

Logic and Theology

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THIS article has been written in the belief that an introductory survey and appraisal of some recent work in the philosophy of religion done by members of the most influential and productive group of English-speaking philosophers would be of service to readers of the *Journal*. How far theologians should take account of it is not for a philosopher to say, but I would at least express a regret that the different paths which philosophers and theologians have taken in the last decade or two seem to have made fruitful debate between them rare and difficult. A new series of books published by the S.C.M. Press is intended to increase the chances of such communication, and I intend to discuss the essays collected in one of them.¹ I shall, in the first place make some remarks on the philosophical climate which produced them; secondly, say a little about the special relationship of religious discourse to philosophical analysis; thirdly, make some expository and critical comments on individual essays in the book; and lastly, make a few general observations.

I

Any book of essays should be judged on the merits of the individual contributions, and although the editors rightly warn against any attempt to force them into "some preconceived matrix of misunderstanding," their warning need not preclude a cautious orientation of the sort I am attempting. The editors specifically try to combat the assumption that because all the contributions might reasonably be called "analytical" their writers can be written off as "Logical Positivists."² If this were an accurate description, theologians might well consider the contents of the volume to be of no interest to them; and in view of the all-or-nothing dogmatism of the philosophy which properly went under this label in the Thirties no one could blame them. Fortunately the label is now entirely inappropriate; and the best way to see this is to read this book. (Compare any of these essays with Chapter VI of Ayer's *Language, Truth, and Logic*, where the same matters are summarily dealt with.³) Logical Positivism can now be seen as just one phase of a philosophical revolution that has been taking place during the last half-century. To characterize it adequately is impossible; but it seems to me to be so different from the kind of change that took place in theology

1. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* (London: SCM: Library of Philosophy and Theology, 1955).

2. See the editors' Preface, p. ix.

3. London: Gollancz, 1936; 2nd edn., 1946. This book was, and deserved to be, very widely read. But I have often thought that it has been unfortunate for the reputation of philosophy among the general public that it *was* such a good book, for the views it put forward with such force and clarity were too elemental to last for long.

during the same period that some attempt to describe it is worth making, in spite of the obvious dangers.⁴

The early stages of philosophical analysis were dominated by the work of Russell and Wittgenstein. The enormous development in formal logic, for which Russell was largely responsible, suggested to them a view of the nature of language modelled upon it. According to this view, language can be regarded as a calculus-like set of propositions built up from certain simple propositions with the aid of logical notions like "and," "or," and "not." This would mean that every proposition depends for its truth or falsity upon the truth or falsity of the simple propositions out of which it is built. For example, the complete proposition "This is red and square" would depend for its truth or falsity on the truth or falsity of its constituent propositions "This is red" and "This is square." To this affirmation was added the (logically independent) empiricist view that the basic propositions are reports of sense-experiences, and that the terms in them derive their meaning from the sensory facts they are used to report. From this combination of two bold doctrines, one old and one new, the whole analytical programme followed. The question might naturally be asked whether this account is supposed to describe languages like English and French, or to describe some idealized language. The answer is that insofar as English and French are composed of significant words and sentences, the account is intended to describe both. For it amounts to saying that *all* significant utterances are constructed out of simply verifiable or falsifiable statements of sense-experience, so that this structure would belong to all significant statements in any language. What would distinguish a natural language from an ideal one would be the fact that in a natural language the relationship of many statements to the sense-statements on which they depend would not be obvious, whereas in an ideal one it would be obvious. The task of the philosophical analyst is to break up statements of ordinary speech into the simple constituent parts out of which they are built up. When one tries to do this, however, there are some cases which, *prima facie*, seem amenable to this sort of analysis, and others which do not. In spite of its grammatical simplicity, "The cat is on the mat" looks to anyone who has read Berkeley as if it *might* be analysable into statements about my sensations; but "Dishonesty is ignoble" or "God loves us" do not. Yet from the theory it follows that if they cannot be analysed in this way, they are not propositions at all; that is they are meaningless, even though grammatically they appear to be quite respectable. So our ordinary language differs from an ideal one in that it contains grammatically correct sentences which are in fact without meaning.

