Revelation and Reconciliation: a Tale of Two Concepts

Offenbarung und Versöhnung

Révélation et Réconciliation

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RÉSUMÉ
Dans cet article, l'auteur critique la manière dont certains théologiens envisagent la portée des thèmes épistémologiques dans la pensée religieuse dans l'histoire intellectuelle de l'Europe. Lorsque nous plaçons l'œuvre de Descartes dans son contexte, nous pouvons noter l'importance du défi, non seulement épistémologique, mais aussi moral, qui était soulevé vis-à-vis du christianisme à cette époque. Une lecture attentive de l'ouvrage de K. Barth, La Théologie Protestante au 19e siècle, suggère que Barth considère que le conflit entre la raison et la révélation qui a caractérisé le 18e siècle était fondamentalement un conflit entre la prétention humaine à se suffire à soi-même et la compréhension chrétienne de la grâce. Puis la position de Nietzsche est brièvement étudiée pour mettre en lumière les questions d'anthropologie fondamentale qui sous-tendent l'épistémologie. Ceci permet de conclure que le scandale historique du christianisme en Europe occidentale a trait à la doctrine de la réconciliation plus qu'à celle de la révélation.

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Why did Christian belief in divine revelation become discredited in the West? According to one account which gains a wide audience today, it is to be explained principally because of mistaken moves in the handling of epistemological matters. René Descartes was the prime culprit. To be sure, this claim as such is not at all new. But it is receiving fresh attention and fresh treatment in the work of Lesslie Newbigin and of Colin Gunton, to mention its two most prominent current theological advocates in
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the United Kingdom. Lesslie Newbigin recently published *Truth to Tell* which preceded a major and theological conference held at Swanwick, England, in July, 1992 organized under the subtitle of that work: *The Gospel as Public Truth*.¹ According to Newbigin, Descartes effected a small-scale repetition of the Fall. His philosophical method gave intellectual primacy to doubt and sought for a certainty which was the issue of one's own intellectual endeavours. Like Adam, then, we have doubt instead of belief, an attempt to attain human certainty instead of trusting in God. In arguing this, Newbigin was continuing a series of assaults on the Western epistemological tradition in philosophy and religion which he began with *The Other Side of 1984* and followed up with *Foolishness to the Greeks* and *The Gospel in a Pluralist Society*.² Colin Gunton has also followed the epistemological trail, likewise charging Descartes with initiating the modern version of the problem and insisting with Newbigin that we must get back to grounding knowledge in faith instead of sustaining the intellectually discredited procedure of starting with doubt and putting demonstrative reason on an epistemic pedestal.³

Both authors offer vigorous, comprehensive and statesmanlike constructive proposals for a theology that will undergird cultural renewal. It is not their proposals that detain us here. Rather, we shall look at the diagnosis they persistently offer, namely that it is the false epistemological alignment of doubt and dogma, reason and faith, that led Enlightenment and subsequent modern thinking into intellectual fatalities that have involved rejection of Christianity and the production of a decadent culture.⁴ What are we to make of this?

1. The Significance of Descartes

For a number of reasons, there are plenty who have found in Descartes the fount and origin of modern intellectual evils. Newbigin's suggestion of a Cartesian Fall is no more dramatic than William Temple's announcement that Descartes' vaunted philosophical discovery was the worst moment in European history.⁵ Here and now is not the time and place to rehearse the essential Cartesian positions. We recall only that Descartes determined to doubt everything as a matter of philosophical principle in order to reconstruct any knowledge he could validly gain on the foundation of some indubitable principle. Descartes turned to himself, to his own intellectual operations, to see if knowledge could be discovered. He fortunately discovered that he could not doubt his own existence and proceeded to proved the existence of God and the external world. However, such discoveries did not mean that the crisis of religious knowledge was over. On the contrary, the game had only just started. What if Descartes was right to try to spin out a method of knowledge but wrong in what he concluded? In the end all came to depend on frail mortal intellect and in the end mortal intellect decided there was no revelation and then no God. So the story may be told.

