the future of his people, founded on the unchangeable love of Jehovah; his certainty of their restoration to God's favour (Chap. i. 10; xiv. 3, ff.); of the reunion of the disrupted kingdom, in the Messiah's days, under "one head" (Chap. i. 11); of the reconstruction of the dismembered tribes, set forth as a resurrection (Chap. vi. 2), an idea elaborated into such splendid proportions by Ezekiel (Chap. xxxvii.), and applied apparently in a literal way to deceased individuals of the house of Israel in Isaiah xxvi.; of the destruction of Death and Hell (Chap. xiii. 14); and the final settlement of the people of God in holy beauty and unchanging power, when they "shall grow as the lily, and cast forth their roots like Lebanon" (Chap. xiv. 5).

A. B. DAVIDSON.

THE PAULINE ARGUMENT FOR A FUTURE STATE.

COLOSSIANS i. 27.

There is a close connection between exposition and apologetics. Exposition is the setting forth of a man's ideas, apologetics the attempt to verify those ideas; and it frequently happens that the surest way of verifying them is just to set them forth. Pope says:—

Vice is a creature of such hideous mien,
That to be hated needs but to be seen.

In saying so he is simply stating, in other words, that the best argument against sin would be an exposition of it. What the English poet says about sin might conversely be maintained of holiness, and of that eternal life which is supposed to be the crown of holiness: to be loved and to be believed in, it has
simply to be exhibited. No evidence for immortality could equal the certitude that would be experienced in one breath of the immortal atmosphere. Such is, at all events, the view with which Christianity approaches the problem of a future state. It no more argues for immortality than it argues for God; it studies to represent immortality and God. Our very attribution of futurity to the conception of man's immortal destiny embodied in the first Christian literature is an anachronism. St. Paul would never have spoken of a future life; his hope was in a higher life. His notion of a world to come was that of a world to be manifested, and whose manifestation was possible in time.

Our design in these pages is to attempt an exposition of the Pauline argument, taking the Pauline argument as the representative of the earliest Christian thought upon this subject. We shall make no effort to verify his positions; we shall content ourselves with trying to set them forth; yet, should we succeed in setting them forth clearly, it is not impossible that the very perception of them may to some minds carry an apologetic value, and convey that special form of evidence which was the only form of evidence recognized by the first age of Christendom.

The Pauline argument for a Future State is contained in seven words: "Christ in you the hope of glory." The first impression suggested by these words is one of surprise. We should have expected that, in a matter of human aspiration, St. Paul would have made his appeal to the light of nature. He was speaking to the inhabitants of a Gentile city; he was speaking of a hope which had always been peculiar to the Gentile nations. That expectation which, in Judaism,
had taken the form of a search for national immortality. had, amongst the nations of the Gentiles, assumed the guise of an individual craving for a life beyond the present. The Jew had found his satisfaction in being a member of a commonwealth whose name would endure as long as the sun, and of whose dominion there would be no end; the Pagan world, in its greatest philosophic moments, longed for a higher commonwealth than the world had ever seen, a commonwealth in which the individual soul would be a sharer in the universal life. These longings, these hopes of glory, the philosophic mind of Paganism had striven to base on natural reason, and here was a man qualified to be the apostle of natural reason. There never was a leader more adapted to be the missionary of the Gentiles than St. Paul, for there never was a leader in whom the cosmopolitan spirit was more distinctly developed. That light which on the road to Damascus struck him to the earth, struck him down to the level of humanity: when he rose he had the spirit of the earth within him. He had found the meeting-place between the light from heaven and the soil of the human heart, and he was prepared to adapt the new religion to all the natural and earnest expectations of the creature. Yet, when he comes to deal with the most natural and the most earnest expectation of all, he seems to desert altogether the standpoint of earthly reason. When he is called to speak to human nature in that point where human nature has ever supposed itself most akin to the Divine, he refuses to feed its aspirations with the materials it has itself gathered, and points for their fulfilment to a region beyond its natural boundaries: "Christ in you the hope of glory."
But let us look deeper. If we have not altogether mistaken the nature of the Pauline argument, this man was never more the Apostle of the Gentiles than when he made Christ the evidence of immortality, never indicated greater respect for the dictates of natural reason than when he placed in Christianity the solution of the great problem which had stirred the Gentile mind. For a little reflection will make it evident that when St. Paul calls Christ "the hope of glory," he does so because he regards Him as the missing link in the argument of nature, the link which, once supplied, completed the natural chain. In the thought of the Apostle grace is not the antithesis, but the consummation, of nature; Christian evidence, not the reversal, but the corroboration, of human instincts. We must therefore expect to find, if we have truly appreciated the Pauline spirit, that, in the hands of the great Apostle, the Christ-argument for immortality will widen into vast proportions, until it shall embrace all the world-arguments, will supply the deficiencies of human thought while yet interpreting with intenser vividness the original thought of humanity. It is in this light, at all events, that we intend to view the Apostle's argument. We wish, if possible, to discover what relation his reasoning bears to all previous and to all subsequent reasonings on this subject. We wish to find whether the source of evidence suggested by him is one that disparages other sources of evidence, or whether these other sources of evidence only become clear in the light of his suggestion; and if the result of our inquiry shall lead us to the latter conclusion, we may be furnished with another presumption in favour of that all-reconciling claim which St. Paul
makes for the Founder of Christianity: "It pleased the Father that in him should all fullness dwell."

