

noting the more softened tone and plaintive mood into which Job has fallen, and as fitly introducing the sweeter and purer strain of pensive recollection contained in the following Chapter. No careful reader of the Hebrew, or even of the English, can fail to notice the melodious close in which this section of Job's Elegy dies away. The Verse has a tender and a "dying fall." The harp and the pipe are instruments of mirth: and by the words,

My harp is changed to mourning,  
And my pipe to notes of grief,

Job at once recalls his delights, and affirms that all his delights are now "converted to their opposites." The festive and joyous music of his life has broken into harsh discords; instead of merry tunes, nothing is to be heard but doleful and dissonant cries. In fine, as in the previous Chapter we have seen him in all the happy wealth and abundance of his Autumn prime, so in this Chapter

That time of year we may in him behold  
When yellow leaves, or few, or none, do hang  
Upon those boughs which shake against the cold,  
Bare ruin'd choirs, where late the sweet birds sang.

S. COX.

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## A WORD STUDY IN THE NEW TESTAMENT.<sup>1</sup>

### PART II.

It will be seen from this cursory survey that Greek philosophy was in some respects by its contents an anticipation, in others by its deficiencies a premonition, of the Biblical ethics of "blessedness." Not in *inwardness* shall we find the difference, but rather in the fun-

<sup>1</sup> See *Part I.* of this article in THE EXPOSITOR for May.

damental conditions of that inwardness, its relations, its development, and its possibilities. The philosophers, no less than those to whom a clearer revelation came, were conscious of a "blessedness" surpassing "happiness"<sup>1</sup> (*εὐτυχία*, "good luck") in its ordinary acceptation. With one accord the nobler schools laid its foundation in moral excellence, not in outward prosperity, nor even in outward prosperity as the result of moral excellence; but defined *εὐδαιμονία* and *μακαριότης* (their rarer word) as "well-being," "the good of the soul." Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and even Epicurus, welded virtue and true happiness inseparably together. With them the *εὐδαιμονία* of the truly wise man was not destroyed by "poverty, need, sickness, or any other adversity."<sup>2</sup> But they failed to allow for the perversion of the will, the feebleness which does the evil that it would not, the depravity which knows to do good, and does it not. Aristotle, indeed, with a more subtle and practical analysis, recognized the influence of the will upon knowledge and the judgment, the force of practice for the advancement of virtue, and the intimate connection of "rational virtuous activity" with happiness. But he deemed preliminary disposition a necessity, and could see no way out of his ethical circle—"Be virtuous, act virtuously, and you will acquire virtue, and therefore happiness." Dimly groping, he seems in one place, it is true, to descry afar off the possibility of a change of heart. "Men ought to pray," says he, "that absolute goods may be goods relatively to themselves, and they ought to choose

<sup>1</sup> Compare Carlyle, *Sartor Resartus*. "There is something higher than happiness, and that is blessedness."

<sup>2</sup> Compare Plato, *Republic*, x. 613.

those things which are relatively good.”<sup>1</sup> But the groping is dim indeed. Again, the great philosophical schools, and not least the Stoics, grasped the consciousness of man’s dignity, and the idea that virtue and happiness were found only in unity with the divine. But the divinity of man remained, in reality, a theory, and the Stoic “grieflessness” and “rational suicide” were only signs, in an extreme form, of that sense of an unconquerable “necessity” of disorder which haunted even Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle with the spectre of the impossible, because they had seen no image of incarnate perfection, and knew not of any transforming power. Without any clear conception of the divine, they could not know exactly in what it differed from the human, and therefore what separated God and man, or what would unite them. Their idea consequently of happiness through harmony with the divine, could not be otherwise than indefinite and unpractical. The object of their desire was harmony rather than holiness—a harmony according to nature or a nature-god, rather than a holiness from penetration with the divine life. Nor is this statement affected by Plato’s maxim, that to be “like God” was to be “holy (*ἅγιος*) and just, not without wisdom;”<sup>2</sup> for the “justice” of this passage must be confined to the social side of the virtue, and the “holiness” (to express which sacred Greek preferred *ἄγιος*, “separate,” rather than *ἅγιος*) hardly covered more than such eternal God-ordained “sanctities” as those contravened by incest,<sup>3</sup> perjury,<sup>4</sup> neglect of the dead,<sup>5</sup> or such other acts as “no human law could make otherwise than abomin-