There may be a good deal of truth in the story. But something is missing, particularly when we think of Descartes in his historical context. Repeatedly in the preface to his celebrated *Meditations* Descartes tells us that he is bent on refuting what he describes as 'atheism'.⁶ Atheists are those who deny the existence of God and the immortality of the soul. So there were 'atheists' before Descartes. Where did they come from? As the Protestant Reformation contributed to the disruption of European civilization, so the search was on for a sound basis for thought and for society. Texts from the ancient sceptics, in the tradition of Renaissance interest in antiquity, became available. The sceptics, who came in varied hue, systematically doubted the validity of claims to knowledge. That put God's own existence in the melting pot. Atheism did not hit Europe on a culturally significant scale until the French materialists of the eighteenth century came along, but even in Descartes' day there were those who commemorated the pagans of old, stout deniers of deity as those ancients could occasionally be. Thomas Hobbes and Baruch de Spinoza, inhabitants, like Descartes, of the seventeenth century, were both called atheists. It was a label of opprobrium, perhaps, but it was an index of the polemical possibilities of
the day. Descartes did not create atheism or atheists. There was something afoot in Europe before Descartes came on the scene. That something was more than philosophical turbulence centred on epistemology. The women who sought out Descartes for instruction are themselves instructive here. Two in particular must be mentioned. The first is Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia. Elizabeth succeeded in persuading Descartes to write his treatise on The Passions of the Soul, less well-known in general than the Meditations and the Discourse on Method but a witness to the prevailing need to sort out the nature of morality. This, Elizabeth thought, needed doing as much as did any work in general epistemology. The second is Queen Christina of Sweden. She brought Descartes over to her domain to teach her to live well and discover herself. The exercise killed poor Descartes who had long-standing objections to tutoring anybody at five in the morning, especially in the Scandinavian winter. It was apparently moral philosophy more than general epistemology that finished him.

Amongst the intellectuals of Descartes’ day there was a culturally restless search for the self, epitomized in the attempt to hammer out some sort of practical and moral philosophy. Descartes partook of the restlessness. He spent several years wandering in search of philosophical truth and method. Nor was he exceptional in that style of life. To use the favoured parlance, what we have in this era is the emergence of the self-defining subject. Traditionally, Christianity permits self-definition only in a radically limited fashion. For our being as creatures, as sinners and, if redeemed, as redeemed, is something given. We do not define ourselves here. That began to be considered irksome and there were stirrings of rebellion in the Italian Renaissance, albeit officially within the ambit of the Christian faith. One figure who set a pattern in self-definition made a particular impression on the France of Descartes’ day, a figure who forced Descartes to react to his work and whose influence on later thought is markedly significant. This was Michel de Montaigne. What is interesting about Montaigne for our purposes is that he can be held to stand at the source of a very different stream of modernity from that of Descartes. So Charles Taylor has contrasted Montaigne’s preoccupation with himself—a first personal preoccupation—with Descartes’ preoccupation with humanity—a more disengaged scientific preoccupation. Montaigne is certainly concerned with epistemology but, more fundamentally, with anthropology. And it is here we begin to see the possibility of an alternative reading of the crisis of Christianity to that of Newbigin and Gunton.

We best see it by recalling the work of Blaise Pascal. As Descartes reacted to Montaigne, who lived in the previous century, so Pascal reacted to Montaigne and to Descartes, his older contemporary. Pascal lamented the indifference to Christianity by the men of his day, those influenced in the direction of urbane, refined, easy-going scepticism by Montaigne. But Pascal’s literature presents a completely opposite reaction to the situation to that of Descartes. Where Descartes probed the sciences and introduced a rationalistic epistemology with all the rigour he could muster, Pascal thought that those who pursued the sciences were missing ‘man’ altogether and he proceeded to reflect on faith and human nature with all the psychological analysis he could muster. One can take as a text for the famous Pensées:

For the Christian faith consists almost wholly in establishing these two things: The corruption of nature and the redemption of Christ. Pascal’s own formulation of religious epistemology, frequently quite wrongly called ‘fideistic’, constantly bears in mind the centrality of the deviant will rather than the mistaken head, the indifferent heart rather than the honest error. In Augustinian fashion, Pascal is impressed by the centrality of desire, of passion and of will, without at all discounting reason, and impressed by the Gospel remedy in redemption and the healing of the heart as a foundation to the restoration and illumination of the intellect. Where does all this take us?

