'The Logos was God'

by Ed. L. Miller

The translation of John 1:1 still causes problems if we may judge by the variety of renderings in modern versions of the New Testament. It was discussed briefly in THE EVANGELICAL QUARTERLY some years ago by V. Perry with particular reference to the teaching of Jehovah's Witnesses (EQ 35, 1963, 15-22). We are grateful to Dr. Miller for raising the matter afresh.

The deity of Jesus, together with the cross and resurrection, stands at the centre of the theology (or theologies) of the New Testament.1 On the other hand, if we turn from what is everywhere assumed or implied about the deity of Jesus to what is stated explicitly and unambiguously — for example, 'Jesus is God' — we encounter very little. The only real candidates for such unequivocal claims are: John 1:1; 1:18; 20:28; Rom. 9:5; Col. 2:2; Tit. 2:13; Heb. 1:8-9; 2 Pet. 1:1.2 Out of these eight passages, three are found in John. Of these three, everyone acknowledges John 20:28 to be an unequivocal 'deity-passage', even the otherwise sceptical Taylor who calls it the 'one clear ascription of Deity to Christ'.3 John 1:18 has always been clouded by a textual problem, but most scholars now correctly take monogenēs theos ('only God') rather than monogenēs huios ('only Son') to be the original reading. In addition to being the lectio difficilior, it is supported by a long list of MSS., Fathers, and Versions, including Vaticanus, Sinaiticus, and now also P66 and

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1 It is, of course, one thing to deny that Jesus Christ was God incarnate and quite another to deny that the New Testament writers believed and taught this. The first question aside, I doubt that one could have much success demonstrating the second, not even the scholars who contributed to The Myth of God Incarnate, ed. John Hick (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977). Cf. the responses to their efforts in The Truth of God Incarnate, ed. Michael Green (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1977), especially Green's essay, 'Jesus in the New Testament,' 17ff.


3 Taylor, 118.
When the textual problem is thus decided, this verse too becomes an unambiguous proof-text for the deity of Jesus. This brings us, finally to the all-important and much discussed claim of John 1:1c: *kai theos en ho logos*.

Our purpose here is to review some of the problems involved in this claim and some proposed solutions, to pay special attention to the grammar of the proposition, to make a little more than has been usual out of the possible theological/Christological implications, and to provide some bibliographical direction for those who wish to investigate the passage for themselves.

A full exegesis would have to take into account the immediate context, vs. 1-5,

\[
\begin{align*}
&\text{En arché en ho logos,} \\
&\text{kai ho logos en pros ton theon,} \\
&\text{kai theos en ho logos.} \\
&\text{houtos en en arché pros ton theon.} \\
&\text{panta di' autou egeneto,} \\
&\text{kai chóris autou egeneto oude hen.} \\
&\text{ho gegonen en auto zóe en,} \\
&\text{kai hē zóe en to phós tòn anthropôn.} \\
&\text{kai to phós en te skotía phainei,} \\
&\text{kai hē skotía auto ou katelaben.}
\end{align*}
\]

and, more generally, the whole Prologue. Here I can only indicate in the barest way my own view that the proposition before us is one line of a Christological hymn which includes at least vs. 1-5 (pieces from the same hymn or from yet others may be found elsewhere in the Prologue)

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5 Schnackenburg comments that whether we opt for one of the other readings 'makes no essential difference' (279). Quite to the contrary, it is precisely because such explicit claims are so rare that the reading here becomes so important.

6 For a recent and exhaustive discussion of the hymnic material of the Prologue, see Mathias Rissi, 'Die Logoslieder im Prolog des vierten Evangeliums,' *Theologische Zeitschrift*, 36 (1975), 321ff. A wealth of bibliographical information is contained in the notes.
'The Logos was God'

