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- Henri Blocher, Vaux-sur-Seine**

RÉSUMÉ

Au début du XX^e siècle, la situation était assez simple: les évangéliques, dans toutes les dénominations, défendaient avec vigueur la proclamation de la Croix comme sacrifice expiatoire, comprise comme substitution pénale (dans la ligne de Calvin et Warfield). Dans un contexte dogmatique et spirituel fort différent, les catholiques romains s'accordaient avec eux, sans en tirer les mêmes conséquences. Les libéraux s'opposaient avec véhémence.

La réaction antilibérale (Barth, Brunner) a remis en honneur le langage pénal et substitutif, mais sans véritable retour à la doctrine. Les tendances théologiques plus récentes se sont, au contraire, éloignées des positions évangéliques orthodoxes (sauf une aile plus positive en Allemagne, avec des biblistes comme M. Hengel ou P. Stuhlmacher, et l'évolution de W. Pannenberg). Les théologies de la libération, en particulier féministe, les dénoncent brutalement. Les catholiques (le jésuite B. Sesboüé serait représentatif) semblent avoir tous abandonné le schème pénal. Aux marges du mouvement évangélique, quelques-uns s'en détournent et reprennent nombre des critiques libérales classiques (celles, déjà, de Faust Socin); en témoigne l'ouvrage collectif, sous la direction de John Goldingay, Atonement Today, Londres, S.P.C.K., 1995.

Le motif principal, chez ceux qui rejettent l'expiation substitutive, ressort clairement: elle paraît inadmissible à la sensibilité contemporaine, elle n'appartient pas au « croyable disponible ». L'argument principal met en avant la nature métaphorique du langage biblique correspondant et la pluralité, plus ou moins divergente, des schèmes de représentation—double relativisation. On note aussi l'importance stratégique de disjonctions qui jouent le rôle de présupposés, comme celle du juridique et du relationnel.

L'article analyse les facteurs culturels qui jouent contre la doctrine évangélique traditionnelle, y compris la diffusion des « herméneutiques du soupçon ». Puis il examine les arguments eux-mêmes, en esquissant une thèse sur le langage métaphorique qui revalorise la portée cognitive et l'intention explicative-systématique des représentations bibliques. Il démasque le caractère arbitraire de plusieurs disjonctions dont on se sert contre l'idée de substitution pénale; il cite des textes probants sur l'union intime et indissociable de notions qu'on veut opposer. Il conclut donc à la nécessité, à partir de l'exégèse et de la réflexion théologique, de maintenir la doctrine en cause, non sans tenir compte, pour la manière pédagogique et apologétique, des dispositions contraires dans l'esprit de nos contemporains.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts war die Situation denkbar einfach: die Protestanten aller Denominationen verteidigten mit aller Kraft die Verkündigung des Kreuzes als Sühnopfer, verstanden als stellvertretende Strafe (im Sinne von Calvin und Warfield). Vor einem dogmatisch und geistlich vollkommen andersartigen Hintergrund stimmten die Katholiken mit ihnen überein, ohne allerdings dieselben Konsequenzen daraus zu ziehen. Die Liberalen hingegen widersetzten sich vehement.

Die antiliberalen Reaktion (Barth, Brunner) hielt die Sprache von Strafe und Stellvertretung in Ehre, ohne jedoch wirklich zur damit verbundenen Lehre zurückzukehren. Die neueren theologischen Richtungen haben sich dagegen von den orthodoxen evangelischen Positionen entfernt (abgesehen von einem positiveren Flügel in Deutschland, der Bibelwissenschaftler wie M. Hengel oder P. Stuhlmacher sowie die Weiterentwicklung W. Pannenberg's umfaßt). Von den Befreiungstheologien, vor allem der feministischen, werden sie erbarmungslos denunziert. Die Katholiken (der Jesuit B. Sesboüe sei hierfür stellvertretend genannt) scheinen das Strafmodell vollständig aufgegeben zu haben. Am Rande der evangelischen Bewegung schwenken einige um und akzeptieren eine Reihe der klassischen liberalen Kritiken (wie sie bereits von Fausto Sozzini vertreten worden waren). Als Beleg dafür das sei kollektive Werk unter der Leitung von John Goldingay (Atonement Today, London, SPCK, 1995) genannt.

Das Hauptmotiv derjenigen, die die stellvertretende Sühne ablehnen, ist eindeutig: sie erscheint ihnen unvereinbar mit der zeitgenössischen Sensibilität, sie gehört nicht zu dem, was als glaubhaft gelten kann. Das Hauptargument betrifft die metaphorische Natur der biblischen Sprache sowie die Vielfalt der mehr oder weniger stark voneinander abweichenden Darstellungen. Der biblische Befund erfährt somit eine doppelte Relativierung. Zudem fällt die strategische Bedeutung der Aufspaltung, z.B. in einen juristischen und einen relationalen Aspekt, auf, der eine Rolle als Prämisse zukommt.

Der Artikel analysiert die kulturellen Faktoren, die der traditionellen evangelischen Lehre entgegenwirken, wie z.B. die Ausbreitung der 'Hermeneutiken des Verdachts'. Außerdem untersucht er die Argumente an sich, indem er eine Theorie der metaphorischen Sprache entwirft, die die kognitive Tragweite und erläuternd-systematische Absicht der biblischen Darstellungen würdigt. Er entlarvt den willkürlichen Charakter der vielfältigen Aufspaltungen, derer man sich in Auseinandersetzung mit der Idee der stellvertretenden Strafe bedient. Er zitiert beweiskräftige Texte über die verbürgte und untrennbare Einheit der Begriffe, der man sich widersetzen will. Er betont abschließend die aus Exegese und theologischer Reflexion sich ergebende Notwendigkeit, die hier behandelte Lehre aufrechtzuerhalten, wobei jedoch abweichende Sichtweisen des zeitgenössischen Geistes aus pädagogischen und apologetischen Gründen berücksichtigt werden sollten.