2. The Pre-eminence of Reconciliation

The defence of Christianity, as far as Pascal is concerned, is the defence of its anthropo-
logical, soteriological and therefore christological theme. Does this, then, indicate an issue deeper than the epistemological one? The question is rather hard to answer because the thematic strands are closely interwoven. There is no reason to doubt the importance of the epistemological issue, the significance of the demotion of revelation on epistemological grounds, as modernity got under way. Yet placing Descartes in the context of Montaigne and of Pascal forces one to query the centrality accorded to the epistemological issue. Can we get any further?

The big break with revelation on the European scene occurred in the eighteenth century. Of course, we must say what we mean. The ‘revelation’ at issue was not such revelation as God might give in private illumination. It was the revelation of God in history, as recorded in the Christian Scriptures. And the issue was not whether anything at all had happened in the first century which might just merit the description of ‘revelation’. It was whether God could or did reveal anything new, anything important, anything religiously significant, anything of saving import in particular time and space. Actually, this way of stating it shows we have an eye on the deists. None more than they effected the break with revelation and their influence was great.

The deists had a variety of difficulties with revelation and they were not short of reasons they could offer. But they were aware that what was at stake was the nature of vera religio. The defence of revelation was the defence of reconciliation through history. For this, eminently, is what God allegedly revealed. Hence John Locke, whose massive influence engulfs the eighteenth century, could insist on the protection of revelation at one crucial point: the revelation of the way of salvation. Reductionist he might be, according to his opponents, but he thought you could boil down Christianity no further than to the essential proposition that Jesus is the Messiah. That proposition is essential, essential to Christianity and essential for anyone to believe to whom it is proposed for belief, if that person truly wishes to be saved. When the deists got rid of revelation they simultaneously had to defend the religious sufficiency of natural religion. In this, they may only have been taking Locke to his logical conclusion; that is a matter for debate. But they had to step over the gulf separating a revealed and natural way of salvation as well as a gulf separating (roughly speaking) revelation and reason. In the ‘Bible of deism’, Tindal's Christianity as Old as Creation, Tindal turns aside in a final chapter to face one particular foe at relative length, the philosopher-theologian Samuel Clarke. Tindal lauds the admirable theological method of his protagonist in deducing all the important religious conclusions from a consideration of the being and attributes of God. Tindal himself does just that to prove the impossibility of revelation of anything not knowable by reason. Why does Clarke, otherwise of sound reasoning, nevertheless come to the perverse conclusion that revelation is needed for religion? The answer is: because Clarke believes in a Fall and a reconciling act in history. If you need reconciliation in history, you need revelation in history. Tindal proceeds to attack this intellectually retrograde move by attacking the notions of Fall and reconciliation through an historical act.

A strong support for the proposition that the reason–revelation issue is the function of a deeper clash between a self-defining kind of moralism and a reconciliation through atonement in history is found in the classic and influential analysis offered by Karl Barth. In his Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century he essayed a detailed investigation of why the theological legacy of the Reformation was perverted. For the story of the eighteenth century before Schleiermacher was the story of the decline and collapse of revelation as reason edged revelation out of the picture. Barth so describes things that he may seem to be reading the story of the demise of revelation as the story of epistemological tragedy and so it has been read. I cannot here debate the matter of the relative emphases on revelation and reconciliation in Barth's overall theology. But on examination in Protestant Theology we find that Barth claiming that if reason can judge then reason can dispose of revelation and this is the crucial logical possibility that was actualized in the eighteenth century.
The claim is undergirded by reference to what he thinks underlies epistemology. It is because he fails to bring out the significance of this aspect of his analysis that Gunton, for example, can appeal to the pride of place Barth gives to theological epistemology.\(^\text{12}\)

When Barth chastises the rational orthodoxy of the early eighteenth century for allowing the natural knowledge of God to govern what God may tell us in revelation, he does so with the lament that eighteenth century theology just succumbed in the realm of theology to a wider cultural malaise. That malaise is the self-exaltation of man (Barth's term) expressed everywhere in eighteenth century life. The apt characterization is 'absolutism'. Absolutism, the inalienable arrogation of power, is expressed in the will for form. If the human master may dominate his subject-matter, then even revelation is permissible, along as it slots in to the place we accord to it ourselves. Barth is at pains to insist that we must regard scientific, epistemological and cosmological speculation and argument as servants to this will for form and at pains to distinguish between the secondary causes of what eventually becomes the assault on revelation and the primary causes of it. The secondary causes include scientific reasoning, the primary one encompasses fundamental anthropology.\(^\text{13}\)

