book. What is ‘world come of age’? What does ‘non-religious interpretation’ mean? What am I to understand by the ‘positivism of revelation’ which he applied to me? I know everything, or certainly very much, of what the ‘experts’ [Adepten], including Heinrich Ott, have made of these things. But so far I do not know what Bonhoeffer himself meant and intended by all this, and I dare, therefore, to doubt gently that his real strength lay in theological systematics. (I also have his Ethics in mind.) Would he not have simply dropped these bons mots later? Was he really sure about what he meant when he phrased them? But even if I am mistaken here, I still maintain that those letters from prison were only one, and indeed, the last, of the stations of his life’s way, which, right from the beginning, was a very lively spiritual venture. They certainly are not its goal. I would also maintain that he would have been capable of the most astounding evolutions in quite a different direction, and that one therefore does injustice to him – ranked all of a sudden in the same line as Tillich and Bultmann – to interpret him now on the basis of those passages (or to regard him as his own prophet in the light of them). It makes no difference whether this interpretation takes the form of an honestly bourgeois, new liberalism, whether it sees him (so Hanfried Müller) as forerunner of the East German ideology, or (so Regin Prenter) as the new Lutheran church-father. It is unthinkable – and I put myself in his place now – what people would have done to me had I died a natural or violent death after the publication of the first or even the second Römerbrief, or after the appearance of my Christliche Dogmatik im Entwurf in 1927! What I would not have wanted to happen to me in such a case I would very much have liked not to see in fact happening to Bonhoeffer.

Please, regard all these expectorations as a token of my thanks, and of the attention with which I have read your book.

With sincere greetings

Yours

Karl Barth

3 HAROLD G. WELLS

Karl Barth’s Doctrine of Analogy

The theology of the late Karl Barth has often been credited in large measure with the recent strength of the ecumenical movement; certainly his influence upon several outstanding Catholic theologians is well known. It is worthwhile, therefore, to see clearly Barth’s disagreement with Roman Catholicism, which continued until the end of his life, and which constitutes a major polemical theme throughout the Church Dogmatics. I would suggest that a close examination of his doctrine of analogy gives us a valuable insight into the nature of that disagreement, and for this point of view we have the direct support of Barth himself in the preface to Church Dogmatics, 1/1, where he writes: ‘I regard
the analogia entis as the invention of Antichrist, and I think that because of it one cannot become a Catholic. Whereupon I at the same time allow myself to regard all other possible reasons for not becoming Catholic as short-sighted and lacking in seriousness.' Quite clearly, he sees analogia entis as necessarily part of a natural theology which points away from the central Reformation doctrines of sola gratia and sola fides. But naturally the question immediately arises: Can theological language be meaningful without some doctrine of analogy that relates the Being of God to the being of the creature? Certainly Barth has not merely evaded this question. Every theologian who concerns himself with epistemology must deal with the problem involved in human language about God, and Karl Barth is no exception.

It is typical of his whole epistemological approach that Barth will not allow the question to be raised for theology from outside Christian faith. Not philosophy, but theology, asks the question of theological language and does so in a way appropriate to itself. Barth's approach is therefore essentially dogmatic rather than apologetic. It can be apologetic with integrity only when it has first been scientifically dogmatic.2 Barth sets himself the question: 'Does there exist a simple parity of content and meaning when we apply the same words to the creature on the one hand and to God's revelation and God on the other?'3 It is immediately clear that he is not inquiring about any general concept of 'God,' which we might be able to discuss apologetically with the non-Christian, but quite strictly about the biblical God. He asks the question, therefore, on the presupposition of actual knowledge of God and actual language about him, in keeping with what he has argued elsewhere – that theological epistemology properly operates with a backward look at our actual knowledge and does not begin by taking up a position outside knowledge to consider its possibility.4

The starting-point for the doctrine of analogy is, then, a biblical one: the hiddenness of the holy God. It is because the Christian knows the God of the Bible as the hidden, holy One that he has to deny a parity of meaning when human words are predicated of God. The hiddenness of God is a statement of faith for Barth. It has nothing to do with 'any philosophical unknowability of God, whether Platonic or Kantian.'5 'We must not,' he writes, 'base the hiddenness of God on the inapprehensibility of the infinite, the absolute, that which exists in and for itself, etc.'6 It is only when the God of the Bible is known in the response of faith that his transcendent hiddenness is truly known. Similarly, however, Barth cannot speak of disparity, for if our words mean

2. Ibid., pp. 31–3.
5. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 183.
6. Ibid., p. 188.
something quite different when applied to God, then, in fact, God remains
unknown to us, and no fellowship can exist between Creator and creature.
The man of faith knows that his speaking must be appropriate to God’s ‘un-
veiling in veiling.’ Revelation pushes him to deny disparity as well as parity.
‘Pressed by the true revelation of God we are pushed on to the word “anal-
ogy’.” Analogy means ‘similarity, partial correspondence and agreement,’ in
distinction to both likeness and unlikeness. The term, Barth admits, is correct
and ‘unavoidable.’