and was composed after the First Epistle which was composed after the Fourth Gospel ‘proper’ (1:19-20:30). Although v.1c is a part of the Logos Hymn we must keep open the possibility that this line, along with v.2, is a later (polemical?) interpolation, though perhaps by the same hand. These two lines do not fit logically and stylistically the otherwise very neat series of four couplets; furthermore, the polemical and clarifying character of these lines is apparent. As for the well-known question concerning the origin and background of the Johannine Logos, I reject all the theories which root it in some pre-Johannine tradition such as Greek philosophy, Gnostic thought, Old Testament Khochma/Sophia concepts, Sapiential literature of later Jewish thought, Philo Judaeus, etc. Without denying utterly some possible connections with these traditions, I propose that Logos here is a peculiarly Johannine idea, and that its Christological development may be traced from the many Christologically ‘transparent’ uses of logos and rhema in the Fourth Gospel ‘proper’, to a more self-conscious Christological significance in the First Epistle, to the full-blown Christological title in the Prologue.7 It means ‘Word’, the saving truth which is revealed in and is Jesus Christ.

But we turn now to the single line which is our subject. Although it does not bear on the essential claim made in 1:1c, we should first consider the possibility of punctuating the whole passage as follows: kai ho logos en pros ton theon, kai theos en. Ho logos houtos en en arche pros ton theon, ‘And the Logos, was with God, and was God. This Logos was in the beginning with God.’ This is grammatically possible and is, in fact, adopted by Sanders/Mastin on the grounds that it makes for a better balance of the clauses, early unpunctuated manuscripts allow it, and the phrase ho logos houtos (‘this word’) occurs twice elsewhere in John.8 But two occurrences elsewhere in the whole Fourth Gospel hardly suggest a rule, and in any case, apart from the present instance, ho logos (alone) occurs three times in the Prologue and never in relation to the demonstrative pronouns houtos or ekeinos which also occur two times each. It is also difficult to overcome the sense that the threefold repetition of ho logos in v.1 is intentional. As for the manuscript witnesses, it would appear that the earliest extant interpretations of the passage coincide with the

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7 I intend to argue and document this thesis in a future publication.
usual one, and the Sanders/Masfin interpretation is unknown in the punctuated manuscripts when they do finally appear. As for the argument from the balance of the clauses, it presupposes certainty about the number of lines involved, the use of couplets, rhythmic patterns, etc., and in any event it produces two lines which, though balanced in length relative to one another, are inordinately long relative to all the other lines in vs.1-5. The standard punctuation is surely the best — John no doubt intended καί θεός ἐν ὁ λόγος.

Three overlapping questions must now be raised in relation to the assertion, καί θεός ἐν ὁ λόγος: (1) the problem of the translation of θεός; (2) the significance of the definite article; and (3) the relation of the line to the preceding statement in v.1b.

With respect to the first, the question is whether θεός might be rendered by ‘divine’. It would appear that for most there is a difference in affirming of χ that it is ‘divine’ and that it is ‘deity’. It is the difference between some sort of participation in or likeness to deity and deity itself. Clearly, ‘divine’ is weaker and more ambiguous a term than ‘deity’ or ‘God’. Some scholars and translators do in fact render θεός as ‘divine’ — ‘And the Logos was divine’. This rendering is sponsored, for example, by Strachan⁹ and Haenchen,¹⁰ and among the translations it shows up in Goodspeed and Moffatt. But it must be rejected.

Several literary/stylistic considerations weigh heavily — perhaps decisively — against this rendering of θεός. First, the adjectival form θεῖος no doubt was ready to hand for John. Though it does not occur in John it is employed elsewhere in the Greek New Testament and by three different authors (Acts 17:29; Rom. 1:20 (θειότης); 2 Pet. 1:3f.);¹¹ if John intended the adjective here, he certainly would have employed it. Second, it is unthinkable from a stylistic standpoint that in the three consecutive statements —

καί ὁ λόγος ἐν προσ τον θεόν,
καί θεός ἐν ὁ λόγος.

houtos ἐν ἐν ἀρχή προσ τον θεόν —

θεός means ‘God’ in the first and third while the adjectival ‘divine’