It is in the discussion of Rousseau, the longest treatment of any individual in the whole book, that this comes most clearly to light. Barth is concerned to show that eighteenth century rationalism is the cradle of Schleiermacher's mistakes. How can he do so, for Schleiermacher participated in the Romantic reaction to rationalism? The key chapter here is the one on Rousseau. Barth documents the fact and the significance of Rousseau's break with rationalism, including its formalism and absolutism. Yet Barth sees in Rousseau the emergence of what is most profoundly true about eighteenth century humanity. Rousseau discovers himself—that is what is new—the bare, existing self, as the quintessential reality. In so doing he abandons the claims of reason construed in a very narrow sense. But narrower reason is just one expression of the option for the self. What Rousseau does is to expand reason to include all that is magnificently human.

Barth alights on the supreme indictment of Rousseau: he is a Pelagian denier of original sin. And that is what the eighteenth century is about. If it does not like Rousseau, it does not like itself.

This analysis is entirely in line with Barth's consistent insistence that bad epistemology flows from a mistaken notion of justification and of grace, while sound epistemology is just the expression of a correct notion of justification and of grace. One can certainly see why epistemology appears to be fundamental here. The difficulty is that within this sphere Barth presents the story of the decline of revelation as the story of the imperialism of reason. But it would have been not only consistent but more satisfactory to approach it differently. Barth could have allied his claim that human self-exaltation was the root of the problem to his discussion of the demise of revelation by considering not the formal relations of reason and revelation but the way in which what lies behind reason (a kind of self-will) is offended by what revelation protects (reconciliation in history). That is, what looks like reason versus revelation is, on Barth's own deeper reasoning, a matter of self-definition versus the need for grace. And of course grace comes eminently in the coming and the reconciling ministry of Jesus Christ. The chapter on Rousseau bears out the fact that epistemology is not the heart of the matter but an expression of the heart in these matters.

It has been worth spending time on this work of Barth's not only because it supports the contention of this article but because his analysis has been regarded as well-nigh watertight.\(^\text{14}\) There is, however, a coda to the story Barth tells in Protestant Theology. In his discussion of theological anthropology in Church Dogmatics 111/2, Barth examines Friedrich Nietzsche.\(^\text{15}\) Nietzsche does not get discussed in Protestant Theology but Barth indicates in Church Dogmatics that the spirit of European humanity since the sixteenth century, which in Protestant Theology is the root of the eighteenth century disease, is actually indicated most clearly, manifestly and boldly by Nietzsche. A line Barth draws in Protestant Theology from the Renaissance through Leibniz to the collapse of revelation by the time of Schleiermacher, is now drawn cursorily right
up to Nietzsche. Barth isolates what he considers to be the crux of Nietzsche's attack on Christianity. It is Christian anthropology, particularly as expressed in Christian morality. Christian morality is a repressive, subervient, sickeningly life-denying manifestation of a repressed, obnoxiously obedient, pathetically creaturely and sinful humanity. Barth does not put it like that, but Nietzsche does and it is to Nietzsche we must now turn.

3. Nietzsche

Both Newbigin and Gunton are concerned not just with the collapse of revelation but the advent of atheism. Nietzsche, though not he alone, is named. Gunton in particular draws on Eberhard Jüngel's work, *God as the Mystery of the World*, to show how Descartes led to Nietzsche. 16 The plot is, briefly, this. Descartes puts God in the midst of a train of logical demonstration. The place of God is thus carved out for him by the philosopher. God becomes in that way dependent on the philosopher. So why not go on to say that God is the product of the construction of our thought and just that? Jüngel elaborates the tale with an account of how the Cartesian project of conceptually locating a God who is greater than can be conceived generated for Nietzsche and for others a critical question: can God be conceived? As far as Nietzsche is concerned, if God is greater than our conceivings, then he is not a creature of our will. That which is not the creature of our will has no objective status. To understand why that is so we must recall the gravamen of Nietzsche's charge against Christianity. Certainly, the deep problem with Christianity is not principally epistemological.