The natural arguments for a future life may, so far as we know, be reduced to four. They are all as old as human reason, yet, at different epochs of the world's history, one or other of them has borne the pre-eminence. Perhaps we shall best mark at once their prominent epochs and their distinctive characters by describing them under four names—the Platonic, the Kantian, the Scientific, and the Poetic. At each of these we shall glance in turn.

1. The Platonic hope of immortality may, in brief and general terms, be described as the argument from unsatisfied desire. The opinion of Plato, when divested of its technical characteristics, may be paraphrased in a form which human nature everywhere will recognize as a true expression of itself. Why is it, he virtually asks, that there is always in the mind of man a typical idea, that is to say, an idea which goes beyond the thought suggested by every object? You speak of a straight line, yet no man has ever seen a perfectly straight line; the straightness is a perfection which your mind imputes to the object. You gaze upon a beautiful landscape; but, even in the act of gazing, your imagination overleaps it, and conjures up a light more lovely and a symmetry more exquisite. You listen to a strain of music; but there is always more in your mind than in the music; some hidden thought in your soul imputes to it a power greater than dwells in itself. Above all, you come into contact with human beings whose virtues you admire and whose acts you seek to emulate; yet you have never said to yourself, This is the perfect man; This is the absolute good-
ness. Your conception of justice always transcends your perception of just men; your ideal of purity always oversteps the boundaries reached by the actually pure; your type of humanity always goes beyond the vision of the human beings who surround you. Why is this? asks the Greek philosopher. Is it not the reminiscence and the prophecy of a life from which we came and a life to which we go? If we had been made for finite forms, we should have been content with the finite forms. Surely the fact that we are not content with them is an indication at once that we have known something better, and that there is something better which still awaits us. Our desires are the index of our capacities. If our desires transcend our capacities, is it not the prophecy that our nature must be enlarged beyond its present limits?