<sup>1</sup> *Ethics*, v. 11.<sup>2</sup> *Thatetus*, 176.<sup>3</sup> *Laws*, 285 B.<sup>4</sup> *Republic*, 203 D.<sup>5</sup> *Laws*, 878 B.

able," and which the poets, it will be remembered, held to be the ruin of happiness. It did not touch the region of moral purity proper, and, speaking broadly, was never applied to the gods. Humanity laboured under deficiency, weakness, ignorance, which the gods in each instance "winked at," or punished; but was not cursed by *sin* that by its very nature radically and permanently severed man from them. We cannot therefore be surprised that Greek philosophy, identifying as it did the beautiful and the good, allowed its adoration of "harmony" to be mixed with sensual conceptions; and we can understand how evil could be regarded, even by Marcus Aurelius, "the best of the Stoics," with cold resignation, and without a single holy repugnance. So far as holiness was a condition of happiness, the Greek systems were largely a prophecy by defect; and especially so, as they did not exhibit the divine as a power actively "making for righteousness" in the individual, and so leading humanity through the individual, as well as the individual through humanity, to a definite aim. The *δαίμων* ("genius," a being ranking between a god and a man), which Socrates spoke of as his mentor, is the only hint of any such internal operation; but as its work was solely prohibitory and practical, it is a most meagre shadow of the Christian substance. This double lack of God-consciousness was the secret of that despair of humanity which everywhere pervaded philosophy. "There are few that be saved," was the universal cry of the Greek schools. Mankind were not only "mostly fools" (in the language of the Chelsea seer), but were likely so to remain. A small aristocracy of knowledge and virtue were, as the inevitable

result of the philosophical theory, fenced off by an almost insurmountable wall of partition, not merely from women<sup>1</sup> and slaves,<sup>2</sup> but from the vast majority of their fellow-citizens, and, as a matter of course, from all nations that were outside the Hellenic family. The philosophers did not expect to influence "the multitude" by their teaching,<sup>3</sup> least of all to reach the degraded residuum; while, in spite of the fair-seeming cosmopolitan theory of the Stoics, the world beyond Greece was practically beside their calculation. "Debtors" they were to "the Greek," but not to "the barbarian." Not to the alien, not to the "poor was the gospel preached;" not for such as they was the joy in the good of which Aristotle prophetically speaks when he defines happiness as the "rational virtuous activity of the soul;" not for such as they even the joy of *μεγαλοψυχία* (the "highmindedness"), by which the troubles of life were to be despised, and which bade the good man seek such an independence of his fellows that, while he might confer benefits, he was not permitted to receive them.<sup>4</sup> Nor did the future life hold out any definite hope either to the "wise" or the "unwise." It cannot be positively affirmed that Aristotle had any idea of the soul's immortality. The Stoic's Pantheism taught the final absorption of all personality in the "Soul of the Universe;" and even Plato's doctrine of immortality<sup>5</sup> is so wrapped in mist, that the happiness of the *earthly personality* in the future world is still left somewhat doubtful.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Plato, *Republic*, v. 455. "In all pursuits the woman is weaker than the man." Compare Aristotle, *Politics*, i. 13, 7-11.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, viii. 11.      <sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* x. 9, 3.      <sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* iv. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *Republic*, x. 109; also *Phaedrus*, 245; *Timæus*, 41; *Phædo*, 62-107.

<sup>6</sup> On this point compare *Meno*, 80, 81.

And thus the vital defect of the philosophical theories of happiness stands before us clearly defined. Speaking broadly, in all the systems of heathen ethics knowledge was the starveling and indifferent substitute for faith and love. We would not say, however, that faith and love are nowhere to be found. A groping faith in the right and in "the God" is the atmosphere of Socrates' defence before the dicasts at Athens. "As I know nothing about [death and] Hades, so I do not pretend to any knowledge; but I do know well that disobedience to one better than myself, whether God or man, is both an evil and a shame: and I will never embrace evil certain, in order to escape evil which, for aught I know, may be a good. I leave it to you and the God to decide as may turn out best for me and for you."<sup>1</sup> There is a vague faith, too, in the noble sentence of Plato near the close of his "Republic:"<sup>2</sup> "In the case of the just man, we must assume that whether poverty be his lot, or sickness, or any other reputed evil, all will work for his final advantage, either in this life or in the next. For, unquestionably, the gods can never neglect a man who determines to strive earnestly to become just, and by the practice of virtue to grow as much like God as man is permitted to do." The resignation of the Stoic under a universal law, and Aristotle's notion of God as a being in perfect bliss, absorbed in self-meditation, left no room for either providence or prayer. Even at the best the faith was rather a firmness and steadfastness than a vivid belief in a personal, loving, ever-present God, able and ready to help in every time of moral and temporal trouble here, and to crown with unfailing and everlasting holi-

<sup>1</sup> Plato's *Apology*, 28.

