Richard of St. Victor’s Condilectus:  
The Spirit as Co-beloved

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SUMMARY
Richard of St. Victor picks up the personalist strands in Augustine, and on that basis he proceeds to a consideration of the Trinity on the basis of love. He focused on the personal relations between human beings and trinitarian existence. Where there is only one person, there is no love. Whereas love requires a plurality of persons as its condition, perfected love demands a Trinitiy of persons. What the fullness of charity requires is nothing less than a divine person of equal dignity. Since God is supremely loving, and only God is deserving of supreme love, the infinite love which is God

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Richard von St. Victor nimmt die personalen Elemente in Augustinus’ Werk auf und stellt auf dieser Basis Überlegungen zur Trinität auf der Grundlage der Liebe an. Er konzentriert sich auf die persönlichen Beziehungen zwischen Menschen und trinitarische Existenz. Wo nur eine Person ist, ist keine Liebe. Whereas love requires a plurality of persons as its condition, perfected love demands a Trinitiy of persons. What the fullness of charity requires is nothing less than a divine person of equal dignity. Since God is supremely loving, and only God is deserving of supreme love, the infinite love which is God

RÉSUMÉ
Richard de St. Victor a adopté la tendance personnaliste chez St. Augustin et a ainsi considéré la doctrine de la Trinité sous la perspective de l’amour. Il s’est concentré sur les relations personnelles entre êtres humains et au sein de l’existence trinitaire. Là où il n’y a qu’une seule personne, il ne peut y avoir d’amour. L’amour requiert une pluralité de personnes en présence les unes des autres ; l’amour parfait requiert donc une trinité de personnes. De plus, pour qu’il y ait plénitude d’amour, il faut, en présence d’une personne divine, rien moins qu’une autre personne divine d’égale dignité. En effet, puisque Dieu aime de manière suprême et que Dieu

presupposes an infinite object even when there are no creatures. Love consists of three levels, moving from self-love (Father) to charity, in which a second is loved (Son), to complete charity, in which a third is mutually loved by the pair (Spirit). Not only does the perfection of love demands love for another (dilectus), but the consummation of mutual love demands shared love for a third (condilectus). A rational analysis of the nature of love, unaided by revelation, leads to the conclusion that the fulfillment of love requires a Trinity of persons. Contrary to Augustine, Richard’s trinitarian language is lover (Father), beloved (Son) and co-beloved (Spirit).

Liebe, die Gott ist, ein unendliches Objekt auch dann voraus, wenn es keine Geschöpfe gibt. Liebe besteht auf drei Ebenen, von der Selbst-Liebe (Vater), über die Liebe zu einem Zweiten (Sohn), bis zur vollkommenen Liebe, in der ein Drittes in gleicher Weise von dem Paar geliebt wird (Geist). Vollkommene Liebe verlangt nicht nur Liebe für einen anderen (dilectus), sondern die Vollendung gegenseitiger Liebe erfordert geteilte Liebe für ein Drittes (condilectus). Eine rationale, nicht auf Offenbarung gestützte Analyse des Wesens der Liebe führt zu dem Schluß, dass die Erfüllung der Liebe eine Trinität von Personen erfordert. Im Gegensatz zu Augustinus benutzt Richards trinitarische Sprache die Begriffe Liebender (Vater), Geliebter (Sohn) und Co-Geliebter (Geist).

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seul est digne d’un amour suprême, l’amour infini qu’est Dieu suppose l’existence d’un objet infini, même en l’absence des créatures. L’amour se présente en trois niveaux : il va de l’amour de soi (le Père) à la charité, qui est amour d’un deuxième (le Fils), pour aboutir à la charité complète, par laquelle un troisième (l’Esprit) est aimé par les deux premiers ensemble. Non seulement un amour parfait est amour d’un autre (dilectus), mais

Introduction

Augustine’s doctrine of the Spirit as love continues to dominate all great western thinkers of the Middle Ages and beyond. He opens two great avenues of development, each with individual differences.¹ The first picks up his analysis of the activities of the spirit, understanding and love, and is followed by Anselm (1033-1109) and Aquinas (1255-1274). The second adopts his theme of God-charity and the Spirit as the mutual love between the Father and the Son, and is followed primarily by Richard of Victor (d. 1172).² Richard makes full and systematic elaboration of Augustine’s treatment of the lover, the beloved and love, and develops what Ewert Cousins calls appropriately, ‘A Theology of Interpersonal Relations’.³ The Trinity is the ideal of perfect interpersonal relations because in Divine existence there is an infinite self-giving and receiving of love, without entailing a loss of one’s identity or a rejection by the other.⁴ Human interpersonal relations, though always are lacking, are only images of God’s divine life.

Well-known as the greatest theoretical teacher of mysticism in the Middle Ages, Richard has also been priced as ‘a theologian of the spiritual life’.⁵ With Hugh’s scholastic knife, he carves out a highly articulated and complete system of contemplation, representing a landmark in the growth of Western mysticism. His two famous treatises on mystical theology are The Twelve Patriarchs and The Mystical Ark, often referred to as Benjamin Major and Benjamin Minor.⁶ Although he does not compose a doctrinal summa, his treatise on his richly speculative and affective De Trinitate is a major development of insights from Augustine and Dionysius.⁷ His theology of Supreme charity, and concept of Spirit as co-beloved, dilectus, will form the main substances of this paper. A rational analysis of love constitutes not only his famous proof of the Trinity, but also the basis of the Spirit as the ‘co-beloved’ of the Father and the Son.

Richard begins with the human persons, with the personal love of one for another, and moves to an unselfish love of friendship, wherein one gives himself wholly to another. In this he catches a glimpse of a divine love of friendship. However human love is lacking, for it excludes a third from sharing this love. In God there must be charity in its most perfect form. Perfect charity is all that God is and possesses. This means that there abides in God one supreme love, and three perfect lovers, in such a fashion that one (i.e., the Father) is the source of a condign beloved (i.e., the Son), and these two lovers (Father and the Son), united by ‘the flame of love’, constitute the single cause of an equal co-beloved, namely the Holy Spirit. The Trinity, thus, is understood as ontological love, which is self-diffusive and self-differentiating.