'Is it any wonder that there is so much abuse in the modern society when the predominant image of the culture is of "divine child abuse"—God the Father demanding and carrying out the suffering death of his own son? If Christianity is to be liberating for the oppressed, it must

itself be liberated from this theology. We must do away with the atonement, this idea of a blood sin upon the whole human race which can be washed away only by the blood of the lamb."¹ Such an explicit evaluation of traditional doctrine, by two representative feminist theologians, not

only unveils one side of the current theological situation but also suggests the *stakes* of our debates: between those who view Jesus' death on the cross as an expiatory sacrifice on our behalf and in our stead (and often cherish this doctrine as the dearest truth of their faith) and those who judge the same to be the most offensive and damaging of all fantasies of sick minds, mild compromises will not do. In every epoch, however, one can find many 'seekers of *h^alāqôth*' . . .

Our survey makes no claim of being exhaustive. We shall draw a rough picture of main tendencies, without rehearsing and documenting in detail the variety of opinions. But we shall try to analyze the arguments, and the factors at work, while focusing on theologians who are nearest to us—acknowledged brothers and sisters in the fellowship of the Gospel—and, yet, have moved to the other side of the great divide. We shall then sketch a possible reply.

Of roots and moves and countermoves

Seen from afar, at least, the situation at the beginning of the XXth century looked fairly simple. Evangelicals, in all denominations, were strongly attached to the proclamation of the cross as the atoning sacrifice, understood as penal substitution; they were heirs to the Reformers, especially Calvin, and to the further elaboration by orthodox divines, whose work Revival movements had taken over; Benjamin B. Warfield (1851–1921) was offering masterly contributions in defence of the doctrine (collected in *The Person and Work of Christ*). Roman Catholics, almost unanimously, would also teach the same interpretation of Christ's death, which Bossuet had preached with powerful eloquence; they would not draw the same conclusions as Protestants, they would relax the *ephapax* to allow for the sacramental 'repetition' of the sacrifice in Holy Mass and for the extension of meritorious satisfaction to the sufferings of the faithful, but they would maintain expiation by the blood of the Lamb; as late

as 1938 the *Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible* published a learned synthesis of that stripe by the biblical scholar A. Médebielle.² Liberal Protestants or Anglicans already felt outraged at the doctrine and complained about a 'blood' theology, in their eyes an ugly relic of primitive stages in man's religious evolution. The British scene, only, had staged attempts at a refashioned orthodoxy, with R. W. Dale (who simply refurbished Grotius' 'rectoral' theory), J. McLeod Campbell (vicarious confession), R. C. Moberly (vicarious repentance), and, most vigorous of all, P. T. Forsyth (the justification of God).

The vehement reaction against liberal optimism in the 'theology of crisis' brought back penal substitutionary language among mainline Protestants. Noteworthy were Emil Brunner's *The Mediator* and, later, Karl Barth's volume IV/1 of the *Church Dogmatics*; however, Barth's discourse of 'the Judge judged in our stead' made it clear that it meant no return to the orthodox theory—closer scrutiny shows it is a matter of Jesus Christ being the man we cannot be and not any satisfaction of justice³; Brunner's *Dogmatics* (vol. II) also revealed the chasm that yawns between his positions and, say, Warfield's. Other leaders of theological thought were even farther removed from the latter. Gustav Aulen branded the same under the name of the 'Latin theory' and claimed the polemic scheme, *Christus Victor*, as the 'classical' doctrine. Bultmann had lucidly perceived that the NT interpretation of the cross 'combines representations of sacrifice and a juridical theory of satisfaction'⁴ but he would retain nothing of this mythological husk of the true message—a false scandal that hinders the working of the true scandal of the cross. Some biblical scholars, with a more conservative approach to biblical trustworthiness, still clung to Isaiah 53 as a witness to atonement by vicarious punishment; one may name Oscar Cullmann and Joachim Jeremias.

The following generations, down to the present, have not flocked back to the sacrificial fold. Liberationist theologies,

including feminist ones, have tended to distrust the model of sacrificial expiation and even to charge it with 'people's opium' effects: it induces submissiveness and resignation among the oppressed, whom they call to take arms and fight for freedom; in any case, these theologies show heavy preference for exemplary models in Christology and soteriology. More philosophically inclined trends (with the influence of Paul Ricœur weighing on many⁵) look in Scripture for a network of symbols, a set of figures to use as a grid for interpreting human existence and make the world a 'live-able' dwelling-place. Even moderates prefer to keep away from the old doctrine of sacrifice⁶. Jürgen Moltmann has rejected the sacrificial understanding of Jesus' death, with the argument that the victim of sacrifice does not rise again to life; however, his opposition, as he aims irenically at the widest possible ecumenical embrace, has grown less vocal recently⁷. Wolfhart Pannenberg could not be claimed for the orthodox position at the time of his *Grundzüge der Christologie*: despite strong statements (he confessed proximity to Barth), he rejected satisfaction, against Melancthon and Calvin,⁸ and argued that Jesus really broke the Law—with an interpretation of Galatians 3.13 strangely involved⁹. But he too has come much closer to traditional Evangelical tenets; his section entitled *Expiation as Vicarious Penal Suffering* appears to confess them now: he tells of the 'change of place between the innocent and the guilty' and he comments: "This vicarious penal suffering, which is rightly described as the vicarious suffering of the wrath of God at sin, rests on the fellowship that Jesus Christ accepted with us as sinners and with our fate as such. This link is the basis on which the death of Jesus can count as expiation for us."¹⁰ Germany may be the only area today where a number of noted biblical-critical scholars, such as Martin Hengel or Peter Stuhlmacher,¹¹ clearly defend penal substitution.

On the Roman Catholic side, a gradual but spectacular reversal has taken place. Although the new universal Catechism

does retain biblical and traditional language, "Through his obedience unto death, Jesus fulfilled the substitution of the Suffering Servant who "offers his life as a *sacrifice of expiation*" "while he was bearing the sin of multitudes" "whom he justifies in taking upon himself their offenses" (Is. 53.10–12). Jesus made reparation for our offences and satisfaction to the Father for our sins' (no. 615, cf. 623; the penal dimension is not spelled out, cf. no. 1008f), one could hardly find today a single theologian of renown and influence who would uphold the doctrine of penal substitution¹². Scholars were convinced by renewed patristic and medieval studies that it is not essential to Catholic faith; a more mystical mood and Teilhard's influence worked together (Teilhard de Chardin had a violent distaste of juristic ways of thought); the 'anthropological turn' (and the influence of Anthropology) re-inforced the trend. One can point to the work of systematic theologians like Gustave Martelet¹³ and Bernard Sesboué,¹⁴ and to symposia like *Mort pour nos péchés*¹⁵ and *Le Sacrifice dans les religions*.¹⁶ Catholic writers emphasize sacrifice but without any penal implication, as homage and thanksgiving (*tôdâh*), consecration of life, and, more technically, as 'symbolic exchange' with a subversion of the relationship between gift and counter-gift in *Christian sacrifice*.¹⁷ They put forward the 'initiation scheme', death as the door to life, according to the grain of wheat parable (Jn. 12.24).¹⁸