But he uses this ‘unavoidable’ word reluctantly, because of its association
with Roman Catholic natural theology. Just what is it that troubles him about
its use in natural theology, and how does he distinguish his use of the concept
from that of natural theologians? It will be useful to glance first, very briefly,
at the doctrine of analogy in the classical natural theology of Thomas Aquinas.
Much has been written about the Thomist doctrine, indicating that Thomist
scholars disagree in their interpretation of him, so my remarks here can be
only of the most elementary kind.

Aquinas, of course, is also well aware of the hiddenness of God to the mind
of man, and therefore also of the problems of language about God. But he
does not understand God’s hiddenness on the basis of revelation. In the
Summa Theologica (1, 12), he bases the unknowability of God on the idea of
God’s infinity. Because God is infinite and everything is cognoscible according
to its actuality, God is infinitely cognoscible. But the created, finite intellect
cannot know God infinitely, for if the mode of anything’s existence exceeds
the mode of the knower, it must result that the knowledge of the object is
above the nature of the knower.” God, therefore, cannot be comprehended
by man. This view leads Aquinas to his via negativa, according to which we
know, not what God is, but what he is not. None of the definite forms sig-
nified by the words we predicate of God actually exists in God, strictly speak-
ing. For example, it cannot be said that goodness as such, intelligence as such,
or power as such, exists as a definite form in the divine Being. Aquinas does
not rest in total disparity, however, for he passes from the negative way to the
affirmative way, that is, to the doctrine of analogy, by way of the distinction
between the perfectio significata and the modus significandi: ‘As regards what
is signified by these names, they properly belong to God, and more properly
than they belong to creatures, and are applied primarily (per prius) to Him.
But as regards their mode of signification, they do not properly and strictly
apply to God; for their mode of signification applies to creatures.”

7. Ibid., p. 225.
9. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, English Dominican translation (London:
Thos. Baker, 1911), 1, 12, 7.
10. Ibid., 1, 12, 4.
that apply properly to creatures can be applied to God, because God is the Creator of creatures. Thus God has to be known by us through 'sensible things.' ‘Because they are His effects and depend on their Cause, we can be led from them so far as to know that God exists and to know of Him what must necessarily belong to Him as the First Cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by Him.'\textsuperscript{13} Since our intellect knows God from creatures, ‘it knows Him as far as creatures are capable of giving a true and adequate representation of Him ... God presupposes in Himself the possession of all the perfections belonging to all creatures.’\textsuperscript{14} If God is said to be ‘good’ or ‘wise,’ these words ‘signify the Divine Substance, but in an imperfect manner,’ for ‘whatever good we attribute to creatures pre-exists in God, and in a more excellent and higher way.’\textsuperscript{15} Even by way of sensible things, then, our words are transferable to God only analogically. But they are transferable.\textsuperscript{16} On this basic presupposition Aquinas proceeds to work out a large part of his doctrine of God within his ‘preambles’\textsuperscript{17} of natural theology. Because of the similarity between the creature and the Creator, he can deduce God’s attributes (e.g., goodness, immutability, eternity, unity, love, justice, mercy) analogically from the creature.