Richard’s Theological Method: Faith and Reason

Augustine addresses the question of human reason at some length in his De Trinitate. His basic argument is that if God is to be discerned within the creation, we should be able to find God at the height of that creation. There are some link-ups between the Creator God and his own creations. The height of God’s creation, for Augustine, is human nature. On the basis of neo-Platonic metaphysics which he inherits from his cultural milieu, he argues that the height of human nature is the capacity to reason. Therefore, he concludes that one could find traces of God, or more appropriately, the ‘vestiges of the Trinity’ in the process of human reasoning.

Like Augustine and Anselm, Richard believes that it is possible to find the ‘necessary reasons’ for the Trinity in a reflection made in faith. To clarify, the phrase ‘necessary reasons’ does not carry the modern sense, a hard-line rationalistic attempt to prove the existence of mysteries, totally independently of faith. Instead the ‘necessary reasons’

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are the resultant fruit of human understanding transformed by contemplation, or more precisely by love. Reason itself cannot comprehend the interior depths of divine mysteries, the truth of which is confirmed in experience: ‘But if experience teaches you that something in human nature is beyond understanding, should it not by that very fact have taught you that there is something in the divine nature that is above your understanding?’ Speaking of the Trinity, he admits: ‘Which of these interior things which we hold by faith, we enter only by faith. In his prologue to De Trinitate, he takes faith as his point of departure, but adds that he would strive ‘as much as this is right or possible, to comprehend by reason what we hold by faith’. Faith and reason constitutes an organic unity within faith. They do not operate in airtight compartment, with no interactions between them. Although faith precedes reason, he adds, once we enter into faith, we should not stop there but enter into faith-seeking-understanding of those interior things which we hold by faith. When inquiring such a sublime subject as the Trinity, Richard, likes Augustine, cautions that we must apply greater carefulness in pursuing more ardently the divine things from the testimony of reason.

In connection with the proposal of my investigation, let him who wishes, laugh; let him who wishes mock — and rightly so. For, if I speak truth here, it is not so much knowledge that lifts me up, but rather the ardor of a burning soul that urges me to try this. . . . What if I falter in running the course? Well, I will rejoice that I totally ran, labored and sweated to the extent of my powers in seeking the face of my Lord.

The surest access to the theology of the Trinity is through the monastic contemplation on the dynamic of human love. The ‘image-like­ness’ thought common in monasticism forms the anthropological basis of Richard’s contemplative discipline. In developing his approach to trinitarian speculation, Richard begins from what is visible in the created order:

Thus, reasoning from the visible makes us conclude to the invisible, from the transitory to the eternal, from the earthly to the above-earthly, from the human to the divine. Because, “That which is invisible of God, from the creation of the world, is revealed by the spirit through that which has been made” (Rom. 1: 20).

The creaturely world, which bears the image and likeness of God, reveals God. The human spirit contains within itself the postulates of divine mystery. Therefore human experience of self and creation are ladders through which one ascends to know God in unity and Trinity. Yet this knowing God presupposes the spiritual experience of the contemplative who has ascended the mount of Transfiguration, and who now, with the help of the Spirit, ascends to the third heaven in intimate knowledge of the Trinity. ‘It is toward this heaven that we are carried by the Spirit who elevates us, each time that the grace of contemplation makes us reach to the understanding of the eternal.’

Richard writes also in his The Twelve Patriarchs, ‘Ascend to this mountain (transfiguration), learn to know yourself’. From the human experience of self-knowledge, he contends, knowledge which transcends experience itself could be deduced.

Book III of his De Trinitate represents Richard’s rational attempt to arrive at the necessary reason for the Trinity. The effulgence of the divine is reflected in the creaturely phenomenon of loving. Interpersonal love is an analog of the Trinity. Instead of looking at the inner soul for his clues to the nature of God, Richard looks at human persons in relation. To penetrate into the inner life of the Trinity, he moves through human love to divine love, uniting these two poles, seeing in this union an interpenetration in experience. For in the perfection of human love, where one person transcends himself in the love of another, Richard sees a reflection of the infinite self-transcending love of the Trinitarian existence. He expressly states his vision as follows:

. . . in that supreme and altogether perfect good there is fullness and perfection of all goodness. However, where there is fullness of all goodness, true and supreme charity cannot be lacking. For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity. However, no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity. Therefore, where a plurality of persons is lacking, charity cannot exist.
Charity: Love for another person (dilectus)

Drawing on experience, Richard deduces that nothing is better than charity. If God is not only greater but also better, then God must be love. God must possess charity in the highest degree. The sovereign charity cannot be self-love, but is self-transcending love for the other, yet of the same or equal dignity, which no creature shares or attains. Charity, who is all that God possesses, is personal. Therefore, in God’s divine being, there must be a self-transcending love of one divine person for another divine person. He justifies his stance by means of three propositions:

A. ‘For nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity.’ He sees no need of providing proof of this proposition, but merely asks that we accept it as an ontological given, rooted in human experience. ‘Let each person examine his consciousness; without doubt and without contradiction he will discover that just as nothing is better than charity, so nothing is more pleasing than charity. Nature herself teaches us this; many experiences do the very same.’ What Richard sees is a reflection of the absolute good in the human experience of charity; more than that, he grasps the highest reflection, as his first proposition confirms this, that ‘nothing is better than charity; nothing is more perfect than charity’. The reflection of the absolute good in human experience is not to be grasped by deductive proofs, but by internal analysis of self-consciousness, which is luminary of the eternal dimension of experience.

B. ‘But fullness of goodness could not exist without fullness of charity’ Charity is a perfection, which only God possesses to the fullest, and in the highest degree. He argues, ‘in that supreme and altogether perfect good there is fullness and perfection of all goodness’. In speaking of the fullness of all goodness, he borrows from Dionysius’s postulate bonum est diffusivum sui, goodness is self-diffusive. He affirms that God’s existence is constituted as summum bonum, the highest goodness which He identifies as love. In LaCugna’s words, ‘God as the supreme good is supremely self-communicating and is the finality of all beings.’ Perfect goodness is not static but dynamic; it is not self-contained but self-communicative. It necessarily goes out to another and returns, and therefore it is charity. ‘Oportet itaque ut amor in aliorum tendat, ut caritas esse queat.’ Thus where perfect goodness exists, perfect charity cannot be absent.