Now every word of this argument would have been admitted by St. Paul. He, like the Greek philosopher, felt the inability of finite forms to realize the ideal of humanity, and declared in express terms that earthly things had no glory by reason of the glory that excelleth: the sense of a glorious type dwarfed the perception of any qualities which could exist in individual things. But Paul went a step further than Plato. The question he would have put would have been this: May not the type be realized in time? Conceding, he would say, that man's nature is such as you indicate, what would be wanted to make your proof of immortality more than a reminiscence or a prophecy? what would be required to make it a present vision? If out of all the objects which meet the mind of man there were to be found one whose own glory was so full that it left no sense of a glory that excelleth, whose-
own attributes so completely reached the summit of our ideal, that there was no margin left for imagination to climb, what would be the only legitimate inference from such an experience? Would it not clearly be this, that eternity had been revealed in time; that the higher life had been manifested through the lower; and that what men called the future state was no longer necessarily future, but a possibility here and now? Such, said the Apostle of the Gentiles, is the gospel which I declare unto you. We Christians profess to have reached, in one object, that sense of absoluteness which leaves no room for belief in a glory that surpasses it; we profess to have found One who is Himself that all-excelling glory whose absence to you has caused all other things to have no glory. We claim to be already in possession of the light which to you is inaccessible; we profess to have already attained the object which to you is but a grand ideal. We have therefore, even now, come into the vision and fruition of that eternal life which as yet you have only reached as a far-off conclusion of the reason; we are risen with Christ; we have already our conversation in heaven: we enjoy our citizenship in that great republic which you have but conceived as a dreamy hope, a mystic possibility, a cloudy ideal of future glory.

2. The second argument for a higher life of the soul is that which finds its most distinguished representative in the German philosopher Kant: it may be called the argument from human responsibility, and may be briefly expressed thus. There is something within my nature which commands me to do right. It gives no reason for its command; it simply says, Thou shalt. It speaks with all the authority of Mount Sinai; it comes
to the soul with a force which is obligatory. "You ought, therefore you can;" "It is your duty, therefore it is within your power:" so speaks the "Categorical Imperative," what we should call the Voice of Conscience. Yet, when we try to execute its commands, we find that one part of our nature contradicts the other. Conscience tells us that we ought; it declares that we are responsible, and therefore able to act; actual experience convinces us that we are not so able. The law thunders from Sinai, and the human heart re-echoes its thunders; it declares its mandates to be good, and proclaims its own duty to obey. Yet the heart has never succeeded in executing its inward resolve; it sees and approves the right, it follows the wrong. It has done those things which it ought not to do, knowing that it ought not to do them: it has left undone those things which it ought to do, knowing that it ought to do them. The sense of responsibility tells it it has power; the experience of life proclaims it to be impotent. Whence this antagonism in the nature of man? Why is it that the will which in our sense of responsibility is felt to be free, is, in the world of nature, perceived to be a slave? Is it not because nature is not its home, because it has yet to find its true province; because the world of sense is too small for the exercise of its legitimate sway? It has not found freedom, yet it was made to be free; it has not received obedience, yet it was meant to be obeyed. That for which it was made must await it in the future; that which time has denied to it must be reserved for it in eternity. The mandates which have never obtained their fulfilment are still awaiting their fulfilment; the law which has never been put in exercise cries out
for its place in the world of being, and, in its very antagonism to the fabric of existing things, it reveals the existence of the things which are not seen and eternal.

Such is the reasoning of Kant, and the reader will see that in some respects it bears a strong analogy to the argument of Plato. Now St. Paul anticipated this Kantian argument by seventeen centuries. He, too, felt the pressure of two antagonistic forces in him, and he expresses his sense of their conflict in the most pronounced terms: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see a law in my members warring against the law of my mind: the evil which I would not, that I do; the good which I would, that I do not."