The Positivists' famous Verification Principle is merely a more robust way of asserting the same belief. The fact that a statement is grammatical, or even that it is often made, is no guarantee that it is meaningful: the

4. For extended accounts see J. O. Urmson, *Philosophical Analysis and The Revolution in Philosophy* (ed. Gilbert Ryle).

criterion for meaningfulness is whether or not the person making a statement can indicate what sense-experiences would confirm or refute it. Our natural language was thus divided into two halves, and the most that could be said for utterances that fell foul of the criterion was that they might have some function as non-informative expressions of feeling. They include metaphysical and theological statements, of course, and moral and aesthetic ones. Regarding this list even the hardest thinker will want to raise some objection, and one ground of objection is obvious, viz. the great variety of *differences* that can be found both among these proscribed groups and within them. Perhaps wholesale philosophical divisions like this are not entirely useless, since they emphasize the oft-neglected difference between all the things on one side of the dividing-line and all the things on the other; but they have the attendant glaring disadvantage that they obscure the actual character of what they classify by ignoring the equally important differences and special features to be found within each of the two sun-dered areas.

The detailed description of the various forms of discourse that make up our living language is the most conspicuous feature of contemporary philosophical analysis, which owes its character to thinkers like Ryle, Moore, and Wisdom, but most of all to the later Wittgenstein, who repudiated his earlier view of language as a static structure composed of propositions which mirror facts. Some post-Wittgensteinian commonplaces are: that words are *tools* that we use, that the conventions governing their use are as various as the activities in which we use them, and that the stating of facts (itself by no means a homogeneous sort of activity) is only one among their uses. On this view the philosopher's task is to come to understand those features of our use of language (particularly our use of certain key words like "knowledge," "cause," "good," "freedom," "obligation" etc.) the misunderstanding of which gives rise to philosophical problems, rather than to try to provide translations of statements into simpler parts, each of which reports some sense-experience. The new approach makes it easy to see why such translations were never in practice forthcoming. The fact that there are differences among various kinds of statement precludes the "reduction" of one kind to another.⁵

Although this break has been radical, certain traditions persist from the earlier analytical period. Philosophy is still thought of as "not a theory but an activity."⁶ The philosopher is not in any way a rival of the scientist, and does not claim to know more about the kind of world we live in than anyone else does. His skill must lie in the clarification of discourse, not in the enunciation of highly general pseudo-scientific theories about the structure of the universe, though the examination of the motives behind such enunciations may be of very great analytical interest. Metaphysics, in other words,

5. See Isaiah Berlin, "Logical Translation," in the *Proceedings of The Aristotelian Society*, 1949-50; also F. Waismann, "Language Strata," in *Logic and Language* (ed. Flew), (2nd series, Blackwell, 1953).

6. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* 4.112.

is often examined, but not *done*.⁷ And the discovery of Russell that the grammatical form of a sentence is no guide at all to what a person using it is saying could still be regarded as the most important linguistic truth to which his successors subscribe.⁸

II

It is not possible to discuss examples of the newer techniques other than the ones in this book. It is therefore important to mention one respect in which the examination of the religious and theological use of words, with which the authors in it are concerned, is in a special position. The investigation of the ways in which we talk in such spheres as science, day-to-day factual communication, or even moral argument, is a descriptive and not a critical task.⁹ The criticism is kept for philosophers who misrepresent these ways, for example in professing wholesale scepticism with regard to one area of discourse as a consequence of applying to it standards belonging to another, as Hume did when he attacked inductive reasoning for being bad deduction, and as his opponents in turn did when they tried to show that it was good deduction or as intuitionists did when they likened moral judgements to mathematical or sensory ones. There is little sympathy for attacks on, or defences of, inductive or moral reasoning as such.¹⁰ When one attempts to describe the manifold religious uses of language, however, the position is different. One can hardly say that the status of religious discourse as such is uncontroversial, for there exist many people who disapprove of engaging in it. Hence we find in this book that the description of the religious use of words is not carried on without judgements of its legitimacy. This is not due to any difference in method, but is a reflection of division of opinion on the subject-matter. Some of the authors claim that they detect in the religious use of language radical incoherencies that make its status questionable because they prevent it from making sense. These sceptical contributors claim that inconsistencies in religious discourse do not only rob it of intelligibility but that they are, unfortunately, of the essence of religious belief and cannot be explained as incidental results of the transcendent character of its object. To quote, ". . . the real intellectual difficulty for the believer or would-be believer is not the problem of proof but the problem of meaning."¹¹ The fact that other contributors try to meet this difficulty by the same methods as the sceptics use to raise it is proof enough that

7. This is too simple, but space is short. What I should say is that the questions metaphysicians have attempted to answer are still of central interest (if preferred, we are still in the Great Tradition), but it is generally supposed and often demonstrated that the way to answer them is not to construct *a priori* cosmologies but to reveal by gradual analysis that the question is unreal or is after all a matter for one of the natural sciences. On this see Essay II in this volume.