<sup>2</sup> Page 613.

ness and glory hereafter. The old idea of happiness lacked this certainty in regard to the present and the future. Neither was love—that lightens all burdens and makes all law-abiding a delight—altogether beyond the horizon of the ancient thought. When Socrates, having given himself up to the education of the Athenian youth, relied upon ἔρως (“love”) as his most efficient helper,<sup>1</sup> the principle was there, though the sensual in idea was not entirely eliminated. In the fable of Diotima, which, in the *Symposium*,<sup>2</sup> Plato puts into the mouth of Socrates, and which tells how the δαίμων Ἔρως (“the Spirit of Love”) was born of Πόρος (“Plenty”) and Ἀπορία (“Poverty”), he hints at a bond between earth and heaven, and a fellowship of all men one with another. Again, in these *Symposium* discourses<sup>3</sup>—with sensual metaphors indeed, borrowed from the practice of nameless vices—he speaks of a love of beauty and knowledge which brings to our thoughts the hungering and thirsting after righteousness; and in his *Phædrus*<sup>4</sup> he calls Ἔρως (“Love”) a πτεροφύτωρ (“one that makes wings to grow”); telling how these wings are the corporeal element akin to the divine, and how they are “budded” by love, and nurtured by beauty, goodness, and the like; so that in the end the possessor (who is the philosopher, and none else) can soar beyond all the mere appearances of things, until he gazes upon the “ideas” of justice, temperance, and knowledge, and thus attains communion with and likeness to the divine. And to this same end tends that “philosophical love,” or joint striving of two souls in pursuit of pure knowledge

<sup>1</sup> Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, ii. 6, 29.

<sup>2</sup> Plato, *Symposium*, 203.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* 211, 212.

<sup>4</sup> *Phædrus*, 246, 248, 249.

and harmony, "the food of the divine."<sup>1</sup> The lovers spur on the beloved by "the greatest of heaven's blessings, the madness of love," "drawing inspiration from having gazed intensely upon their [chosen] God [be it Zeus, Ares, or any other god, who is their ideal], their recollection clinging to him, and they themselves becoming possessed of him, and receiving his character and ways, as far as man can participate in God."<sup>2</sup> Here we have a certain premonition of the aim and end of Christian fellowship. Similarly, in Aristotle, the *φιλία* ("friendship") of social state-organized intercourse brings "well-being" to perfection. As with most of the other philosophers, the state and its ordinances, furnishing favourable outward conditions for "justice" (which included the whole of virtue on its earthly side), constituted his highest moral ideal; nevertheless he hints at a means by which the ethical element may eventually overstep the political. "Friendship," says he, "seems to hold states together, and legislators appear to pay more attention to it than to justice. When men are friends, there is no need of justice."<sup>3</sup> When we recall how the old Greek proverb, "In justice all virtue is contained," was endorsed by Aristotle, it is suggestive to observe that he so regarded love as the "flower of justice, the inspiring principle, the illuminator of state and business life."<sup>4</sup> With him also, though in no very practical sense, "love" was "the fulfilling of the law." The Stoics, again, included in their teaching an idea of the "one fold" which would involve the bond of friendship, and which was deduced by them from their belief in one

<sup>1</sup> *Phædrus*, 252.<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.* 253.<sup>3</sup> *Nicomachean Ethics*, viii. 1.<sup>4</sup> Neander's *Geschichte der christlichen Ethik*, p. 65, a treatise which the writer has found of service for the present article.