No Kantian philosophy could have conveyed in more unequivocal language the impression of a dualism in the nature of man, the conviction of a struggle between the actual life of experience and the inward life of aspiration and desire. But the reasoning of the Christian Apostle goes further than the Kantian philosophy. Paul would have said to that philosophy: "I can shew you a corroboration of your own view. You are satisfied with discovering the immortal principle in struggle with the principle of dead nature: what if I reveal to you the immortal principle conquering the principle of dead nature? How know you that this testimony of the will to its own freedom is anything more than a phantom of the brain? You admit that it has never been realized in fact; what evidence have you that it is other than a figure? If you could point to one instance in the history of humanity in which the will had proved its freedom; if you could shew us out of the myriad of dualisms one single life in which there was
a harmony between aspiration and action, thought of goodness and deed of purity, we should then have the proof of an immortal principle compared to which all the testimonies of the merely inward life would fade into insignificance. This, and nothing less than this, is what we Christians profess to shew. We offer you a practical proof that the human will has a higher origin than the level of dead nature; for we reveal to you the spectacle of an actual historical Life, not only struggling with this nature of death, but vanquishing it in the struggle. We profess to believe that amongst the sons of men there has been One who has triumphed over the moral limits of human nature; who has broken down the barrier between noble aspiration and pure action, and has made the natural world for once the echo of the spiritual. We profess to believe in one sinless Life, one Life in which the mandate, "Let there be light," was followed by the fact that there was light; one Soul in which the infinite law "Thou shalt" found its complement in the crowning testimony of an existence: "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do." In Him the antagonism was broken which parted, and still parts, the world of sense from the world of spirits; in Him the shadows of time became for a moment the pure expression of the thoughts of eternity. We who accept such a solution need not look to a future world to find the missing link of adaptation. We find it here, in the heart of humanity, in the spirit of an individual Man, in the life of a Man of Sorrows whom nature had done her best to imprison in the fetters of finitude. From this source, so naturally unlikely, we derive our strongest evidence of immortality; for in Him we are confronted by the thought that
heaven and earth have met together, that the law of the spirit of life not only in itself is free, but has made us also free from the law of sin and death.

3. The third line of reasoning by which men have attempted to establish the hope of immortality is that which we have called the Scientific argument, because, although in itself it is popular, and even commonplace, it yet powerfully suggests, if it does not directly imply, a law of the most advanced science—the principle of the conservation of force. The reasoning itself, as it is popularly understood, may be called the argument from identity, and may be briefly put as follows. That which we call human life contains within itself a succession of lives, embraces a series of stages, each rising above its forerunner, and each susceptible of a distinct analysis. There is a world of difference between embryonic life, which precedes birth, and the first sensations of the infant life which follows it. There is a difference scarcely less marked between the stage of infancy and the opening intelligence of childhood. Another world of being divides the child from the youth, and another still separates the youth from the man. The existence of a human soul is thus made up of progressive existences, which are rounded off from each other, and have a history of their own. But what is chiefly to be observed in relation to the present case is not the difference, but the connection, of these lives: there is a chain of identity binding them into one harmonious whole. Take the extreme points of any individual life—the embryo and the fully-developed man: it would almost seem as if nothing could add to the conception of distance which is given in the contrast between them. And yet experience tells us that there
is here no chasm; that there is a continuous connecting-medium enfolding in one personality the lowest and the highest stage of human development; and that the elements of character which in the last result mark out each man from his brother, had their origin and their prophecy in that mysterious formative existence which immediately preceded the period of actual birth. Here then, in the very world of sense, where all decays and dies, we have the illustration of an immortal principle not only surviving the death of its natural envelopments, but living by the death of those envelopments. The perishable things are shaken that the life which cannot be shaken may remain, and remain more abundantly. We rise on "stepping-stones of our dead selves," but we never step beyond the sense of our own identity, for our personality derives new strength and vigour by each stage of being which it surmounts. Human nature has not unnaturally woven to itself a vision of analogous development in the surmounting of the last stage of all. Not unnaturally, it has ventured to cherish the hope that the deathday may itself be a new birthday, and that the life which has reached the highest phase in time may be only the embryo of a life which is beginning in eternity.