C. ‘However, no one is properly said to have charity on the basis of his own private love of himself. And so it is necessary for love to be directed toward another for it to be charity.’ The third proposition is revelatory of charity in its truest and highest form. Richard draws a succinct distinction between charity and self-love, the former being superior to the latter. Richard’s thought corresponds to Gregory the Great, who asserts: ‘...there cannot be charity among less than two. For no one is said, strictly speaking, to have charity toward himself, but love is directed to another in order for it to be charity.’ If God is by nature love, his ‘private love’ of himself would be a lesser form of love than other-love. Charity is not self-love; it is self-transcending love for another. Charity is superior to self-love precisely because it is reciprocal. Perfect love wishes, in the act of eccentricity (out of self), to flow beyond oneself so as to embrace the one who is personally over and against it. A love that is curved in upon itself is no true love. Charity, the supreme excellence, transcends itself in openness to a new reality. The perfection of self-transcending love becomes, for Richard, the necessary reason why plurality of persons must not be lacking in true Divinity.

After establishing self-transcending love as the supreme perfection of God, Richard anticipates an objection: Could God’s self-transcending love be accounted by means of God’s relation to his creation, without the need of another divine person? Could God’s self-transcending love be explained merely in view of God-world relation, without ever introducing divine self-relatedness? ‘But you might say, “Even if there were only one person in that true Divinity, nevertheless He could still have charity toward His creation – indeed He would have it”.’ He answers this objection by invoking the concept of ‘ordered love’ (caritas ordinata), that the supreme charity cannot be addressed to a limited creature and lack a divine consort. ‘Oportuit divinam aliquid personam persone condigne, et co ipse divine, consortio non carete.’ The fullness of charity demands nothing less than ‘a person of equal dignity and therefore a divine person’. He further explains:

But certainly He could not have supreme charity toward a created person. For charity would be
disordered if He loved supremely someone who should not be supremely loved. But in that supremely wise goodness it is impossible for charity to be disordered. Therefore a divine person could not have supreme charity toward a person who was not worthy of supreme love. 

God’s infinite love demands that the other be infinite. The creaturely other, the object of God’s infinite love, is incapable of receiving or responding to such love in an infinite mode. ‘Thus God cannot love his creature objectively as much as he loves himself – that is, whereas he will to himself an infinite good, he wills to the creature only its particular finite goodness – and accordingly such love falls short of unconditioned perfection.’

Perfect love demands a return of the love offered. The supreme lover must be loved as much as he loves, but no creature can return to God an infinite love. Since God alone must be loved supremely, a divine person could not express supreme love to a person who lacks divinity. For to love with the highest love that which does not deserve such a love, in Richard’s rendering, is a ‘disordered love’, which God cannot exhibit. The object of his love cannot be human beings. God’s love, like Eros, is guided by the worth of the object. Only God, the Supreme Good, is worthy of absolute love, and therefore the infinite love which is God must always have had an infinite object even when creatures are absent. A second person is needed within the Divinity as an object on which the Divine love bestows without limit. Thus the one to whom supreme charity is expressed fully, and without disorderly waste, has to be divine as well.

Furthermore he approaches the objection from another perspective, that of Anselm’s point of departure – ‘id quo nihil hatius cogitari potest, ‘that than which it is not possible to conceive anything greater’. But Richard’s is ‘id quo nihil est maius, quo nihil est melius’, ‘a being, greater or better than whom there is nothing’. 

In God charity is the greatest perfection, and hence it must be so great that than which no greater could ever be conceived. If God were to immerse totally in his ‘private love’ of himself, he would never reach the highest degree of charity because his self-love would always be greater than his charity. Richard obviously follows Anselm’s designation of God in his ontological argument to flesh out his answer:

However, in order that charity be supreme and supremely perfect, it is necessary that it be so great that nothing greater can exist and that it be of such a kind that nothing better can exist. However, as long as anyone loves no one else as much as he loves himself, that private love which he has for himself shows clearly that he has not reached the supreme level of charity. But a divine person certainly would not have anyone to love as worthy as Himself if He did not have a person of equal worth. However a person who is not God would not be equal in worth to a divine person. Therefore, so that fullness of charity might have a place in that true Divinity, it is necessary that a divine person not lack a relationship with an equally worthy person, who is, for this reason, divine.

**Human Experiences: Happiness and Generosity**

The aforementioned answer reinforces his proposition, that charity is more perfect than self love. Richard continues to explore human experience of happiness and generosity, both of which, in his view, confirm his teaching on charity ‘with such transparent reasoning’ that anyone who fails to see it clearly suffers from the disease of folly, and is therefore weak in mind. 

If one is to be supremely happy, he must have charity, which presupposes an otherness for an appropriate giving and receiving of love. “There, in supreme happiness it is necessary that charity not be lacking. However, so that charity may be in the supreme good, it is impossible that there be lacking either one who can show charity or one to whom charity can be shown.”

Happiness requires a reciprocity of relationship in which there is mutual giving and receiving, yet without destroying oneself nor the other. Happiness demands a return of love. He elaborates:

However it is a characteristic of love, and one without which it cannot possibly exist, to wish to be loved much by the one whom you love much. Therefore, love cannot be pleasing if it is not mutual. Therefore, in that true and supreme happiness, just as pleasing love cannot be lacking, so mutual love cannot be lacking. However, in mutual love it is absolutely necessary that there be both one who gives love and one who returns love. Therefore one will be the offerer of love and the other the returner of love. Now, where the one and the other are clearly shown to exist, true plurality is discovered. In that fullness of true happiness, a plurality of persons cannot be lacking. However
it is agreed that supreme happiness is nothing other than Divinity itself. Therefore, the showing of love freely given and the repayment of love that is due prove without any doubt that in true Divinity a plurality of persons cannot be lacking. 34