universal law and one general task for all men. Plutarch<sup>1</sup> tells us that their highest aim was "that we should not live in separate cities or as separate peoples, each parted from the other by special rights, but that we should hold all men fellow-countrymen and fellow-citizens; that there should be one life and one world, as if a herd were grazing together, fed by a common pasture." But this premature yearning for cosmopolitanism failed to recognize the differences which necessarily existed in the course of man's development: its ideal that mankind should be an unorganic mass, a uniformity and not a unity, was unhistorical, and unsuitable to the attainment of the general "well-being." And this is true apart from the fact that "wisdom"—the panacea of the Stoics, and the general standpoint of ancient philosophy—was really a separating rather than a uniting principle, and, at any rate, was utterly insufficient to compass the desired end. The attainment, moreover, of the Stoical wisdom entailed likewise such a repression of the emotions that the pattern wise man could know nothing of that "touch of nature which makes the whole world kin." Seneca, on one occasion, exalts clemency at the expense of pity. "Clemency," says he, "is an act of the judgment, but pity disturbs the judgment. Clemency is perfectly passionless; pity is unreasoning emotion. Clemency is an essential characteristic of the sage; pity is only suited for weak women and for diseased minds. The sage will console those who weep, but without weeping with them; he will succour the shipwrecked, give hospitality to the proscribed and alms to the poor; . . . restore the son to the mother's tears, save the

captive from the arena, and even bury the criminal; but, in all, his countenance will be alike untroubled. He will feel no pity. He will succour, he will do good; he is born to assist his fellows, to labour for the welfare of mankind. . . . But his countenance will betray no emotion as he looks upon the withered legs, the tattered rags, the bent and emaciated frame of the beggar. . . . It is only diseased eyes that grow moist in beholding tears in others' eyes, as it is no true sympathy, but only weakness of nerves, that leads some to laugh always when others laugh, or to yawn when others yawn." <sup>1</sup> What a travesty this on the philosophy of the affections! What wonder, then, that the Stoics, making a vice of pity, which is "akin to love," found their theory of universal philanthropy nothing but "the baseless fabric of a vision"? He that had no compassion for the troubles of his brethren was not likely to care long to relieve them. But, as Mr. Lecky has truly said in his comment on the above passage, "Friendship rather than love, hospitality rather than charity, magnanimity rather than tenderness, clemency rather than sympathy, are the characteristics of the ancient goodness."

Finally, even the Epicureans devoted themselves to the cultivation of friendship: they looked upon it as the best means of securing life's enjoyments. "It is pleasanter," says Epicurus, in Plutarch,<sup>2</sup> "to do good than to receive it." But while the theory and actual life of the Epicureans did much by friendship towards softening the asperity and exclusiveness of ancient

<sup>1</sup> Seneca, *On Clemency*, iii. 6, 7, quoted in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, vol. i. pp. 199, 200.

<sup>2</sup> Plutarch, *Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum*, xv. 4.

manners, and, by cultivating the social virtues, helped to increase the general happiness, their principle is too nakedly utilitarian to rank with Christian faith and love.

“ Faith, hope, and love—these three,” are, after all, really outside the heathen ethical systems : they are dreams, poetry, and little, if anything, more. All moral excellence was comprehended in *δικαιοσύνη* (“ justice ”), variously defined, but primarily a social virtue, connected only secondarily, and by conjecture, with the gods, and not necessarily springing from the heart ; and the universally accepted avenue to “ justice ” and happiness was knowledge.

But the Biblical, and specially the New Testament, system of ethics, exalted the sphere of happiness another degree—beyond the *external*, and beyond the *intellectual*, into the *spiritual* region. In that system faith guides, like wisdom or knowledge : it is the principle which reveals the love of God to us, and leads us to love Him ; and love is “ the bond of all the virtues.” Faith and love, then, are the fundamental conditions on which Christian philosophy builds its conception of happiness. Our task will now be to observe how the idea of *μακάριος* is widened and deepened, and its possibilities extended, by this radical change in its foundations and its relations.

It should be mentioned in starting that the words *ευδαίμων* and *εὐδαιμονία*—implying, by derivation, as we have said, the possession of a “ good genius ”—are not once found in the Sacred Books. The word *δαίμων* (“ dæmon ”), which had signified to the Greek imagination merely a divine being, ranking between a god and a man, had acquired among the Jews a “ dyslogistic ” sense equivalent to the derivative word “ demon,”

which the English language has adopted; and *δαίμονια* now represented the "evil spirits" by which so many in Palestine were possessed. There can be no reasonable doubt that it was in order to avoid this dyslogistic association that "happy" and "blessed" are throughout the Bible represented by *μακάριος* alone. Nor is this view at all controverted by the use, however conciliatory, of *δεισιδαίμων*<sup>1</sup> ("god-fearing;" in the English Version, wrongly, "superstitious") by St. Paul on Mars' Hill, or of *δεισιδαιμονία* by the Roman Festus, when alluding before Agrippa to the "Jews' religion."<sup>2</sup>