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¹⁰ For example, E. Haenchen, ‘Probleme des johanneischen “Prolog”’, Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, 60 (1963), 313.
¹¹ So, for example, Bultmann, The Gospel of John, 33. Haenchen’s argument to the contrary, that the adjective θεῖος may have been too classical a word for John’s vocabulary (‘Probleme des johanneischen “Prolog”’, 313, n.38) is extremely conjectural as well as question-begging.
intrudes in the second. Third, the adjectival interpretation would destroy the suggested climax: He was with God and he \textit{was} God.\footnote{These last two observations hold even if the line should turn out to be a later addition.} Fourth, the translation 'God' fits otherwise with the Prologue where in v.18 we should accept the reading \textit{monogenēs theos} over \textit{monogenēs huios}.\footnote{But I doubt that v.1c 'is almost certainly meant to form an inclusion' with 20:28 (so Brown, \textit{The Gospel according to John: I-XII}, 5). That this Gospel ends in this way should not be surprising, but vs. 1:1-5 (at least) were probably composed later and independently (from a literary, not a theological standpoint) from the Gospel proper.} Thus the whole Prologue is bracketed at beginning and end with the assertions of the deity of the \textit{Logos}. Finally, it is to be observed that 'God' rather than 'divine' is to be preferred in terms of the context of the whole Fourth Gospel, where in a myriad of ways the deity of the \textit{Logos} is suggested, culminating in Thomas' outburst: 'My Lord and my God!' (John 20:28).\footnote{E. M. Sidebottom, \textit{The Christ of the Fourth Gospel} (London: SPCK, 1961), 48f.} On a more theological note, one must attend to Sidebottom's speculation that

\ldots the tendency to write 'the Word was divine' for \textit{theos en ho logos} springs from a reticence to attribute the full Christian position to John. It will not do to say that the meaning is the Word 'belongs to the same sphere of being as God'; Philo could have accepted some such formula as that \ldots But Philo was a Jew. He could not have accepted what the Church taught about Christ.\footnote{Strachan, 99.}

We turn now to a larger and richer question — the significance of the anarthrous \textit{theos}. But we do not quite leave behind the question of the translation of \textit{theos} as 'divine', because some have reasoned that in the line \textit{kai theos en ho logos} we are to understand \textit{theos} adjectively from the fact that the article is omitted. Strachan, for example, states as straightforwardedly as possible, 'here the word \textit{theos} has no article, thus giving it the significance of an adjective'.\footnote{E. C. Colwell, 'A Definite Rule for the Use of the Article in the Greek New Testament', \textit{Journal of Biblical Literature}, 52 (1933), 12ff. See also the more recent and concise summary of Colwell's work and rules by Bruce M. Metzger, 'On the Translation of \textit{John i:1}', \textit{The Expository Times}, 63 (1951-52), 125f.}

This view was rebutted by Colwell in his oft-cited study, 'A Definite Rule for the Use of the Article in the Greek New Testament'.\footnote{Strachan, 99.} On the basis of a survey of definite predicate nouns in the Greek New Testament Colwell refined the standard rule that predicate nouns tend to omit the article. This he did by suggesting that the presence or absence of the article is not a matter of definiteness (as it is in Blass-Debrunner-Funk:
... the article is inserted if the predicate noun is presented as something well known or as that which alone merits the designation ... '), but a matter of word-order: 'A definite predicate nominative has the article when it follows the verb; it does not have the article when it precedes the verb.' From this it follows that predicate nouns preceding the verb cannot be regarded as indefinite or qualitative simply because they lack the article; it could be regarded as indefinite or qualitative only if this is demanded by the context, and in the case of John 1:1c this is not so: ... this statement cannot be regarded as strange in the prologue of the gospel which reaches its climax in the confession of Thomas. Colwell's conclusion concerning John 1:1c was reinforced in a short piece by J. Gwyn Griffiths in which he, independently of Colwell's work, appealed to general usage in classical and Hellenistic Greek: 'Nouns which shed their articles do not thereby become adjectives; nor is it easy to see how the predicate use of a noun, in which the omission of the article is normal, tends to give the noun adjectival force.