Now, when we turn to the Epistles of St. Paul, we find a view of this subject which, if accepted, would again supply the missing link in human thought, and transform the argument from analogy into the argument from fact. The common reasoning is based upon the perception that we keep our human identity through all the stages of earthly life, and the hope that therefore we shall keep it in the transition from the earthly life to the heavenly. St. Paul says, I will shew you
the identity actually preserved in this transition: "If any man be in Christ, he is a new creature." In the Pauline view, the transition from time to eternity, which is commonly limited to the moment of death, takes place during life in the heart of every Christian. To the Apostle of the Gentiles there is no such passage from death to life at all comparable with that which the soul makes in its regeneration from sin into holiness. The passages from infancy to childhood, from childhood to youth, and from youth to manhood, are but metaphors in comparison with this. He can find no language strong enough to describe it. He calls it a translation from the power of darkness, and in the very word "translation" he seems to suggest the chariot of fire. He calls it, in more pointed language still, a quickening together with Christ into newness of life; a wakening from amongst the dead; a liberation from the old man, with his worldly affections and lusts, and a putting on of the new man, with his uncorrupted and incorruptible being. Whatever figurative sense these expressions may convey to modern ears, they were no figures to St. Paul. When he spoke of regeneration as a resurrection of the soul, he used words which, to him at least, were a profound reality. It is not always easy to tell whether the Apostle's language regarding Resurrection is intended to refer to a literal or to a spiritual rising. Even the magnificent description of 1 Corinthians xv. has in this respect been variously interpreted. But the reason is not difficult to find: to the mind of St. Paul there was no resurrection so literal as the spiritual one. Spiritual experiences were to him the only realities, and all which the world calls real was but a passing show.
The birth of a soul into natural life was but the shadow and emblem of that higher birth of the spirit of man in which old things were to pass away, and all things to be made new. To him, therefore, there was an evidence of immortality clearer than demonstration, because it was the evidence of direct vision, the testimony of personal experience. If a man could live in his old identity after he had become a new creature, if he could retain his original personality after his spiritual nature had become emancipated from its earthly environments, if he could hold fast to his individual responsibility after the darkness of his past life had been lost in the radiance of a Divine light, was there not already given to the world a certain, an infallible proof that death was not destruction, and that life was perfected in death? Christ was here the hope of glory.

4. We come now to the fourth of these natural arguments which have fostered in man the hope of futurity. Strictly speaking, the word argument cannot be applied to it, for it appeals, not to the science, but to the poetry of human nature. It addresses itself exclusively to the feelings, and is therefore intermittent in its character: it is more felt at some times than at others. It may be said to be the argument founded on the sense of human dignity. Observe, we say the sense, not the fact, of man's dignity. Every creature on the earth has, in point of fact, a dignity in relation to the creatures which lie beneath it; but man is the only creature of the earth who is conscious of this greatness. Man, in his moments of poetic enthusiasm, feels that the life which is in him is worthy of a better fate than the blank of annihilation; and because he has such a feeling he is filled with a lofty hope: his
knowledge that he possesses an impression not shared in by the beast of the field seems to mark out his destiny from the destiny of the lower creation. Nor would his hope be greatly shattered if he were forced to admit to its full extent the conclusions of the most advanced Evolutionism. Let us say that science had established as an incontrovertible fact the derivation of man's spiritual being from the material mechanism of nature; let us say that it had freed beyond all doubt the certainty that our sense of human dignity is but the last result of a combination of physical forces. Would the inevitable consequence of such a theory be the death of human enthusiasm? Would not man's enthusiasm for himself gather strength from the very admission that this sense of human dignity is at least a last result, the climax of material nature, so far as material nature has yet advanced in its development? If man's conviction of his own spiritual wealth were proved to a demonstration to be but the latest refinement of a material organism, it would still be the final cause of that organism in the most approved and the most scientific sense of that term; for it would be the type of perfection towards which the organic framework had all along been tending. We should measure our hope of a man's destiny, not by his earliest, but by his latest efforts; we should measure our estimate of the powers of nature, not by their first, but by their last manifestation. If that instinct of immortality which is man's consciousness of himself were nothing more than the full-blown flower of materialism, it would only alter the ground, and not destroy the fact, of man's enthusiasm; it would simply suggest the thought that, at a certain stage of material evolution, nature was so con-
structured as to burst into flower, and reveal the hope of immortality. To the mind, in its moments of elevated feeling, the stimulating thought is the fact that the elevation of its feeling gives it a distinct place in creation. At such moments it matters not whence man came; sufficient is the conviction that, from whatever source he came, he is now at least an existence rounded off from all beside. The poetic instincts of the soul do not inquire what man was; they rest implicitly in the confidence that, whatever he was, he at all events is man now. No doctrine of evolution can touch the certainty of this conviction: it may explain the steps by which human nature has climbed to its present eminence, but it cannot explain away the eminence itself. The origin of humanity becomes a subordinate question; the fact on which the soul's enthusiasm settles is the present existence of its humanity; and the hope on which it bases its immortal aspiration is the susceptibility and the capacity which in the heart of its being the ages have evolved.