This also casts light on Richard’s doctrine of God, that God does not exist in an immortal solitariness. His God is not a solitary monad, who sits alone on his throne of majesty. Divine existence is not a pathetic one, in which it cannot enjoy pleasure sweeter and more pleasing than the delights of charity in eternity. For the divine person to be eternally deprived of this satisfying delights is to be eternally deprived of joy. Such a God would not only be unhappy but also would not share his infinite abundance of his fullness. Certainly, if we say that in true Divinity there exists only one person, just as there is only one substance, then without doubt according to this He will not have anyone with whom He could share that infinite abundance of His fullness. But, how can this be, I ask? Would it be because even though He wished to, He could not have one who would share with Him? Or is it because He would not wish to, even if He could? But He who is undoubtedly omnipotent cannot be excused on the grounds of impossibility. But could not that which is not due to a defect of power be due to a defect of benevolence alone? But if He would not be absolutely unwilling to have one to share with Him when He really could if He wanted, then observe, I ask you, what a defect of benevolence this would be in a divine person and how great it would be. 35

A solitary God is not worthy to be recognized, much less worshipped. What a great deficiency of benevolence that would be if God should want to reserve for himself in a miserly fashion the abundance of his fullness, which if he wishes, he could communicate to another and consequently enjoy such great satisfying pleasure! And if such a great lack of benevolence were in God, he would be better off hiding from the gaze of all, including the angels in his heavenly existence. ‘(Q)uite rightly He should blush with shame to be seen or recognized’. 36 But this is improper for a being like God, who is far from being impassive and selfish. It is precisely God-like to give joyously. God is most glorious in communicating himself completely. ‘(W)hat is more glorious, what is truly more magnificent than to have nothing that one does not want to share? And so it is evident that in that unfailing good and supremely wise counsel there can be no miserly holding back just as there can be no inordinate squandering. 37 God’s omnipotent love seeks to give freely and fully, and this constitutes the fullness of God’s glory. Yet only a divine person could love to the fullness of his power, without disorderly waste. God’s self-transcending love does not imply an impairment of being, an imperfect being who necessarily seeks his perfection and tries to overcome his deficiency through actions. 38 C. S. Lewis’s distinction between ‘gift love’ (agape) and ‘need love’ (eros) helps elucidate Richard’s thought. 39 God does not act out of need love – a love dominated by self-seeking desires. Rather, God acts out of gift love – a free, self-giving love, sharing his boundless goodness, without a miserly holding back. God as love does not wish to exist without a loved one. The self-transcending love, thus, is the joyful sharing of that supra-abundance of his fullness, yet without implying a diminution of being or a deficiency of being. So nothing is more pleasing or sweeter than this, that the supreme charity, which God is, desires to communicate to another with perfect satisfying joy and pleasure. This truth is confirmed in the life of reason.40

**Supreme Charity: Shared Love for a Third (condilectus)**

The divine being must be three incommunicable existents or persons, Richard argues, if God is love (1 Jn. 4:8, 16). That is because perfect love is always other-directed, toward what is distinct from and in some sense outside the self. Self-love is a defect, which cannot be attributed to God. God’s love must be perfect, and must not be contingent upon the creation. God’s love must be other-directed within God himself. This explains why there must be at least two persons within God: the lover and the beloved. But why must it be more than two? Why not binity rather than Trinity? He argues that love between two is less perfect than among three. For selfishness or complacency may surface in the mutual love of only two persons, and only when a third is introduced into a circle of love is love perfected: ‘in mutual love that is very fervent there is nothing rarer, nothing more excellent than that you wish another to be equally loved by him whom you love supremely and by whom you are supremely loved’. 41 Since we are dealing with
God’s supreme charity, it must be perfect in every way. It must possess supreme excellence, in that it must be ‘so great that nothing greater can exist’, and ‘such that nothing better can exist’. Not willing to share the love with which he is loved is a sign of immaturity and weakness. Accordingly, Richard lays down three stages of attitudes of mature and perfect charity: To be able to share love is a sign of perfection; to be willing to share with joy is better; and to search for it with longing is the best of all. ‘The first is a great good; the second, a better one; but the third, the best. Therefore, let us offer to the supreme what is excellent; to the best, what is best.’ Hence the proof of perfected love lies in a willing sharing of the love that has been given to you. The most fervent kind of love presupposes another person who could be loved equally by the one whom you love supremely and by whom you are loved supremely. ‘For the one loving supremely and longing to be loved supremely, surely the most excellent joy lies in the fulfillment of his own longing, namely in the attainment of longed-for love.’ Hence perfect love such as God is must not be short of a Trinitarian series, logic demands that the third person who is the completion of the mutual love of the two. Richard elaborates on the meaning of this term:

When one person gives love to another and he alone loves only the other, there certainly is love, but it is not shared love. When two love each other mutually and give to each other the affection of supreme longing; when the affection of the first goes out to the second and the affection of the second goes out to the first and tends as it were in diverse ways – in this case there certainly is love on both sides, but it is not shared love. Shared love is properly said to exist when a third person is loved by two persons harmoniously and in community, and the affection of the two persons is fused into one affection by the flame of love for the third. From these things it is evident that shared love would have no place in Divinity itself if a third person were lacking . . . Here we are not speaking of just any shared love but of supreme shared love – a shared love of a sort such that a creature would never merit from the Creator and for which it would never be found worthy.

Richard moves from self-love (first stage) to other-love (second stage), from which he moves to the sharing of this mutual love with a third (third stage). If there were only duality, love will be self-enclosed. If the pair who loves does not move to the third stage, he argues, their love might fall back to the first stage. He asks, ‘For if he does not will what perfect goodness demands, where will the fullness of goodness be? If he wills what cannot be done, where will fullness of power be?’ The perfection of charity demands love for another person, and the fulfillment of their mutual love demands shared love for the third. ‘And in those who are mutually loved’, he explains, ‘the perfection of each, in order to be completed, requires with equal reason a sharer of the love that have been shown to them.’ The love of the two is not simply mutual love, but a common love for the third that establishes their union. What is required for perfect love is ‘union with the third’.

Can there be a fourth person? No. Here Richard turns to the logic of divine processions. Within God, there exists only one person who is principle only, the one who is term only, and the one who is both term and principle. Only one person has the source from himself, the one is from the other, and one who is from both others; one who only gives, one who only receives, one who gives and receives. In order to avoid an infinite procession of persons, logic demands that the third person be the completion of the Trinity.