Nietzsche's greatest work was *Thus Spake Zarathustra*. He himself thought it the best book the world had ever seen, but on this I shall suspend judgement for now. As he tells us in his literary autobiography, *Ecce Homo*, Zarathustra, the eponymous hero of the work, once defines his task very precisely. 17 It is that he must create, and in order to create, redeem. Nietzsche believed by the time he wrote this book that God was dead. Christianity and any belief in deity was intellectually discredited, but that meant the collapse of all objectivity, for what remnant objective reality can there be? Humans are none the less in thrall to religious belief and religious belief has as its gripping claims upon us a doctrine of our creation by God and of our forgiveness (redemption) by God. We now, as new people, as the *Übermenschen* (the 'Overmen' in the sense of 'Overcoming-men' is much better than 'Supermen') must be creators, which means supremely creators of value. But creators must be free. And as long as my condition is a given one, either by nature or by grace, I cannot be free. I must therefore throw off all that is allegedly given. But that is extraordinary. What about my past? Above all, what about my regretted past, which holds me in bondage in remorse? Now, says Nietzsche, that may be dealt with by transforming every: 'it was' into 'I willed it thus'. For my life now to be my affirmation, my past must be my affirmation too. This is admittedly a very pale and drastically truncated domestication of Nietzsche and the dramatic doctrine of 'eternal recurrence', which lies behind it, is extremely variously interpreted. But the primary foe for Nietzsche is Christianity and he sees with great clarity that to break the grip of Christianity you must break the grip of your own past.

*Thus Spake Zarathustra* is an extraordinary work of scriptural force, the scripture of one who later identified himself with the Antichrist. But it presents in a form of haunting and tragic brilliance concerns we find everywhere else, at least since the third major work, *Human, All Too Human*. 18 In this particular work there is plenty of reference to the scientific and philosophical exposure of the stupidity of Christianity. But it is not the intellectual error so much as the pathological spirituality of Christianity that elicits Nietzsche's most forcible opposition. To take a particularly striking paragraph:

The Greeks did not see the Homeric gods as set above them as masters, or themselves set beneath the gods as servants, as the Jews did. They saw as it were only the reflection of the most successful exemplars of their own caste, that is to say an ideal, not an antithesis of their own nature ... Where the Olympian gods failed to dominate, Greek life was gloomier...
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and more filled with anxiety. — Christianity, on the other hand, crushed and shattered man completely and buried him as though in mud: into a feeling of total depravity it then suddenly shone a beam of divine mercy, so that, surprised and stupefied by this act of grace man gave vent to a cry of rapture and for a moment believed he bore all heaven within him. It is upon this pathological excess of feeling, upon the profound corruption of head and heart that was required for it, that all the psychological sensations of Christianity operate: it desired to destroy, shatter, stupefy, intoxicate...

If we want to see Nietzsche setting out his ideas in anything like prosaic philosophical form, it is to the later Genealogy of Morals that his students are often urged to go. And here his repugnance towards Christianity is nowhere expressed more keenly than the fourteenth section of the first essay. Nietzsche speaks of Christians 'transmuting weakness into merit...

... Impotence... into kindness; pusillanimity into humility; submission before those one hates into obedience to One of whom they say that he has commanded submission—they call him God... to be unable to avenge oneself is called to be unwilling to avenge oneself—even forgiveness... I'm sure they are quite miserable, all these whisperers and smalltime counterfeiters... But they tell me that this very misery is the sign of their election by God, that one beats the dogs one loves best... I've had all I can stand. The smell is too much for me. This shop where they manufacture ideals seems to me to stink of lies'.

At the end of his sane life (Nietzsche was clinically insane for the last eleven years) Nietzsche offered to the world The Antichrist in which one long contra-Christian screech rises to its crescendo in the accusation that Christianity tramples on everything human. It is an assault on life in the name of an obscene Lord God. Nietzsche has to be read to be believed. But the nub of his opposition is the Christian doctrine of humanity, created, sinful, purchased by blood. So closes his account of his own authorship:

Have I been understood?—Dionysos against the Crucified.