One may observe a renewal of interest in the adventurous ideas of the French scholar (in the U.S.) René Girard.¹⁹ Though his theses met with a distinct disdain on the part of specialists, many have found space to discuss them—an indication of influence.²⁰

In the meanwhile, Evangelical theologians have strengthened the case for the Calvinian and Warfieldian view, especially in its biblical foundations. The 'lion' in the academic jungle has been the Australian Anglican Leon Morris, whose several contributions on the topic, since *The Apostolic Preaching of the Cross* are

an invaluable treasure. Among exegetes, one should mention too I. Howard Marshall (*The Work of Christ*, 1969; *Jesus the Saviour*, 1990) and our colleague Samuel Bénétreau.²¹ Systematic theologians include G. C. Berkouwer, who stood firm on *The Work of Christ*, John Murray (*Redemption Accomplished and Applied*), Roger Nicole (who joined L. Morris against the watering down of 'propitiation' in C. H. Dodd's interpretation), and James I. Packer with his exceedingly fine lecture 'What Did the Cross Achieve? The Logic of Penal Substitution,' *Tyndale Bulletin* 25 (1974) 3–45. And, of course, we may not forget the preacher-exegete-systematician of the century: John R. W. Stott, and his *The Cross of Christ*.

On the edges, the left edges, however, of the Evangelical movement one may observe a growing uneasiness with that traditional hallmark of Evangelical faith. The most significant expression of a deep change in this respect seems to be the symposium held at St John's College, Nottingham, which generated the important book *Atonement Today*. All contributors sound anxious to distance themselves from expiation through substitutive punishment²². Their reasons for so doing deserve our closest scrutiny.

Arguments & strategies

The first consideration that is often put forward is the change in our cultural situation. Preaching penal substitution no longer makes 'living contact with real people and the real issues that concern them'; actually, we no longer preach it, but rather Moltmann's 'empathizing God.'²³ L.-M. Chauvet similarly stresses that the doctrine smacks of a masochistic piety, with a God who hampers life, who obeys a mercantile logic, who acts from the outside: these traits are uncongenial to our culture, they do not belong to 'what is available for belief.'²⁴ These thoughts already underlie earlier treatments.²⁵

The main argument, then, stresses the *metaphorical* nature of the Scriptural language of sacrifice. It is found in almost every critic of the traditional doctrine of

Evangelicals. *They*, reads the charge, are guilty of the 'sin' of reading 'that metaphor literally and merely personalistically [sic].'²⁶ Atonement theories have not respected the distance between the sacrificial and legal images and the reality of Jesus' death.²⁷ One should stress the symbolic status of that language.²⁸

The force of the argument is 'multiplied' by the emphasis on plurality. The judicial imagery is only one among many, a fact that further relativizes its doctrinal import.²⁹ The other 'sin' according to Gunton's accusation is 'to treat one metaphor of atonement, the legal, in isolation from the others.'³⁰ The implication is that the various metaphorical models achieve no unity among themselves³¹: *divide et impera!*

Many critics will not even grant that the penal scheme is, at least, *one* valid model for approaching the mystery of our salvation. John Goldingay flatly denies that Isaiah 53.5–6 and 10–12 implies 'a punitive understanding of sacrifice.'³² In sacrifices, he claims, no punishment is implied: 'By laying hands on the offering, the offerers identify with it and pass on to it not their guilt but their stain. The offering is then not vicariously punished but vicariously cleansed.'³³ Denial of the penal character of sacrificial death is very common (unlike Goldingay's opinion on Is. 53). Goldingay adds that it is 'questionable whether the Old Testament sees sacrifices as propitiating God's wrath,' and that 'the languages of atonement-propitiation-expiation and of anger do not come together.'³⁴

When one considers method, one is struck by the role of disjunctive presuppositions. Stephen H. Travis starts off defining retribution as a 'penalty which is inflicted on the offender *from outside*, not intrinsically "built into" the acts to which it is attached.'³⁵ He considers that 'divine judgement is also expressed there [the end part of Deut] in non-retributive terms of God's "hiding his face". . .'³⁶ Even more decisively, he argues that wrath 'is not the retributive inflicting of punishment from outside,' as Romans 1.24,26,28 shows, and, therefore, 'as *hilasterion* Christ does

not suffer punishment from God and thereby avert his wrath.³⁷ Similarly, C. Greene contrasts, as 'the best framework for understanding the cross,' on the one hand 'universal moral law or retributive justice,' and on the other 'eschatological crisis, judgement and transformation.'³⁸ Another common separation or opposition is the one made between 'legal imputation' and 'real and costly identification'³⁹; (with singular reverence for divine decrees) Smail writes: Christ's 'solidarity with us in our sinfulness came about, not by some legal fiction or external divine decree, but by entering our sinful situation and taking upon himself our fallen humanity.'⁴⁰ A related disjunction, an all-pervasive one in *Atonement Today*, is the disjunction made between the legal or forensic and the 'relational.'⁴¹ Michael Alsford, in his sympathetic treatment of post-modernism, insists that the 'normative mode of existence' is 'a relational one' and he promotes the word 'coadunacy' better to express it.⁴² The antithesis of law and person leads to the major objection against penal expiation: sin, being a most personal thing, *cannot* be transferred. T. Smail is fully aware of the Socinian origin and modern-humanistic roots of that objection; yet he 'cannot but assent' to it.⁴³ As to the disjunction between love and justice, it is trite and hardly needs to be mentioned (though it is still operative).

Motives & factors

Before dealing with arguments, it may be helpful briefly to glance at the conditions and forces that have made the penal-sacrificial view, who once had such a powerful grip on consciences, so unbelievable and so unpalatable today.

The secular mindset seems to be the first and foremost factor. In a world which looks increasingly like a man-made world (for better and for worse), the sense of the Numinous loses its edge; the awe of the sacred, the fear of the Lord, mean almost nothing. God's only excuse, if he/she is allowed to exist, is his/her powerlessness before human free-will and his/her usefulness in providing me with fulfilment.