8. See Antony Flew's introduction to his anthology *Logic and Language* (1st series, Blackwell, 1951).

9. For an interesting and partially dissident discussion of this see the essay by J. O. Urmson in *Essays in Conceptual Analysis* (ed. Flew), (Macmillan, 1956).

10. See Flew in the present volume pp. 183-185.

11. See Prior, p. 3.

philosophy of this sort is not essentially sceptical as Positivism was. But even if this fact had been obscured by every essay in the book being sceptical in tone, what the authors say would still have a claim on the attention of theologians, because all the conclusions reached are reached by careful examination of religious beliefs, and are not deduced from some remote logical theory. The cards are all on the table, and theologians can with integrity subscribe to the rules of the game. They are no longer playing with someone who makes his own rules and who includes among them the rule that all his own cards are trumps.

III

The first essay, by A. N. Prior, is called "Can Religion be Discussed?" It takes the form of a dialogue among Barthian Protestant, Modernist Protestant, Catholic, Logician, and Psychoanalyst, and reveals simply and worryingly how each makes his position impregnable by moves which also preclude any argument with the others. Catholic insists he agrees that Logician can scrutinize his doctrines, but this veneer of reasonableness involves a rigid conservatism in the choice of logical categories, which enables him to make statements like "God is His own goodness," to which Logician objects. He objects that such statements are not reasonable but paradoxically senseless; but he in his turn is stumped by Barthian's cheerful acceptance of the fact of paradox, of the irrationality of faith and our dependence for it on divine grace rather than argument. Logician's moves are hints of what is to follow in the other essays; Barthian's are not discussed by name, but the problem of paradox in religious utterances comes up again and again, either in the form "Is such and such a doctrine paradoxical?" or in the form "What are we to *make* of religious paradox if we find it?"

There follow two papers by J. J. C. Smart: "Metaphysics, Logic, and Theology" and "The Existence of God." The thesis of the former is that philosophical analysis is a necessary tool in theology as well as in philosophy, because theological problems have clear affinities with metaphysical ones, and these should be tackled by examining the conceptual difficulties underlying them. There are some helpful comments on the task of the philosopher as many contemporaries see it, and the charge of superficiality often levelled against the sort of philosophical work they do. The latter paper is a clear survey of the classical objections to the classical arguments for God's existence, along with some interesting new incidental points.

A notion which Smart discussed is central in the next essay and the two rejoinders which follow it. This is the notion of a necessary being, crucial to the traditional Ontological and Cosmological Proofs. It has been routine philosophical procedure since Kant to write these proofs off as fallacious on the grounds that "existence is not a predicate" and cannot therefore be "included in the concept of" any kind of thing, a deity included. J. N. Findlay gives a new twist to this objection, under the heading "Can God's Existence be Disproved?" He holds that the concept of a necessary being

is (i) "self-evidently absurd" and (ii) the inevitable consequence of the attempt to express the demands of the "religious attitude." From this it follows that God, previously defined as the "adequate object of religious attitudes," cannot exist. Issue could be taken either with (i) or with (ii), and the two dissentients who follow concentrate on (i). They agree, that is, that it is a necessary feature of Theism to regard God not merely as great and good, etc., but as great and good superlatively and unsurpassably, and therefore as great and good in some way which makes a greater and better inconceivable, and therefore as great and good necessarily, that is, indistinguishably from His greatness and goodness; this leads us further (the Cosmological Proof) to think of the dependence of other things upon Him as a necessary matter, not just a matter of fact, and finally to think of His existence as necessary and not as a merely contingent fact which might conceivably have been otherwise (the Ontological Proof). They agree that it is incompatible with worshipping God to think of Him as merely *happening* to possess the qualities He has, or as merely *happening* to exist. This certainly seems to me to uncover the motive at work in the minds of those who have resorted to these proofs, but I must insert a query: if Findlay were to turn out to be right in (i), could this not be used by a Theist as an argument for saying that the demands of worship require us only to go as far as in thinking as we can *without* falling under his strictures? Just as it cannot be regarded as a limitation on God's power that he is unable to commit logical absurdities like creating round squares, surely it cannot be regarded as making Him less worthy of worship that He cannot *be* a logical absurdity like a necessary being or a being indistinguishable from His own goodness—assuming for the moment that these *are* logical absurdities? Would it, as Findlay and Hughes say, be idolatrous to worship a being who is infinitely good and powerful but merely happens to be so without any logical necessity? Could God's existence not be the most important of all the contingent facts in the universe, a fact on which all the others causally depend? I make this (possibly dangerous) suggestion here because it does not seem to me that the writers make much headway through the jungle of perplexities that springs up when it is taken for granted that God has to exist "in some necessary manner." I would urge my suggestion rather more strongly in the case of God's existence than in the case of His qualities.