What, then, is the conception of *μακάριος* in the Old Testament and in the New? It has been maintained by some that the Old Testament is the "gospel of prosperity," and that its idea of happiness is little, if at all, higher than the external level. And without controversy the conception of happiness under the Old Dispensation involved more of the external than under the New. We cannot forget the wealth of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, the "fatness" of the Promised Land, the splendours of David and Solomon, or the predicted prosperity and power of Israel under the sceptre of the Messiah. But the connotation of *μακάριος* in the Old Testament, almost without an exception, is a sense of God's favour, in consequence of righteousness, even in the midst of present misery. Only in one or two instances does the association of godliness appear to be absent. For example,<sup>3</sup> when "Zilpah, Leah's maid, bare Jacob a second son, and Leah said, Happy (*μακαρία*) am I, for the daughters will call me blessed (*μακαριοῦσιν*): and she called his name Asher"—the Hebrew word for *μακάριος*. The Queen of Sheba applies the

<sup>1</sup> Acts xvii. 22.<sup>2</sup> Ibid. xxv. 19.<sup>3</sup> Gen. xxx. 12.

epithet to Solomon's servants :<sup>1</sup> but there is something reaching beyond the outward prosperity even here, for she congratulates them not only on standing "continually before him," but chiefly on "hearing his wisdom," and that they had him as "king over them, *to do judgment and justice.*" There is one passage in the Apocrypha<sup>2</sup> where the context seems purely earthly. Antiochus promises a young man, if he will apostatize, "to enrich him, and make him to be counted happy (*μακαριστός*);" but the earthliness may fairly be charged to Antiochus. And even when we find in the Apocrypha<sup>3</sup> what seems at first a startling parallel to the common Hellenic maxim, "Count no man happy before death," it is obvious from the context that religion and righteousness are dominant in the mind of the writer; for in Verse 26 he says that even "in the day of death it is easy for the Lord to reward a man according to his ways;" so that, if his happiness has been apart from God, "the end of the man shall bring the revelation of his works" (Verse 27). The whole chapter is a commentary on the mistake of judging by the outward appearance, and the depth of the religious thought is fathomed in the consolation to the poor contained in Verse 21: "Marvel not at the works of the sinner: trust in the Lord, and abide in thy labour." So emphatically, even in the older books of the Jewish literature, is faith regarded as the inseparable condition of the blessed life. The bulwark of Israel's religion was faith in a future which they could trust to God's righteousness; and the blessedness of the future—whether it were more immediate prosperity and deliverance from enemies, or participation in the final Messianic

<sup>1</sup> Chron. ix. 7.

<sup>2</sup> 2 Macc. vii. 24.

<sup>3</sup> Ecclus. xi. 28.

glory—involved the serving of God without let or hindrance, and by consequence involved present righteousness.<sup>1</sup> This is the burden of the “law, and the prophets, and the psalms,” and we instantly recall such “commonplaces” as Psalm xxxiv. 8, 12, 13, 14: “O taste and see that the Lord is good: blessed is the man that trusteth in him. . . . What man is he that desireth life, and loveth many days, that he may see good? Keep thy tongue from evil. . . . Depart from evil and do good.” Righteousness like this brought present blessedness in spite of present trouble; for, “Blessed is the man whose strength is in thee; in whose heart are highways [that is, ‘to depart from evil’].<sup>2</sup> Who, passing through the [barren] valley of weeping, make it a place of springs: the early rain also covereth it with blessings. They go from strength to strength.”<sup>3</sup> And amid much that appears to make righteousness the avenue to material blessing, there is not a little to suggest that righteousness is a blessing in itself, because thereby we cease to be separate from God. Thus blessedness is attributed<sup>4</sup> to him “whose transgression is forgiven,” “in whose spirit there is no guile;” and in Psalm cxix. (which from beginning to end affords a striking illustration of the promise in Jeremiah xxxiii. 40: “I will put my fear *in their hearts*”), the material seems almost to have vanished before the spiritual: “Blessed are the undefiled in the way, who walk in the law of the Lord. . . . Thy testimonies have I taken as an heritage for ever: for they are the rejoicing of my heart.”

But, it may be said, all this is merely *δικαιοσύνη* (“righteousness”), obedience to, and pleasure in, God’s

<sup>1</sup> Comp. Luke i. 74, 75.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Prov. xvi. 17.