Maybe he/she can represent the ideal of the self. The image of a wrath of God is utterly shocking! Paul Tillich's analysis of the forms of anxiety (*Angst*) is true to fact: whereas in the XVIth century, the dominant form was the dread of damnation, our modern anxiety (and even more post-modern anxiety, under the guise of fun) is that of meaninglessness. Penal substitution does not 'speak' to it.

One may add that the way our consumer society functions, with omnipresent advertisement (and mass production requires it), fosters hedonistic tendencies. The target of advertisement, the prospective customer, is seated upon the throne, to be propitiated in order that his/her pleasure may be the choice of this or that commodity. This affects even evangelism . . .

Social conditions encourage individualism, and so does the 'ground-motive' of humanistic thought. It is intertwined with the democratic (egalitarian) ideal. Both features contribute to the erosion of objective standards. 'The major difficulty in the context of secular Western culture,' Colin Greene discerns, 'is the almost complete dissolution of the framework of universal moral law. This constitutes part of the "crisis of modernity" (cf. Newbigin 1989).'⁴⁴ Moral law and judicial law, ultimately, stand or fall together. It is no surprise, therefore, if the rationale of judgment and penalty seem to decompose under our eyes. The whole judicial system undergoes a severe crisis, as Pierre Burney's analysis convincingly shows.⁴⁵ All this produces inimical reactions to the idea of objective guilt and guilt-transfer.

The brightest of our artists and thinkers, for generations and with increased efficacy in our media explosion, have rebelled against institutional norms, social and moral order (far more bitterly, on average, than the general public has done). From William Blake to Michel Foucault . . . We suggest that this stance was born of the *resentment* of gifted people as they have seen that power was and remains in other hands, whom they despise (in ancient times, they had to flatter the princes and the wealthy, just to get

their living; now it pays more to flatter the streak of rebelliousness in all individuals).

The effect of the younger sciences of human behaviour has been an important factor, especially as it provided the *hermeneutics of suspicion* with their tools. Sociology, mostly of the Marxist stripe, has unmasked under the 'superstructures' of Ethics, Religion, Law, the play of class interests—oppressors' weapons in the class struggle, to be denounced and destroyed. The Sociology of Knowledge has imbibed much of this spirit and currently exerts a strong influence. Psychology, and Freudian Psychoanalysis as the most luminous kind, has also dismantled the prestige of moral judgement and suggested a reduction to unconscious drives. Contrary to popular misconception, Freud never unloosed the lusts he discovered in the hidden depths of the *psychè*; he realized their destructive potential; he maintained an ethic of reason and moderation; but the way his stated theory rooted in the Oedipus complex both Ethics and Religion did contribute to undermining the sense of objective guilt and of divine wrath (a rather obvious neurotic fantasy).

Answers & questions

Constraints of space and competence preclude any treatment of the cultural forces that 'blow' against older Christian orthodox convictions. We shall be content with pointing to a dazzling (enlightening) interpretation of Sociology of Knowledge approaches,⁴⁶ and to a vigorous demonstration that Freud's second period no longer deals with guilt as with a symptom to be dissolved in terms of unconscious mechanics but as an irreducible factor of human life, also a positive factor of personal growth and cultural progress.⁴⁷ Psychoanalytical efforts at deconstructing sacrifice in the Bible did not pass without an answer on their own ground.⁴⁸ If we sift 'hard' facts and rigorous reasoning from matters of taste and ideology, we observe that there is little of weight left against penal-sacrificial views of atonement.

Regarding the drift or change in public opinion and sensitivities, wisdom expresses itself through a complex attitude. On the one hand, we may not ignore the fact, neither in the choice of language, nor in the rhythm of pedagogy; we should make contact with our neighbours at the place of their preoccupations (e.g. the anxiety of meaninglessness) and not force upon them schemes that are alien to them. Luke's discretion is a model here: though it is by no means absent from Luke-Acts, the sacrificial meaning of the death of Christ is diplomatically or pedagogically left in the background, since the work was aimed at a predominantly Gentile audience. On the other hand, we should be wary of letting the fact surreptitiously become the *norm*. Public opinion does not make truth (if we wish to avoid the quagmire of relativism). Pragmatic considerations should not shape the economy of faith. Christina Baxter puts her finger on the decisive point: 'Does salvation have to be *experienced* as salvation for it to be considered salvation? (. . .) There may be biblical warrant for arguing that it is not necessarily the case that we have to feel saved, or feel better, for salvation to have occurred.'⁴⁹ In other words, felt needs are not necessarily true needs, or the truest needs. Our contemporaries' concern is to find a gracious neighbour, no longer to find a gracious God, but they do need to find the gracious God on whose grace their eternal destiny still depends. This means that the category 'what is available for belief' induces treacherous thoughts; we should not receive it! And the question is: do our fellow-theologians who argue against penal substitution guard themselves enough on that side? The force of cultural winds should render us *the more* vigilant against the danger that they carry us away from biblical truth.

The topic of metaphors would deserve a full-scale treatment, which, unfortunately, we cannot offer here.⁵⁰ Although most current words still bear the mark of a metaphorical origin, it would be false, in our opinion, to make the essence of language only and exclusively metaphori-

cal. Metaphors presuppose a distance (*metapherein*) from a non-metaphorical use which must also have its place; nomination is first (cf. Gn. 2.19f) and there are *concepts* attached to linguistic signs.⁵¹ This entails, we suggest, that metaphorical language (within the total linguistic web) knows a whole gamut of differentiated levels, with various degrees of cognitive relevance. It is not enough to say: metaphors! We should distinguish between occasional, 'live,' metaphors and regular, systematic, metaphors which may no longer be perceived as metaphors and come near to concept-status. We should acknowledge varying distances: some metaphors merely point to one item of likeness in two utterly foreign, unrelated, objects; others almost identify the two . . . We fail to see such preliminary reflections among those who deprive the legal and sacrificial metaphors of any precise cognitive import. They seem to imply that metaphors cannot yield determinate knowledge, or, else, they praise metaphors for giving what rational discourse cannot give—a typically romantic, irrationalistic, theme.⁵²