More recently, the pendulum swung somewhat in the other direction with an article by Philip Harner. He emphasized the generally qualitative force of anarthrous predicate nouns, conceded to Colwell that such nouns may be definite, but announced that in John 1:1c 'there is no basis for regarding the predicate theos as definite'. He believes that John meant something stronger than theios, 'divine', but weaker or more qualitative than ho theos, 'God', and suggests for the anarthrous theos the meaning, 'having the same nature as theos'. But, first of all, we have argued already that theos here is definite — recall what has been said

19 Colwell, 13.
20 Colwell, 20f.
21 J. Gwyn Griffiths, 'A Note on the Anarthrous Predicate in Hellenistic Greek', The Expository Times, 62 (1950-51), 314f. The issue before us concerns the significance of the definite article (or its absence) with theos as a predicate nominative. Griffiths emphasizes that in other constructions (such as with prepositions or in the genitive form) not much can be built on the presence or absence of a definite article with theos in John; it is apparently indiscriminately included or excluded in otherwise identical expressions; for example, 1:6 and 9:33, but 5:44, 6:46, and 8:40; 1:13, but 7:17, 8:42, and 8:46; 19:7, but 1:34, 1:49, 3:18, 5:25, 10:36, 11:4, and 20:31 (315).
22 Griffiths, 315.
24 Harner, 84ff.
above about the total Johannine context of our line and also the unlikeli-
hood of a sudden intrusion of a theos with a different sense from the other
two instances in this series of three. Furthermore, in his efforts to arrive
at the middle-ground translation of 'having the same nature as theos'
Harner surely blunts the striking and almost paradoxical character of
John's claim. Finally, why shy away in v.1 from a straightforward repre-
sentation of the Logos as God, when almost immediately following in v.3
the Logos is accorded the status of Creator of all things and thus the status
of God? Why soften in v.1 what v.3 will insist on?

It may be, however, that John's identification of the Logos with God
himself in v.1:1c is clarified and sharpened by yet another consideration.
That the arthrous logos signals the subject of the sentence, and the anar-
throus theos the predicate, is rightly agreed upon by virtually everyone
(exceptions will be mentioned in a moment). After all, predicate nouns
as a rule are anarthrous, and logos is otherwise the subject of all of these
propositions. But we must ask now whether the anarthrous theos is only
grammatically conditioned, signalling the predicate — even definite
predicate — of the proposition, or whether it is not theologically condi-
tioned as well: Does the author here identify the Logos with God, but
suggest also, by virtue of the anarthrous theos, that the Logos is not to be
identified absolutely or wholly with God?

A point not sufficiently emphasized in Blass-Debrunner-Funk, but ex-
plcitly stated in most other grammars, is that though predicate nouns
usually take no article and are thus distinguished from the subject, 'even
in the predicate the article is used with a noun referring to a definite
object . . . that is well known, previously mentioned or hinted at, or iden-
tical with the subject.' More generally, we may say that when in a predi-
cate nominative construction the article occurs with both nouns, the
result is a convertible proposition; grammatically there is no way to dis-
tinguish the subject from the predicate; 'A is B' and 'B is A'. That John
holds to this rule is apparent from the fact that although he here omits
the article with the predicate (theos en ho logos), in v.4 he assigns the
definite article to both nouns on either side of the copula (he zoe en to
phos). In the latter instance, it is evident from the context that zoe is the
subject, though it turns out to be in meaning identical with and inter-

Harvard University Press, 1959), sect. 1152 (my italics). See also, for example, Basil
Lanneau Gildersleeve, Syntax of Classical Greek, Second Part (New York, N.Y.:
American Book Co., 1911), sect. 666, and A. T. Robertson, A Grammar of the Greek
New Testament in Light of Historical Research, fourth ed. (New York, N.Y.: Hodder &
Stoughton, 1924), 767f.
changeable with \( \varphi \alpha \sigma \): It is true both that the life is the light and that the light is the life. In the case of \( \text{theos } \epsilon \eta \text{ ho logos} \), however, this identity and interchangeability is precluded by the fact that the predicate \( \text{theos} \) has no article, \( \text{logos} \) and \( \text{theos} \) are not identical and interchangeable: It is true that the Logos was God, but it is not true that God was the Logos. That this is the force of the construction \( \text{theos } \epsilon \eta \text{ ho logos} \) has been recognized and accepted by many scholars, for example, Holtzmann,

\[ \text{Wäre theos artikuliert, so würde teils Versuchung bestehen, es als Subject zu fassen, teils würde, bei prädikativer Fassung, das schlechthinige Zusammenfallen beider Begriffe, also das Gegenteil von dem ausgesagt sein, was der Verf. aussprechen wollte.}^{26} \]

and Loisy,

Dan cette proposition, le mot theos n'a pas l'article, afin de prévenir une équivoque; car autrement on aurait pu traduire: 'Dieu était le Verbe', ou comprendre que le Verbe était personellement identique à Dieu (le Père), mentionné dans la proposition précédente.\(^{27}\)

and Barrett,

The absence of the article indicates that the Word is God, but is not the only being of whom this is true; if \( \text{ho theos} \) had been written it would have been implied that no divine being existed outside the second person of the Trinity.\(^{28}\)

