasia, which St. Paul repeats in 1 Timothy 
v. 13 (οὐ μόνον δὲ ἀργαὶ ἀλλὰ καὶ ... περιεργαῖ), “Busy in 
the female school of idleness,” makes me think that St. 
Paul must have been familiar with the Latin proverb, 
strenua inertia, “busy idleness,” and that he may even 
have heard the story of Domitius Afer, who described 
Mallius Sura† as one of a class who were non agentes, 
seď satagentes.

(10) 2 Corinthians x. 12: ἐγκρίναι ἢ συγκρίναι εαυτοὺς 
κ.τ.λ. Here it is impossible in English to reproduce 
the paronomasia.

It has been supposed by some writers that, since 
Paul probably thought in Syriac, there are traces of 
paronomasia in his thoughts where they do not appear 
in his Greek. Thus, in 1 Corinthians i. 23, 24, the 
words in Syriac might be: “We preach Christ crucified, 
to the Jews a stumbling-block (micsol), and to the 
Greeks folly (mashcal); but to them that are called, 
both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and 
the wisdom (secel) of God.” But conjectures of this 
kind are apt to degenerate into mere plays of the 
fancy.²

¹ Quint. vi. 3, 54. ² See Glass, Philologia Sacra, p. 959.
The ancients of all nations were more fond than the moderns of what we should call plays, or puns, on names. We regard it as an instance of frigidity (ψυχρότης) and bad taste. Macaulay rebukes the tendency to it in Southey, and classical commentators heap abuse on Æschylus for his fondness for these “cold etymologies.” Nevertheless, we find them in even the most classic of modern writers, and Wordsworth does not hesitate to begin his poem to Charles Lamb with the lines—

From the most gentle creature nursed in fields
Had been derived the name he bore.

Of this particular play of words there are, I think, clear traces in St. Paul. Pleading for Onesimus, he says, with an obvious reference to the meaning of his name “Profitable:” “Yea, brother, may I profit by thee (ἐγὼ σοι δοκιμασίαν) in the Lord” (Verse 20); as before he had said, “My son ‘Profitable,’ once to thee ‘unprofitable,’ but now ‘profitable’ to thee and to me” (Verse 11). It is true that here the words for “unprofitable” and “profitable” are not from the same root as Onesimus, probably because there was no such word as anonesimos in Greek. There is, indeed, anonetos; but on the one hand the paronomasia was all the more graceful for being a little softened down, and on the other it is not impossible that the words actually used (euchrestos, achrestos) may themselves involve another delicate play on words. It is well known that the ancients confused the name Christos, “anointed,” a word which had purely Semitic connotations, with the common word chrestos, “excellent,” and hence they spoke of the Christians as Chrestians. Now the Christians in no wise objected to this mispronunciation,
since it paid an involuntary compliment to their moral character, to which more than one of the ancient Fathers alludes. That the error began very early is clear from the fact that Suetonius attributes the expulsion of the Jews from Rome to their incessant tumults at the instigation of an agitator named Chrestus. Most historians have agreed that, since no person of that name is alluded to in contemporary history, the Romans, knowing nothing of the nature of Messianic disputes between Jews and Christians at Rome, in which the name Christus was often mentioned, imagined him to be some living person, whose name they misunderstood and mispronounced. If so, the error had already begun to be current in St. Paul's days, and he may mean to imply, not only that Onesimus is now "profitable," and no longer "unprofitable," but, further, that he is now no longer "Christless," but "a good Christian.

It must be borne in mind that, in the prevailing itacism of that day, between achrestos and achristos there would be hardly an appreciable difference of pronunciation.

I see another such play on names in Philippians iv. 3. After beseeching two Philippian ladies—Euodias and Syntyche—to reconcile their differences, he adds: "And I beg thee also, true yokefellow, assist these women, seeing that they were fellow-wrestlers of mine in the gospel." In this passage the word Sygyge (Σύγγυγος) has usually been understood as an ordinary noun, and has been supposed to apply to Clement, to Lydia, to St. Peter, and even (by Clement of Alexandria) to Paul's wife! I have very little doubt that it was a proper name—the name of Syzygus, a Philippian convert. If so, to call him "true Syzygus"—yokefellow by name and yokefellow
by nature—would be a genuinely Attic play of words, which might be paralleled by scores of passages in the Greek tragedians, and indeed in all poets, down to Shakespeare's

O Hero, what a hero hadst thou been!

or—

Thou, Leonatus, art the lion's whelp,
The fit and apt construction of thy name.