Like what he does in his treatment of the love of the pair, Richard seeks to confirm his position by turning again to human happiness and generosity. In happiness, he shows that if the two refuses to share their love with a third, they would have reason to grieve. Supposing that there exists in God only two lovers. Why would they not have someone to share their supreme joy? Perhaps both are unwilling to share, or one is willing while the other not, in which case there is a cause for grieving. Consequently the oneness of mind and intimate harmony which we find in perfect friends would be lacking.

But if someone should say that neither is able to find repose in the sharing of love that has been shown to them, how, I ask, will that person be able to excuse them of the defect of love mentioned above? Now we know that nothing can be hidden from those who are supremely wise. And so if they love each other truly and supremely, how will one of them be able to see a defect in the other and not grieve? For if one of the two sees a defect in the other and does
not grieve, where will fullness of love be? If He sees and grieves, where will fullness of happiness be?\textsuperscript{50}

The same logic applies to the experience of generosity. If one refuses to share his joy, Richard argues, not only would the other grieve, but at the same time the first would be ashamed. For just as a true and intimate friend cannot see the defect of one who is loved intimately and not grieve, so surely in the presence of a friend he cannot fail to be ashamed over his own defect.\textsuperscript{51} But shame is inapplicable to a perfect being like God. ‘For just as in supreme happiness there cannot be a cause of grieving, so in the fullness of supreme glory there cannot be matter for embarrassment.’\textsuperscript{52} There should be no defect in that supreme charity. Fullness of goodness and fullness of happiness and glory in accord witness to the fullness of all perfection. In order for charity to be true, plurality of persons cannot be lacking; in order for charity to be perfected, a Trinity of persons is required.

And so sharing of love cannot exist among any less than three persons. Now, as has been said, nothing is more glorious, nothing is more magnificent, than to share in common whatever you have that is useful and pleasant. But this cannot be hidden from supreme wisdom, nor can it fail to be pleasing to supreme benevolence. And as the happiness of the supremely powerful One and the power of supremely happy One cannot be lacking in what pleases Him, so in Divinity it is impossible for two persons not to be united to a third.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Trinity: Persons and Processions}

In his \textit{De Trinitate}, Richard, unlike Augustine and Anselm, has as his starting point, not the unity of essence, but the persons of the Trinity. He demonstrates how the unity of essence is required by perfect love between persons. Boethius defines person as ‘an individual substance of reasonable nature’, emphasizing rationality as the characteristics of person.\textsuperscript{54} However Richard modifies Boethius’s definition and introduces his own distinctive concept of person as ‘an incommunicable existence of an intelligent nature’.\textsuperscript{55} The divine persons are three incommunicable existents, each in his unique and incommunicable self ‘exists in himself alone, according to a certain mode of reasonable existence’.\textsuperscript{56} Each person is distinguishable by a property that belongs incommunicably to the word substance signifies less someone than something; to the contrary, the word person designates less something than someone.\textsuperscript{57} To elaborate, he asserts that the person is not a \textit{quis} (who), but a \textit{quid} (what), thus putting the emphasis on relationality. \textit{Quid} refers to substance, whereas \textit{quis} refers to person. ‘The word person always designates someone who is one and unique, distinguished from everyone else by a singular property.’\textsuperscript{58} This way of thinking accentuates the dynamic of personal and individual action. To account for an ontological distinction of persons in the unity of the divine substance, Richard says, we must ‘know both what the person is and from where this person gets his origin’.\textsuperscript{59} Here he turns to the noun existentia, in virtue of which sistence is synonymous with essence, and \textit{ex-sistentia} designates the way in which sistence manifests itself with a unique and peculiar property. The term \textit{existentia} is a predicate of the person, expressing both the essence (\textit{sistesse}) and the origin (\textit{ex}) of the person. ‘The one verb \textit{existere} or the one noun \textit{existentia}, indicates both that which refers to the nature of the being and that which refers to its person.’\textsuperscript{60} Richard introduces a conceptuality of personhood which is both ontological and relational. This relationality, in Torrance’s words, is indeed ‘an inherent and ontological determination of personal existence’.\textsuperscript{61} Each person, within the community of one indivisible substance, has his own mode of subsistence. In God’s own life, there are three persons who share the same essence, but each possesses a unique property by which he may be distinguished. The persons of the Godhead are one according to their mode of being, but three according to their mode of existing. Moltmann’s explication of Richard’s intra-trinitarian dynamic by way of the patristic idea of \textit{perichoressis} is appropriately adequate:

\ldots being a person does not merely mean subsisting; nor does it mean subsisting in relation. It means existing. . . . By the word ‘existence’ --\textit{existentia} -- he meant: existence, in light of another. It is true that in the first place he related this other to the divine nature. But it can be related to the other persons too. Then existence means a deepening of the concept of relation: every divine person exists in the light of the other and in the other. By virtue of the love they have for one another they exist totally in the other: the Father, \textit{ex-ists} by virtue of his
love, as himself entirely in the Son; the Son, by virtue of his self-surrender, exists as himself totally in the Father; and so on. Each Person finds his existence and his joy in the other. Each person receives the fullness of eternal life from the other.\footnote{62}

How does Richard explain the procession of persons, that which makes each person share uniquely in the divine essence? He again resorts to human experience as an indication of divine mystery: ‘In the human world, we observe a person proceeding from another person, and this procession can evidently be realized from another person sometimes in a manner only immediate, sometimes in a manner only mediately, and sometimes in a manner both mediately and immediate.’\footnote{63} To illustrate this, Richard uses three Old Testament saints, Abraham, Issac and Jacob, the latter two proceeds from the former, but in different ways. Issac proceeds immediately from Abraham; Jacob proceeds only mediately from Abraham through (per) Issac, the intermediary.\footnote{64} Although human generation is not identical with divine generation, there is still a certain likeness in them because humans bear the likeness of God. ‘It is necessary’, Richard states, ‘beginning with this (human) nature, to erect a mirror for contemplation and following the consideration indicated, search out with a very great effort that which is found in God and that which is not found in God, according to the relationship of likeness and unlikeness’.\footnote{65} The Father exists of himself alone, possessing an independently incommunicable existence which is rightly his. Because the Father’s mode of existence is incommunicable, the Son and the Spirit must be seen as existing from another. The Son is the immediate procession in God. The Father requires another of equal dignity so that there will be fullness of charity. Since the Son possesses the same power as the Father, the Spirit does not proceed from the Father alone, but from both the Father and the Son. ‘This is required by the perfection of love of the first two persons who require a third person to be loved by both the first and second persons. The condilectus, the third person, is the unity of the shared love of the two. Thus, the third person proceeds in a procession that is both immediate and mediately.’\footnote{66} No other person proceeds from the Holy Spirit. Why? Nico’s explanation elucidates:

If divine love is mutual love, the Son returns the Father’s love and the Spirit returns the love of both the Father and the Son. Now, processions have only one direction. The Spirit, for instance, proceeds from the Father and the Son, but they in turn do not proceed from the Spirit. On account of Richard’s own principle – that in God loving, as any quality, is the same as being – one should conclude that returning love would necessarily imply returning being: a procession in the other direction.\footnote{67}

There is a divine order of things, which enables Richard to account for the difference between the procession of the second and that of the third. Here we detect Richard’s two distinct ways of producing (modus procedendi): the first one, generating, is willing a beloved (dilectus) responding love, while the second one, proceeding, is willing a companion in love (condilectus).

Through the Spirit, God as love is showered upon the believer. Hence the Spirit is appropriately called ‘Gift’: ‘... this gift is sent to us, this mission is given to us at the same time and in the same way by the Father and by the Son. It is, after all, from the one (Father) and from the other (Son) than the Spirit has everything that he possesses.’\footnote{68} And because the Spirit has his being, power and will from the Father and the Son, it is they who send and give him. The Spirit, being sent, receives from them the power and the will to indwell us. The Spirit, as pure receptivity, fills the human hearts with the love that he receives from the hearts of both the Father and the Son. Inflamed by the Spirit, the ‘divine fire’, says Richard, ‘the human soul loses progressively all darkness, coldness and hardness: the soul passes entirely into the likeness of him who enflames’, and finally is configured to him. It is the property of the Spirit to constitute from ‘a multitude of hearts’ a community of ‘one heart and one soul’.\footnote{69}

**Love: Trinity of Persons**

The concept of charity as self-transcending love is most original and contributive to his reflection and development of his Trinitarian theology. The love of human persons, which Richard uses as a point of departure, enables him to grasp analogously the love of the persons of the Trinity. Love consists of three levels, moving from self-love to charity, in which the second is loved, to complete charity, in which a third is mutually loved by the pair. In Richard’s own terms the three levels are private love (amor privatus) whose object is one’s
self, mutual love (amor mutus or caritas) whose object is a person of equal dignity, and consummated love (caritas consummata) whose object is a person mutually loved (condilectus). Love overflows the lover, but also overflows the union of the pair. Drawn together by one affection, they do not allow their mutual love to remain in a selfish and static state. Because the union is dynamic, it overflows beyond itself into the third. The love of the pair converges in the single ‘flame of love’ they have for the third. Speaking of the inner relations of the Trinity, Richard speaks of ‘the flood of divinity’, in which there is ‘the flowing abundance of supreme love’. This indeed constitutes the core of Richard’s interpersonal theology of the Trinity:

For when two persons who mutually love embrace each other with supreme longing and take supreme delight in each other’s love, then the supreme joy of the first is in intimate love of the second, and conversely the excellent joy of the second is in love of the first. As long as only the first is loved by the second, he alone seems to possess the delights of his excellent sweetness. Similarly, as long as the second does not have someone who shares in love for a third, he lacks the sharing of excellent joy. In order that both may be able to share delights of that kind, it is necessary for them to have someone who shares in love for a third.

Trinitarianly, the love of Father and Son overflows and expresses itself in the Holy Spirit, who is pure charity. This divine overflowing is best expressed by the filioque. “If the two (the Father and the Son) possess the same power, it must be concluded that it is from both that the Third Person of the Trinity received his being and has his existence.” The third person proceeds both from the one who cannot be born (innascibilis), namely the Father, and the one who was born (nascibilis), namely the Son. There is an immediate procession of the Son from the Father; there is an immediate procession from the Father and mediate procession from the Son, namely the condilectus or the Spirit. Both the Father and the Son form a single principle of the Spirit. To account for an ontological distinction of persons, Richard does not make use of Anselm’s principle of an opposition of relations. Instead he distinguishes between the persons through an analysis of love in its absolute perfection and the distinctions that are found in that perfect love. In God there is charity in the highest form. There must be in God one infinite love and three infinite lovers, in such a way that the one (the Father) is the causal principle of a condign beloved (the Son) and these two form the single causal principle of an equal co-beloved (the Spirit). Love begins by the Father gratuitously pouring unto another, namely the Son, who receives. This is reflective of the dyadic relationship between purely gratuitous (gratuitus) love (the Father) and received or indebted (debitus) love (the Son). However, this dyadic love shared by only two is lacking, and does not meet the status of supreme love. Perfect love desires to move beyond the intimacy of the two, embracing a third loved by both; it steers lovers away from each other so as to share their love with a third. This third is what Richard calls, the condilectus, a ‘co-beloved’ – that which is loved together with their reciprocal love. And this third is the Holy Spirit – the love that is purely received, purely indebted (debitus). ‘That the divine Persons are three derives from the idea that, in the perfection of charity, the adequate beloved is condilectus, one willing to share the love received: oportet ut pari voto condilectum requirat. Not only does the perfection of love demand love for another person, but the consummation of mutual love demands shared love for a third. In Congar’s words: ‘The special way of existing which characterizes the divine Persons consists in a manner of living and realizing Love. That Love is either pure grace, or it is received and giving, or it is purely received and due.”

In Richard’s words:

It is certain that true love can be either exclusively gracious or exclusively owed or uniting both, that is to say gracious on one hand and owed on the other hand. Love is gracious when one gives gratuitously to him from whom one has received nothing. Love is owed when to him from whom one has received gratuitously one renders in exchange only love. Love is mixed when, in a double attitude of love, gratuitously one receives and gratuitously one gives.