The similarity which permits this procedure is what Karl Barth refers to as \textit{analogia entis}, analogy of being.\textsuperscript{18} He refuses to admit a similarity between God and man which would permit God’s attributes to be delineated apart from his self-revelation. When Barth comes to speak of the reality of God in \textit{Church Dogmatics}, II/1, he insists that he cannot write the doctrine of God independently of God’s revelation on the basis of a general, natural notion of God: ‘We cannot discern the being of God in any other way than by looking where God Himself gives us Himself to see, and therefore by looking at His works.’\textsuperscript{19} This is most obvious when one considers that the doctrine of the Trinity is absolutely integral to the Christian doctrine of God. It is this triune God of whom Barth wishes to speak when he comes to deal, for example, with the life of God,\textsuperscript{20} the love of God,\textsuperscript{21} and the freedom of God.\textsuperscript{22} Aquinas could not possibly speak of this specifically triune God in his natural theology (the Trinity is for him part of revealed theology), and therefore, in Barth’s view, he should not have attempted, in a preamble, to speak of God in himself. To speak of God himself, without being governed throughout by revelation, is inevitably to distort the true God and set up in his place an idol of one’s own

\textsuperscript{13.} Ibid., I, 12, 12.
\textsuperscript{14.} Ibid., I, 13, 2.
\textsuperscript{15.} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17.} Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, I, 2, 2; cf. \textit{ibid.}, I, 3–26, passim.
\textsuperscript{18.} Cf. Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics}, II/1, p. x.
\textsuperscript{19.} Ibid., II/1, p. 261.
\textsuperscript{20.} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{21.} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 275.
\textsuperscript{22.} Cf. \textit{ibid.}, p. 317.
making. Barth seems to see *analogia entis* as the basic error behind this false method. He accuses Aquinas (and the Lutheran Quenstedt) of including God and the creature under one general concept of being.23 Now Aquinas explicitly rejects this very thing. Not only is God not in any genus, but ‘being’ cannot *be* a genus, for it cannot be distinguished by any *differentia* not included in it.24 Barth is not unaware that Aquinas has said this, for he quotes it at least three times in II, 1.25 Nevertheless, he would argue that Aquinas sees the common ‘existence’ or ‘being’ of God and man as the basis of man’s knowledge and fellowship with God. Barth wants to insist, over against this, that not any common being, but only God’s utterly free grace, is in fact the basis of this knowledge and fellowship.26

At this point we touch at the very heart-centre of Barth’s thought, for the inner dynamic of his whole theology revolves around the Reformation principle of *sola gratia*. If the grace of God builds upon something in man himself, or some natural relation between God and man prior to grace and faith, then *sola gratia* is compromised. It is in accordance with this insight that Barth includes within his *Doctrine of God* (*Church Dogmatics, II*) both his major epistemological work and his doctrine of election. God’s gracious election of man in Jesus Christ, as it is known in his reconciling life, death, and resurrection, is the starting-point for Christian theology. ‘The name of Jesus Christ ... is the beginning and end of all our thoughts.’27 ‘When theology allows itself on any pretext to be jostled away from that name, God is inevitably crowded out by an hypostatized image of man. Theology must begin with Jesus Christ and not general principles.’28 A proper doctrine of God must demonstrate its Christian character from the beginning by avoiding all abstractions, that is, notions of God whose content is not totally determined by Jesus Christ. According to this basic principle, Barth works out his doctrine of God beginning with the Christologically determined statement, ‘God is the One who loves in freedom.’ Under the heading of ‘God’s Love’ he develops the Being of God as grace and holiness, mercy and righteousness, patience and wisdom; under the heading of ‘God’s Freedom’ he discusses his unity and omnipresence, constancy and omnipotence, eternity and glory.29 This particular juxtaposition of concepts, he points out, is offered by way of suggestion, and he does not claim for it any necessity or finality.30 But he does insist that they must be developed entirely in connection with revelation. (This is, of course, not by any means to imply that theology can speak only of God in his outward acts

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and not of God himself in his own Being. On the contrary, Barth has at every point been at great pains to show the rooting of God's outward acts in the inner triune Being of God.)

The implications of this approach for analogy can be seen very clearly, for example, in Barth's discussion of God's power. If we say that God's power is omnipotence, we do not merely extend our creaturely notion of power to the infinite degree and ascribe it to God. We do not know, prior to revelation, what God's 'power' means. Barth writes: 'It is not a matter of already knowing by ourselves what omnipotence is and then learning from God's self-revelation that He is this and acknowledging the One defined in this way as our Father.' Rather, we see God's power in his mighty acts for the people of Israel, and in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. From these we know God as the almighty Creator and Redeemer, who can do what he wills as Lord of this world according to his free love. Moreover, argues Barth, our statements about God's power are not merely about his power ad extra, for his omnipotence is not merely his omnicausality. God is powerful in himself from all eternity, quite independently of his creation, for the God of the Bible is never in any way dependent on creation for any aspect of his being. 'God is the omnipotent God as He is the Trinitarian God; in His life as this God, in His power to be the Father, Son and Holy Spirit; in the power by which He is the One by and in the Other, all being equal in origin, necessity and glory.' The analogy between God's power and creaturely power, then, can be made only in faith, only within a knowledge of God's revelation. Knowing this God in himself analogously from the creation is manifestly impossible. A proper understanding of analogy must be rigorously determined within the Christological doctrine of God. The meaning of our words for God must be filled with this very specific, Christologically determined content.

