With the recent convention and completion of the Second Vatican Council, one traditional concern of the Christian church once more has been placed in sharp focus. Within the context of reform, renewal, and ecumenical conversation, the question of church and council has been raised and discussed with fresh significance.\(^1\) It is not surprising today to find Roman Catholics and Protestants, though they may differ widely in their theological assumptions, all earnestly debating the possibilities of a church council for internal reform and for external reunion of the divided communions. In light of these developments, it is instructive to examine afresh some of the ideas of Marsilius of Padua, who, as a Roman Catholic historian has recently observed, has conventionally been regarded as one of the fathers of modern conciliar theory.\(^2\) Whether such an opinion is historically accurate remains a subject of controversy and research. However, there can be no denial of the fact that Marsilius' *Defensor Pacis*, as a document, was an important milestone in the whole history of conciliar theory and the conciliar movement, and it thus is a significant link from the fourteenth century down to the present. The purpose of the study is to examine and assess Marsilius' concept of the church, with special attention to his theory of the general council.

Before we begin formal exposition of the Marsilian ecclesiology, a word on historical background seems appropriate. When the ideas of the Paduan are studied as more or less isolated phenomena, they appear to be strikingly original and independent of tradition.\(^3\) Yet more recent research tends to minimize this emphasis, by placing Marsilius in the context of his contemporary society, intellectual and otherwise.\(^4\) A note on historical background


2. Cf. Herbert Jedin, *Ecumenical Councils of the Catholic Church* (London: Nelson, 1960), p. 105: 'The doctrine that the council was superior to the Pope, commonly described by the expression "conciliar theory," was at one time traced back to Marsilius of Padua ... the exponent of revolutionary theories of the sovereignty of the people ...'

3. Cf. George H. Sabine, *A History of Political Theory* (London: Harrap, 1948), p. 252: 'Marsilio's theory is one of the most remarkable creations of medieval political thought and showed for the first time the subversive consequence to which a completely naturalistic interpretation of Aristotle might logically lead' (italics mine).

and setting may help us more readily to place him with reference to the
mainstream of medieval history.

Marsilio dei Mainardini was born ca. 1275–80 in Padua. A one-time
medical student, he became the rector of the University of Paris in 1312–13.
Thus the two metropolises which could influence his life were, on the one
hand, an Italian city with its proud tradition of political independence, and
on the other, a French intellectual centre, then the most famous in all Europe
for its learning and free thought. Just how extensively these two places affected
Marsilius is subject to further investigation, but no one denies that traces of
such influences are discernible in the Defensor Pacis.

We have little information regarding Marsilius' life or when he began the
treatise under consideration here. We know that it was finished in 1324. It
was condemned officially in 1327 by Pope John xxii, who, in the bull against
Ludwig of Bavaria, referred to Marsilius and his colleague, John of Jandun,
as 'two worthless men, sons of perdicion and nurslings of malice,' and their
writings as 'replete with various heresies.' When forced to flee because of
papal opposition, Marsilius found protection readily at Ludwig's court, and it
was here that the Defensor Pacis was dedicated solemnly to 'God's servant,
the king. When Ludwig invaded Rome to depose John for alleged heresy in
1328, Marsilius accompanied the expedition, and was named spiritual vicar
of Rome after the coup. He died ca. 1343 in Ludwig's court, after the latter
was forced to leave Rome because of popular displeasure.

The larger historical context in which Marsilius' life and work must be seen

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5. Kenneth S. Latourette calls Marsilius 'an ardent Ghibelline,' and links him with the

6. Schaff, History of the Christian Church, vol. vi, p. 73, quoting Riezler, says that it
was completed in two months. Cf. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua: The Defender of Peace,
vol. i, p. 21. For a long time the treatise was thought to have been written in collabora-
tion with John of Jandun. The opposing view may be found in A. Gewirth, 'John of

7. Cf. J. Riviè re, "Marsile de Padoue," DTC, 10, 166: '... duos viros nequam, perdi-
tionis filios et maledictionis alumnos, quorum unus Marsilium de Padua et alter
Johannem de Janduno se faciunt nominari'; 'librum quemdam erroribus profecto non
vacuum sed plenum haeresibus variis.'

pamphleteers also lived under Ludwig's protection. The King, however, took Ockham's
bargain - tu me defendes gladio, ego te defendam calamo - with typical opportunism.
When he submitted to Clement vi in 1343, he even recanted his association with
Marsilius.
is, of course, a turbulent century when the struggle between church and state had reached a decisive phase. To be sure, the protracted conflict began in the days of the caesars. By the time we reach Marsilius' era, however, we have had an accumulation of incidents which made the relationship between the Holy See and the Holy Roman Empire anything but amicable.