If this was, indeed, John's intent — or at least part of it — then surely the translation of the \textit{New English Bible}, 'and what God was, the Word was', is blatantly incorrect not only because \( \text{Logos} \), not God, is the subject of the proposition, but also because John's statement precludes such a wholesale identification of the \( \text{Logos} \) and God.\(^{29}\) For the same reasons we must reject Morris' rendering 'All that may be said about God may fitly be said about the Word'\(^{30}\) — it would appear that this is exactly

\[ ^{26} \text{H. J. Holtzmann, } \textit{Evangelium des Johannes}, \textit{ed. W. Bauer} (Tübingen: Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1908), 33. \]

\[ ^{27} \text{Alfred Loisy, } \textit{Le Quatrième Évangile} (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1903), 154. \]

\[ ^{28} \text{C. K. Barrett, } \textit{The Gospel According to St. John} (London: SPCK, 1955), 76. \]

\[ ^{29} \text{Contra J. A. T. Robinson who first argues correctly that the construction in John 1:1c precludes the identity and interchangeability of the Logos and God, but then announces that the \textit{New English Bible} 'gets the sense pretty exactly with its rendering' (\textit{Honest to God} (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1963), 71). On Robinson's exegesis, cf. Edwin D. Freed, 'Honest to John', \textit{Expository Times}, 75 (1963-64), 61f. } \]

\[ ^{30} \text{Leon Morris, } \textit{The Gospel According to John} (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1971), 76. \]

Actually, this is an apparent logical slip on Morris' part; he expresses himself more carefully later when he says that 'God was the Word' would have meant that God and the Word were the same. It would have pointed to an identity. But John is leaving open the possibility that there may be more to 'God' than the 'Word' (78).
what John wishes to deny! With such a claim, John excludes any Sabellian notion that the God-head was exhausted in the Logos. Excluded too, at least by suggestion, is the idea, sometimes attributed to Origen, that the absence of the definite article with theos should be represented by an indefinite article (the Logos was ‘a God’), and hence also the rendering of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ New World Translation of the Christian Greek Scriptures in which this polytheistic interpretation persists even yet. The usual rendering of the line — for example in the King James Version, Revised Standard Version, and Jerusalem Bible — seems exactly correct: ‘And the Word was God’.

This understanding of theos en logos fits, furthermore, what John had said just immediately prior: ho logos en pros ton theon. Having just asserted that the Logos was ‘with’ God, John could not now say that the Logos was identical with God. Thus Bernard, commenting on the fact that Codex L does in fact read ho theos en ho logos, correctly emphasizes that ‘this would identify the logos with the totality of the divine existence, and would contradict the preceding clause.’ Also Howard: Theos and Logos are not interchangeable, for then ‘the writer could not say “the Word was with God.”’ And Vawter: ‘The Word is divine, but he is not at all of divinity, for he has already been distinguished from another divine Person.

The reference to v.1b leads to a further observation. Many think that pros with the accusative (as in v.1:1b) is used in John with the same

31 Origen, In Joannem, II, 2. But it requires not a little self-assurance to insist on this as the meaning of Origen’s text. It has been understood also in a perfectly orthodox manner.

32 That is, while this view is not ruled out strictly or logically (though one might have expected ho logos en theos), there is an alternate and much more plausible explanation for the anarthrous predicate theos, especially in view of what is elsewhere said, in this context and throughout John, concerning the Logos. Cf. V. Perry, ‘Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Deity of Christ’, Evangelical Quarterly, 35 (1963), 15ff. Bultmann is emphatic on the anti-polytheistic character of the assertion (The Gospel of John, 33).