To return to Findlay: his argument is that Theism entails the claim that God is a necessary being, that is, that "God exists" is a necessary proposition; Theism must be false because "God exists" *cannot* be a necessary proposition. This he claims follows from the modern view that all necessary propositions are tautologies (like "Brothers are male"), and that tautologies merely reflect verbal conventions and cannot tell us about matters of fact. G. E. Hughes' answer to this is the obvious one that no one is compelled to accept the "modern" view of this matter. If one agrees (against Anselm) that "God exists" is not a tautology, then one can just say that here we have one necessary proposition which is not tautological. It is not even necessary

to claim there are any others. This is to take refuge, quite properly perhaps, in the uniqueness of all statements about God; but in my opinion its consequence is the abandonment of all hope of making clear what is meant by saying that God exists necessarily. The enormous advantage of the theory that all necessary propositions are tautologies is that it affords an *explanation* of their necessity (thus giving us profound insight into the special character of logic and mathematics), which is something that believers in the existence of *synthetic* necessary truths have always found it difficult to give, to say the least.

Another reply is made by A. C. A. Rainer, who says that to assert God is a necessary being is not to say that "God exists" is a necessary proposition, but to make a direct assertion about God Himself, viz. to assert His "complete actuality, indestructibility, *aseitas*, or independence of limiting conditions." If this is what is meant, then of course nothing of what Findlay says need matter, because if I state that these attributes belong to God my *statement* could be held to be contingent and not necessary (my suggestion above).¹² But he does not take this comparatively simple way out; instead he says, a little lower down, that the assertion that God has a certain attribute (and, I think, the assertion of His existence) is necessary, but only "relative to God's omniscience and not to human reason or experience." This seems to mean that such assertions are necessary but that we cannot see it, because we do not understand them well enough to grasp their necessary character. This is not a new view, but it is not an easy one either. It could mean that by all the criteria we use for necessity, these statements are not necessary, but that they are necessary for God; which entails that the word "necessary" is being used in a different way when it is said they are necessary for God. Admittedly necessity is not a pellucid notion, but the question at issue is whether these assertions about God are necessary in *our* sense (whatever precisely this sense may be), not in some other. On the other hand it could mean that when we make statements about God we *say* more than we *mean*, that if we understood our own words better we would see we were uttering necessary and not contingent statements; but this is a very uncomfortable view, making religious statements seem like Freudian slips without the chance of psychoanalysis. A third way of reading this view, and to my mind by far the most promising, is to regard it as the theory that in religious utterance we *mean* more than we can *say*, that language is inadequate to

12. There is a dangerous ambiguity in the word "contingent." It is sometimes used to mean "conditioned" or "dependent." In this sense states of affairs are said to be contingent *upon* other states of affairs. In its other sense it applies to propositions; this sense is harder to define, but might be roughly characterized as "not necessary." A contingent proposition in this latter sense may be true, but it is not true by necessity, or cannot be seen to be true merely by inspection. (The only clear definition that has been offered of necessity in this sense is in terms of tautology, and this begs questions at issue here regarding the possibility of synthetic necessary truth.) It is in this latter sense that I suggest that "God exists" is a contingent statement, since it would clearly be theologically absurd to suggest that God's existence is contingent in the former sense. What would make the assertion of God's existence unique, then, would be that the fact this statement claims to record would be the only one in the universe which is not contingent in the first sense. Is not this enough?

express the facts with which people claim to be confronted in religious awareness, and that the expression of these facts in ideal language would be in the form of necessary propositions, though our ignorant attempts to articulate them in ordinary terms are not. But does a Theist need to take Rainer's stand on this matter, in any of these three forms?