The only objection to this view, which gives to the passage an appropriateness which it receives from no other interpretation, is that the name Syzygus—though a perfectly natural name—does not occur elsewhere. This, however, would by no means disprove the application of the passage. There must have been scores of names, especially in the provinces, of which no trace has come down to us, and Syzygus, as a proper name, would simply have to take its place with other hapax legomena, such as occur in every writer. Who would have doubted that there were "Politarchs" at Thessalonica, though not a single writer mentions them except St. Luke, and though the word only occurs in one single inscription?

St. Jerome thinks that he discovers a more latent instance of this kind of annominatio in Galatians i. 6, where he supposes that in the words, "ye are so soon being removed" (μετατιθεσθε), St. Paul refers to the resemblance of the name Galatae to the Hebrew Galal, "to roll."

I might have adduced many other instances of Paul's figures of rhetoric, such as—

**Climax.** Romans v. 3, 5; viii. 29, 30; x. 14, 15, &c.

**Anadiplosis,** or the forcible repetition of words. Romans ix. 30; Philippians ii. 8, &c.
Epanodos, or inverted repetition of words. Galatians ii. 16, &c.

Epanorthosis, or forcible correction of a weak or insufficient expression. Romans viii. 34; Galatians ii. 2, iii. 4, &c.

And to these might be added asyndeton (1 Cor. xv. 43; 1 Tim. i. 17; 2 Tim. ii. 3–5, 10, 11, &c.), polysyndeton, antiptosis (Col. iv. 17; Gal. vi. 1; iv. 11), synathroismos (Rom. i. 16–32; 2 Cor. xii. 20; Gal. v. 19, &c.), &c., but I spare the reader a multitude of these technical names, which might easily be added. This much, at any rate, is certain, that the figures of Greek Rhetoric occur in St. Paul far more frequently and in a far more specific way than they do in the other writers of the New Testament. I think, then, that I have furnished some evidence in favour of the thesis with which I started—namely, that it is far from improbable that, as a boy in Tarsus, he had attended some elementary class of rhetoric, which, indeed, may have been only a part of his education in the grammatical knowledge of the Greek language. Tarsus was at this time a university town, in which there were many professional rhetoricians; and there was no branch of rhetoric to which, in the age of the emperors, more attention was paid than to the study and elucidation of rhetorical figures. They had commanded the attention alike of eminent philosophers and obscure grammarians. If St. Paul’s parents intended from the

1 I do not reckon anakolouthon, or unfinished construction, among St. Paul’s figures of speech, because his numerous anakolutha are accidental, not rhetorical. They are due to his eagerly pressing forward with his subject, as in Rom. xvi. 25–27; ii. 17–21; i. 8; 1 Cor. xi. 18; Col. i. 22, &c. The mere change into a participle or other construction is hardly to be accounted an anakolouthon, as in Eph. iv. 2; Col. iii. 16, &c. Perhaps the nearest approach to a rhetorical anakolouthon in St. Paul is Gal. ii. 6; 2 Thess. ii. 3, 7.
first to send him to the school of Gamaliel, they would naturally be aware of the cosmopolitan liberality for which that school was celebrated. To some of the Rabbis—as we see from the Talmud—a knowledge of Greek learning opened a career of ambition; and the Pharisee of Tarsus, seeing the brilliant capacity of the youthful Saul, may have thought that an elementary training in Greek Rhetoric, for which the city of his home offered exceptional facilities, would be the best way of preparing his son for future distinction among the Hillelites of Jerusalem. If so, the lessons which he had learnt were not thrown away, though they were applied to very different objects than had at all been dreamt of by one who meant his boy to be like himself—a Pharisee of Pharisees, a Hebrew of Hebrews.

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THE SOLILOQUY OF JOB.
SECOND MONOLOGUE. (CHAPTER XXXI.)

And yet, radical and mournful as is the change in the whole tone and tenour of his life, it is utterly unprovoked. It springs solely from the change in God, who has withdrawn his presence from him and become "very cruel," although he has done nothing to

blunt his love,
Or lose the good advantage of his grace,
By seeming cold or careless of his will.

On the contrary, as he proceeds to shew in Chapter xxxi., he has made that Will the one rule both of his inward and of his outward life.

This Chapter is perhaps the most lovely in the whole Poem, and its theme is worthy of the exquisite