33 Harner balks at this usual translation inasmuch as it ‘could represent’ an interchangeability of the terms (87). Also Robinson: ‘This would indeed suggest the view that “Jesus” and “God” were identical and interchangeable’ (71). But, of course, it would be a simple logical error to infer from ‘A is B’ that ‘B is A’.

34 The reading of L must certainly be rejected on textual-critical grounds. It arose, no doubt, precisely in the interest of a theological claim which, as we are arguing, John was in fact denying.

35 Bernard, 2.


meaning as \textit{para} with the dative, and that in any case it means here nothing more nor less than 'with'. But others think that the English 'with' does not sufficiently reproduce the force of the preposition \textit{pros} with its fundamental connotation of 'motion towards'. Of the latter, Westcott noted long ago:

The phrase (\textit{\'en pros}, Vulg. \textit{erat apud}) is remarkable. The idea conveyed by it is not that of simple coexistence, as of two persons contemplated separately in company (\textit{eina\ i meta}, iii, 26, & c.), or united under a common conception (\textit{eina\ i sun}, Luke xxii.56), or (so to speak) in local relation (\textit{eina\ i para}, ch. xvii.5), but of being (in some sense) directed towards and regulated by that with which the relation is fixed (v.19). The personal being of the Word was realized in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God.

And more recently de la Potterie has discussed the matter fairly exhaustively, and gives five arguments for a more 'dynamic' \textit{pros} at John 1:1b:

1. Nowhere in John does \textit{pros} with the accusative mean 'with' or 'by'.
2. Wisdom Literature (which inspires the Johannine Prologue) always represents Wisdom's relation to God by means of the preposition \textit{para}.
3. When John wishes to represent a relation of proximity between the Father and the Son, as between any persons, he always employs \textit{para} with the dative, \textit{meta} with the genitive, or \textit{sun} with the dative — never \textit{pros} with the accusative.
4. On the contrary, John always employs \textit{pros} with the accusative with a suggestion of direction or orientation.
5. The \textit{pros ton theon} of vs.1-2 forms an inclusion with \textit{ein ton kolpon tou patros} of v.18, and it can be shown that the \textit{eis} of v.18 bears a dynamic sense.

Aside from certain of de la Potterie's literary presuppositions and a begging of the question here and there, such observations, especially when considered cumulatively, must be reckoned with.

40 Westcott, 3.
41 de la Potterie, 379f.
Certainly *pros* with the accusative often conveys a *personal* relation,\(^42\) and in fact in the Gospels *pros* used in reference to persons by far outnumbers other instances, and John almost always uses it in this way. At the very least *pros* surely suggests here the same degree of personal relation as is suggested by the *para tou patros* of 8:38 and the *para soi* of 17:5, to cite only two examples, and a person-to-person relation is necessarily involved in 2 John 12, where the phrase *elpizo genesthai pros humas* is explained by *kai stoma pros stoma lalēsai: 'I desire to be with (pros) you, and to speak face to face (stoma pros stoma).*\(^43\) We might ask, further, whether John employs *pros* of the Logos' relation to God in such a way as to suggest a special or unique relation, a relation to God not enjoyed by believers. In this respect, we should note the shift in the first verses of 1 John from the representation of the Logos' relation to God as *pros ton theon* (1:2) to the believer's relation to God as *meta tou patros* (1:3). Such a distinction would, of course, be consistent with John's other distinction between the Logos as the 'Son of God', *huios tou theou*, and the believer as the 'child of God', *teeknon tou theou*. Perhaps also relevant in this regard is the Johannine expression *monogenē huios*. Aside from the question whether it means 'only-begotten Son' or 'unique Son',\(^44\) it suggests the distinction between the sonship of Christ by nature and the sonship of believers by faith — here St. Paul would speak of 'adoption'. We might even pose the possibility that for John *pros* is an almost technical term by which, on occasion (for example, John 1:1f. and 1 John 1:2), he designates a special, *personal* relation within the God-head.