The immediate occasion for the present conflict was Ludwig of Bavaria's contention with Frederick of Hapsburg for the throne, after Henry vii's death in 1313. 'In 1317 John declared that the pope was the lawful vicar of the empire so long as the throne was vacant, and denied Lewis recognition as king of the Romans on the ground of his having neglected to submit his election to him.' By 1324, the Pope was forced to excommunicate the whole Bavarian group, as the King remained adamant and refused submission.

A second source of dispute lay within the church itself, in the doctrine advocated by the Spiritual Franciscans. We may recall that, from the beginning, the last testament of St. Francis, pleading for the practice of absolute poverty, was not accepted by the church at large. It was suppressed in 1263 by Bonaventura's life of the saint; in 1279, however, Nicholas iii granted a partial recognition to the principle of poverty, allowing the Franciscans to use property as tenants, but not to hold it in fee simple. Boniface viii took harsher measures and deposed their general, Raymond Gaufredi. The conflict continued to the time of John xxii's accession, and in 1317 (in the decretal Quorumdam exiget and the bull Sancta romana et universalis ecclesia), the pope took positive action against the Spirituals. In the conflict,

Michael of Cesena, Ockham, and others, took the position that Christ and his Apostles not only held no property as individuals, but held none in common. John, opposing this view, gave as arguments the gifts of the Magi, that Christ possessed clothes and bought food, the purse of Judas, and Paul's labor for a living. In the bull Cum inter nonnullos, 1323, and other bulls, John declared it heresy to hold that Christ and the Apostles held no possessions.

Under persecution, the prominent Spirituals found refuge at Ludwig's court.

9. Cf. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 251: 'The controversy between John xxii and Lewis the Bavarian permanently changed the centre of political discussion. In its course the independence of the temporal from the spiritual authority was settled, except as this question might arise as an incident of national politics in connection with other issues, and the question of absolute monarchy as against representative or constitutional monarchy was definitely raised. The problem was shifted to the relation between a sovereign and the corporate body which he ruled.'

10. We may recall to mind such events as the Edict of Milan, the proclamation of Theodosius in 380, Justinian's invasion of ecclesiastical administration, Gregory i's papal policy, the development of the classical medieval view of two spheres of authority in Charlemagne's time, Nicholas i and the Pseudo-Isidorian decretals, Henry iv's deposition by Gregory vii, the Investiture controversies, the Concordat of Worms and its compromised settlement, Henry ii and Becket, Frederick Barbarossa and Alexander iii, the policies of Innocent iii, and the Unan Sanctam of Boniface viii.


12. Ibid., p. 67.
These events provided the setting for Marsilius' attack on papal power and his lengthy defence of supreme poverty as the virtue of Christian perfection, in the second discourse.

The occasion for Marsilius' writing his *Defensor Pacis* was, by his own confession, the turbulence and discord that were allegedly rampant in his own country, Italy. Since he assumed with Aristotle that the 'greatest goods' for the state were 'the fruits of peace and tranquility' (1/1:4), he concluded, not unlike Hamlet, that Italy was 'sick,' like a diseased animal. For what reason, then, we may ask, was the time out of joint for the state? Marsilius' answer embodies the approximately four hundred pages of the *Defensor* itself.

In his analysis of the state, which was for the most part a repetition of Aristotle, though not without alterations whenever he saw fit to make them, Marsilius had singled out a certain group of people from the beginning for special scrutiny. This special group, according to his differentiation of the various parts of the state, was none other than the priestly class. Whereas the five other classes of people (the agricultural, the artistic, the military, the financial, the judicial) which made up the theoretical Marsilian state were shown to be inherently necessary for the welfare of the state as such, and were therefore self-evident components of the state in any rational demonstration, such as that of Aristotle (cf. 1/4:3), the priestly class, in a sense, was sui generis. For the necessity of this class was not self-evident, and its origin could not be explained on a naturalistic basis. "All men have not thought so harmoniously about this as they have about the necessity of the other parts of the state. The cause of this difference was that the true and primary necessity of this part could not be comprehended through demonstration, nor was it self-evident." (1/5:10) The origin or the final cause of the priesthood, from a Christian point of view, was traced directly to 'special revelation' (cf. 1/4:3), and to God himself (1/6:4, 10). But Marsilius was less interested in this point than in demonstrating the cause of Italy's illness. To that end, he believed that the effects of the presence of a priestly class on a civil regime required special consideration.