Each person possesses love, which is God’s essence. Each, based on the infinite giving and receiving of love, exists according to his distinct mode of origin: the Father is the fullness of giving love; the Son is the fullness of both giving and receiving love; the Spirit is the fullness of receiving love. The trinitarian-shared love, where each person is totally different from the other two but totally equal with them, is the perfect love which
befits God. The distinction of divine processions stems from Richard's unique conception of God's nature as love, which by its very constitution requires divine relationality and community in God's inner life.

Concluding Reflections:
Fairly speaking, it is through Richard's appropriating of Augustine's ideas that helps establish his De Trinitate as the locus classicus of the interpersonal approach. Although the dominant image of Augustine's De Trinitate is a trinity of mind, knowledge and love, he does not reject completely inter-personal relations as the image or rather the vestige of the Trinity. He knows the limitation of the interpersonal analogy: 'If we recognize the image of the Trinity not in one but in three human beings, namely father, mother and son, it follows that man was not made in the image of God until he had a wife and begot a child - because till then there was no trinity.' However in Treatise XIV of Tractatus in Ioannem, Augustine's comments on Acts 4:32, 'the multitude of believers had but one neighbor, McGinn writes, Richard doubtless owes something to Book 8 of Augustine's De Trinitate, that from which he develops his own distinctive theology of consummated charity (amor consummatus). And the highest form of which demands the overflowing of the supreme and perfectly shared love found in the Trinity. In commending to our reason the revealed doctrine of the unity of the divine substance and the trinity of persons, Richard assumes and elaborates the meaning of charity given in Augustine. Why must there be three persons in one Divinity, to a certain extent, has been answered in Richard's theology of interpersonal relation, although his is not a scholastic proof of it as in Anselm.

But has Richard answered the question: why only three? He is right to say that there is at least a third to open up the two, but why stop at three? The strength of Augustine's idea of the Spirit as the bond of love lies in the fact that it answers the question, 'why three?' For in God, there are two, and the reciprocity of the two. But this thinking seems to underplay the distinct identity of the Spirit, which Richard seeks to avoid. Augustine's mutual love theory has been criticized for de-personalizing the Holy Spirit. In an I-Thou relationship, the love that the Father and the Son bestow upon each other is not a distinct person; at least, it is not an activity that defines a person distinct from the 'I' and the 'Thou'. The Holy Spirit, for Augustine, is the Gift of mutual love between Father and Son. The Spirit has little function, if any except as a link between Father and Son. Richard develops this love analogy further, insisting that the Spirit is not the mutual love between Father and Son; rather it is the mutual love between Father and Son turned to the third. Mutual love, to be perfect, must be love shared with the third. 'In God we find not just an I-Thou relationship of reciprocal love', O' Collins writes, 'but also the Holy Spirit as the 'Co-beloved' (condilectus). There is a movement from self-love (Father) to mutual love (Father and Son) to trinitarianly-shared love (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). The Spirit, thus, is the specific and incommunicable mode of existence of the divine substance constituted as love. In Gunton's words: 'The Holy Spirit is then indeed the dynamic of the divine love, but one that seeks to involve the other in the movement of giving and receiving that is the Trinity: that is, to perfect the love of Father and Son by moving it beyond itself.' Richard's view of God as the perfect communion of love allows the distinctiveness of Holy Spirit to come through far more clearly.
and strongly than Augustine’s mutual love-theory. In lieu of Augustinian language of lover, beloved and love, Richard’s trinitarian language is lover, beloved and co-beloved. Person is understood as being in relation or communion. In other words, God’s being is a relationality. Thompson writes of the ‘two main effects of Richard’s view’: it gives concrete particularity to the persons who interrelate and so constitute the deity, and at the same time it conceives of God’s being in these distinctions as creative of or in fact existing as communion. This social view of the Trinity has profound implication for understanding humanity, in view of which human personhood is not to be understood in purely individualistic terms, but in concrete, communitarian and relational terms. That which defines personhood is indeed its reciprocity and relationship. Divine existence, thus, is the ideal of personal existence.

Beyond dispute, Richard’s thought differs with Augustine’s. With Anselm, Richard affirms that the Spirit is not the mutual love of the Father and the Son. For Anselm, the source of the Spirit lies in the love the Father and the Son have for the divine essence, the divine goodness, rather than a mutual love between persons. For Richard, the love expressed by the Spirit is not of two lovers turned towards each other as in Augustine, but rather of two turned to a third. Richard’s position, in that respect, distances itself more from Augustine’s idea than Anselm’s, since the Spirit’s love for its divinity includes a love for the dyadic lovers (Father and the Son). Badcock explains:

In the trinitarian sense, furthermore, love is what God is; love is not to be appropriated technically to the Holy Spirit as the third person of the Trinity, as in Augustine, but is rather to be understood in terms of the divine being itself, so that it is from this that the distinctive logic of God as a Trinity of persons flows. Because God is love, and specifically the perfection of love, God is necessarily a community of love, Trinity.

Richard’s De Trinitate has revived the social analogy, which is already there in the Cappadocian fathers, who draw on human social life as analogies for God’s three-in-oneness. Although Richard stands within the Latin tradition, his view shows affinity with the Greek tradition, that which retains the identity of the Spirit as the one who opens up the relationship of the other two, even though it is not clear why must there be only three. Gregory of Nyssa, for one, in his Not Three Gods: To Ablabius, uses the analogy of Jesus’s three disciples, Peter, James and John. There he argues that just as they are three yet one according to their human nature, so the Godhead is three identities yet one as to their divine nature. However he stresses that the unity of the divine persons transcends the unity of any three humans. The divine persons act in full unity with themselves in all things, whereas any three humans may act at times contrarily of each other. Gregory writes: ‘In the case of the Divine nature we do not (as in the case of men) learn that the Father does anything by Himself in which the Son does not work conjointly, or again that the Son has any special operation apart from the Holy Spirit.’ It is an analogy, however imperfect, of God’s tri-unity whose community makes up one eternal Godhead.