Such lines of thought lead to the problem of using our ordinary language to talk about God. This problem is analysed by Flew, Hare, Mitchell, and Crombie in "Theology and Falsification," a group of short papers which became widely known before being reprinted in this collection.¹³

Flew presents a simple and direct challenge to the believer. To understand a statement one has to know what would be the case if it were true, and this essentially involves knowing what is ruled out by it. Any statement which is said to be true in all possible circumstances tells us nothing, since only if there are at least some conceivable circumstances which could falsify it does it make a claim about any matter of fact. Statements about God, for example that He loves us, appear to be in this category of empty statements, because although the use in them of ordinary words like "love" suggests that certain sorts of fact count in favour of them and certain opposite ones count against (since this is the fundamental feature of the ordinary use of these words), the believer refuses to admit that the most extreme (actual *or* imagined) disasters could falsify them. So to claim that, say, God loves us, is to assert nothing, while appearing to do so by using ordinary words.

One could say in reply that religious statements are not intended as assertions, but merely as expressions of an attitude to life; and though I have put it crudely, this is in fact what Hare does say. But it is unsatisfying and unorthodox.¹⁴ Religious assertions have to be assertions, even though unusual ones. Mitchell agrees, and stresses that the facts of evil and suffering do count against the claim that God loves us, but, to the believer at least, not conclusively. This is the source of the theological problem of evil and the personal trial of faith. Flew appears to accept this as a partial answer, but it is worth saying that the believer could surely be challenged to say what would count against his assertions conclusively, even though of course he does not expect whatever it might be to occur. Crombie in fact does offer an answer to this question, and much of what he says could be used to supplement Mitchell's points. According to him, what would count against God's love conclusively would be "suffering which was utterly, eternally, and irredeemably pointless." He says that the believer looks for the life of the world to come, in which the whole picture will be revealed and the evil

13. It was this discussion I had primarily in mind when composing the public lecture later revised and printed in the *University of Toronto Quarterly* under the title "Faith, Fact, and Philosophy" (October, 1956).

14. For a full critique of Hare see H. J. N. Horsburgh in the *Philosophical Quarterly* (July, 1956). A position akin to Hare's, and containing an explicit identification of religion with the adoption of certain moral commitments, may be found in R. B. Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture, *An Empiricist's View of the Nature of Religious Belief* (Cambridge, England, 1955).

and suffering will be seen not to be pointless. This is only a part of Crombie's candid and moving paper, but it bears most directly on what has gone before. Faced with this argument the sceptic can shift his attack to the intelligibility of talk about the future life,¹⁵ and to the logical possibility of evil and suffering ever being explained away at all.¹⁶ But one can hardly expect one paper to handle all this, and of course argument about either of these matters is not on the ground that Flew originally chose.

Crombie also deals with the question of predicating ordinary terms like "good" and "loving" of God. He says that as applied to the Deity they are used in their ordinary, not in an analogical sense, but with the understanding that as so used they are not adequate but merely seem appropriate. He likens this use of them to the use of language in parables. But without more explanation of the function of a parable, it does not seem to me that this position differs very clearly from the old claim that such words are used analogically.

A word of my own on this controversy: it is necessary, I think, to distinguish between the *kind* of evidence one uses for or against a statement, and the *way* the evidence is used. Flew might have done this more clearly, since it could be retorted to him (and this would seem to be Crombie's reply) that the believer's oddity lies not in the way he uses his evidence, as Flew holds, but in the kind of evidence to which he appeals, at least when pressed. It would indeed be a hangover of Positivism to insist that all the evidence has to be observable. To take this line of defence would expose the believer to many problems, not the least of which would be that of making his references to non-natural evidence intelligible; but these would not be quite the same as the problem Flew begins with.

The best paper in the book is probably Flew's "Divine Omnipotence and Human Freedom." I summarize his thesis: recent discussion of the philosophical problem of the freedom of the will suggests there is no contradiction in saying that an action is free (and therefore accountable) and also takes place in accordance with the laws of nature. It is therefore not necessary to look for gaps in scientific understanding to locate human freedom. If this attempted resolution of the problem is sound, it has important consequences for the problem of explaining the presence of evil in a world created by an omnipotent and benevolent God. The most popular and reasonable-looking answer to this latter has been that the possibility of evil is a necessary condition of human freedom, since it is self-contradictory to suggest that God could have created the world in such a way that all men would freely choose rightly and not wrongly. But if the above-mentioned resolution of the freewill problem is correct, this suggestion is not self-contradictory, and this classic answer to the problem of evil collapses. At present this seems to me conclusive. The only way to reject Flew's conclusion is to reject the solution to