The legal and sacrificial metaphors in Scripture have such a frequency and regularity, they constitute such a stable network, with predictable use, they are so *insistent*, that they may not be dealt with as 'mere' metaphors. The intimation that goes with them is that they convey some *intelligence* of the way the death of Jesus accomplished our salvation. Noteworthy is the fact that they are drawn from privileged realms, not from any realm in reality. Human judges are instituted, according to Scriptural views, as *'elôhim*, as the representatives and delegates of God (Rm. 13.1ff; Ex. 21.6; 22.8f; Ps. 82, etc.); the sphere of law is intended to mirror God's dealings with men—indeed, not only to mirror but to be the instrument of *his* judgments (Rm. 13.4). It is an exercise of transcendence: the transcendent norm of justice applied to creatures who transcend earthly horizons, 'images of God.'⁵³ Metaphorical distance is greater with the animal sacrifices of Levitical law—and this easily disposes of Moltmann's objec-

tion that a sacrificial victim does not rise again (one cannot avoid *some* dissimilarity)⁵⁴—but the whole system was designed by God to forecast Christ's atonement, as 'shadows' of the 'real thing' (*sôma*, Col. 2.17) in him. We may presume it is the source of eminently proper metaphors.

The charge that the classic Evangelical doctrine *isolates* the legal metaphor sounds strange indeed. We should say: on the contrary! The opponents isolate the various metaphorical strands and play them off against one another, to show that none of them should be taken literally. We strive to distinguish the main sets or 'cycles'—we count five of them, of sacrifice, punishment, ransom, victory and passover, with due attention paid to each specific angle and contribution—and to show how a unified picture emerges from them all.⁵⁵ Actually, we often find two of them, even three, in the same verses, and it is difficult to disentangle them (e.g. Rm. 3.24–26 mixes forensic language [just, justice, justify, leaving unpunished], ransom-language [redemption] and sacrificial language [means of propitiation, blood]). The phenomenon is easily explained when we realize how easily we can translate one 'language' into the other: the sacrificial term *kippēr* (atone, expiate) is related to the 'commercial' word *kôfer* (ransom), while Exodus 21.29f shows that in forensic situations the *kôfer* may be the penalty inflicted on the guilty party (in substitution for his life). The key-phrase *bearing the sin / offense*, which is not even discussed in the book *Atonement Today*, belongs both to the penal and to the sacrificial languages. It has the technical meaning of 'undergoing the penalty incurred' (Gn. 4.13; Ex. 28.43; Lv 5.1.17; 19.8; 22.9, etc.). It is prominent in Isaiah 53 where John Goldingay unexpectedly, but peremptorily, denies any thought of punishment; we consider J. Alec Motyer's commentary to be a sufficient refutation.⁵⁶

Given the perfect unity of Ethics and Religion in biblical perspective, 'holiness' in cultic language will be translated 'righteousness, justice' in ethical-juristic

language. 'Uncleanness' similarly will be translated 'guilt' in moral-forensic categories. When J. Goldingay claims that offerers 'pass on to [the victim] not their guilt but their stain,⁵⁷ we ask: what is the spiritual stain of sin if not their guilt before God? If the awful energy of the sacred strikes dead presumptuous mortals like Nadab, Abihu, or Uzzah (Lv. 10.2; 2 S 6.7, with the word wrath; cf. the axiom 'No one can see the Lord and live'), hence the need for priesthood and propitiatory sacrifice, the legal 'translation' is the demand that crime be punished, and justice satisfied. (The notion of satisfaction is biblical, expressed by the verb *rātsah*, Lv. 26.41,43, cf. Is. 40.2.) The other 'languages' do not diverge: the *Christus Victor* scheme depends on the forensic one as soon as one realizes that the Devil's weapon is *accusation*, that the satisfaction of justice deprives him of his hold (Rv. 12.10f); if one argues that the Passover sacrifice was no atonement, a ready answer is that Jews considered that the eschatological Passover would make expiation for sins. We are not *reducing* the variety of biblical representations but we affirm the *organic unity* of their whole field, with the penal-sacrificial understanding at the centre (so it is in apostolic explication): a firm basis for doctrine.

Critics of penal substitution do not appear to stress the metaphorical status of other languages that please them more: the language of friendship or of married intimacy is no less metaphorical than that of judgement! They often put forward metaphors that tell of the *effects* of Christ's work as if they were substitutes of expiation-language, such as 'liberation'; but they are not alternative ways of speaking; they are complementary, and shed no light on the *how* of the saving efficacy. Even more distressing, we notice a strong liking for vague language and rudimentary metaphors. Stephen Travis sums up the teaching of 2 Corinthians 5.21 in these terms: 'The essential point is that Christ has experienced the sinner's estrangement from God, he has absorbed and thereby taken away sin, so that we might be brought into a right

relationship with God.⁵⁸ Why 'experience' when Paul's says 'death' (v. 14f)? Why 'estrangement' when Paul thinks in terms of 'imputation' (*logizomenos*, v. 19)? Why that verb 'absorb' that suggests a material substance to be destroyed by physical or chemical means? How did Christ 'absorb' sin? How did that supposed 'absorption' cancel the spiritual reality of sin? It is striking that this crude metaphor occurs no fewer than seven times in *Atonement Today*.⁵⁹ And it is not even biblical!

Isaiah's Servant prophecy combines penal language and sacrificial terms ('he shall sprinkle,' 52.15, 'guilt-offering', *'āshām*, 53.10), but it does not mention God's wrath. Is it the case, as Goldingay, again, advances, that 'the languages of atonement-propitiation-expiation and of anger do not come together'⁶⁰? It is approximately the case in Leviticus—with the exception of chapter 10 (the ritual protects from divine wrath, v. 6, and it implies bearing sin, making expiation, v. 17). But this may be due to literary genre. Not seldom, elsewhere in Scripture, do we find both languages coming indeed together in the same passages. Deuteronomy 32 combines the languages of wrath (v. 22), retribution (v. 35), vengeance (if we distinguish it from retribution, vv. 35,41ff) and expiation (*kippēr*, v. 43). Isaiah 27.7–9 evokes the severe *rûah* which led Israel into exile ('anger' belongs to the semantic field of *rûah*!) and it is closely linked to the expiation of iniquity and the removal of sin (v. 9); 34.2ff tells terribly of God's wrath (which is also a retributive action, v. 8) under the simile of sacrifice (v. 6). For Jeremiah 18.23, expiation is the thing that would avert God's anger. In Ps. 78.38, making expiation is also parallel to refraining from exercising wrath. Two passages are very impressive: 2 Samuel 21 and 24; they similarly conclude that the Lord 'was entreated' (21.14 and 24.25), a term that implies propitiation; the Vulgate rendered *repropitiatus est Deus*. In the first case, it was through the infliction of the death penalty upon the guilty family (Saul's), the way for David to atone/expiate (21.3, *'akappēr*). In the second