Now none felt the force of this sentiment more keenly than St. Paul: to him the human soul was pre-eminently grand. But Paul felt that, in the region which we call the light of nature, the human soul is not adequately represented, and he draws a powerful distinction between the actual and the ideal life of man's spirit; between the product which the hour has realized, and the mighty susceptibilities which are waiting for their realization. "It is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power; it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory; it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body;" is the language in which the Gentile Apostle distin-
guishes the actual from the potential majesty of the soul. We agree with those Commentators who think that the sowing takes place, not at death, but at birth; that it is not the planting of the life-seed in the ground to wait for a resurrection at the end of time, but the planting of the life-seed in a body of sin and death to be made perfect through the conquest of death, and to obtain the resurrection of those who are perfect through suffering. St. Paul held that, to see the soul in its glory, we must see the soul in its regeneration; and the soul in its perfect regeneration was not to be seen in the actual course of time. Birth into the race of Adam was to St. Paul a partial burial, a sowing of the soul into corruption; its dignity was levelled with the dust, its immortality was allied to the grave. If its dignity were to be seen, if its immortality were to be represented, the race of Adam must be interrupted; there must appear a new river of life which, in part at least, must be fed by those streams which make glad the city of God. Such a life St. Paul declared. The first Adam could not represent the soul, because he was of the earth; but there was a Man from heaven, a Humanity whose form of servitude mirrored the life eternal. It was not simply that the first Adam became sinful, and that the second was uniformly sinless; it was rather that the first Adam, even when sinless, was comparatively soulless—there was more of matter than of mind in him. Christ was the first pure expression of the human soul. He brought life to light, and therefore He brought immortality to light. The evidence which Christ gave the world of a future state lay, not in his words nor in his deeds, but in Himself. We might point to his promise of a Father’s house
with many mansions, but what rendered that promise valuable was solely and entirely the character of Him who made it. We might point to the doctrine of his own resurrection as a pledge of man's future destiny, but the writer of the Acts says, not that He was immortal because He rose, but that He rose because He was immortal; He burst the bands of death because it was not possible He should be held by them. We are, therefore, driven back for our vision of immortality to the direct and immediate Presence which bore within itself the secret and the mystery of life eternal. We are called to contemplate the conquest of death, not in the mere historical fact of resurrection, but in that which made resurrection a fact inevitable—the living and life-giving spirit of the Master. We are asked to believe in futurity, or rather in eternity, not on the ground of certain utterances, or on the strength of certain promises, or on the evidence of certain miracles, but on the authority of that inherent grandeur which in the person of the Son of Man the soul claims as its own. In Him man beholds himself at his best, sees the ideal grandeur of his own nature, discovers the nobility, the power, the greatness, of which a human soul is capable; and learns to contemplate an eternal existence no longer as something which is foreign and supernatural, but as that natural and normal law of his own spiritual being which the struggles and aims of time have only interrupted and violated: Christ becomes his hope of glory.