Richard’s view is not without criticisms. Richard appears to say that the Father first loves himself, then extends his love to the Son, and finally together with the Son enters into a shared love for the Spirit. What is the origin of such plurality in God? His language of love – private love, mutual love and consummated love – in which the respective objects are the self, the equal other and their co-beloved, as Hill argues, may result in a certain inconsistency in Richard’s thought, but it can also be somewhat misleading. His emphasis seems to fall, not upon love as a dynamism giving rise to the Word and the Pneuma, but upon the very nature of love as presupposing an inner relationality that is personal in kind. This is his primal and dominating principle to which the doctrine of the processions is subordinate. The universal tradition on the invariant order among the Persons demanded that he give consideration to the processions. But there his system reaches an impasse, because love may well require a plurality of persons as its condition, it does not explain the origin of such plurality. If the processions also constitute a structure indigenous to love, then it is difficult to explain that the Father is without origin, that the Son arises from the Father alone, and that the Spirit’s origin is from Father and Son (this is the Western tradition which Richard represents). That is, it is difficult to maintain a distinct personal identity for each of the Three. One is inclined to think of one person who reproduces himself twice over.

Hill’s criticism is justified, however, only insofar
as the only real relations are the processions, as in the Augustinian view. Hill fails to see Richard’s affinity with the Eastern tradition in this aspect: persons are distinguished by origin, not by relation; the relations merely express personal distinction. Furthermore the basic presupposition at work in Richard’s formulation is that trinitarian relations need not necessarily be relations of origin or processions. Hence the Son and Spirit can be eternally related, without having their eternal origin in one another. The possibility of genuinely interpersonal relations of love is dependent not upon origin, but on their individual personalities. Persons as persons, in Richard’s view, are capable of being the subject of acts that relate each to the other; they are capable of loving relationships within the one substance of God who is love. As such Richard’s view is an alternative in Western theology to the predominant Augustinian position.

Pannenberg observes with approval how the antinomy between the personal character of the Three in God, on the one hand, and the unity of the divine essence, on the other, is resolved in Richard’s intimation. Personal autonomy is established precisely in the relation of origin through which the persons are bound together in the one indivisible essence. However, he sees in Richard the tendency of over-emphasizing the independence of persons at the expense of the divine unity. Richard is successful in deducing the immanent-Trinitarian dynamic from the essence of God’s love, yet he fails to derive God’s unity from the reciprocity of the persons. Furthermore Richard does not develop his theory from the perspective of the economy of salvation, and thus the immanental relations are really devoid of any definite content. How God might be in and for himself is Richard’s preoccupation; how God might be for us is left unattended.

Augustine holds that love as ‘ordered love’ must take into consideration the worth of the object. This view is shared by Medieval theology, too: the greater the good, the greatest the love. From this, Richard deduces that God as the highest good must love himself supremely. If God is love, the object on which God’s love bestows must be infinite. To love supremely that which is not worthy of such infinite love would be to exhibit a ‘disordered’ love, which is inapplicable to a being like God. Nygren criticizes:

The unquestioned premise of this argument is that God’s love must not be an “unordered” love. It must not, as Agape does, leave the scale of values out of account, but like Eros it must be guided by the worth of the object. Richard of St. Victor has no room for the New Testament idea that the highest love is precisely that which loves those who are not worthy of it (Rom. v. 8). In other words, Richard will not allow God’s love to be spontaneous and unmotivated, to be Agape. The result is that in the last resort it can only be conceived as Divine self-love, God’s “amor sui”.

That being said, praiseworthy is Richard’s conception of the unity of nature as a dynamic one grounded in the community of intrinsically-related persons. This gives rise to a concept of what it is to be, i.e., God’s being is constituted by the relationship of persons in a communion of love. Richard’s view of God as community of persons is also contributive to the development of twentieth century social doctrine of the Trinity.

Notes


8 De Trin. 4. 3 (Cousin's translation).


12 De Trin. 1:8, 93.


23 De Trin. 3.2 as cited in Stiegman, *ibid.*, 154.


25 See Cousins, *ibid.*, 68, his footnote 27, where he quotes favorably Gregory the Great. *XL Homiliae in Evangelia* 1, 17 (PL 76, 1389A).


there stress on individuality – unrelatedness – but the tendency that was to play so important a part in modern individualism, of defining our humanity in terms of reason (Descartes again), is given strong prominence'.


61 Thomas F. Torrance, The Hermeneutics of John Calvin (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1988), 9. Cf. John J O’Donnell, The Mystery of the Triune God (London: Sheed & Ward, 1988), 101: ‘The person is constituted not only by substantiality but also by the origin from which he has his being.’ Nevertheless O’Donnell argues that Richard preserves the Boethian definition of person, because for him sistere refers to the person who has its being in itself, not in another, while ex speaks of the relationship of origin by which the person receives its being. Collins argues against O’Donnell, but in favour of Moltmann’s interpretation, that existence is in the light of another. Quoting Moltmann: ‘Ex-sisting means “being out of oneself”, which is an experience of oneself in the ecstasy of love, to be totally in the other and to understand oneself totally from the other is the ecstasy of love.’ See Paul Collins, Trinitarian Theology West and East. Karl Barth, the Cappadocian Fathers, and John Zizioulas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 139.


91 Nygren, Ibid., 653. 92 Ibid., 654. 93 Leonard Hogdson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944. Hogdson, for one, argues for an ‘internally constitutive
unity’ between the divine unity and organic unity in creation. Moltmann, in particular, has developed his model in some ways similar to Hodgson’s. He insists that the unity of the three persons lies not so much in some underlying substance as in communicative love among the persons. His emphasis on perichoretic unity, not substantial unity, accentuates the elements of mutuality and interdependence as ontologically constitutive of God’s inner life. The Trinity is no ‘self-enclosed circle in heaven’ but a dynamic community of fellowship open to creatures: ‘To throw open the circulatory movement of the divine light and the divine relationships, and to take men and women, with the whole of creation, into the life-stream of the triune God: the meaning of creation, reconciliation and glorification’ (Moltmann, Ibid., 178.). For an extensive of Richard’s influence on Russian theology, see Meerson, The Trinity of Love.

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