One may well ask whether Nietzsche is unique and, if so, whether he can provide any backing at all for wider claims about Western intellectual history. Although I agree with Barth at least generally in locating Nietzsche within a cardinal tradition of a Western turning against Christianity, there is no opportunity to prove the point here. Rather, mindful of the ad homines nature of the argument of this article, we recall Nietzsche's own intense interest in locating his own work within a succession that stretched back to pre-Socratic days and in the Christian era went back to the Italian Renaissance and the French free-thinkers of the seventeenth century. Indeed, his particular remarks on Descartes, Montaigne and Pascal are telling. Descartes he admires for his strength of soul. Montaigne he admires even more. No one was more honest than Montaigne. But Montaigne fulfils another function. He points the way to a refuge from the blight of Christianity. This is where Pascal comes in. Nietzsche often alludes to Pascal. He admired Pascal as a mind and a moralist. Indeed, says Nietzsche effusively in Ecce Homo, 'I love Pascal'. But it is the love of one who sees a fellow-genius go to the slaughter. For Pascal was the victim of Christianity, psychologically and horribly sacrificially murdered by the faith which he himself tried to hand on to others. How could one avoid such a desperate end save by the wantonness of a Montaigne? says Nietzsche. Montaigne or Pascal: that is the question put to us by Christianity in the end. It is a question of fundamental anthropology, of whether or not we need another in our stead. It is not fundamentally a question of epistemology.

4. Conclusion

Nietzsche has been tremendously influential. Modernity and now post-modernity is enormously indebted to him. This is particularly, to all appearances, because of Nietzsche's grasp of the fact that objectivity was dead forever; that all is perspectival; that language is creative, not correspondent to independent reality. But it is interesting to note Nietzsche's influence on the religious thinker most overtly influenced by him in Britain today, Don Cupitt. Cupitt is influenced in all the areas mentioned above. But if one dare sift his literature for the very
bitterest of attacks on Christianity as traditionally understood, one finds it in the attack on Christian ethics in *The New Christian Ethics*.\(^3\) A wretched and ugly theory of sin and masochistic doctrine of redemption is the problem behind traditional Christian ethics. And, Cupitt says, nothing matters more to us than ethics. This is recycled Nietzsche.\(^3\) Cupitt’s philosophy of language, usually regarded as the nub of his enterprise, may appear idiosyncratic to the Anglo-Saxon eye.\(^2\) But his philosophy of life and life-force is neither idiosyncratic nor new. Yet it is central.\(^3\)

There is no doubt that epistemological issues have been and are important in the decline and fall of revelation and of Christianity. They have, of course, developed largely in league with thinking about science. But when Augustine told his tale of two cities, these were the city of ‘man’, founded on the love of self and the city of God, founded on the love of God. Augustine believed that human loves, most fundamental of all human desires, regulated and guided life and thought. The will has a certain primacy over the intellect. It is whatever collides with the will that energizes reflection directed against God. There are certain consequences that we must be careful not to draw from this, if we believe it. For it is not to say that overt atheism is always the product simply or even mainly of palpably rebellious will. Overt adherence to Christianity, be it also remembered, is certainly not simply, mainly or even usually the product of an obedient will. What Augustine does do, and here, of course, Pascal followed, is to alert us to the dangers of construing the story of faith or unbelief in terms of the public epistemological moves. According to our diagnosis of an ill so will our remedy be. What that remedy positively is, is a story for another day.

4. This is not to suggest that Newbigin and Gunton agree in all respects. Gunton’s recent Bampton Lectures, *The One, The Three and The Many* (Cambridge, CUP, 1993) indicates that clearly.
13. Chapter 3 is particularly important here.
16. Jüngel’s work was translated in 1983 (Edinburgh, T&T Clark).
19. Ibid, Book 1, section 114, p. 66.
23. I am less sure about Barth’s inclusion of Leibniz in his genealogy, op. cit., p. 236.
24. Nietzsche alludes to this at several junctures starting with *Human, All Too Human* (Cambridge, CUP, 1986)—see, e.g. 1. sec 237; 11.11. sec. 214.
27. From *Human, All Too Human* onwards again, but see, e.g., the scathing references in *Daybreak* (Cambridge, CUP 1982), sections 63, 64.
31. See especially up to the end of Chapter 5 (c) of this work.
32. This, it will be appreciated, need not carry much weight as far as the Celtic author of this article is concerned!