The application of the sola gratia and sola fides to analogy is worked out most explicitly by Barth in his polemic against the seventeenth-century Lutheran theologian A. Quenstedt. Quenstedt, like Aquinas, rejects as inappropriate for language about God an analogy of inequality - the kind of similarity which exists between the different species of one genus; he rejects also the analogy of proportionality - the similarity which exists in the agreement when some determinations of two objects agree, but at the same time others disagree. Barth concurs in the rejection of these. We must rather, he says, use an analogy of attribution - a similarity of two objects which consists in the fact that what is common to them exists first and properly in the one, and then, because a second is dependent upon it, in the second. But Quenstedt wants to say that this is an analogia attributionis intrinsecae - a similarity proper

31. Ibid., pp. 524f.
32. Cf. ibid., pp. 527f.
33. Ibid., p. 529.
34. Cf. ibid., pp. 237–43.
35. For a discussion of analogy of proportionality, see below, p. 212.
36. Cf. Barth, Church Dogmatics, II/1, p. 238.
both to the analogans and the analogatum. The similarity which the creature bears to God is, though secondary and dependent, an inward quality or characteristic of the creature's being. Now Barth believes this means that the creature is qualified for revelation, indeed that he has a relationship with the Creator apart from Christ, that the creature is a participant in God's truth without Christ. He reasons that, if the similarity between creature and Creator is given and constant, a state of affairs belonging to the creature as such, then the absolute necessity of revelation - or, at any rate, sola fides - is denied. But, in his view, this is quite contrary to the biblical teaching of the total lostness of man without Christ. Quenstedt, complains Barth, holds to sola fides in his doctrine of justification, but fails to see its implications for epistemology, as though knowledge of God could be something other than faith-knowledge, knowledge in the relationship of grace. And Quenstedt makes this error (as Aquinas does) by misunderstanding the nature of God's hiddenness. He rejects parity because it denies the distinction between absolute and relative being, both of which are true being. God is absolutely what we are relatively, according to this view, so that being and not grace is the ground of the knowledge of God and the criterion of truth. The being in which both God and man participate is the similarity between them, and the basis of their knowledge and fellowship. This is what Barth objects to when he so strenuously anathematizes analogia entis. This is what he means when, with apparent rashness, he accuses Aquinas of including God and man together in the same genus of being. Over against this, Barth wants to insist that the readiness of man for God's revelation is itself a gift of God, a creation of God, a miracle that comes in and with the objective revelation. Sola gratia, he believes, is endangered seriously if man's being is itself said to be capable of fellowship with God. Holy Scripture, he argues, expressly describes our participation in the person and work of Christ as a work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit, and not any innate capacity of man, is to be given the praise for man's hearing and reception of the word of God. The Spirit creates the point of contact. This holds also for our language. Earthly concepts do not have in themselves the capacity to speak of God, not even analogically. Our words cannot be transferred from man to the Creator.

The pictures in which we view God, the thoughts in which we think Him, are in themselves unfitted to this object and thus inappropriate to express and affirm the knowledge of Him. For God - the living God who encounters us in Jesus Christ - is not such a one as can be appropriated by us in our own capacity. He is the One who will appropriate us, and in so doing permit and command and therefore adapt us to appropriate Him as well.

To argue otherwise is to posit a togetherness of God and man which is forbidden by the transcendent holiness of God, the holiness which is destructive