But now St. Paul seems to have proposed to himself a question which since his days has been often repeated. Supposing it should all be so, still what is that to me? Conceding that this outward life of the
Master was a real life, a stainless life, an immortal life; conceding that He proved his immortality by the most infallible signs and the most unmistakable evidences; conceding even that the vision of his spiritual nature is the clearest vision which a finite being can have of the things which are not seen and eternal: it still remains to ask, How does this help me? The Apostle could not have avoided putting to himself such a question. He had all along regarded Christ as the only perfect expression of a human soul which the world had ever seen, and therefore as the highest hope of immortality which the world could ever enjoy; yet, in the same breath, he had confessed that this Christ was an interruption of the race of Adam. He had never allowed Him to be the son of David in any other sense than "after the flesh:" he had recognized Him as the true Man, but still as the Man from heaven. If so, he must have felt that there was a link yet wanting to his argument to make that argument available even to a believer in the historical Gospel. How could a soul, however human, be any revelation of man's destiny, if it could point to an origin higher than the Adamic? The sinlessness of such a Being, the resurrection of such a Being, could not prove to me that I am sinless, or that I shall rise. Nay, they could not even prove that sinlessness or resurrection would ever be so much as possibilities to my nature. By the admission of St. Paul, by the distinctive doctrine of the New Testament, the Son of Man possessed these privileges not by reason of, but in spite of, his union with the race of Adam, possessed them as the recipient of a higher life, the descendant of a nobler origin, the inheritor of an older name; and how then could the race of Adam,
even while it beheld in Him the vision of immortality, be justified in appropriating that vision as the foretaste and the prophecy of its own eternal being?

It was, we believe, the perception of this difficulty which led St. Paul to insert these words, In you. He felt that a Christ, however great, however exalted, however Divine, could not, if it ended there, be man's hope of glory; nay, he felt that the more exalted and Divine He was, the less could He be in Himself an evidence of human immortality. Therefore it was that he added a last link to the argument. This Christ was not a mere vision outside of humanity, He was a power within the soul. "Christ in you the hope of glory." His was not an interruption of the race of Adam, which merely occurred for a moment, and then left things as they were before; it was an interruption which introduced into the ocean of human life a new stream of being which was thenceforth to mingle its waters with the course of man's earthly destiny. The immortality which Christ revealed was not the fact of the resurrection, but the "power of the resurrection." The centre of all St. Paul's aspirations regarding Christ was the belief that, alike in his sufferings and in his glory, man might obtain a fellowship, might enter into union, with that Cross and with that Crown which alike and equally revealed the victory of the soul over the body of death. It is here that Christianity has appropriated all that is good and true in the doctrines and the yearnings of Pantheism. It has found the necessity for a God who is not only personal, but impersonal; not only above the world, but in the world; not only the Maker and Monarch, but the Inspirer of the spirit of man. It has not been content to see in Him the King
eternal, immortal, and invisible: it has sought to make man partaker of his eternal, immortal, and spiritual being. It has recognized the need; and it has proclaimed the existence, of something higher than a Divine worship—a Divine communion, a sharing of man's nature in the nature of God. Judaism worshipped the immortal Spirit, but it was unable to appropriate his immortality; there was a middle wall of partition between the Divine and the human which prevented the life of the one from running over into the life of the other. Christianity claims to have broken down the wall, to have made the life of God a possibility to the life of man. It professes to have destroyed that enmity which had so long rendered the finite the antithesis of the Infinite, and to have quickened the heart of time with the pulsations of an eternal Being. The acceptance, or the rejection, of that claim is not here the question, but there is one point at least on which there can exist no doubt. They who have accepted it, if they seem to have yielded to a supernatural influence, have thereby only vindicated the primitive instincts of human nature, and have found for natural reason the key which alone was wanting to unlock the portals of eternal life.

GEORGE MATHESON.

THE BOOK OF JOB.

VI. THE SOLILOQUY OF JOB. (CHAPTERS XXVII.-XXXI.)

We have followed the polemic of Job with the Friends to its close. We have seen how, as they grew more definite and personal in their charges and more vehement in their invective, he has grown more profoundly conscious of his innocence, and less vehement, though