Marsilius, in short, contended that Italy's sickness was not caused by any 'civil' disease. Had that been the case, it would be sufficient for him, after he had developed an ideal theory of the state, to proceed to examine wherein the state had departed from this norm and created the undesirable consequences. But in fact, the trouble was coming from elsewhere. Marsilius wrote:

There is, however, a certain unusual cause of the intranquility or discord of cities or states, a cause which arose upon the occasion of the effect produced by the divine cause in a manner different from all its usual action in things; and this effect, as we recall having mentioned in our introductory remarks, could not have been

13. Cf. Gewirth (ed.), *Marsilius of Padua: Defensor Pacis*, vol. ii, 1/1:1: 'Italy is once again battered on all sides because of strife and is almost destroyed ...'

14. All subsequent quotations will be taken from Gewirth's translation, and the reference will be given immediately following the quotation.

15. '"... discord and strife, which, like the illness of an animal, is recognized to be the diseased disposition of the civil regime.' (1/1:3).
discerned either by Aristotle or by any other philosophers of his time or before... This cause has for a long time been impeding the due action of the ruler in the Italian state, and is now doing even more; it has deprived and is still depriving that state of peace and of all the above-mentioned goods which follow thereon; it has vexed it continually with every evil, and has filled it with almost every kind of misery and iniquity. In accordance with our original aim, we must determine the specific nature of this cause which is such a singular impediment because of its customarily hidden malignity (1/19:3–4).

The root of evil, Marsilius went on to say, lay in the apostasy of the church, specifically in that of the Roman Bishop. This is a crucial point for our understanding of Marsilius, for the accusation serves not only as a transitional link between his discussion of the state in Discourse I of the *Defensor Pacis*, and his discussion of the church in Discourse II, but also as a starting point of his whole ecclesiology. It seems that Marsilius was not so much interested in writing a new treatise on government as he was in advocating and prescribing church reform. The ideal state was set forth only as a foil against which he delineated his ideal church, with a view to showing that the Roman See had departed from this ideal in almost every way.

That, of course, did not mean that Marsilius had no political interests. 'As a patriotic Italian his enmity for the papacy needed no more stimulus from Germany than Dante's, and as a citizen of Padua he need feel no more friendship for the Empire than the interests of his city dedicated.' But it does seem that Marsilius' concern for the well-being of the church was genuine. Moreover, his political formulations on the theoretical level required him to deal with this body of citizens, whose existence was at once religious and secular.

In order to fully grasp Marsilius' view on the general council, which he explicitly set forth in chapter 19 of Discourse II, we must briefly survey his understanding of the nature and function of the church, as presented up to that point. We note from the outset that Marsilius' definition of the Christian church was holistic, inclusive, and democratic. The church meant...

... the whole body of the faithful who believe in and invoke the name of Christ, and all the parts of this whole body in any community, even the household. And this was the first imposition of this term and the sense in which it was customarily used among the apostles and the primitive church.

And therefore all the Christian faithful, both priests and non-priests, are and should be called churchmen according to this truest and most proper signification, because Christ purchased and redeemed all men with his blood (II/2:3).

16. Writing on Marsilius and Ockham, Sabine, *History of Political Theory*, p. 251, commented: 'For these writers the overt issue – settled by establishing the independence of the Imperial Electors – was almost incidental. Their argument on the principles of political authority had no special application to Germany whatever. Its application was far more to the government of the Church and to the Petrine theory of papal power. Already an issue in the work of John of Paris, this problem of papal government and of ecclesiastical reform became the chief question a half-century later.'

An effort was exerted from the beginning to undermine any absolutistic formulation of hierarchical structure (see, for example, Augustinus Triumphus or Alvarus Pelagius) within the church. The end of the church was otherworldly, its essential life was eternal, its nature spiritual, and its function advisory by persuasion (cf. n/2). From such a point of view, Marsilius directed his attack against the coercive rule of bishops (n/4), since by definition coercion – as a forceful measure taken to alter human actions for preventive and punitive ends – belonged only to civil authority. Religious actions, however, derived their sanction and merit only on a voluntary basis.