case, God's wrath being mentioned (24.1), it was through the offering of sacrifices (burnt-offerings also have the expiatory role, Lv. 1.4). This is more than enough to prove the connection between wrath and atonement in biblical thought. The same data expose the inadequacy of the view of sacrifice which several, especially Roman Catholic, theologians would prefer, that of life being born of death. It is based on a projection of alien ideas into the Bible. C. S. Lewis wrote of his experience: 'I myself, who first seriously read the New Testament when I was, imaginatively and poetically, all agog for the Death and Rebirth pattern and anxious to meet a corn-king, was chilled and puzzled by the almost total absence of such ideas in the Christian documents.'⁶¹

Other disjunctions fare little better under biblical scrutiny. There is no need to oppose retribution and the consequences that a man reaps from his evil acts. When the latter is stressed, it is not rare that the thought of retribution be also present. Galatians 6.7 states the law of harvest, but it means that 'God is not mocked'—it is not a matter of mere immanent causality. We shall receive back the things done through the body (literally, 2 Co. 5.10), but at Christ's judgment-seat. Those who perish by their own corruption (in their own *phthora*, 2 P 2.12b.13a) receive the retribution (*misthon*) of their injustice. Those who debase their own bodies in the practice of homosexuality receive the retribution (*antimisthian*) of their sinful choices (Rm. 1.27). Defining retribution as inflicted 'from the outside' disregards the fact that the biblical God is not simply and merely 'outside.' He who fills heaven and earth works through the processes of nature, which are never independent of his free and righteous decrees.

Stephen Travis, as we have seen, also creates an opposition between wrath and retribution.⁶² He refers to Romans 1.24,26,28, 'God gave them up . . .' He does not notice, however, the *antimisthian* of v. 27 (which we just quoted), and he does not read on to chapter 2! In Romans 2.5 the day of wrath is the day of judgement (*dikaiokrisias*), further defined in v. 6 as

retribution (NEB: 'He will pay every man . . .'); 12.19 is equally clear: God's wrath (whose agents, to bring punishment, magistrates are to be seen, 13.4.) is explained as retribution (Vg: *ego retribuam*). The same association is found in the OT: Isaiah 34.2ff,8, already cited, 35.4 and 66.6.15f (Vg: *reddentis retributionem*); in Jeremiah 51.45 (*ira furoris*), 56 (*ultor, reddens retribuet*). Scripture plainly 'translates' numinous wrath as just retribution. Regarding deeper philosophical deconstructions of the retributive principle, we may simply refer to our brief and critical analysis of Ricœur's attempt.⁶³

The foregoing examples warn us against accepting criticisms which belong to the system of thought as the disjunctions we have found wanting in biblical legitimacy. The basic antinomy between the legal and the personal is also radically foreign to Scripture: there is nothing more personal than in-law relationships—marriage itself is first of all a legal reality (and the notion of *persona* is first juridical). The lack of this perception leads one to ignore the classical distinction between *reatus culpæ* and *reatus pænæ* (to use the commonest phrases, which were introduced by Peter Lombard, although they are open to criticism), the key to the issue of guilt-transfer. No distance may be created between the idea of transfer and that of substitution, abundantly witnessed to in Scripture: they are two sides of the same coin. When Tom Smail asks (rather movingly), as he rejects the transfer of our guilt upon Christ: 'Am I just conniving with the Socinians in the individualistic prejudices of the culture to which we both belong . . .?'⁶⁴ we are bound to answer him: 'Yes, brother, exactly so!'

Further exposition of the grounds and justifications of the classical Evangelical view would include the radical questions other theories do *not* answer. But tackling these questions would exceed the bounds of this paper. A quotation from another reader of *Atonement Today* will provide us with a sufficient summary and a fitting conclusion: '. . . Once we move out of relationships of mutual love and trust, inevitably the issue of obligations, and

the sanctions that go with the neglect of them, must arise. In other words the relationship necessarily takes on a legal, and therefore penal, character. (. . .) Indeed without this, the wrath of God loses its moral content, and could take on the character of mere petulance. If we may not think of the Cross as dealing with that penal dimension, then it is unresolved; we are forgiven, cleansed, accepted, loved, but *still liable*.⁶⁵

Thanks be to God—who delivers us from all such liability, from all condemnation, through Jesus Christ our Lord!