This of course brings us to the further consideration that it is God the *Father* that is in view in v.1:1b. This is virtually certain in light of the (almost) parallel passage at 1 John 1:1ff., where it is said that the Logos of life, which was from the beginning and was 'with the Father' (*pros ton patera*) has been revealed, and also the concluding verse of the Prologue itself, John 1:18, there the Logos is said to be 'in the bosom of the Father'. This latter is especially significant because it joins two ideas in the same way as in 1:1b and 1:1c, namely the relation of the Logos to God the Father, and the deity of the Logos:


\(^43\) A. T. Robinson on *pros*: 'The idea seems to be "facing", German gegen. Cf. *prostōnon*. In *ho logos en pros ton theon* (John 1:1) the literal idea comes out well, "face to face with God"' (A. T. Robinson, 623).

v.1:18b
monogenês theos (= Logos)
ho ōn eis ton kolpòn tou patros

v.1:1b, c
theos en ho logos
ho logos en pros ton theon (= Father)

But why, then, is not pater rather than theos employed in vs.1:1b and 2? We merely mention here three considerations: (1) theos with the definite article is a common designation for God the Father in the New Testament; (2) the Logos as Son has not yet been mentioned in the Prologue, and not at all in vs. 1-5 which, as indicated earlier, may be a complete literary-theological unit, perhaps a hymn; (3) theos is required throughout for the literary pattern in vs. 1-2.

But to return to our central concern, what we have in John 1:1c is an assertion that the Logos was God himself, but grammatically posed so as to be consistent with the prior claim of 1:1b which involves a distinction between the Logos and God the Father and an emphasis on the personal character of their relation. And the reader can surely see what is coming now! Implicit, if not explicit, in such talk is the later trinitarian concept, ‘unity of substance, distinction of persons’.

Naturally, we are always in danger of reading our texts too much from the perspective of a later and more systematic theology and this is rightly emphasized. Brown, however, probably overstates the case when he says in reference to the statements before us, ‘... there is not the slightest indication of interest in metaphysical speculations about relationships within God or in what later theology would call Trinitarian processions’, and that in John 1:1 ‘there is no speculation about how the word is related to God the Father’. If our analysis is at all correct, then there is here an interest in, caution about, and reflection on the divine nature — surely this can be conceded without picturing John as swept away with metaphysical speculations, and without ‘ontologizing’ his basically ‘functional’ Christology. Furthermore, Brown’s comment neglects the fact that the doctrine of the Trinity was not, after all,
invented *ex nihilo* and is at least implicit in the New Testament, especially John — this can be conceded without insisting on full-blown trinitarian ideas there.

Generally, who can deny that the unity and relationship of the *Logos* and the Father (and Holy Spirit too) is very much a concern of the Fourth Gospel? And who would care to deny the theological and historical continuity of this concern with later and more speculative efforts? As MacGregor noted, 'In what sense Christ can thus be "God" and yet not the whole Godhead but a Person distinct from God, is just the problem which the doctrine of the Trinity seeks to solve.'48 Also Sidebottom: 'That John had some idea of the problem which was later to occupy the best minds of the Church may seem difficult; but the constantly recurring theme of discussions on the "equality" and the like of Jesus with his Father seems to point in that direction.'49 And whatever one may think of Käsemann’s general treatment of the Fourth Gospel, relevant here is his observation that John expresses ‘the beginning of dogmatic reflection in the strictest possible sense and thus opens the door for patristic christology.’ Again,

The problem of the nature of Christ is discussed thematically in John, to be sure still within the frame of his soteriology, but now with an emphasis and a force which can no longer be explained on the basis of a pure soteriological interest. The internal divine relationship of the revealer as the Son is just as strongly emphasized as his relation to the world.50

Our purpose has been to provide an exegetical commentary on John 1:1c, *kai* *theos* *en* *ho* *logos*. To summarize our main conclusions: (1) On both philological and literary-stylistic grounds ‘divine’ should be rejected as too weak a rendering for *theos*; (2) the general and immediate contexts of the line suggest a definite, not qualitative, meaning for *theos*; (3) neither does an adjectival or qualitative meaning follow from the absence of the article with *theos*; (4) it does follow from the absence of the article that John avoids a complete equation of the *logos* and *theos*; (5) this is consistent with the distinction (or persons) implies by v.1:1b; (6) vs. 1:1b and 1:1c together are suggestive, at least, of a sort of metaphysic of the Christian God.

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48 MacGregor, 4.
49 Sidebottom, 49.