37. Cf. ibid., p. 237.
39. Ibid., p. 188.
of the unholy, as we know it in revelation. Our words can have valid reference to God only in Jesus Christ, since it is only in and through him that we can know, and be related to, God at all. The analogy, or similarity, between God and man which permits our language to refer truly to God is the \textit{analogia fidei}, analogy of faith. Faith in Jesus Christ, the creation of the Holy Spirit in us, is our similarity to God. The creature is ‘converted’\textsuperscript{40} into an analogue of God, by faith, that is, by the Spirit. The analogy of attribution is therefore not intrinsic, as Quenstedt would have it, but, according to Barth, extrinsic. The similarity between God and man can only be one controlled and bestowed by God in his revealing and saving work, and it is not to be understood as a constant co-existence of the Creator and creature in a like being. We are adopted into our similarity with God, and so also is our language adopted.\textsuperscript{41} ‘This happens only as the grace of the revelation of God comes to us and therefore to the means of our thinking and language, adopting us and them, pardoning, saving, protecting and making good.’\textsuperscript{42} Our words for God are properly predicated of him analogically ‘so far as they are formed and expressed in faith in God’s revelation, in obedience to the direction given to man in it ... The limit of our knowledge of God is this: that when we know God we must not and will not leave the grace of His revelation.’\textsuperscript{43} A doctrine of \textit{analogia entis}, Barth thinks, is secretly an attempt to dispense with faith, or at least with \textit{sola fides}, to give aid to the Holy Spirit to do what we do not quite trust him to do on his own. But with \textit{analogia fidei}, ‘the Holy Spirit can be given the last word instead of the absolute, all enquiries being answered by the presence and work of the Holy Spirit, that through Him our faith is true faith and our knowledge true knowledge of God.’\textsuperscript{44}

Barth’s doctrine of analogy of faith seems to me to be a very important contribution to the question of theological predication. His attempt to carry it out in a rigorously Reformed way is to be appreciated. But it is faulty, I think, in its connection with the doctrine of man, and therefore faulty in its total rejection of all \textit{analogia entis}. One comes to this conclusion on the basis of Barth’s own theological statements about man in \textit{Church Dogmatics}, \textit{III}. His statements there about man are, I think, inconsistent with those assumed and implied in \textit{II/1}, where he makes the most extravagantly negative statements about man. For example, he says: ‘We do not resemble God. The fact that we are created in the likeness of God means that God has determined us to bear witness to His existence in our existence. But it does not mean that we possess and discover an attribute within ourselves on the basis of which

\textsuperscript{40. Ibid., p. 239.}
\textsuperscript{41. The belief that our human words in themselves are quite unfitting to describe God at all is suggested very early by Hilary of Poitiers, in his \textit{De Trinitate}, i, 19 (Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, 2d series, vol. ix [Oxford: Parker, 1899], p. 45), where he writes, ‘There can be no comparison between God and earthly things ... I proceed with my task, intending to use the terms supplied by God ...’}
\textsuperscript{42. Barth, \textit{Church Dogmatics}, \textit{II/1}, p. 223.}
\textsuperscript{43. Ibid., p. 235.}
\textsuperscript{44. Ibid., p. 249.}
we are on a level with God. But here he has only disposed of a straw man, for no exponent of *analogia entis* puts man on a level with God. Again, he writes, ‘Of ourselves we do not resemble God. We are not master of God.’ But it is most misleading to suggest that a resemblance between God and man implies our mastery of him, even in terms of knowledge. Barth is surely extravagant when, in his polemic against Quenstedt and Aquinas, he contends that no similarity exists between Creator and creature except that given by revealing and saving grace.

But Barth is much sounder in *The Doctrine of Creation* (Church Dogmatics, III). There he finds the image of God in man generally, even from creation, because of his relation to the one image, Jesus Christ. Man’s being in God’s image, and therefore his resemblance to God, as *analogia relationis*, is his by virtue of his election and creation in and for Christ. Every man created by God is created in God’s image, ‘man generally, man with the fellowman.’ Barth’s teaching is clear that man is an analogue of God, not only by faith, but in virtue of his creation. He can say this because creation too is grace and is to be understood Christocentrically. From his creation, man is a ‘type of the one to come’ (Rom. 5:14). In volume III Barth appears to have recognized in the grace of creation a presupposition of revealing and saving grace—which, of course, is not as such a departure from *sola gratia*. However, he seems to withdraw all this in the pages of volume III itself in his continued rejection of *analogia entis*. The ‘God-likeness’ of man, says Barth, does not consist in anything that man is or does.