<sup>3</sup> Psa. lxxxiv. 5-7.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. xxxii. 1, 2.

commandments, with faith, but without much sign of love. Well, it was something that faith, not in a universal law, but in the leading of a personal, holy, and merciful, as well as almighty, God should have shed a flood of light upon the life of one people, at any rate, among the peoples of the earth. "Blessed is the nation whose god is the Lord. . . . Our soul waiteth for the Lord. . . . For our heart shall rejoice in him, because we have trusted in his holy name."<sup>1</sup> Yet the "personal relation" required not only faith, but love; and as the love of God for his chosen people was manifest, being constantly revealed in word and act, so also was the all-absorbing love of Israel for God enjoined as "the first commandment of all."<sup>2</sup> A strange *commandment*, indeed, it may appear; but commandment is the keynote of the Old Testament; and in this instance God sought, through the lawgiver, to make known to the people, now under training, how love, and love alone, was the secret of obedience, after which secret ("the secret of Jesus") they were always to yearn. It must have been suggestive to them that the "loving" was constantly placed before the "keeping of the commandments:"<sup>3</sup> in loving, the order seemed to say, lay the strength of obedience. In the Book of Judges,<sup>4</sup> those that love the Lord are compared to the sun, "when he goeth forth in his might" of warmth and joy and brightness. The love and trust which pervade Psalm xviii. are well heralded by the first verse: "I will love thee, O Lord, my strength!" And at times the luxury of trusting and loving the Lord during adversity appears,

<sup>1</sup> Psa. xxxiii. 12, 20, 21.

<sup>2</sup> Comp. Mark xii. 29, 30; a quotation from Deuteronomy vi. 4, 5. This commandment occurs frequently in Deuteronomy.

<sup>3</sup> Comp. Deut. vii. 9; xxx. 16, 20; Neh. i. 5.

<sup>4</sup> Judges v. 31.

especially in the Psalms, to produce a blessedness counterbalancing even the joy of prosperity. "There be many that say, Who will shew us any good? Lord, lift thou the light of thy countenance upon us. Thou hast put gladness in my heart, more than in the time that their corn and their wine increased."<sup>1</sup>

The higher air breathed by the Old Testament saints is, in a word, the atmosphere of a trust in God guaranteeing future prosperity, and going far to take the sting out of present calamity; and a love of God in return for experienced and expected deliverance, and because of his loving-kindness and tender-mercy towards them that feared Him. It is true that the pre-Christian idea of happiness appears to be confined, for the most part, to hope in this life. For instance, in Psalm vi. 4, 5, we find the words: "Return, O Lord, deliver my soul: oh, save me for thy mercies' sake. For in death there is no remembrance of thee: in the grave who shall give thee thanks?" And again in Psalm xxxix. 13: "O spare me, that I may recover strength before I go hence, and be no more:" in Psalm lxxxviii. 10: "Wilt thou shew wonders to the dead? shall the dead arise and praise thee?" and in Psalm cxv. 17: "The dead praise not the Lord: neither any that go down into silence." But from such passages as Psalm xvi. 10, 11: "For thou wilt not leave my soul in hell (Sheol): neither wilt thou suffer thine holy one" (thy saint), "to see corruption. Thou wilt shew me the path of life: in thy presence is fulness of joy; at thy right hand there are pleasures for evermore:" and Psalm xvii. 15: "As for me, I will behold thy face in righteousness;

<sup>1</sup> Psa. iv. 6, 7.



I shall be satisfied when I awake with thy likeness :” and again, Psalm xlix. throughout, but especially Verse 15 : “ God will redeem my soul from the power of the grave : for he shall receive me ”—from such passages we can but conclude that the idea of the perfection of blessedness in a future life—a life with God—was already dawning on the Hebrew mind, awakened as it was by observing the prosperity of the wicked, and the continued misfortune of the righteous, and also by the earnest longing for a higher and more unbroken communion with God than was possible under the conditions of mortality. Communion with God “ face to face ” had been regarded hitherto as the highest earthly privilege bestowed, at the rarest intervals, upon “blessed” ones like the “faithful” Moses.<sup>1</sup> “With him will” (or rather, “do”) “I speak mouth to mouth, even apparently (*i.e.*, visibly), and not in dark speeches ; and the similitude of the Lord shall” (or rather, “doth”) “he behold.” But, in the later times, the devout spirit, rising upon the wings of its conscious oneness with the Divine, soared beyond the “land of forgetfulness” to the bliss of an immortal fellowship with God.

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<sup>1</sup> Num. xii. 8.

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