Notes

- 1 Joanne Carlson Brown & Rebecca Parker, 'For God So Loved the World,' in *Christianity, Patriarchy, and Abuse: A Feminist Critique*, ed. Joanne Carlson Brown & Carole R. Bohn (New York: Pilgrim, 1989) 26, as quoted by Charles B. Cousar, 'Paul and the Death of Jesus,' *Interpretation*, 52 (1998) 39.
- 2 Art. 'Expiation,' *Supplément au Dictionnaire de la Bible*, vol. III, ed. Louis Pirot (Paris: Letouzey & Ané, 1938) 1–262.
- 3 Barth expressly disowns the traditional understanding of Evangelicals in *Dogmatische*, IV/1*, trans. Fernand Ryser (Geneva: Labor & Fides, 1966) 267 (§ 59/2.2; p. 253 in the *Church Dogmatics*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley), cf. 268 ('not by undergoing our punishment as such'), 290 (no satisfaction in the orthodox sense). His summary: 'Because he is God, he [Christ] acts in his omnipotence in order to be in our stead and for our benefit the man whom we are not' is found p. 12 (§ 57/1.6); salvation is defined on p. 7 (§ 57/1.3) as the perfection of being, the participation in the being of God. The ontological meaning of Barth's judicial language surfaces when he deals with sin as *das Nichtige*, when he claims that, in the person of Christ, both sinner and sin are destroyed, annihilated, destined to non-being. The (dialectical) substitution in being entails also the theme of vicarious repentance and confession (p. 273; § 59/2.4).
- 4 In his famous lecture 'Neues Testament und Mythologie,' trans. Odette Laffoucrière, *L'Interprétation du Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1955) 174.
- 5 Ricœur mainly unfolds and argues his antipathy towards the orthodox doctrine of sacrifice in 'Démystifier l'accusation' and 'Interprétation du mythe de la peine,' *Le Conflit des interprétations. Essais d'herméneutique* (Paris: Seuil, 1969) 330–347 and 348–362. But see also his comments on divine wrath, 'Sur le tragique,' *Lectures 3. Aux frontières de la philosophie* (Paris: Cerf, 1992) 197 (with n. 1).
- 6 As a recent issue of *Interpretation* 52/1 (Jan. 1998), 'Atonement and Scripture,' evidences; Joel B. Green's brilliant contribution, 'The Death of Jesus and the Ways of God. Jesus and the Gospels on Messianic Status and Shameful Suffering,' 24–37, is careful not to discard penal substitution but it avoids squarely affirming it either.
- 7 In 'The Passion of Christ and the suffering of God,' *Asbury Theological Journal* 48 (1993) 26, Moltmann writes: 'God transforms human sin into his suffering by "carrying" human sin . . . Christ is not only the Brother of the victims but also the expiation for the culprits,' as quoted by John G. Kelly, 'The Cross, the Church, and the Jewish People,' in *Atonement Today*, ed. John Goldingay (London: SPCK, 1995) 183. The last statement strongly suggests sacrificial penal substitution but the context (to which we had no access) may qualify or correct that impression.
- 8 *Esquisse d'une christologie*, trans. A. Liefooghe (Paris: Cerf, 1971) 355 (356 near to Barth).
- 9 *Ibid.*, 321ff.
- 10 *Systematic Theology*, II, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans/Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994) 427.
- 11 We may mention the French translation of his art. 'Pourquoi Jésus a-t-il dû mourir?', trans. B. Bolay, S. & S. Carrel, *Hokhma* 40 (1989) 17–36.
- 12 The only partial exception we have found is Roch Kereszty (not very famous), 'Toward a Contemporary Christology,' ed. Jonathan Leach, in *Crisis in Christology: Essays in Quest of Resolution*, ed. William R. Farmer (Livonia, Mich.: Truth/Dove Booksellers, 1995) 340ff, who insists on the connection between sin and punishment, and substitution in sacrifice, but falls back on solidarity and example (344–6).
- 13 See, e.g., his *Libre Réponse à un scandale. La faute originelle, la souffrance et la mort* (Paris: Cerf, 1986) esp. 160n. Martelet is avowedly anti-Augustinian, in the name of Irenæus.

- 14 *Jésus-Christ, l'unique Médiateur. Essai sur la rédemption et le salut* (Paris: Desclée, 1988).
- 15 Xavier Léon-Dufour et al., *Mort pour nos péchés. Recherche pluridisciplinaire sur la signification rédemptrice de la mort du Christ* (Brussels: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1976).
- 16 Marcel Neusch, ed., *Le Sacrifice dans les religions* (Institut de Science et de Théologie des Religions; Paris: Beauchesne, 1994).
- 17 In *ibid.*, see Marcel Neusch, 'Une conception chrétienne du sacrifice. Le modèle de saint Augustin,' 117ff, and Louis-Marie Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice comme échange symbolique,' 277–304.
- 18 In *ibid.*, Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice en christianisme. Une notion ambiguë,' 147 (referring to A. Vergote) and 'Le Sacrifice comme échange symbolique,' 289.
- 19 See *Ichthus* no. 90 (March 1980) with the art. by Gérard Kuntz, 'René Girard, Des choses cachées depuis la fondation du monde: Une relecture de la Bible,' 2–5 and our 'Christ, agneau de Dieu: La mort de Jésus selon René Girard et selon le Nouveau Testament,' 6–10 (bibliog. in notes).
- 20 Pierre Gisel, 'Du sacrifice. L'avènement de la personne face à la peur de la vie et à la fascination de la mort,' *Foi & Vie* 83/4 (July 1984) 32–37; Christophe Desplanque, 'Pourquoi Jésus a-t-il dû mourir? La réponse de René Girard,' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 48–62; Marcel Neusch, 'Une conception . . . , *op. cit.*, 135ff; John Goldingay, "Old Testament Sacrifice and the Death of Christ," in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 15ff; Christoph Schroeder, "Standing in the Breach." Turning Away the Wrath of God,' *Interpretation* 52 (1998) 17f.
- 21 Before he wrote his two-volume commentary on Hebrews, he penned an important 'La Mort du Christ selon l'épître aux Hébreux,' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 25–47.
- 22 With the exception of Christina A. Baxter, whose highly competent treatment of historical issues is exceptionally independent and fair (we deplore a weakness on punishment towards the end of her 'The Cursed Beloved: A Reconsideration of Penal Substitution,' 70f, where the danger of a confusing mixture of retribution, retaliation, reparation or restitution lies too near for us to rest in peace). Christopher Cocksworth, 'The Cross, Our Worship and Our Living,' 111–147, hardly touches the most sensitive issues; he offers fine comments on Hebrews.
- 23 Tom Smail, 'Can One Man Die for the People?,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 75; in his foreword, J. Goldingay indicates that T. Smail's reaction prompted the convening of the symposium (p. xi). John Goldingay had formerly pushed forward the same argument in his 'Expounding the New Testament,' in *New Testament Interpretation. Essays on Principles and Methods*, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Exeter: Paternoster/Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) 358f.
- 24 Chauvet, 'Le Sacrifice en christianisme . . . , *op. cit.*, 139. The last phrase is 'croyable disponible,' it was coined by Ricœur.
- 25 See the issue of *Lumière & Vie* 20/101 (Jan.-March 1971), 'La Mort du Christ.'
- 26 Colin Gunton, as quoted (approvingly) by Colin Greene, 'Is the Message of the Cross Good News for the Twentieth Century?' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 231.
- 27 Charles B. Cousar, 'Paul and the Death of Jesus,' *op. cit.*, 42 (together with reassuring words about the value of metaphors).
- 28 Chauvet, 'Le "Sacrifice" en christianisme,' *op. cit.*, 145f, 148.
- 29 E.g., Sally Alford, 'Sin and Atonement in Feminist Perspective,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 162.
- 30 Gunton, as quoted by Greene, *op. cit.*, 231.
- 31 We dealt with that proposition, as found in R. W. Dale, E. Brunner, St. Lyonnet in our *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption* (Vaux-sur-Seine: Edifac, 1997²) I, 143–145.
- 32 Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice . . . , *op. cit.*, 8.
- 33 *Ibid.*, 10.
- 34 'Your Iniquities Have Made a Separation between You and Your God,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 50.
- 35 'Christ as Bearer of Divine Judgement in Paul's Thought about the Atonement,' in *ibid.*, 22.
- 36 *Ibid.*, 25.
- 37 *Ibid.*, 28f.
- 38 *Op. cit.*, 237.
- 39 Tom Smail, *op. cit.*, 81.
- 40 *Ibid.*, 81f.
- 41 Tom Smail, *op. cit.*, 89, quoting Gunton to the same effect. Cf. Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice . . . , 6.
- 42 'The Atonement and the Post-Modern Deconstruction of the Self,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 214. On the same page, he stresses, after Levinas, the need immediately to 'unsay' what is being said; however we fail to see him intent upon