The analogy of relation is not, like the analogy of being, an existing quality or intrinsic capacity, possibility, or structure of man’s being. It is an analogy of two relations, but not of two beings, he insists. He expressly denies, then, that his *analogia relationis* is reducible to an *analogia entis*: ‘We repeat there can be no question of an analogy of being, but of relationship. God is in relationship and so too is the man created by Him. This is the divine likeness.’ It is difficult, however, to see any reality in this distinction. If both God and man possess personal being, so that both man and God can rightly be addressed as ‘Thou,’ and therefore live in relationship, surely a similarity of being does exist. Of course, a similarity of being is not a continuity of being. God possesses his character as ‘Thou’ prior to man, and in a different way from man. In this sense, we must accept the dictum of Aquinas, accepted as correct by Barth, that God

45. Ibid., p. 188.
46. Ibid., p. 190.
48. Cf. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, II/1, p. 239.
51. Cf. ibid., p. 195.
52. Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, III/2, p. 324.
and the creature are not to be included together under one genus of being. The juxtaposition of God and the creature as two extremes, the absolute and relative, in one continuous Being cannot be considered. But that is not necessarily implied by *analogia entis*. Nor need such an analogy be a static thing; it can be a dynamic, relational reality, such as Barth has so ingeniously described in his doctrine of man.

One suspects that an analogy of being is implied in Barth's own position, not only in the doctrine of man, but also in his understanding of the priority of God. This is evident, for example, when he speaks of our use of the word 'Father' for God. He recognizes that the word 'father' in ordinary human language primarily signifies the natural human originator of our existence. 'In calling God our Father, Scripture adopts an analogy, only to break through it at once.' 53 Barth goes on, 'We must not estimate by natural human fatherhood what is meant by God being our Father. But from the fatherhood of God natural human fatherhood acquires any meaning and value inherent in it.' 54 In other words, our human word 'father' is adopted and used in God's revelation to refer to God the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, and is thus filled with new content which is fitting to him. And through this revelation of God's fatherhood we come to know the truth of all human fatherhood. But to say this is to recognize a real similarity of being between divine fatherhood and proper human fatherhood. To speak of fatherhood, or love, or power, or any other attribute, as having its being in God prior to its being in man, is to imply, quite unmistakably, a real similarity between the being of the Creator and the being of the creature. To deny this similarity of actual being (known of course only in faith) is to adopt the position of disparity which Barth rejected so clearly in *Church Dogmatics*, II/1, and to render theological language meaningless. One can have sympathy, then, with Quenstedt's analogy of 'intrinsic' attribution over against Barth's 'extrinsic.'

John McIntyre throws a great deal of light on this whole matter in an article entitled 'Analogy,' published some years ago. 55 Barth, he thinks, has unnecessarily limited himself in the discussion of analogy by his acceptance of Quenstedt's terminology. Quenstedt, says McIntyre, though he rejects analogy of inequality (the kind of similarity that exists between different species of one genus) has in fact made use of it, and Barth has quite rightly 'shot a sitting bird.' 56 He is mistaken, however, to concur in Quenstedt's reference to it as an analogy of intrinsic attribution. McIntyre thinks it most unfortunate that both of them have ignored analogy of proportionality. Proportionality does not, as Barth supposes, involve a calculable, mathematical proportion; it is not to be represented $A/B = C/D$, but rather $A:B :: C:D$. 57 In fact, Barth uses

54. Ibid.
proportionality of this latter kind constantly when he speaks of analogy of grace, which is an analogy of relations.  

The kind of proportionality that Barth does in fact use, however, is not adequate in itself (as I have suggested above). The formula $A:B :: C:D$ will not do, McIntyre points out, without some indication of how $A$ is related to $C$, and/or $B$ to $D$. Because the analogy of proportionality is an analogy of relations, it requires supplementation by some form of analogy which relates the terms—perhaps an analogy of intrinsic attribution. The dynamic, relational feature which Barth wants to insist upon in his understanding of the image of God could be protected adequately, I think, by a combination of intrinsic attribution with proportionality, in a very carefully defined *analogia entis*.

The all important issue, of course, is *sola gratia*. If *analogia entis* threatens a clear and true understanding of the grace of God, then it is indeed the ‘invention of Antichrist.’ Barth believes that the traditional Roman Catholic or Thomist doctrine of analogy is deeply implicated in erroneous and disastrous doctrines of revelation and of the knowledge and Being of God, and as a result, most seriously, of the grace of God. It is only in the light of his passion for the true proclamation of grace as God’s absolutely free and sovereign gift that we can appreciate his unflinching diatribe against *analogia entis* and his continuing disagreement with Roman Catholicism. I would suggest, however, that a form of *analogia entis* is necessary if theological language is to be meaningful, and that in fact, despite his protests to the contrary, Barth uses and applies it in a way appropriate to his doctrine of grace.