15. See, e.g., Flew and Mackinnon in Essay XV.

16. See, e.g., Flew in Essay VIII, and J. L. Mackie in *Mind* (April, 1955).

the freewill question from which it follows, but this is something that (emphatically) no one should do without examining it independently of this theological consequence.¹⁷

It is not possible to comment on the remaining nine essays, though I must mention C. B. Martin's "The Perfect Good," in which the necessary connection between God and His qualities is again explored, and the author claims that it logically precludes the possibility of the Incarnation.¹⁸

IV

To conclude, I offer a few general words on the main trends in the book. The writers are concerned throughout with deciding how and how far religious statements are to be *understood*, and not with the more usual problem of deciding on their truth assuming their meaning to be grasped. The issues they raise are therefore prior to the more familiar ones of truth and falsity. The sceptics here are uncertain what they are being asked to accept; they are not arguing against theological assertions by bringing forward counter-evidence, for example, from biology. Since this sort of attack is more sophisticated than that of the nineteenth-century sceptics it is at one and the same time less likely to gain wide currency among the lay public and more difficult to answer. As a philosopher of similar stamp I am only making an external judgement when I say that the problems raised are fundamental. But this fact seems hardly to be doubted. It follows that the philosophical aim of investigating the religious use of language on its own ground has been at least partially a success, and that no one here is trying to judge it in terms of some standard appropriate only outside it. The most perplexing of all the problems raised is the one which bears most directly on this question of the standards by which religious language is to be judged, viz. the problem of paradox in religious statement. Every theologian knows that in describing the Christian religion he is likely to utter paradoxes. Some hope they are only apparent, and others seem to glory in them. If they are entitled to glory in them, then anyone who regards their presence as a stumbling-block is clearly judging religious discourse by external standards. But we should call a paradox what it is, viz. a self-contradiction. To show a scientist or a philosopher that what he says is self-contradictory is to refute him by showing that what he has said, when added together, equals zero. When Flew and Findlay and Martin say they detect the same sort of vacuity in talk about God's love or God's existence or God's manifestation in human

17. Among many recent writings on the freewill question which present this sort of solution, one should mention Chapter VI of G. E. Moore's *Ethics* (Home University Library), and the following articles: P. Nowell Smith, "Freewill and Moral Responsibility," *Mind*, 1948; the same author's "Determinists and Libertarians," *Mind*, 1954; F. V. Raab, "Free Will and the Ambiguity of 'Could,'" *Philosophical Review* (January, 1955). This view is attacked in C. A. Campbell's "Is 'Freewill' a Pseudo Problem?" *Mind* (1951), and in W. I. Matson's "On the Irrelevance of Freewill to Moral Responsibility, and the Vacuity of the Latter," *Mind* (1956).

18. Martin's paper has led to several discussions in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, in which it first appeared. (See issues of August and December, 1955; May, 1956).

form, it would be a poor return for their pains to be told that in theology everything is different and that theologians can eat their cake and have it because they are cooking with very special ingredients. Perhaps this is all that can be said, but if so we are faced with a tragic and complete failure in communication. I would find this hard to credit; and I notice with interest that a volume of theological essays is appearing which will deal with some of these questions in contemporary terms.¹⁹ Its authors are all from Oxford, where this kind of philosophy is dominant. I hope, however, that I have said enough to show that there is much of importance here for readers in this country also.

19. B. Mitchell (ed.), *Faith and Logic* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1957).

Since this article was completed (February, 1957) this book has become available; there have also appeared several other books and a considerable number of articles dealing with the problems raised in the Flew-MacIntyre volume—in not a few cases the stimulus has been direct. Among the books I would mention the following: Alasdair MacIntyre (ed.), *Metaphysical Beliefs* (London: SCM, 1957), reviewed in the *Canadian Journal of Theology*, January, 1958, Ian T. Ramsey, *Words and Images* (London: Longmans, 1957).

Among the papers: R. L. Franklin, "Necessary Being," and J. A. Passmore, "Christianity and Positivism" in the *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* (August, 1957); H. J. N. Horsburgh, "The Claims of Religious Experience" (December issue); complete issue of *Philosophy* (July, 1957).

Finally, a very valuable little book, *The Nature of Metaphysics* (London: Macmillan, 1957), (ed. D. F. Pears), contains a series of articles (originally B.B.C. talks) expounding the views of a group of Oxford philosophers on a topic I have been forced to pass over far too cursorily here.