- unsaying his statements on relationality/coadunacy.
- 43 *Op. cit.*, 77f, cf. 85 'absolutely unthinkable.' The Socinian flavour of the whole position is undisputable; the Socinians had anticipated most of the arguments; cf. Jean-Pierre Osier, *Faust Socin ou le christianisme sans sacrifice* (Paris: Cerf, 1996) 53–99.
- 44 *Op. cit.*, 228.
- 45 'La Théologie et l'évolution sociale: rédemption, damnation et justice,' *Lumière & Vie* 20/101 (Jan.–March 1971) 60–77.
- 46 Craig M. Gay, 'The Sociology of Knowledge and the Art of Suspicion (A Sociological Interpretation of Interpretation),' in *The Act of Bible Reading. A Multi-disciplinary Approach to Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Elmer Dyck (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity P., 1996) 88–113.
- 47 Jacques Gagey, *Freud et le christianisme. Existence chrétienne et pratique de l'inconscient* (Paris: Desclée, 1982). On the primal murder, also Jacques Gagey's interview by Jacky Rigaux, 'Religion: Au risque de la psychanalyse,' *Le Journal des Psychologues* no. 87 (May 1991) 14–18. Cf. also (no reference to Gagey), Bernard Locoge, 'Psychanalyse et substitution sacrificielle. Quels apports, quelles limites?' *Hokhma* no. 39 (1988) 63–82.
- 48 We are thinking of Marie Balmory, *Le Sacrifice interdit. Freud et la Bible* (Paris: Grasset & Fasquelle, 1986), with Dominique Stein's reply, 'Une lecture psychanalytique de la Bible, "le sacrifice interdit" de Marie Balmory,' *Lumière & Vie* 39/198 (October 1990), 'Bible et psychanalyse. Fragments,' 47–61.
- 49 'Jesus the Man and Women's Salvation,' in *Atonement Today*, *op. cit.*, 135.
- 50 We made a few remarks (altogether too brief) in our *Original Sin. Illuminating the Riddle* (New Studies in Biblical Theology no. 5, series ed. D. A. Carson; Leicester: Apollos, 1997) 109ff, focusing on metaphors of original sin.
- 51 Or *meaning* as defined by Eugene A. Nida, *Componential Analysis of Meaning: An Introduction to Semantic Structures* (The Hague: Mouton, 1975) 26: 'Meaning consists of that particular structured bundle of cognitive features, associated with the lexical unit, which makes possible the designation of all the denotata by the lexical unit in question,' as quoted by Moisés Silva, *Biblical Words and their Meaning. An Introduction to Lexical Semantics* (Academie Books; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983) 134.
- 52 So Gunton, according to Charles B. Cousar, *op. cit.*, 42.
- 53 Goldingay's clever humour, in 'Your Iniquities . . .', *op. cit.*, 40, when he compares the Lord to 'the mafia Godfather' (à propos the verb *pàqad*) may betray too weak a sense of the divine calling of magistrates, never to be assimilated to *mafiosi*, if one talks seriously.
- 54 We are led to a new consideration: we should view, in expiatory sacrifices, not the victim only, but the couple of *priest and victim* as 'bearing sin' together (Ex. 28.28; Lv. 10.17; the fact that the priest eats the flesh of the sin-offering may be a symbol of their solidarity). The high-priest's returning from his service in the Holiest Place—which Israelites watched for with eager expectation—could be considered as a figure of the resurrection (some have suggested the thought in He. 9.28 for the parousia; the resurrection is the parousia anticipated).
- 55 In our *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption*, *op. cit.*, 133–148.
- 56 *The Prophecy of Isaiah* (Leicester: InterVarsity P., 1993) 422–443; see 437f n. 1: 'To say, as Whybray does, that the phrase "bear iniquity" (*nāsā 'āwôn*) does not occur in the poem is an unworthy quibble, for the equivalents to "shoulder iniquity" (*sābal 'āwôn*) and "bear sin" (*nāsā' hēt*) do. To say that even if *nāsā' 'āwôn* occurred it could not refer to "vicarious punishment and suffering" ignores the use of *nāsā'* in Nu. 18:1–2 and of *sābal* in La. 5:7. Cheyne was correct to understand verse 11 as "an emphatic assertion of the vicarious atonement as the foundation of his righteous-making work".'
- 57 'OT Sacrifice . . .', *op. cit.*, 10 (see above n. 33).
- 58 *Op. cit.*, 26.
- 59 In Travis, *ibid.*, 26, 37, 38 (3 times), and in Goldingay, 'OT Sacrifice,' *op. cit.*, 18 (twice).
- 60 'Your Iniquities . . .', *op. cit.*, 50.
- 61 *Miracles, a preliminary Study* (New York: MacMillan, 1947) 118. In *The Problem of Pain* (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1940), however, he had not yet come to that sharp discernment.
- 62 *Op. cit.*, 28f. We also mentioned that he claimed that God's 'hiding his face' was non-retributive (25); we fail to see on what

grounds, when this hiding happens on account of sin: it is a terrible deprivation 'inflicted from outside' if you will! Ez 39.23f equates the hiding of God's face with his dealing with the people according to their offenses, a formula of retribution.

63 *La Doctrine du péché et de la rédemption, op. cit.*, 40–43.

64 *Op. cit.*, 78.

65 John Peck, 'Review of John Goldingay, ed., *Atonement Today*, *The Evangelical Quarterly* 70/2 (April 1998) 186.

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