The question of religious authority was further examined in terms of the ‘priestly keys’ and the power of excommunication. With regard to the first issue, Marsilius revealed a further departure from official theology in maintaining that God alone effects the forgiveness of sins without any instrumental use of the priest (cf. n/6:3–9). As far as excommunication was concerned, the priest, like a physician, could serve only as an advisor. He could exercise judgment, in the sense of discernment and detection of heretics and heresies, but never judgment in terms of penal or coercive actions (cf. n/2:6–12; also ch. 10). Underlying such a view was Marsilius’ basic anthropology, which saw in human nature more to condemn than to praise. Like the contemporary Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, Marsilius seemed to say that the sacred could be a special locus for demonic temptation and manifestation. The priest, no less than the prince, was liable to moral errors and pernicious emotions. Not even the supreme pontiff himself could claim exemption from these moral tendencies. Thus, judgment against heretics could not be safely entrusted to a sacerdotal oligarchy, for erroneous judgments in religious life inevitably would bring disastrous effects also into civic life.

Again, the problem of authority may be seen in the discussion of the apostolic and priestly office. Contrary to any ultramontanist theory, Marsilius stressed the equality of all priests in their office, in terms of the priestly ‘character.’ This ‘character,’ a direct bestowal from God, meant ‘the power of performing the sacrament of the eucharist or of consecrating Christ’s body and blood, and the power of binding and loosing men from sins ...’ (n/15:4). In so far as the pope was a priest, he was equal to all in this ‘essential authority.’ No claim of superiority could be made from the Petrine office, since Peter was among the original twelve apostles. Moreover, the Roman see was more likely a successor to St. Paul than to St. Peter. The pre-eminence of Rome, according to Marsilius, arose for historical and sociological reasons, and in that sense Rome could receive due honour. But it could never justify itself as a dogmatic necessity.

In this brief survey of the central tenets of his ecclesiology, we have seen the tendency of Marsilius to decentralize religious authority as much as possible in an inverse pyramidal manner. This tendency, of course, parallels

his political theory, with its concession of prominence to the human legislator as being the universitas of the citizens or its valentior pars. We must ask, however, how far Marsilius was prepared to take his theory. Was he indeed anticipating post-Reformation radical individualism in both politics and religion?

The consideration of these questions brings us to the conciliar theory of Marsilius, and we note again that this theory was developed within the framework of the central problem of religious authority – viz. the question of the beliefs necessary to salvation. We may observe here that what was a problem to Marsilius had, in fact, always been a problem to theologians and church historians, who had wrestled with the perplexing issue of relating the individual believer to the corporate nature and life of the church. Philosophically considered, it was the issue of how the one was related to the many.

‘That the holy Scriptures must be firmly believed and acknowledged to be true is assumed as self-evident to all Christians ...’ (π1/19:2). That was the starting-point for Marsilius in his discussion of the whole matter. But the moment the Bible was received as a norm, the problem of interpretation arose. As long as the church had a definite segment which was venerated as the infallible source of exposition and understanding of Scripture, the dilemma of conflicting views was at least theoretically reduced to a minimum – though in the light of the historical development of Catholic dogma, one wonders whether even this much could be granted. But Marsilius' ecclesiology did not allow such a presumption either in theory (for the pope and his cardinals were by no means infallible) or in practice. The articles of faith could not be safely defined either by an individual or by a minority group. For errors thus accrued could lead to ‘eternal damnation’ as well as to grievous schism and sectarianism (cf. π/20:1). For Marsilius, therefore, the necessary mean between papal absolutism and individual anarchy was the general council. Gewirth is incisive in his comment about Marsilius, who,

although he has decentralized the church by making its hierarchy of bishops headed by a single pope a matter of human convenience rather than of divine necessity, and has withdrawn from it all coercive power ... nevertheless halts the decentralization at the point where it affects that unity of the faith on which he has said that the unity of the church depends.

On the dogmatic side of his theory, Marsilius developed the authority of the council with reference to Christ's promise at the end of St. Matthew's Gospel. The phrase ‘I am with you always’ was explained as referring to the church as a whole, rather than to the unified leadership in the Apostolic see of Peter, as the papalists had contended. The general council, as the church or the essential representative of the church through elective delegates, could claim

21. Ibid., p. 284.
the guidance of the Holy Spirit (II/19:2), enabling them to make infallible decisions. These decisions were equivalent to the beliefs necessary for salvation.

On the practical side of his conciliar theory, Marsilius insisted on the participation of both theologians and laymen. These were to be elected 'from all the notable provinces or communities of the world, in accordance with the determination of their human legislators whether one or many, and according to their proportion in quantity and quality of persons ...' (II/20:2). They were to convene for the essential matters of faith, liturgy, as well as 'in order to settle other matters, outside divine law, which are important for the common utility and peace of the believers ...' (II/20:3).

The Marsilian emphasis on the general council thus surpassed all antecedent theories in that Marsilius made (1) the council greater than the pope in the crucial role of defining the essential articles of faith, and (2) the 'Council dependent upon the laity and hence upon the whole “church”.' Such a view of the council, to be sure, was not without its defects. Gewirth had pointed out some of these: the infallibility of a general council's decisions as inconsistent with that fallibility of all human utterances which Marsilius assumed to be axiomatic, the impracticality of electing a universal ecclesiastical representation, the unresolved tension between centralized authority and individualism which Marsilius himself displayed. From the standpoint of theology, Marsilius had very little use for, or understanding of, the self-corrective power of the Christian church. Despite all his specifically religious affirmations, he seems to have been a naturalist at heart. In his second major premise of the treatise he saw no harm in invoking a secular ruler to correct the abuses of the church. He assumed, of course, as even the leaders of the Protestant Reformation also assumed, that the ruler was a Christian prince, and therefore he was not thoroughly 'secular' as we understand the term today. But perhaps, in reality, this position was only one step removed from seventeenth-century Erastianism or from later Gallicanism and the Kulturkampf. A further difficulty of his conciliar concept lay in the theoretical possibility that the council might vote itself right into papal absolutism, just as the human legislator could bring about political tyranny by choice.

The influence of Marsilius on subsequent conciliar theorists has been enormous. Immediate effects can be traced in Dietrich of Niem, Nicholas of

23. Ibid., p. 286.
24. Cf. Sabine, History of Political Theory, p. 263: 'The authority of a General Council is as nebulous as the corporation of all Christian believers of which it was the organ. The truth is that Marsilio's conception of European society provided no real basis for an international organization like the Church. In this respect, in providing a theory for a General Council, he provided also the reasons why, when the theory was tried, it proved to be merely a paper constitution, impractical because of the national jealousies and particularism which it lacked the force to unite. Effective as a destructive attack on the spiritual authority of the hierarchy, it was ineffective as a means of restoring the unity of the Christian commonwealth of the Middle Ages.'
25. Cf. Rivière, 'Marsile de Padoue,' 172 f.: 'En dépit et parfois en raison même de sa
Cusa,\textsuperscript{26} and Ockham – even though not without significant differences. Marsilius provoked a number of refutations from papal apologists, such as Alexander of Saint-Elpide, Conrad of Megenberg, and Thomas of Strasbourg.\textsuperscript{27} In the Reformation period, an English edition by William Marshal, issued in 1535, became a useful anti-papal document.\textsuperscript{28}

The conciliar theory of the church was historically important, in that it drew the line clearly between the absolute and constitutional forms of government. To be sure, this was at first an ecclesiological line of demarcation, but the issue was easily transferred to the political sphere, since, in the fifteenth century, the distinction between the church and secular government was still pictured as a distinction not between two societies but between two organizations of the same society. Any argument about the nature of authority in either church or state must, therefore, go back to the fundamental nature of society itself. The conciliarist argument depended throughout upon the premise that any complete community must be capable of governing itself and that its consent is vital to any kind of lawful authority.\textsuperscript{29}

When irreconcilable conflict finally broke out between the king and subjects, such a view necessarily became part of the foundation of modern democratic political theories.

The conciliar theory, moreover, had implications beyond the political sphere. As we suggested at the beginning of this study, conciliarism remains a crucial issue in the larger ecumenical concern for church reform and reunion. Though Marsilius’ name is seldom mentioned, one is amazed to see how many similar ideas and motifs – e.g., the idea of the church as the ecumenical council \textit{par excellence}, the principle of representation and delegation, the undermining of papal infallibility by a stress on the theological understanding of the church as \textit{ecclesia peccatorum}, which allows for possible errors in the highest echelons of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and in the most sacred dogma – can be detected in the writings of modern Catholic theologians such as Hans Küng.

The question confronting the Roman Catholic Church at the present is this: will Marsilius of Padua be allowed to make a permanent contribution by the church’s adoption and enactment of at least some of his more liberal and liberating ideas, or will the Marsilian ecclesiology remain only a venerable topic of scholarly investigation?

hardiesse, le système exposé par Marsile de Padoue, eut une très grande influence dans la suite. Les censures de l'Eglise le désignèrent à la critique des théologiens orthodoxes, qui ne faillirent pas à cette tâche, sans d’ailleurs l’empêcher d’avoir toujours de fidèles partisans. De toutes façons, le nom et la pensée de Marsile se retrouvent mêlés aux grandes crises religieuses des siècles suivants, à celles surtout qui ranimèrent le vieux conflit, jamais éteint, de l'Eglise et de l'Etat.'